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The Great Patriotic War is one of the highlights in the history of Soviet-American cooperation. The USSR and the United States managed to overcome the inertia of mutual mistrust that persisted throughout most of the interwarperiod, taking together the lead in the fight against the Axis powers. However, rapprochement between the two future superpowers was neither plain nor swift; rather was it constantly hampered by mutual suspicion, aggravated by differences in their political cultures. Under these conditions, the fate of their alliance depended on the willingness of the ‘Big Three’ leaders to respect each other’s interest and concerns, as well as on the personal initiative and determination of individual politicians and diplomats. In this regard, the figure of M.M. Litvinov, appointed ambassador of the USSR to the United States at the most alarming and dangerous moment of the Great Patriotic War, deserves particular attention. Having played a major role in the Soviet-American cooperation in 1941–1943, M.M. Litvinov has been then forgotten for many years in both Soviet and Russian historiography. On the basis of new archive materials, the authors reexamine the activities of M.M. Litvinov as an ambassador to the United States and the specifics of his relationship with J.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov during the period under review. The first section covers the initial steps of M.M. Litvinov in his new position. Special attention is paid to his efforts aimed at clarifying the Soviet position on the most sensitive issues of bilateral relations and establishing contacts with various groups of the American political, economic and intellectual elites. The second section analyzes M.M. Litvinov’s activities in the context of increasing contradictions between the Allies with regard to the opening of the second front and disruption of supplies under lend-lease. The authors show that M.M. Litvinov used all the diplomatic tools available to defend the interests of the USSR, instantly reacting to any changes in the moods of the U.S. military and political establishment and immediately reporting them to Moscow. In this context, the authors question the widespread claims in historiography about the ambassador’s excessive independence and willfulness. On the contrary, M.M. Litvinov can be said to have consistently adhered to the official foreign policy line of the Soviet leadership in both his speeches and practical steps. This indicates the need for further study of the M.M. Litvinov’s figure in order to avoid oversimplified, cliched assessments of this personality.

This editorial introduces a series of papers based on presentations made at the "Soviet Diplomacy during World War II" conference held at MGIMO on June 30, 2023. It draws attention to notable aspects of Soviet diplomacy during the wartime period. Firstly, it highlights the persistent effort and skill in negotiating despite significant divergences in interests and approaches. Secondly, it discusses the adeptness in striking a careful balance between steadfastly maintaining one's stance and employing flexibility and pragmatism to achieve the ultimate objective of victory over the enemy. Thirdly, the article examines the history of international negotiations during World War II as an illustration of the clash and collaboration among prominent political figures, notably emphasizing how I.V. Stalin often outplayed his counterparts in this personalized “diplomacy of leaders.”The history of World War II compellingly illustrates the necessity of diplomacy, not only during the conflict but also in the transition to peace and negotiations thereafter, as well as in the establishment of a new global order.

In the work, the attempt to identify the features of the interaction of signs of different semiotic systems in the context of multimodal texts, which are considered as a special information construct and are perceived through the visual communication channel, which combines verbal, graphic, iconic, color codes. The aim of the work was an attempt to make a comprehensive analysis of multimodal political texts, an important element of which is the image of the historical personality of Stalin. This analysis allows us to trace the transformation of the perception and assessment of the life activity of an ambiguous politician in the minds of Soviet and Russian people and, as a consequence, the linguistic society as a whole. The material for the study was Soviet political posters of the mid-20th century and modern multimodal texts, the total number of which was 53 and 67 examples, respectively. The set of methods systematization and generalization, continuous sampling, contextual, intertextual and comparative analysis, is due to the expediency, logic and historical retrospective of the study. This made it possible to reconstruct the cognitive past recorded in the historical consciousness of the people: the article reveals the image of Stalin, in Soviet posters and in modern political multimodal texts, the specificity of perception, categorization and attitude of Soviet / Russian society to its past and present is revealed. For example, the image of Stalin on the posters of the 1930-1953s is as idealized and metaphorical as possible, which is due to the manipulative function – the need to promote the cult of the personality: the themes of patriotism, duty and beneficence become the leading ones and are called upon to form in the mass consciousness a stable, deliberately positive idea of the bright communist future the whole country and its every single Soviet citizen. In modern multimodal texts, it can be noted that they reflect two diametrically opposed views on the personality and life of Stalin: on the one hand, a positive, idealized image of a politician, a nostalgic perception; on the other hand, there is a negative (ironic) view of the “situation of the past,” which is due to the historical context, the cult of the individual and his debunking of this cult after the death of the leader. The specificity of these types of texts is largely due to the author’s linguistic pragmatic attitude and extralinguistic factors.

