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Popular and scholarly responses to nonconsensual pornography (colloquially known as 'revenge porn') have largely, though not exclusively, focused on cases that fit within the paradigmatic mold of men nonconsensually distributing intimate images with the intention to harass or abuse their female partners/ex-partners. However, several recent studies offer evidence that the dynamics of this act are more diverse than previously assumed. In this article I analyze 49 Canadian legal cases to determine the extent to which those cases that make it to the court level fit within the typical framing and to explore the dynamics of cases laying outside this paradigm. I find that, while a large portion of cases fit the commonly imagined pattern, the case law also includes several cases that complicate dominant framings of nonconsensual pornography. Using intersectional and postmodern feminist theory, I argue that this variety of case contexts necessitates more diverse socio-legal understandings of and responses to nonconsensual pornography. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prostitution is illegal while pornography is constitutionally protected. Modern technology, however, is complicating the relationship between prostitution and pornography. Recent technological advances make the creation and distribution of recorded material more accessible. Within our smart phones we carry agile distribution networks as well as the technical equipment required to produce low-budget films. Today, sex workers may be paid to engage in sexual activities as part of performances that are recorded and broadcast to a public audience. No longer confined to the pornography industry, this form of sexual performance can be created by anyone with a cell phone and access to the internet. In addition, modern popular culture recognizes the expressive value of reality and ordinary life. Technological advances will only continue to make broadcasting and sharing everyday life possible, raising the possibility that there will be a growing audience for, and communities organized around, sexually expressive materials online. This Article is the first to analyze this increasingly important and common phenomenon that it defines as reality porn. It argues that reality porn is pornographic paid sex work that should be accorded First Amendment recognition, notwithstanding the criminalization of the underlying act of prostitution. This Article redefines pornography and provides a framework for analyzing this sexual expression. As long as the conduct is consentable--both consented to in fact and consensual in nature--it should not be deprived of constitutional protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Deepfake videos, made using machine learning technology, have the potential to increase the efficacy of disinformation campaigns. Deepfakes can be broadly classified into two categories. The first category, which includes Deepfake pornography, has a harmful effect regardless of the number of individuals who view the videos. The second category, and the one addressed by this Note, requires broad dissemination to have a harmful impact. Three specific Deepfake threats are analyzed: (1) election interference; (2) economic interference; and (3)public safety. Existing legal mechanisms are insufficient to address the threat because Section 230 of the Communication Decency Act shields social media companies from liability for Deepfakes disseminated on their platforms. Even proposed amendments to Section 230 do not adequately address the Deepfake threat. This Note will argue that Deepfake videos are not protected speech under the First Amendment, and social media companies can be considered publishers of Deepfakes if the videos are not quickly removed. Section 230 should thus be amended to create a narrow exception for Deepfake videos. Regulatory agencies should then enact new rules and amend existing ones in order to hold social media companies liable for the circulation of Deepfakes. The threat of liability will deter social media companies from allowing the videos to spread unchecked on their platforms and incentivize them to develop new technology for prompt detection and removal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Revenge porn has become an epidemic in the United States in recent years. A debate among legislators has emerged, focused primarily on the question of whether to criminalize the phenomenon, with most states having already done so, based on the grave harm that revenge porn inflicts on victims and the ease of distributing it. However, the conceptual questions of how to categorize the offense, and why, have not received much attention. Contrary to the prevailing approaches in the United States, which sporadically define revenge porn as an infringement of privacy, as obscenity, or as some other offense, this Essay proposes, for the first time, theoretical grounds for categorizing it as a sex offense. This novel, though possibly controversial, reconceptualization more accurately reflects the social values that are violated by the phenomenon, more correctly labels the behavior of the offender, and more succinctly recognizes the nature of the harm inflicted on the victim. Categorizing revenge porn as a sex offense has not only theoretical but also practical implications, both for victims and released sex offenders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Article provides a law-and-economics analysis of the question of liability for online republication. Its main thesis is that liability for republication generates a specter of multiple defendants which might dilute the originator's liability and undermine its deterrent effect. The Article concludes that, subject to several exceptions and methodological caveats, only the originator should be liable. This seems to be the American rule, as enunciated in Batzel v. Smith and Barrett v. Rosenthal. It stands in stark contrast to the prevalent rules in other Western jurisdictions and has been challenged by scholars on various grounds since its very inception. Following the Introduction, Part II presents the legal framework. It first discusses the rules applicable to republication of self-created content, focusing on the emergence of the single publication rule and its natural extension to online republication. It then turns to republication of third-party content. American law makes a clear-cut distinction between offline republication which gives rise to a new cause of action against the republisher (subject to a few limited exceptions), and online republication which enjoys an almost absolute immunity under § 230 of the Communications Decency Act. Other Western jurisdictions employ more generous republisher liability regimes, which usually require endorsement, a knowing expansion of exposure or repetition. Part III offers an economic justification for the American model. Law-andeconomics literature has showed that attributing liability for constant indivisible harm to multiple injurers, where each could have single-handedly prevented that harm ("alternative care" settings), leads to dilution of liability. Online republication scenarios often involve multiple tortfeasors. However, they differ from previously analyzed phenomena because they are not alternative care situations, and because the harm--increased by the conduct of each tortfeasor--is not constant and indivisible. Part III argues that neither feature precludes the dilution argument. It explains that the impact of the multiplicity of injurers in the online republication context on liability and deterrence provides a general justification for the American rule. This rule's relatively low administrative costs afford additional support. Part IV considers the possible limits of the theoretical argument. It maintains that exceptions to the exclusive originator liability rule should be recognized when the originator is unidentifiable or judgment-proof, and when either the republisher's identity or the republication's audience was unforeseeable. It also explains that the rule does not preclude liability for positive endorsement with a substantial addition, which constitutes a new original publication, or for the dissemination of illegally obtained content, which is an independent wrong. Lastly, Part IV addresses possible challenges to the main argument's underlying assumptions, namely that liability dilution is a real risk and that it is undesirable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the article, the author presents a critical analysis of the Texas Penal Code (TPC) Section 21.19, which aims to regulate indecent exposure or harassment online. Other topics include the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the reasons why the TPC is unconstitutional, and the freedoms protected by the First Amendment like freedom of religion, assembly, and speech.

