Search

The relevance of the subject under study was conditioned by the fact that in Ukrainian judicial practice, both judges and experts who are members of the Scientific Advisory Council of the Supreme Court have differed in their opinions regarding the possibility of disqualifying an heir from inheritance based on the requirements of Article 1224, Part 1 of the Civil Code of Ukraine. The purpose of this study was to clarify such general legal issues as the applicability and extension of the presumption of innocence in civil proceedings, and protection against violation of this principle in the resolution of certain civil law disputes. The methods of analysis, synthesis, comparison, generalisation, and case study were employed to examine the decisions of national courts of general jurisdiction of various instances, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, and the European Court of Human Rights. It was stated that the deceased heir – the accused, who inflicted serious bodily injuries to his father – the testator, as a result of which the latter died, cannot be considered as having no right to inheritance, based on the analysis of the content of Article 1224, Part 1 of the Civil Code of Ukraine. The study proved that a form of condemnation by public authorities and posthumous conviction outside the scope of due process of law would be establishment by a court in a civil case of the circumstances of intentional deprivation of the testator’s life by an heir, where the former died at the time of the consideration of a civil dispute. It is unacceptable for a civil court to rely on the circumstances of the indictment and the grounds for closing criminal proceedings against a deceased defendant – an heir. Only a guilty verdict establishes a person’s guilt. If it is referred to in other procedural decisions, it is probable that the person will be socially stigmatised. A civil court may not assume the powers of a court that are exercised only in criminal proceedings when resolving a dispute over inheritance. The practical value of the study lies in the development of arguments for the court and participants in the trial. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the meaning of the words with intent, destroy, in part or in whole, drawing upon evidence of the Genocide Convention and defends the genocide label as acts of mass killing with the goal of displacement rather than extermination consistent with the lost history of the Convention, and the link of ethnic cleansing to genocide. Topics discussed include intent to destroy in the Bosnia cases, moral coherence of genocide in language and law, and the Convention's drafting history.

The article discusses the U.S. Supreme Court case Counterman v. Colorado which deals with freedom of speech. Topics mentioned include the definition of stalking and true threats, the explanation of Vonnie's law, the first amendment meaning of intent, and the meaning of recklessness in true threat cases.

The "hard cases" for the law relating to accomplices deal with the definition of what counts as aiding and abetting a crime. A retailer might sell a murder weapon in the ordinary course of business, while an accomplice might do nothing because their help was simply not needed. How do we distinguish between these cases? The Capitol Riot is a striking example of this sort of hard case because there were so many people involved in so many different and ambiguous ways. Outside of the conceptually easy cases of someone caught on camera making off with property or attacking officers, who should be found guilty of what? A lack of a rubric for answering these questions makes collective crimes like the Capitol Riot especially challenging for the law. Drawing on philosophy of action and game-theoretic reasoning, we develop a novel model of complicity built on the concept of standing in reserve and show how it helps to understand joint intention and responsibility in complex social situations, such as those where only a proper subset of participants may actively engage in the primary criminal act. This model of complicity is consistent with the fundamental normative commitments of criminal law, such as the central importance of mens rea and punishing only intentional actions. Standing in reserve thus offers a principled, coherent approach to identifying complicity in these hard cases. Through a series of applications, we show how the standing in reserve model sheds light on the Capitol Riot as well as related controversies including guilt by association, terrorism, and felony murder. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores how arbitral rules in an unsophisticated arbitration agreement invalidates an employee's clear and unmistakable manifestation of intent to arbitrate questions of arbitrability. Topics discussed include role of delegation clauses in the agreement of parties to arbitrate questions of arbitrability, contract of adhesion theory, doctrine of unconscionability and principles of incorporation by reference, and rebuttable presumption of unsophistication for certain contracts.

