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Three established torts require the defendant's behavior to be "offensive" or "highly offensive" in order to be actionable: offensive battery, public disclosure of true private facts, and intrusion on seclusion. Although what links these "offensiveness" torts together has not been recognized before, this Article demonstrates that they occupy a sub-category of tort liability that is coherent, insight-generating, and useful. The torts developed at different times and in a sense for different reasons, but all three rest on the same principle: the idea that individual autonomy involves not only inviolable bodily space, but also inviolable private and informational space. What counts as actionable wrongdoing for these torts depends on the cultural context, because what is considered offensive conduct may vary, as cultural conditions change. The typical victim (or observer) of one of these torts must plausibly have the reaction "How dare you?" for the offensiveness element of the tort to be satisfied. That is what links these three superficially disparate torts together, and warrants understanding them together, as protections against invasions of the different forms of inviolable space that are a core feature of every individual's autonomy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policymakers have increasingly turned their attention to wrongdoing that affects wills, such as the forgery of wills, the procurement of wills through coercion or deceit, and the destruction or suppression of wills. In particular, they have attempted to deter this misconduct by punishing wrongdoers through new forms of criminal and civil liability. Because the United States is on the precipice of the largest intergenerational wealth transfer in history, a significant portion of which will take place through wills, these attempts of deterrence are well-intentioned. However, their implementation has been flawed. These implementation difficulties stem from the fact that a will has no legal effect until the testator's death. Because the consequences of misconduct affecting wills are delayed until after the victim's demise, policymakers have stretched traditional coneeptions of criminal law and tort law to fit situations to which they do not easily apply. Specifically, they have created crimes akin to theft that punish conduct that does not deprive the testator of property rights during life and torts that remedy property harms inflicted upon a deceased victim who arguably can suffer no more harms. Current conceptions of criminal and civil liability for wrongdoing affecting wills are therefore riddled with theoretical and doctrinal shortcomings. To remedy these shortcomings, this Article reconceptualizes wrongdoing affecting wills as evidentiary misconduct. A will is documentary evidence of a testator's intent that probate courts use to determine how to distribute a testator's property upon death, and misconduct that affects a will diminishes its evidentiary value. When wrongdoing affecting wills is framed as evidentiary misconduct that impedes the functioning of probate courts, rather than as property offenses, sounder theoretical footing for punishing this misconduct emerges. The victim is no longer the deceased testator but is instead the probate system itself. Reframing the wrongdoing as an interference with evidence also alleviates some of the doctrinal shortcomings of the current scheme. Misconduct involving evidence that impedes judicial proceedings is already criminalized in a variety ofcontexts. However, the idiosyncrasies of the probate system counsel in favor of an evidentiary crime that is specifically tailored to wills. This Article therefore proposes a new evidentiary crime, entitled Intentional or Willful Interference with Probate, that better deters misconduct and is more easily implemented than the law's current deterrent mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conventional insurance law lore provides intentional torts are not, and should not be, covered by insurance. There are four primary justifications for this: (1) injuries or losses must be fortuitous (i.e., accidental) to be covered by insurance, (2) most insurance policies contain express intentionality exclusions that preclude coverage for injuries or losses expected or intended by the insured, (3) wrongdoers should not be permitted to benefit from their own intentional misconduct by allowing insurance to cover their liabilities for such misconduct, and (4) it is against public policy to allow insurance to cover injuries or losses caused intentionally because allowing such coverage would undermine society's interest in deterring and punishing intentional