In 2018. the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Traflicking Act (FOSTA) produced thefirst category of speech not provided immunity by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. This first cut against Section 230 was followed by President Donald Trump's May 2020 executive order aimed at limiting the legal protections for social media companies. Both of these actions represent a new battle over old ideas about protecting expression. This Article uses Paul Starr 's "Constitutive Choices" model to suggest that Section 230 represents a legacy of laws and regulations designed to fosterfree speech and access to information. As this latest battle continues in Woodhull Freedom Foundation v. United States, this Article argues that FOSTA violates the First Amendment, failing strict scrutiny review. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1996, Congress passed the Communications Decency Act (CDA). In 1997, the United States Supreme Court struck down most of the CDA. However, section 230, which protects providers and users of interactive computer services from liability for defamatory content posted to their platforms by third parties, remains in effect. In the California and federal judicial systems, courts interpret section 230's immunity provisions broadly--so that the statute conveys broad immunity. This Note argues that the broad application of section 230's protections is consistent with the intent of the statute's drafters. However, it also contends that (1) this interpretation of section 230 has had unexpected, negative consequences for plaintiffs seeking to recover in online defamation cases and (2) that we should consider making changes to section 230 that would allow it to accomplish its original purpose while also ensuring protection for persons injured by malicious actors online. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Internet access is an essential part of daily life for most children. Due to the lack of online protections, American children have unrestricted access to the most extensive and extreme adult video library in history. Consequently, children are being exposed to pornography at unprecedented rates. A child's first exposure to pornographic material is generally around 11 years old. Some seek it intentionally while others stumble upon it by accident. Adolescents are more susceptible to pornography because of the significant physical, emotional, cognitive, and sexual changes associated with adolescent development. Accordingly, adolescents are increasingly struggling with compulsive behaviors related to internet pornography and cybersex. Existing neuroscience literature suggests that early exposure to pornography negatively impacts adolescent brain development. Most of today's pornography does not reflect consensual, loving, healthy relationships. Instead, pornography teaches dominance, aggression, disrespect, and objectification. The most current research shows that many children want to repeat the acts they see in pornography. Consequently, the most comprehensive literature reviews find that pornography use is strongly correlated with sexual aggression in boys and sexual victimization in girls. Notably, a 2019 study among tenth graders in the United States revealed that boys exposed to violent pornography were two to three times more likely to commit sexual violence against a dating partner. Several countries are attempting to address this issue by requiring pornographic websites to verify the age of each user. Germany was one of the early pioneers in protecting children online, using age verification since the early 2000s. The United Kingdom recently emerged as a new leader in child online protection with The Digital Economy Act of 2017. This Act required age verification for all commercial pornography accessible from the United Kingdom. Though the United Kingdom recently abandoned the Digital Economy Act in favor of the Online Harms regime, the Digital Economy Act served as a model for Poland and Australia who are now developing their own age-verification regimes. The United States enacted the Communications Decency Act (CDA) of 1996 and the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) of 1998 to protect children from online pornography. Both failed judicial scrutiny under the United States Constitution's free speech protections. However, children are immersed in today's digital environment more deeply than ever previously imagined, and internet filters have proved mostly ineffective. Now, lawmakers must come together and explore innovative solutions that will protect youth from today's toxic internet pornography. A majority of Americans are in favor of making it more difficult to access internet pornography. The technology available for age verification has made significant advancements enhancing privacy, security, and anonymity. Given the changes in the digital environment and available technologies, age verification may now be a viable solution under judicial strict scrutiny. Alternatively, age verification may be viable under other legal doctrines such as the secondary-effects doctrine. I strongly recommend that the United States take action to: (1) promote education regarding pornography's harm to children; (2) support the digital-identity industry; (3) draft new legislation that requires robust age verification for commercial pornography; (4) call for greater childprotection measures on social-media platforms, such as a content-rating system; (5) encourage internet-service providers to provide more comprehensive internet-filtering services; and (6) consider state, federal, and international resolutions identifying pornography as a significant public-health issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on how foreign countries have approached regulating livestreaming services, as well as the role moderators play in keeping social media sites. It examines the developments made in recent court cases concerning Section 230 of Communications Decency Act (CDA), as well as potential pathways livestreaming services can take to limit illicit. It also mentions how CDA Section 230's blanket protection has been limited in the courts.