There is a dimension of rationality, known as structural rationality, according to which a paradigmatic example of what it means to be rational is not to be akratic. Although some philosophers claim that aesthetics falls within the scope of rationality, a non-akrasia constraint prohibiting certain combinations of attitudes is yet to be developed in this domain. This essay is concerned with the question of whether such a requirement is plausible and, if so, whether it is an actual requirement of aesthetic rationality. Ultimately, this paper defends the view that aesthetics is no different from other domains in that it requires coherence between a subject's mental states (in the aesthetic case, between what is judged and what is aesthetically liked). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the provisions of commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policies, particularly those concerning assault and battery exclusions. Other topics include the expected or intended injury exclusion in standard CGL policies, the conditions where assault and battery can be considered as accidental, and the policies' intentional acts exclusion.

The aim of the present article is to accomplish two things. The first is to show that given some further plausible assumptions, existing challenges to the indispensability of knowledge in causal explanation of action fail. The second is to elaborate an overlooked and distinct argument in favor of the causal efficacy of knowledge. In short, even if knowledge were dispensable in causal explanation of action, it is still indispensable in causal explanation of other mental attitudes and, in particular, some reactive attitudes and factive emotions. Taking into account this sort of causal efficacy in determining which mental states are genuine mental states opens up new perspectives for defending the view that knowledge is the most general factive and genuine mental state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On March 9, 2021, in United States v. Lancaster, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a district court ruling on a First Step Act motion must consider intervening factual and legal developments when deciding whether to resentence an offender under the Act. In doing so, the Fourth Circuit exacerbated a circuit split regarding the proper scope of the First Step Act. Four circuits, led by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, have taken the opposite position and do not allow their district courts to consider intervening circumstances at all. The United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits, on the other hand, allow their district courts to consider intervening circumstances but do not require them to do so. Within the latter group, the First Circuit created a two-step framework for ruling on a First Step Act motion where a district court may not consider intervening circumstances when deciding whether to resentence but may do so when actually resentencing. This Comment argues that the Fourth Circuit incorrectly expanded the First Step Act's scope of relief in United States v. Lancaster because it did not properly balance the Act's statutory text with the Act's discretionary grant. Additionally, this Comment argues that the Supreme Court should adopt the First Circuit's two-step framework because that approach best realizes Congress's intent within the Act's textual limitations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper looks at deceit's ambivalent nature in Marguerite de Navarre's Heptameron. The first part of the article is made up of an overview of how legal commentators in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries understood the notion of deceit as both good (dolus bonus) and bad (dolus malus). The second part turns to Marguerite de Navarre's activities in the fall of 1525, when she was trying to negotiate her brother, Francis I's freedom from Charles V's prison following his capture at the Battle of Pavia. The legal commentaries and accounts of Marguerite's activities point to a decidedly ambivalent understanding of deceit in sixteenth-century France. In many of the Heptameron's novellas, as was the case in these commentaries and accounts, deceit can be good or bad, depending on who is doing it and to what end. Such an understanding of deceit helps modern readers grasp the moral complexity of the Heptaméron. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Tiempos Modernos is the property of Tiempos Modernos and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Will construction--the process wherein a trier of fact must determine the testator's probable intent because the testator's actual intent is not clear--is too little discussed and too often misunderstood in succession law jurisprudence. Yet, construction issues are becoming increasingly important due to a growing number of will and trust disputes concerning the determination of beneficiaries in a post-Obergefell United States. Currently, courts are being asked to construe terms like "spouse," "husband," "wife," "child," "son," "daughter," and "descendants" in estate planning documents during a time in which understandings of marriage, identity, reproduction, religious liberty, and public policy are rapidly evolving. Interestingly, these various construction cases may have disparate legal outcomes depending upon the states in which the cases are litigated, even in cases with similar underlying facts. In fact, these definitions and consequent outcomes may correlate with the views of the state's dominant political party--whether a state is red or blue. Data support the notion that red states and blue states generally have different attitudes toward LGBT issues, artificial reproductive technology, and religion. Data also support the inference that judges-- particularly elected judges--tend to be influenced by their respective state's attitude. Where a judge's decision-making is influenced one way or the other--toward the red side or the blue side--her approach to will construction and her understanding of public policy may reflect that tendency. Therefore, diverging public policies in red states and in blue states may affect judicial construction and govern dispositions. Accordingly, this Article addresses real-world construction issues in the estate planning context where a particular state's approach to the redefinition of both words and policy may influence the deemed intent ascribed to a donor's words. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on how the transferred intent doctrine developed to provide for redress in cases where tort law traditionally left plaintiffs empty handed. Topics discussed include doctrine based on transferred intent be applied to climate change fraud cases; substantial step toward holding companies like those in the fossil fuel industry liable for misrepresentations and sea level rise or other climate-change caused phenomena resulting from global warming.

