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After the Marseille attack in 1934, in which French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou and King Alexander I of Yugoslavia lost their lives, from 1935 to 1937 the League of Nations worked on drafting the first Convention for the prevention and punishment of international terrorism. Only British India ratified the Convention, which never came into force. Despite this, it represents the most significant precursor of the definition and regulation of international terrorism and of the affirmation of a nexus between arms trafficking and terrorism. Also availing of unpublished diplomatic documents, this essay analyses the debate raging in those years, investigating at the same time how a highly significant chapter in the history of relations between Great Britain and pre-independence India was shaped by the two countries' different political stances and priorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the Red Sea region's strategic importance due to its role in global trade and its position as a hub for arms trafficking and smuggling. It is reported that the region has been characterized by instability, conflict, economic and food insecurity, and human development challenges. It is further reported that the overlapping rivalries of Iran, Israel, and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries has been escalating regional tensions.

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While diplomatic efforts to halt Iran’s nuclear ambitions continue, it is clear that the private sector can and does play a role in slowing sanctioned programs in Iran. This is certainly the case with the country’s ballistic missile program, which is highly dependent upon imports of high-specification materials and components from the international marketplace. Activities relating to Iran’s ballistic missile program have been prohibited under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 since June 2010. However, Iran has continued to undertake research and testing activities focused on the development of liquid-fueled missiles. Iran’s illicit efforts to obtain missile-grade oscillators—components used in guidance systems—have targeted Rakon UK, the British arm of a New Zealand-owned company. The company has made significant efforts to prevent its products from ending up in programs of concern. Undertaking activities that go beyond basic compliance practices has allowed Rakon UK to mitigate risks more holistically. The insights gained from Rakon UK’s experience, in conjunction with information from a number of other sources, can help shed light on the methods that proliferators use—and, more generally, on the role that the private sector can play in combating proliferation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article introduces an analytical framework to explain the coexistence of peaceful borders and illicit transnational flows as evidenced by drug trafficking, human trafficking and smuggling, weapons trafficking, and terrorism in the Americas, a region characterized by international peace, domestic peace, and regional integration. Under the assumption that peaceful relations among neighboring countries enable the incursion of transnational nonstate actors across their borders, the article poses this main question: Under which conditions might peaceful borders enable illicit transnational flows? There is much more variance in the incidence of these illicit transnational flows across borders than in the existence of international peace. The article examines two major variables: the degree of governance and institutional strength of the bordering states; and the prevalent socioeconomic conditions of the bordering states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A more accurate and complete understanding of the full range of Organized Crime Group (OCG) specialised in arms trafficking is, and will remain, among the highest priorities of law enforcement agencies, in order to prevent illicit import and export operations. In this regard, improving abilities to obtain timely and accurate knowledge of adversary's methods and strategies constitute a key element for developing law enforcement policies. Another important aspect is represented by knowing at any moment the level of readiness and complexity of the OCG and to have a hierarchy of these, to concentrate institutional resources for dismantling the most dangerous ones. This article presents a new method who analysis the main characteristics of an OCGs and created a model for establishing a hierarchy of the OCGs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Terrorist participation in illicit trade is not only about revenue generation. It serves many functions: destruction of history, demoralization of communities, the weakening of social solidarity, and harms individuals' health and well-being. It also pays for the social service functions of terrorist groups. Over time, the role of the drug trade has become less central to the financing of terrorist groups. Diversification of illicit product has been key to their survival. This is part of the rational trade practices of terrorists: engaged now in less policed forms of illicit trade than narcotics where they can make consistent profits with less threat to their supply chains. Terrorist groups are technically adept and have relied recently more heavily on technology and cryptocurrencies to facilitate the operations of their illicit trade in arms and drugs, increase anonymity, and reduce risk. The United Nations has increasingly recognized the key role that illicit trade assumes in the funding and operations of terrorist groups. Curbing illicit trade by terrorists is not just the responsibility of multinational bodies such as the UN, government, or law enforcement bodies – it requires a whole of society approach including business, civil society, journalists, and researchers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the Libyan Crisis which represents a case study of failed collective security due to the competing interests of major and regional powers. Topics discussed include the common source of instability including arms trafficking and the status of Libya as a safe haven for terrorists, the belief that General Khalifa Haftar as the only one who can restore order in Libya, and informal peace initiatives.

The article focuses on the global problem of sex trafficking in light of the Pentecost narrative. It mentions about the theological responses to sex trafficking have focused on christology, soteriology, and liberation. It mentions that Christians have been wary in assisting sex workers because of the image of "the great whore of Babylon" from Revelation 17 and 18. It also mentions about several other issues including drugs trade and arms trade.

The Black Sea region is the center of the world’s nuclear black market, with Russia being the known or suspected source of most nuclear contraband and Turkey the preferred destination. To date, known attempts at nuclear smuggling have been unsuccessful, because the insiders who stole fissile material were not experienced at finding buyers and moving the material across country borders. Recently, however, organized crime appears to have become involved in some nuclear trafficking. Such involvement threatens to change the nuclear terrorism equation, providing the marketing and transportation expertise previously lacking. The US response to nuclear smuggling is handled by the Defense Department and the Energy Department. These agencies have few capabilities for dealing with organized crime, and the countries of the Black Sea region tend not to share nuclear information with one another. Unless international coordination and law enforcement are improved, criminal organizations will likely be able to supply terrorists sufficient fissile material to build an atomic bomb. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