misconduct. On the other hand, there are other competing public policies that weigh in favor of allowing insurance to cover intentional torts: (1) the enforcement of contracts, and (2) the compensation of innocent victims. This Article analyzes the competing public policies and arguments in favor of and against allowing insurance to cover intentional torts. In doing so, it discusses numerous lines of liability insurance that expressly cover various types of intentional torts. It then explores whether the theoretical foundation underlying the public policy against allowing liability insurance to cover intentional torts-that intentional misconduct is effectively deterred and punished by disallowing coverage-is supported by empirical evidence. Ultimately, the Article concludes that the compensation of innocent tort victims and the enforcement of contracts outweigh the limited deterrent impact of disallowing coverage. Consequently, the Article makes the novel proposal that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the default rule should be that liability insurance can cover intentional torts unless there are compelling reasons why the specific type of intentional tort at issue should be deemed uninsurable. The Article further proposes that, contrary to the current law, insurers be granted subrogation rights against their insureds under certain lines of liability insurance for injuries intentionally and directly caused by their insureds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bullying is a phenomenon that results in psychological and physical effects, or even suicides and school shootings. Many states have enacted anti‐bullying laws to prevent bullying, but we still see the same tragedies that come from it. A town in New York jails parents for their child's bullying and has seen improvement. However, the goal of this amendment is to deter, not to punish. To protect the welfare and safety of our state's children, this Note proposes that New York amend its parental liability law by adopting the parental liability laws of Oregon, Tennessee, and the notification law of Utah. Key points for the family court community: Victims of bullying are 2 to 9 times more likely to consider suicide than those who are not bullied.40.5% of girls and 27.6% of boys have exhibited symptoms of PTSD at the time of their bullying trauma.Every day, 160,000 students will not attend school due to fear of being bullied.Approximately 71% of school shooters were victims of bullying and 87% of them have left evidence at the scene suggesting they were bullied.There is no current law in New York State that addresses these issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brentano's (1874 : 88–89) suggestion that intentionality is the mark of the mental is typically spelled out in terms of the thesis that all and only mental states are intentional. An influential objection is that intentionality is not necessary for mentality (McGinn 1982 ; Dretske 1995 ; Deonna and Teroni 2012 ; Bordini 2017). What about the idea that only mental states are intentional? In his 2008 paper published in Analysis, Nes shows that on a popular characterization of intentionality, notably defended by Crane (2014 [1998] , 2001), some non-mental states come out as intentional. Crane (2008) replies that the concept of representation solves the problem. In this paper, I argue that no representational account of intentionality meets Nes's challenge. After distinguishing between two notions of representation, I contend that there are two versions of Crane's representational account, but neither of them is able to solve the problem posed by Nes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many intentional torts involve conduct that is impulsive or unthinking, or defendant who lack sufficient assets to pay a tort judgment or whose insurance policies do not cover intentional torts. Tort theory, intentional torts, negligence, justification, restatements, torts, consent, dignity, intent, battery 46 The authors do note the possibility of a second-best solution: in lieu of replacing all of the "dignitary" torts with a single tort, the law might "retain[] separately named torts that describe specific ways a defendant may invade another person's dignity ... We simply do not see why these categories should have different rules." Keywords: torts; tort theory; intentional torts; negligence; justification; restatements; intent; battery; consent; dignity EN torts tort theory intentional torts negligence justification restatements intent battery consent dignity 551 573 23 04/12/22 20211001 NES 211001 1 Introduction This brief essay explores the issue of generality and tort law from two directions. [Extracted from the article]