The article examines the issues behind the integration of 'no contest clauses' in estate planning. Topics include the primacy of testamentary freedom as reason for the enforcement of said clauses in wills and other estate planning documents, how California testators and their lawyers allegedly overuse the 'no contest' provisions, and the use of sticky default rules to avoid issues emanating from testators' intent in boilerplate no contest clauses.

The article discusses issues in contractual boilerplate and a party's intent in the construction of contracts. Topics include the duty of the courts to refrain from enforcing contract terms that are illegal or contrary to vital public policy, the hard boilerplate contracts or contract of adhesion, and the pari passu clauses in sovereign debt contracts.

North Carolina should abolish its location requirement for making a holographic will. Under the North Carolina holographic wills statute, a handwritten document must be found in an approved location after its author's death in order to be regarded as a holographic will. No other state has mandated a location requirement for holographic wills since 1941. The location requirement furthers neither of the core functions of will execution formalities: it makes probate courts' decisions less efficient but no more accurate. And, because holographic wills in North Carolina are not technically executed until they are found postmortem, confounding doctrinal issues arise when testators attempt to revoke them before death. The location requirement of the holographic wills statute imposes costs without countervailing benefits. Thus, the North Carolina General Assembly should abolish the location requirement from the holographic wills statute. In its place, the location in which a decedent stores a purported holographic will should be relegated to simply one contributing factor in assessing testamentary intent. Such a revision would reflect sound policy and bring North Carolina into accord with the rest of the country when it comes to the making of holographic wills. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Competition law is characterized by uncertainty: the vagueness and open-ended character of its provisions and the creative approach of enforcers and case-law indeed blur considerably the boundaries between lawful and unlawful conduct. It submitted that intent – which consists of a mental element coupled with a finalistic element – can be relied upon within the competition assessment as a useful disambiguating factor. To do so, however, the case-law should come clear as to intent importance and relinquish the orthodox position pursuant to which intent would be immaterial or accessory for competition law assessment. This because such position, despite being reinstated in theory as a mantra, is in substance often disavowed: intent importance is particularly evident under an Article 102 TFEU perspective. Furthermore, albeit in more limited cases, intent is also relied upon within Article 101 TFEU analysis, showing that its disambiguating role can be important for the whole competition law assessment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article tackles the issue of genocidal intent by placing emphasis on the nature of genocide as a hierarchical and collective crime. While traditionally it is the collective dimension of victimization that is highlighted, in this article the author highlights the collective dimension of perpetration, which is often downplayed in genocide cases. This is done by examining two specific cases pertaining to the genocide in Bosnia (Trbić and Nikolić) and the evidentiary patterns followed by the judges in these cases. Moreover, the author relies on his interviews with perpetrators (in Rwanda, Burundi, Bosnia, and Cambodia). Broadly speaking, the approach taken is that often the intent of individual perpetrators is conflated with more general collective policies and there are elements of this interplay that should be taken into account. It would seem more appropriate for the author to emphasize these collective aspects rather than inferring genocidal intent of individual perpetrators from a set of contextual elements which may not really be sufficient in determining the special intent required. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thousands of patients in the United States live in limbo every day waiting for a lifesaving organ transplant, and the gap between the number of people who need a transplant and the number of available organs widens every year. Every state currently allows individuals to unilaterally indicate their intent to donate their organs upon death, but in practice, family members are frequently allowed to override the express intentions of decedents. In addition, the current U.S. "opt-in" system fails to reach its full potential because many eligible decedents never express their desires to become or not to become organ donors, and family members refuse to consent to donation or cannot be contacted in time. This Note argues that states should again take the lead in organdonation regulation to solve the organ-shortage crisis and proposes a twofold solution for states to adopt. First, states should switch to a presumed-consent, or opt-out, model. Second, states should implement a monitoring and enforcement mechanism through which state attorneys general and state health departments enforce first-person authorization. Organ procurement organizations should be required to adopt bylaws requiring their strict compliance with decedents' wishes, and a failure to do so would give state attorneys general grounds to sue for breach of 501(c)(3) status obligations. The result would be to increase the supply of viable organs for transplant by interpreting an individual's failure to opt out as a desire to donate and to enforce this choice by not allowing anyone to override it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses pocket deeds which are nondelivered deeds that were executed during the lives of titleholders and expected to be delivered to grantees upon the deaths of the titleholders, and it mentions the conveyance of real property in America and various deed-related legal cases such as Bould v. Coe and Jeffords v. Jeffords. Deed delivery requirements and a constructive delivery doctrine are assessed, along with a grantor's intent, a life estate, and land trusts.

