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In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that executing individuals with intellectual disability violates the Constitution. Due to this categorical exemption, the accuracy and reliability of an intellectual disability determination is literally a matter of life or death. We tested the influence of context on mild intellectual disability diagnosis in a sample of 179 people with intellectual disability expertise. We found that experts diagnosed intellectual disability at nearly identical rates in death penalty and disability benefits cases. Men, Republicans, and people who believed intellectual disability is not an excuse for a crime were significantly less likely to diagnose intellectual disability in both types of cases. These findings suggest that in this sample, the facts of the crime did not cause the experts to refrain from diagnosing intellectual disability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article describes a quasi-experimental study of the effectiveness of Responsive Aggression Regulation Therapy (Re-ART) in terms of recidivism for 16- to 21-yearold juveniles with aggression problems and high risk of recidivism. In a Dutch juvenile justice institution, an experimental group received Re-ART (n = 63, Re-ART group) and a waitlist control group received Treatment as Usual (n = 28, TAU group). Results indicated that Re-ART is significantly more effective than TAU in reducing the juveniles' recidivism risk for violent offending. Compared with the TAU group, the Re- ART group showed significantly less violent crimes after 2 and 3 years, less property crimes after 2 years, and less general recidivism after 2 and 3 years. There was no significant difference between groups in recidivism of property crimes with violence. Ethnicity, mild intellectual disabilities, substance abuse, and age did not moderate the effects on recidivism outcome, which indicates that Re-ART was equally effective for various groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the effects of legislatively mandated changes in terminology for National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) questions on proxy and self-reports of an important condition. Specifically, we examine changes from the use of the term "mental retardation" to "intellectual disability" that were mandated by what is now known as "Rosa's Law," an act signed by President Obama in October 2010. Our analyses focus on changes in national prevalence of measures of intellectual disability during the period 2011–2016, compared to 1997–2010, for the population as a whole and for demographic subgroups. Findings show that the change in question wording implemented in the NHIS after Rosa's Law produced a small, albeit statistically significant, increase in reporting of intellectual disabilities for adults and for children. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The intersection of intellectual disability and the death penalty is now clearly established. Both under the U.S. Supreme Court's constitutional decisions and under the terms of many state statutes, individual defendants who have that disability cannot be sentenced to death or executed. It now falls to trial, appellate, and post-conviction courts to determine which individual criminal defendants are entitled to the law's protection. This Article attempts to assist judges in performing that task. After a brief discussion of the Supreme Court's decisions in Atkins v. Virginia, Hall v. Florida, and Moore v. Texas, it analyzes the component parts and terminology of the clinical definition of intellectual disability. It then offers more detailed discussion of a number of the clinical issues that arise frequently in adjudicating these cases. For each of these issues, the Article's text and the accompanying notes attempt to provide judges with a thorough survey of the relevant clinical literature, and an explanation of the terminology used by clinical professionals. Our purpose is to help those judges to become more knowledgeable consumers of the clinical reports and expert testimony presented to them in individual cases, and to help them reach decisions that are consistent with what the clinical literature reveals about the nature of intellectual disability and best professional practices in the diagnostic process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the impact of the bright-line cut-off rule and the adversarial expert explanation of adaptive functioning on capital juror comprehension of intellectual disability (ID). It explores the link between experts' difficulty of diagnosing ID and lay jurors' difficulty of evaluating the expert and lay evidence. It also explains the variability of juror assessment of ID based on some jurors' view that ID is a more organic sympathetic disorder.

The article discusses the author's views about the American Supreme Court cases Hall v. Florida and Moore v. Texas which deal with clinical definitions of intellectual disability, and it mentions independent judgment, a proposed solution involving underinclusiveness under the U.S. Constitution's Equal Protection Clause, and additional requirements for defendants. The case Atkins v. Virginia, which deals with substantial guidance on an intellectual disability definition, is examined.

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses several reports published within issue on topics including influx of persons with serious mental illness into jails and prisons; the U.S. criminal justice system; and need of reform in justice and mental health system interactions.