The use of automated filtering systems is increasingly touted as an effective solution for regulating a variety of different kinds of user-generated content online. Despite this, there remain serious concerns about their ability to accurately identify infringing material, and the potential impact on freedom of expression as a result. This article looks at the problems encountered by the micro-blogging platform Tumblr, which sought to detect and remove adult material from their network, and the relevance of that experience for the discussions around the European Union's controversial Copyright Directive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the ability of the legal environment to address the harm caused by nonconsensual pornography to its victims. Topics discussed are consequences of nonconsensual pornography, damages suffered by revenge porn victims, regulations and their limitations including Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, Federal Copyright Law, Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Common Law Tort Claims such as privacy and emotional distress, anti-blackmail and anti-hacking statutes.

The article focuses on various provisions of the U.S. Communications Decency Act of 1996, and its role in preventing online human trafficking. Topics include growing sex trafficking targeting children due to Internet and the Internet Service Providers (ISPs); vision for progress and potential strategies against bad actors like cyber entities Backpage; and Fourth Circuit decision in the case Zeran v. America Online Inc. which interpreted the Act's immunizing scope as essentially unqualified.

A growing new anti-pornography movement has arisen in reaction to the ready availability of pornography on the Internet. It includes both traditional social conservatives, who still complain that pornography damages the moral tone of society, corrupts immature minds, and could lead to sexual assault and other violence against women, and feminists who still complain that some pornography furthers the subordination of women. Both groups may be joining forces behind a new public health approach that focuses on new alleged harms caused by Internet pornography. Critics claim that online pornography negatively affects sexual relationships between real couples and in some cases causes psychological harms, perhaps even addiction. These are serious claims that, while contested, deserve to be taken seriously. Just as some who drink or gamble come to have a serious problem and need help, the same may be true for some viewers of pornography on the Internet. Just as with alcohol and gambling, we may need to educate potential users about online pornography's possible harms and provide help for those having difficulty with its use. But many, if not most, of those in the anti-pornography movement also urge stricter legal prohibitions on "obscene" materials, even when viewed in private homes, and greater enforcement of existing laws, or both. This Article draws three lessons from history that demonstrate that these proposals are unsound and should not be adopted. First, "obscene" pornography is difficult, if not impossible, to define satisfactorily under basic First Amendment principles. At most, it can be imprecisely limited to the ill-defined concept of "hard core" pornography, which might reach some of the online material criticized, but certainly not all of it. In particular, the current definition does not come close to reaching the materials that allegedly corrupt the moral tone of society, the health of relationships and family life, and the status of women. Second, the history of Prohibition demonstrates the almost intractable difficulties of using legal coercion to deprive large segments of society of goods that they desire on moral grounds that they do not share. Censorship is another form of prohibition, which also has proved difficult to enforce even in authoritarian countries. Censorship of the Internet is especially difficult in free countries, although modern technologies are increasingly enabling authoritarian countries to control what their citizens view online. Third, any broader definition of obscenity would be inconsistent with basic First Amendment principles and could not be limited to sexually explicit materials in any principled way. It could easily pave the way for a radical curtailment of free expression across the board. What is more, enforcing such a sweeping suppression on what even adults may watch in the privacy of their homes would be impossible if we are to remain a free country. The thesis of this Article is