Inheritance disqualification is basically a personal civil sanction with personal characteristic (applies only to the perpetrator of the act prescribed by law) that removes a natural person from the inheritance in cases stipulated by law. Disqualification is the decline in the succession of the individual, and has the effect of removing the legal or testament successor from the inheritance. Disqualification of the legal successor is found only by the court. It operates by law, it is found by the court at the request of any interested party or ex officio, but in order to avoid the processes by which disqualification is found, the successor can renounce the inheritance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the final draft of the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law, Liability Insurance that was approved in May 2018. Topics covered include the Restatement's virtual silence on the concept of intent, its omission of the competing judicial interpretations of the term "accident," and the definition of fortuity in the liability insurance context.

The article offers information on the analysis of intent element of generic burglary in the case United States v. McArthur by U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. It discusses that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated requirement of intent to form at the moment of unlawful entry or remaining in for the purposes of enhanced sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act.

In Wood v Capita Insurance Services Ltd [2017] AC 1173, the UK Supreme Court emphasised that contract interpretation involves 'striking a balance between the indications given by the language and the implications of the competing constructions'. This paper investigates the nature of the balancing act at the heart of construction. It argues that the balancing exercise is easier to comprehend if construction is understood in a particular way, namely, as a technique employed to infer objective intention from the choice of words in a contract. The admissible factors—ie, the potential meanings for the words, the background, the purpose of the contract and the consequences of the potential interpretations—serve as indicators of intention. The composition and relative strength of the competing considerations ultimately determines the resolution of the dispute. Often, the objective intention of the parties is found in the complexities and implications of the contract text. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this essay is twofold. First, it seeks to examine how Russia and the European Union understand the emerging Eurasian space. We will do this by looking at how the two narrate the space, the use of power and each other. Second, we want to argue that the narratives at the heart of the conceptual and normative maps that guide their actions and behaviour create an essentially ontological security dilemma; that is, behaviour aimed primarily at enhancing confidence in the identity and continuity of a political community threatens the ontological security of other actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our question is this: What makes an act one of entrapment? We make a standard distinction between legal entrapment, which is carried out by parties acting in their capacities as (or as deputies of) law-enforcement agents, and civil entrapment, which is not. We aim to provide a definition of entrapment that covers both and which, for reasons we explain, does not settle questions of permissibility and culpability. We explain, compare, and contrast two existing definitions of legal entrapment to commit a crime that possess this neutrality. We point out some problems with the extensional correctness of these definitions and propose a new definition that resolves these problems. We then extend our definition to provide a more general definition of entrapment, encompassing both civil and legal cases. Our definition is, we believe, closer to being extensionally correct and will, we hope, provide a clearer basis for future discussions about the ethics of entrapment than do the definitions upon which it improves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although in German and in Spanish legal systems there are no express provisions with regard to the criminal negligence (culpa), this has not hindered the legal doctrine and jurisprudence to thoroughly analyse this form of guilt. This made it possible to qualify as intentional offences some deeds which in our legal system are considered to be committed with conscious negligence (involving foresight). The difficulty to distinguish between indirect intention (dolus eventualis) and conscious negligence (luxuria) has nonetheless determined Spanish courts to ask the legislator to provide a clear definition of indirect intention, which could be an additional argument with respect to the weaknesses entailed by such a legal approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Modern day vicarious liability cases often address the liability of enterprises and institutions whose agents have committed intentional acts. Increasingly, when employers are sued, the line is blurred between the principal's vicarious liability for its agent's acts and its own direct liability for hiring and/or failing to supervise or control its agent. From an economic deterrence perspective, the imposition of vicarious liability induces employers to adopt cost-justified preventative measures, including selective hiring and more stringent supervision and discipline, and, in some instances, to truncate the scope of their business activities. Negligence-based direct liability likewise induces employers to adopt cost-justified preventative measures (without constraining activity levels to the degree that strict liability does). This raises questions. Why doesn't direct employer negligence liability suffice, in terms of deterring employees' intentional torts? Or conversely, so long as