When Oliver Wendell Holmes synthesized the writs of trespass and trespass on the case, he left out of his gloss of modern accident law an extremely important part, namely, the strict liability that everyone faces for routine errors, such as failing to check one’s blind spot before changing lanes.One proof of how poorly the language of negligence fits the strict liability that actually exists for routine “compliance errors” is the debate among legal historians about whether the modern tort rule governing accidents is less strict than the classical English rule. As I develop in the article, the modern accident rule is, in reality, strikingly similar to the ancient accident rule. Holmes’s neglect of the strict liability component of the modern negligence rule has hindered our understanding of both it and the classical accident rule.When we see clearly what the strict-liability component of the modern negligence rule is, it opens a new window on negligence theory.

The average American would be shocked to learn that the United States government holds itself absolutely immune from civil liability for most sexual assaults by its employees. Even the average lawyer might be surprised to discover that the federal employee who commits a sexual assault may also be shielded from individual tort liability by a special federal statute. The Federal Tort Claims Act bars assault and battery claims against the sovereign United States, even if committed by an agent acting within the scope of most types of federal employment--that includes military recruiters, postal workers, and daycare employees. At the same time, the Westfall Act grants federal employees immunity from state tort claims for acts within the scope of employment. The scope of employment for both federal statutes is defined by state respondeat superior law, which over the decades has evolved to hold employers legally responsible under more circumstances for the intentional wrongdoing of employees. As a consequence of these statutes and evolving liability doctrines, both the federal government as an entity and the federal employee as an individual may well be immune from tort liability for assault and battery. Absent legislative reform, the victim of a sexual assault at the hands of a federal employee may be left without any remedy against either the government or the individual in any venue, state or federal. In this article, the preclusion of a remedy for sexual assault by a federal agent and the avoidance of federal responsibility is highlighted, together with a proposed legislative resolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Modern day vicarious liability cases often address the liability of enterprises and institutions whose agents have committed intentional acts. Increasingly, when employers are sued, the line is blurred between the principal's vicarious liability for its agent's acts and its own direct liability for hiring and/or failing to supervise or control its agent. From an economic deterrence perspective, the imposition of vicarious liability induces employers to adopt cost-justified preventative measures, including selective hiring and more stringent supervision and discipline, and, in some instances, to truncate the scope of their business activities. Negligence-based direct liability likewise induces employers to adopt cost-justified preventative measures (without constraining activity levels to the degree that strict liability does). This raises questions. Why doesn't direct employer negligence liability suffice, in terms of deterring employees' intentional torts? Or conversely, so long as there is vicarious liability, is there any need for direct negligence liability at all? In this Article, I argue that, as a form of strict liability, vicarious liability will have an edge over direct employer negligence liability to the extent that there is a significant risk of under-detection of the failures of an employer's preventative measures. Traces of this under-detection rationale for vicarious liability can be found in the academic literature and court decisions, but it warrants further elaboration. The risk of under-detection provides a strong justification for the expansion of the scope of institutional or employer vicarious liability. The under-detection rationale, moreover, has the potential to serve as a coherent framework for some modern doctrinal debates, including whether punitive damages should be imposed either vicariously or directly upon employers when their employees commit intentional torts. Specifically, I argue that the under-detection rationale correspondingly strengthens the case for punitive damages in direct negligence cases and weakens the case for punitive damages imposed in vicarious liability cases. Focusing on under-detection, vicarious liability acts as a quasi-substitute for punitive damages. And seen through this lens, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 909, Punitive Damages Against a Principal--typically defended as a "complicity rule" limiting the imposition of vicarious punitive liability on fairness grounds--is justified on economic deterrence grounds by allowing punitive damages coupled with direct negligence liability but limiting its operation in the vicarious liability sphere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article informs on the role of Minnesota district court in addressing negligence and intentional tort claims. Topics discussed include Minnesota criminal justice administration; claims under Minnesota's Child Victims Act such as child sexual abuse; and vicarious liability; and issues surrounding inclusion of sexual abuse under public nuisance claims.