simple. Even if Internet pornography has all the ill effects that its critics assert, the appropriate remedy in this liberal democracy cannot be censorship. The remedy for this speech is more speech, not legal repression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The internet provided consensual sex workers with a sense of safety and community not available on the streets. Screening clients before meeting them, sharing information about dangerous clients, and finding work without relying on pimps turned a historically dangerous profession into a safer, more reliable way to earn a living. Unfortunately, the internet also provided sex traffickers with a more efficient way to advertise sex trafficking victims without detection by law enforcement. Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, websites hosting advertisements of sex trafficking victims were often immune from liability. Section 230, which meant to promote free speech on the internet, repeatedly left these victims without remedy. Congress recognized a need to hold someone responsible for online advertisements of sex trafficking victims. FOSTA/SESTA removed website immunity under Section 230 to encourage websites to diligently monitor and remove sex trafficking posts or otherwise be held responsible for facilitating the unlawful action. To avoid the work of monitoring content under FOSTA/SESTA, websites removed posting capabilities previously used by consensual sex workers. Congress failed to consider how the internet protects consensual sex workers and how this protection would be stripped from them in the wake of FOSTA/SESTA. This Comment will argue consensual sex workers deserve protection under FOSTA/SESTA. Ultimately, this Comment will recommend that Section 230 immunity be reinstated and either enforced jointly with existing legislation or construed more narrowly. Under either recommendation, both sex trafficking victims and consensual sex workers will receive the protection they deserve. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article considers the impact of a hypothetical nonconsensual pornography victim's previous sexual history on potential legal remedies, both criminal and civil. Due to jury bias and the difficulty in proving standard elements of many claims, the research shows that such a victim would likely be unsuccessful in court. This Article then turns to two legal concepts from related fields--the incremental harm doctrine and rape shield laws--and considers what effect their application would have on the hypothetical victim's case. Ultimately, the author presents an argument for the logical expansion of rape shield laws to cases of nonconsensual pornography. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses how revenge porn victims are protected under the U.S. criminal justice system, particularly the efforts by the U.S. Congress and state governments to create laws and strengthen criminal statutes, respectively. Other topics include the ideal victim theory, the proposal to limit victim-blaming evidence admissibility in criminal proceedings, as well as the proposed criminalization of revenge porn.

Over the past two decades, there has been increased attention on offending behaviors and motivations of child pornography offenders (CPOs). Although existing research has provided a knowledgeable foundation in regard to this offending subpopulation, the literature has been relatively limited on examining changes in offender behaviors and motivations. This study used interviews with 25 online CPOs in a southern state to identify themes underlying offending behaviors and motives at onset, as well as, continuation of offending over time. We found that offenders reported various circumstances (ranging from intentional to unintentional) and motivations (including thrill-seeking and attraction) at onset; however, CPOs reported thrill-seeking and attraction to be the most common factors driving their continued offending. We applied these themes to the existing literature on child pornography offending and recommended directions for future research. Based on our findings, we offered considerations for the treatment of CPOs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the concept of revenge porn in relation to legal notions of privacy and consent rights. Topics include the work of the organization Cyber Civil Rights Initiative (CCRI), the views of the organization American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in relation to the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and problems with the connotations of the word revenge.

