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An underspecified doctrine of implied "reserved powers of the states" has been deployed through U.S. constitutional history to prevent the full application of McCulloch v. Maryland's concept of implied powers to the enumerated powers--in particular, the Commerce Clause. The primary rationales for these implied limitations on implied federal powers stem from two eighteenth and nineteenth century elements of American constitutionalism. First, the inability of pre-twentieth century judges to conceptualize a workable theory of concurrent federal and state power made it seem constitutionally necessary to limit the Commerce Clause and to refrain from applying the concept of implied powers to the Commerce Clause in order to preserve a substantial scope for state regulation. Second, because slavery so obviously fed into interstate and international trade, a robust application of implied powers to the Commerce Clause could naturally lead to a congressional power to "interfere with" the institution of slavery within the states. Antebellum judges and political leaders saw the implied limitation of such a power as an inescapable element of the constitutional bargain. These twin supports of the implied limitation concept have been eliminated from American constitutional law, yet the concept persists, with potentially significant consequences. In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the 2012 Affordable Care Act case, for example, five Justices maintained that there is an implied limitation against regulating economic "inactivity." The justification offered for this is an abstract concept of federalism that is largely detached from the once powerful, but now defunct, principles of constitutional politics that sustained it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This introduction discusses the current situation in France in the light of the attacks on Charlie Hebdo and the Hypercacher supermarket in January 2015. I demonstrate how the attacks have reinforced tensions relating to the implementation of laïcité and the respect for diverse religious value systems. The papers in this special issue are taken from a conference on contemporary citizenship after Charlie Hebdo, which was initially cancelled due to concerns about security, and then reinstated. This introduction goes on to consider the why and wherefore of the conference cancellation, asking what this shows us about current attitudes towards terrorism, and how we should respond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent American debates about the relationship between the historic political compromises underlying constitutional provisions and their contemporary judicial application have been largely ignored in Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada has only twice referred to originalism--and never positively. But in two 2014 decisions about how central institutions of government--the Senate and the Supreme Court of Canada itself--might be changed, the Court relied on the underlying historic political compromises to interpret the Constitution, rejecting arguments from the text or democratic principle. In this article, I consider how Canadian courts have looked to history in the past and in the 2014 decisions, and I situate their approach within contemporary theories of originalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The British Westminster parliament is frequently dismissed as a weak policy actor, in the face of dominant executive power. But through analysis of 4361 amendments to 12 government bills, and over 120 interviews, we suggest six reasons for doubting the orthodox view. These fall into three groups: overstating government success in making amendments, overstating non-government failure, and overlooking parliamentary influence before and after the formal passage of bills. We demonstrate that Westminster in fact has substantial influence in the policy process, not readily visible through commonly published data. Uncovering influence requires careful tracking of amendments, but also qualitative analysis of actors' motivations and the power of 'anticipated reactions'. Because Westminster is often seen as being at the weak end of a comparative spectrum of parliamentary influence, these results are important for demonstrating both the dynamics of British politics, and of parliamentary systems more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article looks at the decision of the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the case Prosecutor v. Ruto on the power of trial chamber to subpoena witnesses. It mentions that the duties of states parties to enforce subpoena and to compel attendance of witnesses with the implied powers for testifying the witnesses of the charges of crimes against humanity under the principles of customary international criminal procedural law and rule of good faith.

A response is provided to the article "The Constitution and the Philosophy of Language: Entailment, Implicature, and Implied Powers" by John Mikhail which appears in the same issue of the journal and addresses the claim that the U.S. Constitution's Necessary and Proper Clause grants the nation's Congress the power to promote the general welfare in America. Philosopher of language Paul Grice's distinction between entailment and implicature is examined, along with conversation.

The article discusses philosopher Paul Grice's philosophy of language in relation to the U.S. Constitution and an effort to elucidate the textual basis of a progressive approach to American constitutional law as of 2015. The U.S. government's implied powers are mentioned, along with corporate laws in the U.S., American federal laws, and several rulings by the nation's Supreme Court. U.S. constitutional implicatures and entailments are also examined.