In Atkins v. Virginia, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment precludes capital punishment for intellectually disabled offenders. Death penalty states responded with laws defining intellectual disability in various ways. In Hall v. Florida, the Court narrowly struck down the use of a measured IQ of 70 to mark the upper limit of intellectual disability because it created 'an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability will be executed'. But the Court was unclear if not inconsistent in its description of an upper limit that would be acceptable. Four dissenting Justices accused the majority not only of misconstruing the Eighth Amendment, but also of misunderstanding elementary statistics and psychometrics. This article uses more complete statistical reasoning to explicate the Court's concept of unacceptable risk. It describes better ways to control the risk of error than the Court's confidence intervals, and it argues that, to the extent that the Eighth Amendment allows any quantitative cut-score in determining an offender's intellectual disability, these more technically appropriate methods are constitutionally permissible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rosa's Law, which changed references of "mental retardation" to "intellectual disability" within federal legislation, marked recognition by the federal government that the term "mental retardation" is outdated and pejorative. However, Rosa's Law did not apply to many notable federal programs related to disability, such as Medicaid. This article explores if and how the term "mental retardation" was used within Medicaid Home and Community Based Services 1915(c) waivers, as they are the most prevalent provider of long-term services and supports for people with intellectual and developmental disabilities. Waivers provide some of the most advanced community services and the language used in them should reflect this. Although an overwhelming majority of waivers used "mental retardation," we found that the term was used less for later benchmark dates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses how courts in Texas, Florida, and Alabama have addressed death penalty cases after the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Atkins v. Virginia. Topics discussed include relationship between intelligence and criminal culpability; the U.S Supreme Court's decision in the case "Penry v. Lynaugh" related to execution of defendants with intellectual disabilities (ID); and number of executions of individuals with ID.

When the Supreme Court's 2002 Atkins decision held that it was unconstitutional to execute defendants with intellectual disability, the ruling was heralded as an important protection for these vulnerable defendants. However, courts have been faced with a number of conceptual and procedural issues because determining who has an intellectual disability has remained elusive, especially for defendants whose intellectual disability is considered to be "borderline" (i.e., IQs within the 65-75 range). This Article examines some of these issues from three states (Texas, Florida, and Alabama). Because the meaning of intellectual disability and attempts to measure it have been elusive, the courts' search for a particular objective measure for determining who should be exempt under Atkins will continue to result in arbitrary outcomes. This Article proposes that the focus should shift to a broader conceptualization of intellectual disability embodied within a social construction model to include examining the social context and its relationship to how an individual functions and reasons. Only then can a greater number of defendants whofunction along the borders of "intelligence" benefit from the Supreme Court's Atkins ruling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Mental Deficiency Act (1913) was prompted by the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-Minded. Two Birmingham figures, Ellen Pinsent and Dr William Potts, were part of and witnesses to the Commission, ensuring that the city and their pioneering diagnostics influenced national legislation. Against the backdrop of the nineteenth-century institutional landscape, this article explores how the apparently clear definitions and medical terminology (now obsolete and considered insulting) engineered through the legislation, gave way locally to more nuanced understandings. Using the case study of Monyhull Colony, this article considers how these local interpretations funnelled children into, through, and rarely out of the specialist mental deficiency facility in England between c.1913 and c.1940. During each stage of this filtering process - in education, in the community, at Mental Deficiency Committees, on admission to the colony, at the colony school, and on reaching the age of sixteen - it will show that a dense and ever-expanding panoply of descriptors and organising principles was employed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides advice on how to align the U.S. criminal justice system with the mental health profession in the wake of the American Supreme Court's ruling in the 2014 case Hall v. Florida which deals with suspected murderer Freddie Hall, mental competency, and intelligence level (IQ) requirements for a intellectual disability defense. The Eight Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is addressed in relation to Florida law and the capital punishment case Atkins v. Virginia..

The author reflects on the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the case Hall v. Florida related to the adjudicating claims of intellectual disability and the plaintiff Freddie Lee Hall asked a Florida state court in a post-conviction proceeding to vacate his death sentence. It also mentions the U.S. Supreme Court case Atkins v. Virginia related to the execution of individuals with intellectual disabilities. It also mentions the criteria for the testing of intelligence quotient (IQ).