there is vicarious liability, is there any need for direct negligence liability at all? In this Article, I argue that, as a form of strict liability, vicarious liability will have an edge over direct employer negligence liability to the extent that there is a significant risk of under-detection of the failures of an employer's preventative measures. Traces of this under-detection rationale for vicarious liability can be found in the academic literature and court decisions, but it warrants further elaboration. The risk of under-detection provides a strong justification for the expansion of the scope of institutional or employer vicarious liability. The under-detection rationale, moreover, has the potential to serve as a coherent framework for some modern doctrinal debates, including whether punitive damages should be imposed either vicariously or directly upon employers when their employees commit intentional torts. Specifically, I argue that the under-detection rationale correspondingly strengthens the case for punitive damages in direct negligence cases and weakens the case for punitive damages imposed in vicarious liability cases. Focusing on under-detection, vicarious liability acts as a quasi-substitute for punitive damages. And seen through this lens, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 909, Punitive Damages Against a Principal--typically defended as a "complicity rule" limiting the imposition of vicarious punitive liability on fairness grounds--is justified on economic deterrence grounds by allowing punitive damages coupled with direct negligence liability but limiting its operation in the vicarious liability sphere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article is about what malice should mean under bankruptcy law. Malice is used in other areas of law as a sorting function--to identify wrongful acts that are especially grievous. For example, criminal law uses malice to separate murder from manslaughter. The Bankruptcy Code uses malice to perform a similar sorting function. Bankruptcy law discharges or forgives certain kinds of debts. It separates debts that society is willing to forgive from debts that are not forgivable. One way it accomplishes this sorting function is through Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code, which excepts from discharge debts for "willful and malicious injury by the debtor.". The Supreme Court has interpreted the word malicious to require "a wrongful act, done intentionally, without just cause or excuse." But neither the Supreme Court nor the circuit courts have provided meaningful guidance on the degree of wrongfulness that is required. Because intentionally injuring another is inherently a wrongful act, there should be a difference between a mere willful injury and the required "willful and malicious" injury. In addition, a circuit court split has developed on whether malicious requires intent, and if so, what level of intent. This Article seeks to clarify the meaning of malicious. It explains why courts should stop construing malicious to require intent. It also recommends the definition of malicious be changed to require an "extraordinarily" wrongful act so that malice can accomplish its sorting function. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neuroscience has already changed the understanding of how intent forms and is acted upon, how an individual's cognitive processes shape behavior, and how bio-psychosocial history and neurodevelopmental approaches provide information that has been largely missing from the assessment of intent. In this paper, we first review the state of forensic assessment of mental condition and intent, focused primarily on the weaknesses of the current approach. In Section 2, we discuss neurobehavioral forensic assessment, which is a neuroscience-based approach. Section 3 focuses on the changing understanding of mental illness and how neuroscience is pushing law towards a functional capacity-and-ability model and away from a diagnostic cut-off model. Finally, in Sections 4 and 5, we turn to the role of social and environmental context in shaping behavior and propose a model of behavioral intent in line with the scientific evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Criminal responsibility in the American legal system requires the presence of an actus reus-a harmful act that was committed voluntarily-and a mens rea, or guilty mind. Courts frequently consider questions surrounding mens rea but rarely question whether an act was committed voluntarily. Thus, courts presume that acts have been committed voluntarily and with an ill will; retribution, which serves the primary basis for punishment in the USA, relies on this presumption. Research in neuroscience and the behavioral sciences, however, suggests that this presumption is flawed and not sufficiently robust to justify punishment that is grounded in retribution. In this paper we discuss the presumption of voluntariness and free will inherent in the law, provide examples of how the courts have conflated actus reus and mens rea and the consequences of doing so, and the implications of neuroscience and behavioral science research for actus reus (also known as the voluntary act requirement). Finally, we propose re-conceptualizing punishment within a consequentialist, empirically-based framework that does not rely on folk psychological notions about human behavior and reinvigorates the actus reus as the foundational requirement for legal responsibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the facilitation of the intent of deceased social media users, regarding their social media accounts. Topics discussed include the post-life policies of social networking websites such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram; its comparison with traditional trusts and estates law; and the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act (RUFADAA) and the Privacy Expectation Afterlife Choices Act (PEAC) in the U.S.