The American Law Institute's Third Restatement of Torts was initially conceived as a series of separate projects, each with its own reporters. From 1998 through 2010, the ALI completed and published three different segments: Products Liability, Apportionment of Liability, and Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm. Initially, the ALI did not intend to restate the intentional torts, believing that the Second Restatement's treatment of these torts was clear and largely authoritative. It was ultimately persuaded that there were numerous unresolved issues that needed to be addressed. As a result, it authorized a new project on Intentional Torts--a project that is currently ongoing. Rather than applaud or critique the specific choice the reporters are making, I have chosen to discuss two broader concerns regarding the project. The first concern is that the piecemeal nature of assembling all the separate projects of the Third Restatement of Torts (including the review and adoption of different sections within Intentional Torts) has made the Intentional Torts reporters' task more difficult than it should have been and may contribute to an overall product that is flawed in important respects, primarily because of inconsistencies that cannot easily be corrected. The second concern is that the Intentional Torts reporters have too often lost sight of the conceptual distinctions between intentional and nonintentional torts. Although I agree that these conceptual distinctions should not have driven the basic organization of the project, as was once suggested, I argue that the reporters are making doctrinal decisions that further blur, rather than clarify, the boundaries between the intentional torts and other torts, primarily negligence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the most recent draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Intentional Torts to Persons, the intentional torts protect the rightholder's interests differently from negligence-based rules and strict liability, placing them into a distinct substantive category. This conceptualization, however, does not provide courts with adequate guidance on how to formulate the element of intent. Different formulations can protect the rightholder's interests differently from negligence and strict liability, so something else must determine the appropriate way to formulate the element of intent. The draft Restatement's reasoning can be easily extended to provide a more useful conceptualization of the intentional torts. The practice of tort law involves the enforcement of behavioral norms, and so the substantive categories of tort law should correspond to normatively distinguishable categories of behavior. For tort purposes, three different paradigmatic forms of social behavior are relevant: aggressive interactions; interactions of mutual advantage; and the remaining nonaggressive, risk-creating interactions that are not motivated by an expectation of mutual benefit. Within this normative framework, the category of intentional torts is defined by aggressive interactions, which involve intentional harms that are normatively different from accidental harms. The intentional torts accordingly protect different interests in a distinctive manner as per the rationale in the draft Restatement. This normative framework straightforwardly explains a number of established rules while also resolving two questions of intent that have vexed courts and commentators. Difficult issues of intent involve hard questions about how the conduct is best categorized for tort purposes. Once the categories have been conceptualized in behavioral terms, the element of intent has a clear substantive purpose: it determines whether or not an interaction is aggressive and properly governed by the intentional torts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The idea that criminal punishment carries a message of condemnation is as commonplace as could be. Indeed, many think that condemnation is the mark of punishment, distinguishing it from other sorts of penalties or burdens. But for all that torts and crimes share in common, nearly no one thinks that tort has similar expressive aims. And that is unfortunate, as the truth is that tort is very much an expressive institution, with messages to send that are different, but no less important, than those conveyed by the criminal law. In this essay, I argue that tort liability expresses the judgment that the defendant wronged the plaintiff. And I explain why it is important to have an institution that expresses that judgment. I argue that we need ways of treating wrongs as wrongs, so that we can vindicate the social standing of victims. Along the way, I consider the continuity between tort and revenge, and I suggest a new way of thinking about corrective justice and the role that tort plays in dispensing it. I conclude by sketching an agenda for tort reform that would improve tort's ability to serve its expressive function. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In contemporary debates about legal responsibility for sexual misconduct, the status of "affomative consent" is front and center. Most often associated with the campus rape crisis and the enforcement of Title IX by colleges and universities, affirmative consent places responsibility on individuals who initiate sex to secure the affirmative permission of their partners before engaging in sexual conduct. Going beyond "no means no," affirmative consent is best captured by the slogan "only yes means yes" and aims to protect those sexual assault victims who react passively or silently in the face of sexual aggression, even though they do not desire to have sex and would not have initiated the sexual activity if they had been given the choice. The criminal law in most states has not yet caught up with these developments and has continued to require either a showing of "force" on the part of the defendant or proof of a verbal objection on the part of the victim. Given its prominence, one might expect affirmative consent to emerge as a central issue in the revision of the Restatement (Third)'s provisions on consent. Instead, affirmative consent makes an appearance only briefly in the Restatement's commentary and has not affected the core black letter statements of the law of consent. Although purporting to be neutral, the approach of the Restatement (Third) is incompatible with affirmative consent, both in the Restatement's definitions of actual and apparent consent and in its determination to assign the burden of proof to the plaintiff instead of the defendant. Because there is no controlling precedent that would prevent the Restatement (Third) from embracing affirmative consent, the Restatement (Third) is free to follow the Title IX model and incorporate affirmative consent into the body of tort law. This article makes the case for adopting affirmative consent in sexual misconduct tort cases, even if the criminal law in any given jurisdiction continues to apply a more defendant-oriented consent rules. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a bold proposal: eliminate the intentional tort of battery and merge cases of both the negligent and intentional imposition of physical harm into a single new tort. The advantages of a single tort of wrongfully causing physical harm to persons are many. It would (a) do away with complex and unneeded doctrinal details now contained within battery law, (b) pave the way to a sensible regime of comparative fault for all such physical injuries, (c) properly shift the legal focus away from the plaintiff's conduct and onto the defendant's, (d) eliminate the Restatement's need to supplement battery law with yet a separate intentional physical harm tort when an injury is intentionally caused but without the contact or other requirements of battery, and (e) force courts to decide various collateral issues (like whether punitive damages are available or whether liability insurance coverage is applicable) on their own terms and not by linking them to whether this case involves a battery (and then making exceptions, since it turns out that battery is not a reliable basis for deciding those collateral matters). More broadly, the new tort is intellectually more insightful as it anchors acts that now count as batteries more in their wrongfulness than in their intentionality as battery law does today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The five thoughtful, incisive articles by Professors Bernstein, Chamallas, Geistfeld, Moore, and Sugarman offer a breathtaking range of perspectives on the Restatement, Third of Torts: Intentional Torts to Persons ("ITR"). Some view tort law from the widest vantage point, inquiring whether this forest deserves its own appellation or should instead be assimilated to the rest of tort's greenery. Some focus more on the trees-on the distinct doctrines that characterize the torts and defenses that ITR is restating. In this response, we engage with the participants at both levels. Our response also addresses two fundamental questions-the role of a Restatement and the significance of the "intentional tort" category. First, ITR is a Restatement of tort law. It is not a model code of tort law, nor is it an academic article committed to a particular vision of the proper purposes and principles of tort law. We see our task, not as creating a grand theory from which all of intentional tort doctrine can be deduced, but as a bottom-up endeavor, accurately characterizing developments in the case law and then providing the most sensible and persuasive justifications for extant doctrine. At the same time, however, we strive to provide intellectual coherence to this body of law. Thus, we examine not only the holdings in narrow doctrinal categories, but also the consistency of those holdings with more general tort law principles. Second, what is distinctive about the intentional torts to persons? How do they differ from torts of negligence or from other intentional torts? These questions have no simple answer, because most of the intentional torts to persons have very long historical roots, and because the common law process of reformulating doctrine has played a vital role in defining the scope of these torts in current American law. It is thus not at all surprising to find tensions and apparent inconsistencies between some current doctrines. Nevertheless, we believe that the contemporary formulations of these torts are indeed justifiable in principle. First, these intentional torts sometimes reflect a hierarchy of fault or culpability. Purposely injuring someone is more culpable, ceteris paribus, than negligently causing the same injury. Second, these torts sometimes protect distinct interests, such as the interest in avoiding emotional harm or in freedom of movement, that for various policy reasons are not protected by liability rules if they are only negligently invaded. Third, the intentional torts do not simply identify species of conduct that reflect greater fault or culpability than negligence. Comparing intentional torts is sometimes akin to comparing apples and oranges, because these torts protect a varied set of interests or protect them in varying ways. Fourth, the intentional torts express a pluralistic set of values and principles. No single principle (such as welfare, autonomy, or freedom) fully explains all of these torts. And fifth, although these intentional torts contain some reasonableness criteria, for the most part they reject the reasonableness paradigm of negligence, and thus reject the more flexible, less structured criteria of liability that that paradigm engenders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By furnishing new blackletter on battery, assault, and false imprisonment, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Intentional Torts to Persons provides illustrations of what the medieval writ of Trespass once remedied. All three causes of action restated in this Restatement derive from the trespass writ, as do other modern doctrines that fall under intentional torts to persons. This article, hewing to the tradition that the law of trespass provides redress for direct, unmediated, and wrongful boundary-crossing, argues that sexual penetration unwanted by the person penetrated is trespass. If rape is trespass, then consequences follow for the law of torts as well as crimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Washington State, tortfeasors get a break when they commit intentional torts. Instead of receiving more punishment for their planned bad act, intentional tortfeasors are punished as if they committed a mere accident. The trend does not stop in Washington State--nationwide, punitive damage legislation inadequately deters intentional wrongdoers through caps and outright bans on punitive damages. Despite Washington State's one hundred and twenty-five year ban on punitive damages, it is in a unique and powerful position to change the way courts across the country deal with intentional tortfeasors. Since Washington has never had a comprehensive punitive damages framework, and has largely avoided the sway of the nationwide tort, reform movement, it is a blank slate for demonstrating how punitive damages should be used to deter intentional wrongdoing in a fair and appropriate way. While law and economics theorists have debated how to reach complete deterrence, this Note's argument takes reality into consideration in the form of binding Supreme Court precedent on punitive damages to provide a punitive damages framework that results in more deterrence than current punitive damages provide, and still passes constitutional scrutiny. This Note argues for a punitive damages framework based on graduated levels of culpability and correlated compensatory to punitive damage-award ratios to allow for as much deterrence of intentional wrongdoing as possible, while conforming to Supreme Court precedent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the controversy involving legal issue for the sport of baseball, wherein a fan was injured by a foul ball and turned into a civil suit constricting the risk of injury. Topics discussed include parties involved were Royals mascot Sluggerrr and the Royals fan John Coomer; the mascot were accused of various tort cases such as intentional torts, negligence, and assault; intellectual property protection such as logo, designs and marks.