When the Eighth Amendment was ratified, common law protections categorically prohibited the execution of "idiots." On two occasions, the Supreme Court considered whether these protections proscribe executing people with intellectual disabilities; however, the Court concluded that idiocy protections shielded only the "profoundly or severely mentally retarded." This Note argues that the Court's historical analysis of idiocy protections was unduly narrow. It then proceeds to reassess common law insanity protections for idiots and finds strong evidence that these protections included people with a relatively wide range of intellectual disabilities. Based on this new historical account, this Note argues that there are people with intellectual disabilities on death row today who likely would have been protected from execution in 1791. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nowadays, both the demographic shift to an ageing population and the development of neurodegenerative diseases are raising new legal challenges regarding the protection of intellectual disability. These challenges cannot be addressed from a single perspective, but require a cross-cutting approach. This article aspires to reflect on the supportive measures that have been introduced in this subject recently; on the one hand, they give more relevance to the autonomy, but on the other hand, they provide more scope for public intervention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on various reports on a law reform including jury empanelment and mental impairment in criminal trials by the Victorian Law Reform Commission, and the Witchcraft Suppression Act 1957 by the South African Law Reform Commission. Topics discussed include the judicial decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the Singer v. United States case, Propensity evidence based on the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence, and Native title review by the Australian Law Reform Commission.

ABSTRACT The use of national numbers and percentages to describe the millions of people with intellectual disabilities is beyond the comprehension of most people. The challenge is to personalize these numbers if we are to bring increased attention to these individuals. Examples of Census Bureau report data for the States, Congressional Districts, Counties, and High School districts are suggested as a format to lobby legislators with the realities of the numbers of their constituents who are affected by intellectual disabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neuroimages and, more generally, neuroscience evidence are increasingly used in the courtroom in hope of mitigating punishment in criminal cases. Many legal commentators express concern because they fear that the prejudicial effect of such evidence significantly outweighs its probative value. In light of earlier empirical studies, this concern is predominantly directed toward the visual impact of neuroimages. Thus, the conventional wisdom in the legal literature is that the visual impact of neuroimages drives the overpersuasiveness of neuroscience evidence. However, recent empirical studies draw into question the conventional wisdom because they show that neuroimages themselves are not overly persuasive. Thus, this Comment proposes a new theory--the structure/function paradigm--as a competing theory to the conventional wisdom. This paradigm posits that the type of brain abnormality drives the prejudicial nature of neuroscience evidence, not the visual impact of neuroimages. That is, laypeople perceive structural and functional brain abnormalities differently and view structural abnormalities as more causally potent than functional abnormalities. This Comment seeks to show that the structure/function paradigm provides a more consistent and compelling story than the conventional wisdom by resolving contradictions in the empirical studies and applying the paradigm to actual cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the place of the intersections of the criminal law of assault and the Family Court's welfare jurisdiction in rendering Family Court authorised sterilisation of girls with intellectual disability a legally permissible form of violence. The article does this by examining court authorised sterilisation of girls with intellectual disability by reference to the concepts of 'legal violence' and 'abnormality'. The article's central argument is that Family Court authorised sterilisation of girls with intellectual disability is a form of lawful and 'good' violence against abnormal legal subjects. Such girls are - by reason of their incapacity - positioned outside the group of 'normal' legal subjects of assault who have the capacity to decide to consent to contact with their otherwise 'impermeable' and legally sacrosanct bodies. As the girls with intellectual disability are deemed to constitute 'abnormal' legal subjects of assault, the lawfulness of the contact involved in the act of their sterilisation is not dependent on the consent of the girls themselves, but instead on the consent of their parents as authorised by the Family Court acting in its welfare jurisdiction. In the course of authorising parental consent to sterilisation, the Family Court not only renders an act of sterilisation 'lawful violence', but also 'good violence' through the characterisation of girls with intellectual disability as absolutely different to individuals without disability, and through the characterisation of the act in legal, familial and medical terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the wake of deinstitutionalisation, a range of punitive, restrictive and coercive measures for controlling the lives of people with intellectual disabilities have emerged from criminal law. This article critically engages with one of these measures, the Australian state of Victoria's, supervised treatment order (STO) regime. Drawing on STO decisions, this article argues that, during STO tribunal hearings, the margins of criminal and civil law converge, and the margins of law and medicine further conflate such that the medical diagnosis of a person's intellectual disability becomes a legal 'diagnosis' of that person's innate and ongoing risk and danger to society. That is to say, during STO tribunal hearings, the characteristics and features which typically contribute to medical diagnoses of intellectual disability become the characteristics and features which are now used to 'diagnose' the presence of risk and dangerousness in legal subjects. The article explores the implications of these converging diagnoses for our understanding of people with intellectual disabilities' engagement with civil and criminal justice systems, the fluid nature of medico-legal boundaries, and the shifting nature of civil and criminal institutional controls over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