The article focuses on the Necessary and Proper Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which outlines the powers of U.S. Congress. Topics include the unenumerated duties and powers of U.S. Congress, the implied and inherent powers of Congress, and sovereign authority within the U.S. Information is provided on the interpretation of the clause in 2014.

The justification for the modern American administrative state is built on a belief that (1) limited congressional delegation, (2) cabined executive discretion, and (3) properly exercised judicial deference are akin to the system of checks and balances established by the nation's Founders. In this Article, I propose that the time has come to rid ourselves of this legal fiction, particularly as it has developed in two well-known (and highly criticized) lines of administrative cases: the United States Supreme Court's Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., jurisprudence and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit's cases wrestling with the use (or misuse) of nonlegislative rules by agencies. In its place, I propose the creation of a "Necessity Doctrine." Unlike the constitutional branches of government, agencies are tasked with a much narrower objective within our system: to enable the enforcement of congressional directives through application of expertise, practicality, broad stakeholder input, and inclusion of political considerations. To restore the value of administrative process, we must limit the exercise of that process to those matters that necessitate the use of these bureaucratic tools and deny the urge to rely upon agencies as a surrogate for properly exercised judicial and legislative power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses two U.S. Supreme Court cases: Boumediene v. Bush and Munaf v. Geren. Information is provided on how the cases both deal with the scope of constitutional protections for individuals. It is noted that the cases both deal with the Constitutional protections for the public against armed conflicts.

The article focuses on prosecutorial immunity in cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court led by Supreme Court Justice John Roberts. The author discusses how the court has upheld immunity in prosecutors even though prosecutorial misconduct is a prevalent problem. It is also noted that there is no historical justification for absolute prosecutorial immunity and shows an overstep of judicial power. It is noted that prosecutors did not enjoy immunity in the U.S. until 1976 and an explanation of how the decision has changed responsibility and liability in the U.S. court system is presented.

The article presents information on the implied powers of the U.S. federal government in regulating immigration and its impact on national sovereignty. The role of states in framing law and the related federal and state tensions are discussed. The different categories of state laws and the issues addressed in the trial of Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting by the U.S. Supreme Court are also discussed.

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act empowers the executive branch to designate organizations and individuals "Specially Designated Global Terrorists." Though IEEPA designation is used against both domestic and foreign entities, its consequences are most severe within the United States. The designee's assets are frozen and transacting with the designee becomes a federal felony. For an American organization, IEEPA designation is a death sentence. For an American individual, it amounts to house arrest. This Article analyzes IEEPA using the Mendoza-Martinez test for determining whether a purportedly civil statute imposes criminal punishment and concludes that IEEPA designation of U.S. persons violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments by imposing criminal punishment without providing the required procedural protections. This Article offers a new framework for evaluating preventive counterterrorism policies and provides clarity to a notoriously unclear area of constitutional law--the jurisprudence of the civil-criminal divide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The mechanism established in what has now become Article 352 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (formerly known as Article 235 and 308) has many names. One of the more common is to refer to the mechanism as the 'flexibility clause'. As the notion indicates, the basic purpose of the mechanism is to provide the European Union with a possibility of (flexibly) adjusting legislative powers to arising needs. Since the very purpose of the flexibility clause is to provide for the exercise of legal powers where none is to be found in the EU Treaties, the clause hereby defines the ultimate reach of EU competence. Remarkably, although use of the clause has often been contentious, the wording of the clause has remained unchanged ever since the Treaty of Rome. The aim of the article is to outline the function and development of the flexibility clause especially in light of the Treaty of Lisbon, which for the first time in the history of the EC/EU rewrites the flexibility clause. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author responds to various reports published within this special issue on the administration and presidential leadership of U.S. President George W. Bush, focusing particularly on the use of executive powers after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Some of the subjects considered include the writings of American Founding Father Alexander Hamilton on Federalism, the unitary theory of executive power, and government checks and balances among the branches of government found within the U.S. Constitution.

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An essay is presented on the power of appointments under the U.S. constitution. The history of the Appointments Clause which governs such a power, with particular attention to the motivations behind the structure of the clause, is recounted. Also tackled is the significance of the distinction between principal and inferior officers within the domain of administrative law. It examines the cases Morrison v. Olson and Edmond v. United States, in which the Supreme Court came in conflict with the distinction.