An essay on the topic of the determination of liability in case of intentional torts and the consent of plaintiff for the conduct of defendant. Topics discussed include the role of miscommunication in such cases, the responsibility of plaintiffs and defendants to clarify ambiguous signaling, and the use of comparative faults as a defense in intentional torts.

This paper aims to introduce the romanistic formed jurist in a short peregrination through a different legal system--different as an intellectual source and legal structure such as the Anglo-Saxon legal system, in order to bring an affable concern for the perspectives that can offer, therefore exploring a cultural dimension subjected to low interest of a nowadays continental jurist. Our concern will focus on that branch of private law known in a common law system known as tort law, trying to facilitate and understand the reason of this matter by drawing certain guidelines that will lead to a much tangible shape and crystallization of the institution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Particularly in places with few recognizable gun control laws, "gun neutral" civil and criminal rules are an important but often-unnoticed basis for the legal regulation of guns. The burdens that these rules impose on the keeping and bearing of arms are at times significant, but they are also incidental, which raises hard questions about the boundaries between constitutional law, regulation, and legally enforceable private ordering. Does the Second Amendment apply to civil suits for trespass, negligence, and nuisance? Does the Amendment cover gun-neutral laws of general applicability like assault and disturbing the peace? In the course of addressing these practical questions and the broader conceptual challenges that they represent, this Article fashions analytic tools that may be useful to a wide range of constitutional problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intentional misconduct frequently has extraterritorial consequences. Terrorist attacks, toxic pollution, civil rights violations, and other intentional torts can cause harm within a state despite originating outside the state. Those harms raise a vexing constitutional question: when do the local effects of intentional wrongdoing authorize personal jurisdiction over a defendant whose conduct occurred outside the forum? The answer has several significant implications. Granting or denying jurisdiction can support or undermine regulatory interests by allocating power between states, imposes burdens on the parties that can impede access to justice, and alters risk assessments that shape both socially desirable and socially destructive behavior. The jurisdictional dilemma posed by the in-state effects of out-of state conduct is timeless and timely. It is timeless because it has arisen in thousands of cases and is an unavoidable feature of a federal system that allocates judicial power between fifty coequal states. It is timely because the Supreme Court's 2014 decision in Walden v. Fiore directly addressed effects jurisdiction for the first time since 1984. This Article critiques Walden and proposes a new approach to the broader constitutional question by focusing on five conclusions. First, it illustrates how Walden relies on a distinction between a defendant s contacts with the forum state and a defendant's contacts with the forum's residents. Second, it critiques the forum/ resident distinction as imprecise, misleading, and a revival of the formality that plagued nineteenth-century personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. It also offers a new account of Chief Justice Stone's reasoning in International Shoe, a case about enforcing taxes, by comparing Shoe to Stone s strikingly similar opinion in a case about imposing taxes. The comparison highlights Shoe's hostility toward the sort of formality that animates Walden. Third, it contends that lower courts might salvage the Court's emphasis on forum contacts by focusing on the defendants contacts with the forum's law, in effect merging constitutional limits on the state's legislative and judicial power. Fourth, it suggests that state regulatory interests are more important than commonly recognized when local effects are severe, such as an Ebola quarantine. Fifth, it proposes a new approach to analyzing jurisdiction by considering whether actors who commit intentional torts without a geographic focal point assume the risk of being sued wherever harm occurs. These conclusions suggest that Walden's reasoning would be misleading if read literally and acontextually. The opinion leaves more room for exercising jurisdiction in effects cases than its dismissive veneer implies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article discusses how the Walden Court may have mischaracterized the effects test of Calder, and it explores how Calder's effects test should be applied. This Article argues that personal jurisdiction should be based primarily on forum regulatory interest, and it uses this link to apply effects test analysis in defamation situations, then in other contexts unexplored by the Walden opinion. Dram-shop liability and products-liability cases are explored as situations where personal jurisdiction should be upheld, similarly to Calder, on the basis of a plaintiff's good-faith allegation that a defendant intentionally acted to create foreseeable forum effects. To the extent courts are uncomfortable applying such effects analysis, and instead insist on additional defendant forum conduct, this Article suggests such action may be in response to the reality that a plaintiff's jurisdictional allegations almost always involve factually contested matters that, unlike a defendant's presence, cannot be determined apart from the merits of the case. This Article urges courts, however, to resist importing defendant presence-based considerations into modern personal jurisdiction analysis. Instead, courts should allow a plaintiff's goodfaith allegations of defendant-initiated effects to support jurisdiction. Such an approach is the best way to fully implement the minimum contacts approach required by International Shoe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the application of statutes of limitations to continuing tort claims. The author provides an overview about the continuing violation doctrine in current discourse with details on the essence of and rationale for the violation doctrine. Also tackled are the news perspectives of the continuing violation doctrine and the tests and remedy for identifying continuing violations.