State-based supports and services are essential to improving the quality of life of many individuals with intellectual disabilities. However, access to vital assistance is often reserved for those who satisfy the state's definition of "intellectual disability." On a national scale, Connecticut employs the most restrictive definition of intellectual disability, denying services to individuals with intensive needs simply because they have an IQ score above 69. Effectively, Connecticut quantifies the quality of life of individuals with intellectual disabilities. This Note argues that Connecticut's eligibility criteria is inconsistent with the best practices set forth by the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD). In assessing intellectual disability, the AAIDD dispels of strict IQ cutoff scores and instead engages in a holistic inquiry emphasizing the individual's overall well-being. This Note calls upon the Connecticut legislature to enact a statutory amendment that will modernize Connecticut's eligibility practices, and ensure that Connecticut is meeting its imperative of providing assistance to those most in need. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports the decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme and Superior Court in the cases Commonwealth v. Holmes and Commonwealth v. Abraham related to Post Conviction Relief Act. It discusses the limiting of post-conviction relief to defendants who are in custody and also mentions the assessment of claims regarding mental retardation during post-conviction proceeding.

The article offers information on the relationship between history of mental retardation and the death penalty in the U.S. with relevance to the ruling in Godfrey v. Georgia case. It analyzes the judicial opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Atkins v. Virginia, related to execution of a defendant with an intellectual disability violating the Eighth Amendment. It reports about the qualifying criteria of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) IV-TR.

Accessible summary People with learning disabilities may not know about sexual relationships., People with learning disabilities may need education about sexual relationships., People with learning disabilities may need education about contraception., Summary The introduction of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 has brought to the fore issues regarding capacity in various clinical settings. One important area where capacity assessment is often vital is regarding vulnerable people being able to consent to sexual relations. Case law from courts has evolved with regard to this sometimes complex and emotive issue both before and after the implementation of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. This article describes and analyses the evolution of such case law which predominantly involves people with learning disabilities. In doing so, it explains key principles and tests both for consenting to sexual relations and for the use of contraception which can be applied and used in clinical practice. The article also discusses the associated human rights issues for vulnerable adults in trying to balance the right to sexual relations as part of an individual's private life whilst managing potential abuse issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cross-examination is fundamental to the adversarial criminal trial. However, when children and witnesses with an intellectual disability are cross-examined, it can lead to unreliable evidence and further trauma to the victim. Various reforms in Australian jurisdictions, England and elsewhere have had only limited practical effect as they fail to address the underlying problems that arise from the adversarial system itself. While any changes must maintain a defendant's vital right to a fair trial, the current criminal trial may allow defendants an illegitimate advantage. Fairness to the defendant, victim and society can and must be balanced. In order to reduce any illegitimate advantage, direct cross-examination should be removed. Instead, cross-examination should be conducted in advance of trial by a suitable third party and video-recorded. A similar process is used in Norway. A wholesale transformation into an inquisitorial system is not required for the benefits of non-adversarial examination to be achieved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background Intellectually disabled offenders may have different characteristics than offenders with average intellectual functioning. We therefore compared pre-trial reported defendants with an IQ score ≤70, 71-84 and ≥85 points. Methods Nationwide database of pre-trial psychiatric reports requested by Dutch courts between 2000 and 2006 with a reported level of intellectual functioning ( n = 12 186). Results Defendants with an IQ score between 71 and 84 ( n = 2 439 reports; 20.0%) and ≤70 ( n = 539 reports; 4.4%) were younger, more often from an ethnic minority and more often diagnosed with psycho-organic syndromes, developmental and conduct disorders as compared with defendants with an IQ score of 85 or higher. In addition, there was an increased risk of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and rape as indicted crime and a decreased odds ratio of having a steady job and cannabis abuse in defendants with an IQ score of 71-84. Conclusion Intellectually disabled defendants have different characteristics than defendants without intellectually disability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background Studies focusing on pathways in the criminal justice system for individuals with intellectual disability are limited in that they only study individuals once they are involved in the system and do not consider the pathways into it. The purpose of this study is to examine predisposing factors that lead to various outcomes for individuals with intellectual disability when police are called to respond to their behavioural crises. Method The current study examined the outcome of police response to 138 individuals with intellectual disability in crisis. Following police intervention, 15 individuals were arrested, 76 were taken to the emergency department and 47 received on-scene resolution. Comparisons between the three groups were conducted. Results The three groups differed in terms of residence at the time of crisis, history of forensic involvement and type of crisis. Police intervention with adults with intellectual disability can happen for different reasons. Both individual and situational predictors explained this outcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article sheds light on the obstacles that are encountered by persons who are suffering from mental deficiencies in context to employment and therapeutical benefits denial. It suggests that a fundamental rights perspective and an obligation for plausible accommodation for handicapped workers may serve as a measure to prompt labour markets to take such workers' reality into account.