The legal and social landscape of "revenge pom" has changed dramatically in the last few years. Before 2013, only three states criminalized the unauthorized disclosure of sexually explicit images of adults and few people had ever heard the term "revenge pom " As of July 2017, thirty-eight states and Washington, D.C. had criminalized the conduct; federal criminal legislation on the issue had been introduced in Congress; Google, Facebook, and Twitter had banned nonconsensual pornography from their platforms; and the term "revenge porn" had been added to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary. I have had the privilege ol playing a role in many of these developments. In 2013, I argued that nonconsensual pornography required a federal criminal response and drafted a model statute to this effect. That statute served as the template for what eventually became the federal Intimate Privacy Protection Act of 2016, as well as for numerous state laws criminalizing nonconsensual pornography. As the Legislative and Tech Policy Director of the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, I have worked with tech industry leaders, legislators, attorneys, victims, and advocates to develop policies and solutions to combat this abuse. This Article is an account from the front lines of the legislative, technological, and social reform regarding this evolving problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article argues that current revenge porn legislation in the U.S. is unconstitutionally overbroad and fails strict scrutiny review, as of January 2016. Topics discussed include emerging phenomenon of revenge pornography; ways in which revenge porn postings are, despite their morally objectionable nature, constitutionally protected speech that falls outside the U.S. Supreme Court's obscenity jurisprudence; and need of strict scrutiny related to revenge porn postings.

The article reflects on the history and concept of revenge porn and mentions the ways in which the Internet is used as a platform for an attack. It mentions the need to encouraging couples to use non-disclosure agreements before sharing intimate pictures for the evidence of non-consent to disclose in connection with pursuing criminal liability. It also mentions the need to consider the First Amendment issues by lawmakers for drafting revenge porn legislation.

The article reflects on the shortcomings of criminal laws in regulating revenge porn and several laws attempting to criminalize revenge porn in the U.S. Topics discussed include the protecting privacy and revenge porn victims, the use of civil suits to prevent revenge porn such as privacy torts or copyright claims, the application of revenge porn laws to website owners and operators who republish user submissions and the U.S Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.

The article focuses on non-consensual pornography which includes sexually graphic content being posted on the internet as revenge by jilted ex-partners. Topics discussed include the Communications Decency Act (CDA) regarding the criminalization of revenge pornography, civil liability being applied to revenge pornography, torts such as Disclosure of Private Facts (DPF) applied to revenge pornography and nonconsensual pornography falling into obscenity.

The article compares the American and European views of internet privacy and human dignity as well as laws governing it with reference to several cases. Topics discussed include the right to privacy afforded to European Union (EU) citizens under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, privacy tort law in the U.S, and the treatment of internet privacy under the U.S Communications Decency Act of 1996.

The article discusses the concept of freedom of expression in U.S. law regarding what is referred to as revenge pornography. It examines U.S. legislation such as the Communications Decency Act (CDA) and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), efforts to criminalize revenge porn in New Jersey, California, Florida, and New York, and the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment protection of some pornographic images.

The article provides theoretical, empirical and practical critics of the child pornography crusade and concludes that the movement is over inclusive. It discusses the legal and policy initiatives driving the child pornography crusade. It further explores the current situation of the net-widening consequence thereby arguing the expansion of formal criminal justice responses for people engaged in this ridiculous offence.

The article examines discourses anticensorship and pro-sex discourses arising in response to child pornography censorship legislation. According to the author, such discourses reinforce existing forms of oppression, particularly the oppression of children, rather than opposing them. It is suggested that the online child sexual abuse industry is illustrative of the normalization of sexual cruelty within late capitalism. The author critiques ambivalence towards pedophilia in the works of several theorists including Michel Foucault and Gayle Rubin and argues that child pornography should be a feminist issue. Moral panic and philosophical concepts of transgression and self-mastery are also discussed.

The article offers information on the role of the Internet in promoting prostitution in the U.S. It features enforcement measures imposed by the state to address the problem without violating their constitutional rights. It presents legislations on Internet escort services and the three categories of escorts.

The article offers information on the Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA). It states that Section 230 has been designed with two foremost objectives including to protect children from Internet pornography and to promote freedom of expression. It adds that Section 230 provides immunity to websites and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) from defamation liability on defamatory content created by third parties. It also claims that the courts have adopted a broad view of the Section and tried to apply and interpret it.