The article focuses on the legislative amendment in the Workers' Disability Compensation Act of 1969 (WDCA) of Michigan on June 27, 2014 which allows a magistrate to approve a settlement without the consent of the employer. It mentions the several court cases including Thomai v. MIBA Hydramechanica Corp. related to the claim of injury by employee based on intentional tort, Nichols v. Howmet Corp. related to the liability for wage loss compensation.

An introduction is presented in which discussess topics within the issue including intentional torts, distinctions between intentional and nonintentional torts, and feminist perspective on intentional tort issues.

The article discusses the Minnesota Supreme Court's ruling in the 2014 case Doe 169 v. Brandon which deals with the state's tort laws, a foreseeability legal doctrine, and the determination that a church licensing body did not owe a duty to protect a minor from the intentional and tortious conduct of a third party. Negligence law and the procedural posture of the Doe 169 case are examined, along with summary judgments and legal exceptions under Minnesota law.

The article presents a primer on an intentional-tort legal exception to employers' workers' compensation immunity in Florida. A strict liability legal doctrine is addressed in relation to Florida's Workers' Compensation Law, workplace injuries, and an employee's relinquishment of the right to file a common-law action against an employer for negligence. Several Florida statutes and legal cases are mentioned, including Turner v. PCR Inc. which deals with an employer's lack of immunity.

The article discusses various legal aspects of intentional torts against the person in Australia, focusing on the concept of negligence in Australia, as well as information about the elements of torts and analyses of several legal cases. The writ of trespass is addressed, along with damages under Australian law. According to the article, battery, assault, and false imprisonment are three separate intentional torts against the person. Intent, voluntariness, and recklessness are examined.

The article provides practical advice for Florida attorneys on how to apply statutes of limitation (SOLs) in institutional childhood sex abuse cases as of 2014, focusing on allegations of fraudulent concealment and repressed memory in relation to efforts to avoid SOLs. Several childhood sex abuse-related legal cases are addressed, including matters involving the Archdiocese of Miami Inc. Various Florida statutes are mentioned, along with intentional torts and the equitable estoppel doctrine.

The article offers information on history, developments and significance of nthe Tort Immunity Act in 1965 of Illinois, which provides qualified immunity for local governmental and governmental employees from the liability against negligence and injuries. It analyzes the impact of the Tort Immunity Act upon the intentional torts of police officers in Illinois. It discusses the General Assembly's role in justifying the immunity to ordinary negligence of police officers.

This Note uses the Broadway musical Spider-Man: Turn Off the Dark as a case study to examine the legal and nonlegal systems in place to deter unsafe working conditions in the theatre industry. In little over a year of rehearsals and performances, seven members of the Spider-Man cast were injured, one very seriously. (An eighth cast member was then seriously injured as this Note was being prepared for print, approximately two years later.) This Note argues that Spider-Man illustrates how the current regime does not deter unsafe conditions. It argues that the workers' compensation exclusivity bar to a civil suit--which provides employers a complete defense with respect to covered injuries, unless an injury is the result of an intentional tort--should be lowered to create better incentives for producers to ensure the safety of their actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the sex exception in vicarious liability tort litigation in the U.S. Topics include the widespread sexual abuse of children by members of the Catholic Church, if institutions can be held liable for the misdeeds of their members, and tort law in the U.S. Information is provided on compensation for intentional torts.