This article discusses the history of the grassroots movement led by self-advocates and their families to replace the stigmatizing term mental retardation with intellectual disability in federal statute. It also describes recent and pending changes in federal regulations and policy to adopt the new terminology for Social Security and Medicaid. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intellectual disability (ID) is differently yet validly described by different professions. Legal professionals find it most useful to consider ID as a disability rather than a disorder. Because the law regulates the actions of individuals in a society and the actions of society on an individual, the law's concern in dealing with a person with ID is almost always with that person's functional abilities and limitations in society. This concern is reflected in various aspects of criminal and civil law, although the methods of assessing those functional abilities and limitations have changed considerably over time. The law has not always been wise or humane in its treatment of people with ID, but its focus on functional abilities and limitations allows us to assist people with ID to use their abilities and participate in society to their fullest potential. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court case of Atkins v. Virginia, regarding the constitutional and evidentiary challenges of executing a cognitively impaired individual, with special focus on childhood onset criterion for mental retardation (MR). It discusses issues related to the approach of courts that require unrealistic amounts of proof on the onset issue and on MR definition. It argues that the age of onset requirement is an irrational and unconstitutional issue.

The article offers information on the development of a public policy for protection of rights of persons with mental retardation in North Carolina. It analyzes various basic constitutional protections available under the Constitution of North Carolina regarding protection of liberty interests of the criminal defendants'. It discusses the U.S. Supreme Court case Jackson v. Indiana in which the court held that confinement of persons with mental retardation is unconstitutional.

State-based supports and services are essential to improving the quality of life of many individuals with intellectual disabilities. However, access to vital assistance is often reserved for those who satisfy the state's definition of "intellectual disability." On a national scale, Connecticut employs the most restrictive definition of intellectual disability, denying services to individuals with intensive needs simply because they have an IQ score above 69. Effectively, Connecticut quantifies the quality of life of individuals with intellectual disabilities. This Note argues that Connecticut's eligibility criteria is inconsistent with the best practices set forth by the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD). In assessing intellectual disability, the AAIDD dispels of strict IQ cutoff scores and instead engages in a holistic inquiry emphasizing the individual's overall well-being. This Note calls upon the Connecticut legislature to enact a statutory amendment that will modernize Connecticut's eligibility practices, and ensure that Connecticut is meeting its imperative of providing assistance to those most in need. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the passage of the Higher Education Opportunities Act (HEAO) of 2008, students with intellectual disabilities who are enrolled in a federally approved Comprehensive Transition and Postsecondary Program on a college campus will be eligible for some forms of federal student financial aid. This Brief Report discusses the forms of aid available, the impact upon higher functioning students with ASDs, the impact upon colleges and the potential conflict between HEOA and Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on laws related to death penalties litigation which were discussed by the Georgia Supreme Court in Georgia from June 1, 2011 through May 31, 2012. It informs about several court cases discussed by the Georgia Supreme Court including the Humphrey v. Morrow on death penalty trail, the stripling v. State which deals with the issue of mental retardation and the Clay v. State in which the court introduced a rule for calculating time limitations for impeachable convictions.