Federal substantive criminal law and constitutional remedies might seem to be distinct bodies of law. But since the closing decades of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has demonstrated an increasing unwillingness in both areas to impose either direct or indirect sanctions on persons who violate the law but whose conduct is not necessarily indicative of an unlawful or antisocial intent. Instead, the Court has tended to narrow liability or remedy to instances in which there is evidence that the regulated actor contravened not just the law on the books but also a social understanding of legality. We call this supervening criterion for individual criminal or civil liability an apparent fault requirement. This Article documents the contemporaneous rise of an apparent fault requirement across two domains of Supreme Court jurisprudence and explores its causes as well as its effects. We argue that the demand for apparent fault is likely to make some kinds of coercive regulation less costly even as it imposes an inhibiting tax on other species of state intervention. Rather than diagnosing apparent fault's rise as an endogenous product of legal reasoning, we situate it within a broader historical and intellectual context as a way of showing the value of understanding doctrine in the context of its sociocultural moment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article distinguishes claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress from negligent infliction claims, and it argues that while intentional infliction is a legitimate and valuable theory of recovery, negligent infliction is not. Topics discussed include professional situations like employment, marital in which the intentional infliction tort should not be allowed if it overlaps other traditional claims; and model statute defining intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The rise of the willful blindness doctrine in the Spanish legal system implies a structural change in the subjective imputation system, given that according to this doctrine, it is posible to punish as intentional act a conduct which may be described as ignoring elements of crime that could and should have been known by the perpetrator. This new approach entails the equalization of effective knowledge of the elements of a crime with the duty to know them, therefore understanding the ascertainment of intent in criminal law as an act of attribution, and leading to a complete normativization of the concept of intent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fourth Amendment cases are replete with references to "purpose." Typically, these references pertain to the motivations of individual officers and occasionally to those of public institutions. That courts pay attention to purpose is unsurprising. Across many areas of law, an alleged wrongdoer's intentions are often critical to determining liability, a remedy, or both. Purpose analysis in Fourth Amendment cases, however, is surprisingly confused. The Supreme Court has, without explanation, advanced separate frameworks for analyzing purpose--objective, subjective, and programmatic. The only consistent thing about the three approaches is that they all fail to ensure that law enforcement agents behave transparently and honestly. The failure is particularly worrisome because of the increasingly salient role that purpose analysis has played in recent Supreme Court cases. This Article contends that courts and policy makers should use purpose as an ex ante institutional design principle. This would be in stark contrast to its current role as a judicial device for ascertaining an actor's past motivations. A single enforcement bureaucracy should not be responsible for too broad a range of functions, particularly i f those functions implicate very different levels of state coercion--for example, enforcing felony narcotics laws as opposed to traffic laws. Modern police departments tend to have sprawling mandates that sometimes make it impossible for policy makers and officers to differentiate and rank distinct goals. Mandate sprawl is particularly problematic because it creates opportunities for pretextual searches and seizures--police have access to a broad range of rationales to justify conduct actually carried out for impermissible motives. Were enforcement bureaucracies required to differentiate enforcement activities by purpose, it would go a long way in curing this problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on acceptance of holographic wills in other non-Florida jurisdictions in the U.S. Topics discussed include Florida's antagonistic position against holographic wills; mechanism for effectuating testamentary intent; and enactment of Wills Act for governing the same. It also mentions about Dalk v. Allen court case on the same.