The aim of the article is to examine the process of constructing the images of Stalin and Mao Zedong in the material of Soviet central newspapers on the themes of the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) and Soviet-Chinese friendship. Our focus on the techniques of such constructions allow for dealing with a number of research issues, such as which conceptions of the political leaders were rendered to the Soviet audiences and in which way was this implemented; was there a potential for dynamics in treating the subjects and if this was the case what were the factors that played a role in such dynamics. Data and methods. For our database of primary sources we have chosen the ”Ogonyok” issues published in the period between October 1949 and March 1953. The authors of the present article were interested in references in the magazine texts but also in the images of Stalin and Mao. Hence, the research lens of historical imagology allowed us to examine the images under study as complex synthetical constructions, the constructions that were impacted by inner and outer factors in play in the Soviet society itself, including its political culture, the specific features of representations in the sphere of internationl relations, etc. The illustrative material was used for the sake of further verification and detailization. Results. The ”Ogonyok” material on the theme of Soviet-Chinese friendship included a considerable amount of texts and their visual supplements, with Stalin and Mao as their central personages. The thematical distribution of the database has shown that its main themes are Soviet-Chinese friendship described in hierarchical terms as the ”teacher-pupil” relationship, the achievements of socialist transformation in China, etc. Conclusions. The personification of the images of the leaders of the USSR and the PRC was designed to promote the positive attitudes towards the main Soviet ally, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, to contribute to the legitimization of the USSR’s leading position not only in the Soviet-Chinese interaction, but in the whole of the Socialist world as well. Mao’s leading role in the transformations of the Chinese society confirmed to the Soviet audiences the correctness of the development model in the Soviet Union itself. Numerous presentations of the good will with which the Chinese side was ready to follow the ”Stalin recipe” in building socialism served as a marker that the ”great friendship” was under Moscow’s control.

On the anniversary of the centenary of the formation of the Soviet Union, we naturally remember the name and ideas of one of the most brilliant Soviet agricultural economists, who made a huge practical and theoretical contribution to attempts to reform not only Soviet agriculture but also Soviet society as a whole. Vladimir Grigoryevich Venzher (1899–1990) was an agriculturist and economist, who primarily became widely known for his correspondence with Stalin in the early 1950s about the possibilities of reforms in the collective farm system of the Soviet Union. At the same time, the fact that his personality was much broader and deeper than his professional incarnation as an agrarian economist. Venzher, of course, was also an original and deep social thinker, partly Marxist and partly populist-cooperative, who repeatedly proposed to the Soviet leadership and then in relation to the Kosygin and Gorbachev reforms a number of comprehensive alternative reforms aimed at shaping the sustainable development of the Soviet Union and Russia based primarily on the required agrarian reforms.1 To prove and develop this statement, this article examines several key fragments of the political economy and social and philosophical heritage of Venzher in the 1960s–1980s, his letters to the Central Committee of the CPSU, and some of his scientific monographs, which have not yet attracted much attention from researchers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background. The relevance of the study is determined by the need for a compre-hensive and objective analysis of the relationship between state leaders in the struggle for power. The purpose of the study is to reflect the activities of the state security agencies un-der the leadership of Minister V.S. Abakumov in compromising G.K. Zhukov. Materials and methods. The implementation of research tasks was achieved through the use of docu-ments from the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation and pre-viously published materials on the research topic. The methodological potential includes the philosophical principles of dialectics, namely, objectivity, scientific character, compre-hensiveness, unity of the historical, logical, etc. Results. Based on the documents, the mechanism of falsifying the testimony of those arrested from the marshalʼs close circle in order to compromise him is considered. At the same time, it should be noted that the facts of Zhukov’s looting in Germany, his moral character and the facts of his exaltation really took place. Conclusions. The compromise of G.K. Zhukov was carried out on the initiative of G.M. Malenkov and L.P. Beria and quite obviously with the consent of A.A. Zhdanov, who, thanks to their influence on I.V. Stalin, removed competitors from the political Olym-pus, clearing their way to power. The executor of their will was the Minister of State Secu-rity V.S. Abakumov, who, in addition to Stalin, was guided in his work by his protégé, Beria.

Background. The relevance of the study is determined by the need for a comprehensive objective analysis of the Politburo activities of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) – the Central Committee of the CPSU on the investigation’s falsification of the case of the Minister of State Security (MGB) of the USSR V.S. Abakumov. The publication aims to reflect the process of both the investigation and the court in this case. Materials and methods. The implementation of research tasks was achieved through the use of documents from the Archives of the President of the Russian Federation and the Russian State Archive of Social and Political History. The methodological potential includes the philosophical principles of dialectics, namely objectivity, scientific nature, comprehensiveness, the unity of the historical, logical, etc. Their implementation helped to study documentary sources related to the case of V.S. Abakumov. Results. On the basis of the documents of the Archives of the President of the Russian Federation and the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, for the first time introduced into scientific circulation, information about the process of investigation and trial in the case of Abakumov is published. Conclusions. The charges against V.S. Abakumov were constantly changing. During the investigation, three indictments were prepared in his case, and the individual conclusions of each subsequent conclusion sometimes contradicted the previous one. The scenario for each subsequent indictment changed depending on who was in power at that time. The trial in the case of Abakumov was also well prepared. It took place in the presence of only party activists. The composition of the court was agreed, and politically proven lawyers were selected. At present, it is quite obvious that it was the first persons of the state, I.V. Stalin, G.M. Malenkov and L.P. Beria, who, for one reason or another, influenced the initiation of the investigation in the state security bodies. V.S. Abakumov is a zealous executor of the will of “their masters”, first of all Stalin and Beria.