Purpose: The present study was undertaken to assess the level of awareness on legislations relating to intellectual disability among family members in India. Method: A sample of 103 respondents attending home based training services for their wards at National Institute for the Mentally Handicapped (NIMH), India, were administered a thirty item questionnaire, classified into awareness of legislations, awareness of rights, concessions and benefits and life cycle needs. Results: There is a moderate level of awareness on legislative aspects. Educated respondents showed better awareness about legislations than less educated persons. Respondents were better aware of benefits and concessions because of their direct utility in their day-to-day activities. Conclusion: There is a need for creation of awareness and sensitization among parents and caregivers having persons with intellectual disability to enable them to receive optimum benefits. To reach the uneducated population the materials must also be made available in non-print media such as television, posters and illustrated pamphlets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a framework for practitioners and academics to begin a dialogue underlying two guardianship laws' reform for incapacitated persons including the Mental Hygiene Law (MHL 81) and the Article 17-A of the Surrogate's Court Procedure Act (SCPA 17-A) in New York. It informs that as per the first amendment to the (SCPA 17-A), it manifests that it is the authority of a guardian of a mental retarded individual to make health care decisions encompassing end-of-life decisions.

The author describes how the Gloucestershire reasonable adjustment outcome tool was developed and what it is intended to achieve. Along with details of how the tool was implemented, its structure and content are also described to aid effective use. The author hopes that others will use the concept and the design of this approach to enhance the development of reasonable adjustments and access to mainstream services in their areas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

National campaigns promoting the use of the term intellectual disability (ID) have culminated in the recent U.S. congressional passing of Rosa's Law. Rosa's Law changes how ID is referred to in federal disability programs by removing all references to the term, "mental retardation" (U.S Government Printing Office, October, 2010). Little is known about how the change in language will affect rehabilitation counseling practice and education. Accordingly, this article addresses the following: (a) history of the descriptors of ID, (b) the stigmatizing effects of terminology, (c) eliminating the use of the r-word through Rosa's Law, and (d) implications for the rehabilitation counseling profession. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose - The purpose in writing this paper is to highlight the lack of knowledge of many who are involved in capacity assessments, especially non-professionals such as carers of the learning disabled, and the view that current guidance for capacity assessments does not take into account issues of emotionality.Design/methodology/approach - The approach is to discuss current guidance and practice, and to offer academic criticism and explanation.Findings - The findings include the discovery that the Mental Capacity Act 2005 Code of Practice suggests that healthcare professionals and family/carers may undertake assessments of decision-making capacity, yet the guidance it provides for their doing so overlooks salient issues. Many of those involved in the daily lives of those, who may lack decision-making capacity (and thus be seen as legally incompetent) such as the learning disabled, demented, mentally ill and neurodiverse, must decide whether to respect their decisions as competent, or to disregard the decisions on the grounds of incompetence and to act in the person's best interests. As many will lack training in their clinical and legal responsibilities and liabilities, it is crucial that they, and those they care for, are protected by not only an increased knowledge of mental capacity legislation and practice, but also how it may apply to questions of emotionality and neurodiversity.Originality/value - This paper expands and builds on the authors' previous research into including emotionality in assessments of capacity, and will be of use to practitioners in the field of learning disability, and other psychiatric specialities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Mental Capacity Act and the code of practice (Department of Health (DH) (2005) make it clear that people should not be treated as unable to make a decision about their own lives unless all practicable steps to help them to do so have been taken without success. In the case of Peter, not his real name, a young man with severe learning disabilities and a degree of sexual frustration, the multidisciplinary learning disabilities community team used guidance from the act to discern his capacity to consent to treatment and how to work with him. This ensured that he, his family and the staff involved were fully supported throughout. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper deals with the initial steps of the judicial process for persons with intellectual disabilities who are suspected of a minor offense; a stage where plaintiffs, police officers, and crown attorneys make a series of decisions that will have a significant impact on the course of the judicial process. The objective of this study was twofold: (i) to document the criteria that influence dispositions by police officers and crown attorneys about persons with intellectual disabilities in the criminal justice system (CJS), (ii) to report suggested improvements to better support them throughout the judicial process. Fourteen semi-structured interviews were conducted with key informants from the CJS and from service and community organisations working in the field of intellectual disabilities. The results of this qualitative study indicate that decisions made and dispositions taken rely on a series of implicit criteria that influence the course of the subsequent judicial procedures against persons with an intellectual disability. Suggestions for improvement pertain to developing the screening of intellectual disability procedures, the provision of information to key actors about intellectual disabilities, a preference for the use of summons to appear over other types of procedures, and drafting memorandums of understanding between various organisations and police services regarding persons with intellectual disabilities. In conclusion, an emphasis must be put on screening and diversion procedures for persons with intellectual disabilities when appropriate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is concerned with the management of the very vulnerable people who were brought to the attention of authorities concerned with the implementation of the Mental Deficiency Acts because of allegations of criminal and/or immoral behaviour. Scholars have long recognised that the identification of 'criminal defectives' was central to the campaign for and implementation of this legislation. To date however we know more about the policy debates than practical arrangements for the care of individuals. This is because discussions about vulnerable offenders have largely been separate from another strand of the historiography that seeks to focus on the personal experiences of service users and their families. It is perhaps too readily assumed that allegations of criminality disempowered families and communities. Evidence from the (Royal) Western Counties Institution, Starcross, suggests that contentious policies surrounding the admission of criminal defectives actually increased the number of people who were invited to make representations about such cases. Interestingly this did not always serve to the benefit of 'criminal defectives'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the court case Atkins v. Virginia, which presents an analysis on the correct standard and examination practices used in the determination of metal retardation. The Supreme Court executes mentally retarded individuals who violated the prohibition against unusual and cruel punishment. However, the court rules to leave the method of identifying which defendants are considered mentally retarded to individual states.