The article discusses the authors' views about the legal aspects of asset protection and the role of valuation in assessing fraudulent transfer exposure as of 2017, and it mentions how creditors can prove a fraudulent transfer by showing actual or constructive intent to prevent collection under Florida's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. The process of determining if a debtor received reasonably equivalent value for business assets is examined, along with limited liability companies.

In art. 16 paragraph (2) and (4), the new Romanian Criminal code provides „(2) Guilt exists when an action is committed with direct intent, with basic intent or oblique intent.” and „(4) An action is committed with basic intent when the perpetrator: a) can foresee the outcome of their actions but does not accept it, believing without reason that such outcome will not occur; b) cannot foresee the outcome of their actions, though they should and could have done so.” In art. 16 paragraph (6), the Criminal code provides „(6) The act consisting of an action or inaction shall constitute an offense when committed with direct intent. The act committed with basic intent constituted an offense only when the law specifically establishes it as such.” How to find out, the new romanian Criminal code regulates exlicitly the basic intent with foresight and the basic intent whidout forsight. The Criminal code does not regulate other approaches of basic intent, which are analyzed in doctrine. However, these are reference points to be taken into consideration when the judiciaries analyze the criminal guilt whenever an offence has been committed under the criminal law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the legal aspects of the branding and trademark practices of charitable organizations in America as of 2017, and it mentions judicial interpretations of the U.S. Lanham Act, the over-enforcement of trademarks, and several trademark litigation matters in the country. The concept of trademark bullying by charities is addressed, along with shaming in the nonprofit sector, trademark costs, a defendant's deceptive intent, and pleading requirements in the U.S.

The American Law Institute's Third Restatement of Torts was initially conceived as a series of separate projects, each with its own reporters. From 1998 through 2010, the ALI completed and published three different segments: Products Liability, Apportionment of Liability, and Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm. Initially, the ALI did not intend to restate the intentional torts, believing that the Second Restatement's treatment of these torts was clear and largely authoritative. It was ultimately persuaded that there were numerous unresolved issues that needed to be addressed. As a result, it authorized a new project on Intentional Torts--a project that is currently ongoing. Rather than applaud or critique the specific choice the reporters are making, I have chosen to discuss two broader concerns regarding the project. The first concern is that the piecemeal nature of assembling all the separate projects of the Third Restatement of Torts (including the review and adoption of different sections within Intentional Torts) has made the Intentional Torts reporters' task more difficult than it should have been and may contribute to an overall product that is flawed in important respects, primarily because of inconsistencies that cannot easily be corrected. The second concern is that the Intentional Torts reporters have too often lost sight of the conceptual distinctions between intentional and nonintentional torts. Although I agree that these conceptual distinctions should not have driven the basic organization of the project, as was once suggested, I argue that the reporters are making doctrinal decisions that further blur, rather than clarify, the boundaries between the intentional torts and other torts, primarily negligence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]