Abstract: The Children''s Internet Protection Act (CIPA; 2000) requires an Internet filtering and public awareness strategy to protect children under 17 from harmful visual Internet depictions. This study compared high school students who went online with the CIPA restriction and college students who went online without the restriction in order to investigate differences in basic knowledge and perceived education of Internet safety protection strategies. The two groups differed in Internet use at school but did not differ in their Internet use at home, their knowledge of Internet safety, and their Internet education experiences. Findings suggest that CIPA is associated with a decrease in high school students'' Internet use at school but does not appear to have a beneficial effect on their knowledge of Internet safety or opportunities for Internet safety education. Applied implications of using a filtering strategy in schools but not in home settings as a means of improving knowledge and awareness of Internet safety issues are discussed. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The article discusses the problem of suppressing Internet pornography, particularly child pornography. It notes that this problem has been deepened by several factors including the differences in Internet laws from country to country and the technological advances in virtual imagery. It cites the effort of the International Center for Missing and Exploited Children to establish a standard in protecting children, especially on the Internet. In conclusion, it discusses the need to create measures that will prevent the spread of pornography as well as highlights the role of the society in ensuring the responsible use of technology.

The article offers information on the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003 in the U.S. and discusses the case White Buffalo Ventures LLC v. The University of Texas at Austin. The Act, which regulates transmission of spam, prevents individual lawsuits, showing the intentions of the U.S. Congress to limit litigation. The 5th Circuit ruling in the case would result in consequences for the Internet industry and damages to the aims of the Act.

The article focuses on the concern of the use of Internet in promoting pedophilia and child sex-abuse. Such technology that makes communication around the world possible has contributed to the increase in the spread of pornographic materials. In response to the issue, child pornography and child-abuse legislation has been drafted to stop the abuse. The amended rules characterizes the child pornography in three categories such as real child pornography, pseudo child pornography and virtual child pornography.

This article deals with the necessity to suppress pornography on the Internet, including both child and adult pornography. The main question is whether the states should co-operate in enforcing their moral standards, taking into account also the fact that their standards of indecency do differ. The article begins with giving an example of difficulties arising from suppressing the crime of pornography on the Internet. It givers a general overview of the state of international law in this area. It is stressed that the lack of the international cooperation can mean for the states a diminishing of their sovereignty to determine their public policy. Pornography also threatens traditional cultures and their concept of decency. Since there is an international obligation to protect world cultures and cultural diversity, the reason to suppress pornography, particularly adult pornography, on the Internet is not bound to proving any individual harm which adult pornography may cause. The reasons to ban pornography are weighed against the reasons not to ban. It is argued that there are sufficient reasons to ban adult pornography internationally as well as child pornography. The main difficulty to introduce an effective international regulation of the ban is the lack of the international standard for obscenity. The US standard found in the US case law is examined and found unsatisfactory. It is finally emphasised that it is not enough for the states to introduce criminal sanctions and enforce them strictly when combating pornography on the Internet. International law needs to address deeper problems which give rise to the wide spread indecency on the Internet. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reviews cases of Internet censorship in the U.S. and their implications for the information age. Overview of the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens; Regulation of communications and broadcasting; Discussion on the child Internet pornography protection and national security laws.

Explores Congressional attempts to protect children from Internet pornography through the use of Internet filtering software in public libraries, while complying with the U.S. First Amendment. Judicial and scholarly perspectives on Internet filtering software; Treatment of laws designed to regulate Internet filth by the Supreme Court; Alternative solutions to the problem posed to librarians and First Amendment advocates who value protecting children but resist censorship.

Explores the evolution of the secondary effects doctrine in the regulation of sexually-oriented expression in the U.S. Emergence of the secondary effects doctrine; Secondary effects which can justify the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA); Reasons given by the U.S. Supreme Court for ruling that CPPA was unconstitutional; Effect of the Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, a case questioning whether porn with virtual children can be banned without abridging freedom of speech, on the continuing evolution of the doctrine.

Examines problems related to the regulation of pornography on the Internet in the U.S. Actions taken by the U.S. Congress to solve the problem of Internet pornography; Discussion on the Children's Internet Protection Act; Recommendations to help solve problems related to Internet pornography.