Criminal law generally assumes that all defendants are alike. Social science research, however, has demonstrated that most defendants with mental retardation are unlike their peers of average intelligence in their cognitive and behavioral capacities—a difference with profound effects on their blameworthiness. The law acknowledges these differences in a few limited areas, most notably in the Supreme Court's recent decision excluding defendants with mental retardation from death penalty eligibility. But while that decision arguably has begun to percolate into the rest of criminal law, consideration of the unique circumstances facing defendants with mental retardation has not yet reached the law of statutory rape. When framed as a strict liability offense, statutory rape precludes the fact-finder from considering the defendant's state of mind altogether. This exclusion of mens rea is an anomaly in criminal law, where a finding of guilt typically requires proof not only of an "evil act," but also of an "evil mind." Commentators have criticized strict liability but have ignored its increased injustice when applied to defendants with mental retardation. A close analysis of statutory rape law reveals several assumptions which are thought to justify departing from a mens rea requirement for such a significant offense: Would-be defendants are presumed to have notice that sex with underage partners is unlawful; to be in the best position to prevent any harm from occurring; and to be deviant, immoral aggressors. When examined in light of research about mental retardation, however, these assumptions collapse. Further, punishing persons with mental retardation without regard to their awareness of the law, social cues, and the nature of their conduct may also run afoul of constitutional due process and proportionate sentencing principles. This Article therefore argues that legislators, prosecutors, and judges should modify the ways that defendants with mental retardation may be prosecuted for statutory rape. In particular, the government should have to prove that a defendant with mental retardation had the appropriate mens rea. This Article also recommends formalizing the existing ways of addressing differences in culpability of defendants with mental retardation through charging and sentencing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article the author discusses the execution of mentally retarded offenders based on the court case Atkins v. Virginia in the U.S. It highlights the court's decision to illegalize the execution of mentally ill defendants and to give states the right to implement their definition of mental retardation. The author believes that the states' definition in which juvenile-onset is considered is inappropriate since it requires varying punishments for similarly impaired offenders.

The article focuses on the legality issue regarding the sanctioning of death penalty to Ernest Lee Johnson, who murdered three employees on a certain store, in Missouri. The Supreme Court of the U.S. states that enforcing such punishment to mentally-ill offenders is a violation to the constitution. Meanwhile, it cites the ruling of the Supreme Court on Johnson's case due to insufficient evidence that he suffered from mental retardation. Johnson's efforts in contesting his case are also noted.