Background. The relevance of the study is determined by the need for a comprehensive objective analysis of the removal from the post of Minister of State Security of the USSR V.S. Abakumov. The publication aims to reflect the process of activity of the Commission of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) to investigate his case. Materials and methods. The implementation of research tasks was achieved using documents from the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation and the Russian State Archive of Social and Political History. Methodological potential includes: philosophical principles of dialectics, namely objectivity, scientific character, comprehensiveness, unity of historical, logical and others. Their implementation helped to study documentary sources related to the case of V.S. Abakumov. Results. On the basis of first introduced in the scientific use of documents of Archive of the President of the Russian Federation and Russian state archive of socio political history published information about the Commission’s investigation of the Politburo of the CPSU(b) in the case of V.S. Abakumov. It tells about the work of the Investigative Unit for particularly important cases of the Minister of State Security of the USSR, about the activities of which almost nothing is known. Conclusions. After being appointed to the post of head of the Minister of State Security of the USSR, V.S. Abakumov in his work focused mainly on L.P. Beria, he often turned to him for advice. In fact, Beria was an unofficial curator of the Minister of State Security of the USSR. The statement of the senior investigator of the Investigative Unit for Particularly important cases of the Minister of State Security, M.D. Ryumin, who signaled the unfavorable situation in the ministry with the investigation of a number of important cases, contributed to the removal of Abakumov from the post of minister. However, the main reason was not his statement, but the fact that Abakumov was becoming too independent, he alone made decisions on the conduct of the investigation, without informing Stalin about it. The leader was used to making his own decisions about whom and in what direction to conduct the investigation, but not the Minister of the Minister of State Security, who was supposed to be an intermediate link. Taking advantage of the situation, Stalin without regret removed the “presumptuous” minister.

This document recently uncovered in the archive of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party brings supplementary clarifications regarding Romania’s role in the establishment of the Comecon in January 1949. According to this document, Romania submitted the Soviet Union, on December 4 1948, the proposal of creating a permanent institution to coordinate the economic relations between the Soviet Union and the people’s democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ana Pauker was arrested on 18 February 1950, at a time when the antizionist campaign was at its climax in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Soon after the death of Stalin she was released and moved to a conspirative house of the Communist Party. The circumstances of her release still remain unclear. The author of this article argues that Ana Pauker was released, but under strict surveillance, on 15 March 1953 and examines the possible reasons that led to this decision. The article also reproduces a transcript of Ana Pauker's conversation with two leaders of the Communist Party, on 8 April 1953, that was recorded by the Securitate. During this conversation, Ana Pauker makes important revelations on the accusations she faced during her arrest and explains why she believed Emil Bodnăraş was the real traitor within Romanian Workers Party's leadership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this essay, a history of the COMECON establishment is traced on the basis of a considerable range of documents of the Soviet and Easteuropean communist regimes, including those from their former archives. The author is studying an organization machinery of the COMECON making, with an analysis of the USSR and the so-called People's Democracies interaction and role of each of them in this process. The much attention is given to clearing up and comparison of real and declarative the COMECON nature and purposes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Romanian-Bulgarian relations were assigned the role of satellites belonging first to the Axis, and then to U.S.S.R., following the regulation of the territorial statute of South Dobruja on September 7th 1940, through the Treaty from Craiova. After the Red Army has entered Bulgaria, on September 8th 1944, an unusual fact has intervened between Bucharest and Sofia, from the perspective of Kremlin's influence, of course: the priority of Bulgarian political, ideological and diplomatic factors over the Romanian ones, unprecedented fact in the history of almost seven decades of the modern bilateral relations. The lack of human and ideological resources of the Romanian Communist Party has become obvious during the not even declared competition with the Bulgarian Communists and their leader, Georgi Dimitrov. The Communist Bulgaria has become a model that Romanian communists do not only seriously took into account, yet, at least the year King Mihai I has abdicated (1947), they zestfully were also studying and copying, as the case may have been. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During 1944-1952, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, secretary general of Romanian Communist Party, had several meetings with Stalin, in Moscow. The discussions held with these occasions as well as Stalin's indications to Dej played a significant role in the evolution of the RCP and the Romanian society. In spite of their importance, these visits are not fully uncovered. A reason might be related to the fact that historical sources are rare and contradicting. This study intends to clarify several key issues of Gheorghiu-Dej meetings with Stalin, such as the exact chronology, the subjects discussed, and the participants. In the context of time, these visits are relevant for the political leaders behaviour and for Romanian deeply dependence of Moscow. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During 1944-1952, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, secretary general of Romanian Communist Party, had several meetings with Stalin, in Moscow. The discussions held with these occasions as well as Stalin's indications to Dej played a significant role in the evolution of the RCP and the Romanian society. In spite of their importance, these visits are still to be fully uncovered. A reason might be related to the fact that historical sources are rare and contradicting. This study intends to clarify several key issues of Gheorghiu-Dej meetings with Stalin, such as the exact chronology, the subjects discussed, and the participants. In the context of time, these visits are relevant for the political leaders behaviour and for Romanian deeply dependence of Moscow. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]