North Korea’s efforts to obtain technology related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were recently revealed when two Japan-based traders were convicted for attempting to illegally transport sensitive materials. Historically, North Korea has acquired much of its WMD-related technology and training from abroad, particularly China and the Soviet Union; today, North Korea’s procurement networks employ a sophisticated mix of front companies, brokers, and transshipment strategies. Over the last decade, about a half-dozen cases of WMD-related trafficking have surfaced, demonstrating the extent of foreign technology and know-how obtained by North Korea. The country’s trafficking threatens international security and the viability of the global efforts to stem the flow of sensitive dual-use technologies. The use of front companies and transshipment destinations reveals a network that is continuously evolving in response to U.N. sanctions and increased nonproliferation-focused export controls in supplier countries like Japan. The convictions are noteworthy in that they are based on Japan’s “catch-all” controls, designed to encompass even the most innocuous dual-use items if intended for WMD programs. While North Korea’s WMD-related procurement networks continue to evolve, national and regional countermeasures may be able to keep pace, especially if bolstered by multilateral sanctions such as those currently in place against North Korea. Japan’s export control system reflects what may be an innovative variant of counterproliferation—one characterized less by traditional military action and more by intelligence gathering, investigative capacity, regional information-sharing, and police action. The authors explore how Tokyo’s efforts may serve as a useful model for other countries seeking to implement effective nonproliferation-related trade controls. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article reports on the legal status of suspected A. Q. Khan nuclear smuggling network members worldwide. They include Buhary Syed Abu Tahir, managing director of the Dubai-based SMB Group and was the alleged to be right-hand man of Abdul Qadeer Khan. Friedrich Tinner is a close friend of Khan and president of CETEC, a Swiss firm specializing in vacuum technology. Another is Gotthard Lerch, a German engineer alleged to have tried to obtain supplies of pipes in connection with the machine shop 'Project 1001' in Libya by sourcing from South Africa. Henk Slebos is a Dutch businessman who studied with Khan at Delft Technical University in the Netherlands and was responsible for procuring numerous items for the Khan network for more than two decades.

The article reports on the investigation concerning the international nuclear arms smuggling network of Abdul Qadeer Khan. A break in the case came in 1993 when German Customs agents seized some cigar box-shaped crates who belonged to a businessman named Ernst Piffl at Stuttgart Airport. For several years, German authorities had been placing Piffl under surveillance. What experts found inside the crates were not semi-manufactured spindles for making ballpoint pens as Piffl declared, but an unfinished machined parts called preforms. These little tubes are used in collecting and withdrawing the separated particles of enriched uranium from inside the spinning rotor. Piffl was convicted of illegally exporting centrifuge parts and received a 45-month jail sentence.

Reports on arms traffickers working in Africa. Illicit enterprises; Collection and trans-shipment of weapons from Soviet Union and Easter Europe; Battles created by the uncontrolled flow of small arms in many countries; Description of their operations; Consequences.

Details the Wye River Memorandum, an agreement that stipulates further Israeli withdrawals from West Bank territory in exchange for tougher Palestinian actions to combat terrorism. Component of the Wye document; Violence and instability in the Palestinian society; Illegal weapons in Palestinian; Market for illegal weapons in Palestinian territory; Profits made in weapons smuggling.

Uncovers the world of arms dealing. Dangers; Potential for profit; Art of the deal; Ways of doing business; Middlemen.

This article aims to analyze the evolution of Brazilian criminal organization Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC—First Command of the Capital), especially its transformation from a group advocating human rights to a transnational violent non-state actor. Created in the late 1990s by inmates at Taubate Prison, PCC is currently a key trigger of violence in South America. Since a massive attack performed in 2006 against security forces, the group continues to be highly operative, also coordinating drugs and arms smuggling in Brazil and abroad. A combination of sources supported this analysis of PCC's evolution, mainly Brazilian official judicial minutes, NGOs reports, and news released from reputable sources. The article shows that PCC has gained strength in the 2010s, expanding illicit business operations in cooperation with other criminal groups. The results suggest that PCC's expansion has changed significantly since their beginnings, into an actor that poses a challenge for the building of peaceful society in all of South America. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the multibillion-dollar traffic in black-market munitions, spare parts and military-related technology, including nuclear arms technology. Black-market arms deals span all political and ideological boundaries. Examples of smuggling operations; Persian Gulf War as a leading arms `market'; Arms trade in Europe; `Gray market' trading for supposedly civilian purposes.

The article offers information related to the amendment of The Arms Act, 1959 which was enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to arms and ammunition. It mentions that Arms Act, referred to as Parent Act, 1959 and rules made thereunder regulate the acquisition, possession, use, manufacture, export and import of arms and ammunition, and punishment for contravention of the provisions of the act, in order to curb illegal weapons and violence stemming from them.

Today, outlaw motorcycle gangs are best known for their involvement in an international criminal network dealing in narcotics, human trafficking, and arms smuggling. Law enforcement agencies in three continents have identified groups like the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club, the Outlaws Motorcycle Club, and the Bandidos Motorcycle Club as a major threat to public safety. Before their descent into organized crime, outlaw bikers captured the imagination of the American public due to their peculiar look and outrageous behavior. They dressed in dirty sleeveless leather jackets and Nazi paraphernalia, their arms covered in tattoos of Nazi and White-supremacist symbolism. They drove highly customized, loud, and heavy American bikes—almost always Harley-Davidsons—and despised Japanese vehicles. They were notorious for their erratic behavior, in particular, the propensity to use violence in an idiosyncratic way when interacting with non-bikers and the public display of nudity and sexual practices. Unlike standard treatments of outlaw bikers, which draw from criminology, sociology, and psychology, I propose an explanation for these seemingly irrational and certainly odd practices rooted on the economic approach. Following the literature on the economic theory of religious sects, I argue that these odd practices served as effective obstacles to the ability of outlaw bikers to free ride on the club goods provided by these organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]