1. Effects of Land Misallocation on Capital Allocations in India
- Author
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Duranton, Gilles, Ghani, Ejaz, Goswami, Arti Grover, and Kerr, William R.
- Subjects
FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT ,MICRO-CREDIT ,INVESTMENT ,PAYMENT ,CO-OPERATIVE BANKS ,INFRASTRUCTURE ,INVENTORY ,RISK PERCEPTION ,ECONOMIC GROWTH ,PERSONAL ASSETS ,ENTREPRENEUR ,EMPLOYMENT GROWTH ,RURAL BANKS ,OVERDRAFT ,CREDIT POLICY ,EXTERNAL FINANCING ,FINANCING ,OUTSTANDING LOAN ,EMPLOYMENT ,ACCESS TO BANKING ,LAND ISSUES ,ACCESS TO EXTERNAL FINANCE ,LENDING ,MACROECONOMICS ,PRODUCTIVITY ,RESOURCE ALLOCATION ,GOVERNMENT POLICY ,BANK LOAN ,WOMEN ,GOVERNMENTS ,BUSINESS OWNERS ,COLLATERAL ,GUARANTEE ,PRIVATE ENTERPRISES ,REPOSSESSION ,BANK ,INFORMATION SHARING ,LOANS ,MICRO-FINANCE ,FINANCIAL DEEPENING ,LACK OF COLLATERAL ,STRATEGIES ,FINANCIAL MARKETS ,INTEREST PAYMENT ,BORROWER ,HIGH INTEREST RATE ,BORROWERS ,INDUSTRY ,MARKETS ,FINANCE ,CREDIT SUPPORT ,ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT ,ACCESS TO FORMAL FINANCE ,ACCESS TO FORMAL CREDIT ,SMALL BUSINESSES ,FORMAL CREDIT ,INTANGIBLE ASSETS ,BANKING ,FINANCIAL DEPTH ,COLLATERAL SUPPORT ,INTEREST EXPENSE ,ENTERPRISES ,LABOR MARKET ,MARKET VALUE ,ACCESS TO FINANCIAL SERVICES ,MONETARY POLICY ,HOUSEHOLD ,RURAL BANK ,SERVICES ,SMALL BUSINESS ,PRICING ,DEBT ,CREDIT RISK ,COST OF CAPITAL ,ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION ,SMALL BUSINESS OWNERS ,WORKING CAPITAL ,INTEREST PAYMENTS ,PAYMENTS ,LOAN AMOUNTS ,PROPERTY ,FINANCIAL SERVICES ,NET VALUE ,INEQUALITY ,CREDITS ,TRADE CREDIT ,PROFITABILITY ,ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ,ACCESS TO FINANCE ,TANGIBLE ASSETS ,FORM OF COLLATERAL ,MICRO-FINANCE INSTITUTIONS ,ENTREPRENEURS ,FINANCIAL SECTOR LIBERALIZATION ,LOAN AMOUNT ,ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ,COLLATERAL REQUIREMENTS ,LAND MARKETS ,DEBT COLLECTORS ,EMPLOYEE ,FIXED ASSETS ,EXCLUSION ,CAPITAL ,CREDIT-WORTHINESS ,PRIVATE ENTERPRISE ,LENDERS ,BUSINESS PLANS ,MICRO-ENTREPRENEURS ,START-UP ,ACCOUNTING ,LENDER ,GREATER ACCESS ,MICRO ENTERPRISES ,SECURITY ,VALUE ,RISK ,ENTERPRISE ,BANK FINANCING ,CREDIT INFORMATION ,MONEY LENDERS ,ECONOMETRICS ,FINANCIAL INTEGRATION ,VILLAGES ,CREDITWORTHINESS ,PRINCIPAL ,ACCESS TO LOANS ,FAMILY ,GENDER INEQUALITY ,FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ,HUMAN CAPITAL ,CREDIT BUREAUS ,REVENUE ,HOUSEHOLDS ,EMPLOYEES ,BANKING SERVICES ,TAXES ,EQUITY ,BANKS ,BANK LOANS ,LAND ,UNION ,ECONOMIC POLICY ,BORROWING ,BANK BRANCHES ,DISPARITIES IN ACCESS ,LOAN ,SIZES OF LOAN ,CREDIT ,ACCESS TO CREDIT ,FINANCIAL ACCESS ,LOAN DEMAND ,BANK CREDIT ,FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT ,INTERNATIONAL BANK ,MICRO-ENTERPRISES ,COMMERCIAL BANKS ,NEW ENTRANTS ,MICROFINANCE ,ISSUE OF ACCESS ,CREDIT REGISTRIES ,LABOR ,LABOR MARKETS ,TRADE CREDITS ,REAL ESTATE ,HOUSING ,ECONOMICS ,FORMS OF CREDIT ,EXTERNAL FINANCE ,INTEREST ,MARGINAL REVENUE ,JOB CREATION ,CORRUPTION ,LOAN ACCESS ,BIASES ,CREDIT MARKETS ,WATER SUPPLY ,DIRECTED CREDIT ,TRANSPORT ,ENTREPRENEURSHIP ,FINANCIAL SUPPORT ,FORMAL FINANCE ,RURAL BANK BRANCHES ,RESERVE BANK OF INDIA ,OUTREACH ,FINANCIAL STRENGTH ,OUTSTANDING LOANS ,URBAN AREAS ,INTEREST RATE ,CREDIT MARKET ,GENDER - Abstract
Growing research and policy interest focuses on the misallocation of output and factors of production in developing economies. This paper considers the possible misallocation of financial loans. Using plant-level data on the organized and unorganized sectors, the paper describes the temporal, geographic, and industry distributions of financial loans. The focus of the analysis is the hypothesis that land misallocation might be an important determinant of financial misallocation (for example, because of the role of land as collateral against loans). Using district-industry variations, the analysis finds evidence to support this hypothesis, although it does not find a total reduction in the intensity of financial loans or those being given to new entrants. The analysis also considers differences by gender of business owners and workers in firms. Although potential early gaps for businesses with substantial female employment have disappeared in the organized sector, a sizeable and persistent gap remains in the unorganized sector.
- Published
- 2015