In Millbrook v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held the law enforcement proviso--an exception to the Federal Tort Claim Act's ("FTCA") preservation of sovereign immunity for intentional torts-- applied to torts committed by law enforcement officers regardless of whether the officer was engaged in investigative or law enforcement activity. The Court, granting certiorari to address a division among circuits as to how the proviso should be interpreted, reasoned that a plain reading of the statute's text revealed congressional intent for immunity determinations to depend on officers' legal authority, not the specific activity they were performing during the alleged tort. Thus, under the Court's holding in Millbrook, the question of whether the government has waived sovereign immunity to intentional torts via the law enforcement proviso depends on the powers invested in the officer, not whether the officer was conducting a search, seizing evidence, or making an arrest. The Court's holding in Millbrook will increase the federal government's liability in regard to torts committed by law enforcement officers, and it leaves certain significant questions unanswered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on tort theory. The author presents his opinion on different versions of tort theory given by Professor John C.P. Goldberg from Harvard School of Law and Professor Benjamin C. Zipursky from Fordham University School of Law. The views expressed are in terms of sport fouls after several colleges changed their intercollegiate sport events to intramural sports. The author argues against intentional foul and whether they can be classified as intentional torts.

This Article takes as its starting point Tony Weir's comparative essays on the law of torts. In particular it examines the circumstances in which requirement to establish malice subsists in the intentional torts and tracks "the staggering march of negligence" first charted by Weir fifteen years ago. As the conclusion argues, this process is certain to continue unless greater precision can be achieved identifying the element of intention entailed in different wrongs and the interests thereby protected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents U.S. family law-related case digests which include legal proceedings which occurred between August 31, 2011 and August 31, 2012 and address topics such as adoption law, the legal aspects of child custody, and intentional torts. Cohabitation agreements in Iowa are mentioned, along with alimony in New York, prenuptial agreements in Connecticut, and attorney ethics in states such as Oregon. The termination of parental rights in California is also examined.

Although Title VII is often described as a "statutory tort," that label has, until recently, been mostly metaphorical. In Staub v. Proctor Hospital, however, the Supreme Court took an important step in incorporating concepts from tort law into the antidiscrimination statutes. Although Staub received some attention as a "cat's paw" (or subordinate bias) liability decision, it will have broader significance for two reasons. First, the Court explicitly adopted tort law's definition of "intent" for statutory discrimination cases, thus raising a threshold question of what it means to "intend to discriminate." This Article suggests that, rather than widening the notion of discriminatory intent, which Staub at first blush seems to do, the opinion actually adds another layer to the plaintiff's burden: for liability, the decisionmaker must now both have the requisite wrongful motivation and either desire a resulting "adverse employment action" or believe that such an action is substantially certain to occur. Second, and potentially more important, Staub for the first time imported the concept of proximate cause into the antidiscrimination context from its usual home in negligence law. Such a transplant is especially remarkable because proximate cause was unnecessary for resolving the case before the Court. The only purpose of adding a proximate cause requirement is to limit liability short of the full reach of but-for causation, and limiting employer liability tracks what the Court has done in other areas of federal statutory law. In those areas, the Court has not only applied proximate cause to intentional conduct (a phenomenon largely foreign to tort law from which the Court is theoretically borrowing) but has also adopted a more rigorous view of what proximate cause requires. Rather than looking only to the foreseeability of the plaintiff or the harm, which is the majority approach in the negligence arena, the Court has articulated a policy-driven perspective that allows it to restrict liability in the name of applying traditional tort doctrine. After exploring these issues, this Article argues that Staub's deployment of proximate cause in the discrimination area may have been intended to set the stage for a later effort to narrow the reach of Title VII and the other discrimination statutes by finding that "cognitive bias" does not proximately cause a resulting adverse employment action. While there is a spirited debate about whether Title VII bars adverse employment actions resulting from such bias, Staub may portend the Court's resolving that controversy by suggesting that only conscious bias can proximately cause an adverse employment action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the dignitary torts of defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) in relation to the U.S. Constitution, freedom of speech and expression protections, and American tort law as of September 2012. The First and Ninth Amendments to the nation's Constitution are addressed in regards to the right to sue for dignitary injuries. Other topics include American common law, the U.S. Supreme Court, and a historical overview of torts laws.

The article discusses the development of workers' compensation laws and the policies influencing these laws in Oklahoma. It explains the competing standards for intent-based exceptions to workers' compensation and assesses courts application of these standards. It describes the evolution of intentional tort exception in light of Oklahoma Supreme Court case Parret v. UNICCO Service Co. and provides an analysis of Parret in subsequent cases.