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Defense Analysis Poster

Viscoelastic properties are followed during the formation of gels by moderately concentrated solutions of atactic polystyrene (aPS) in a mixed solvent of carbon disulfide and tri-m-tolyl phosphate (TCP). This mixture is a thermodynamically “good” solvent for aPS and with solution glass transition temperatures far below the temperatures used in the study. Gel formation is driven by the CS2 component, at temperatures and polymer concentrations similar to those observed in solutions of aPS in pure CS2. The TCP adjusts the viscoelastic response to a convenient range. The results show appreciable hysteresis in the melting and formation temperatures of gels, with the gel formation being a slow process, permitting dynamic mechanical or creep and creep recovery studies as a function of ageing during gel formation, as well as on the solutions prior to permit gel formation. These data reveal systematic behavior analyzed using the linear viscoelastic constitutive relation to obtain the viscosity and a measure of the...

The article of record as published may be located at http://dx.doi.org/10,1080/01436590601153663 US success against irregular threats is inversely related to the priority senior US officials (civilian and military) attach to the effort. When one investigates the return on investment in the global war on terror (GWOT), now increasingly described as the Long War, in Iraq versus in the Philippines, it is clear that US efforts in the Philippines are achieving great success with minimal resources, while efforts in Iraq are achieving limited success with almost unlimited resources. The same is true of US success against an irregular threat in El Salvador in the 1980s. During that period the focus of US military attention was in Europe. El Salvador was a backwater that was never of particularly great importance to the Pentagon. This paper will seek to understand why limited efforts against irregular threats seem to result in greater success than all-out efforts.

The progressive advancements in communication and transportation has changed human daily life to a great extent. While important advancements in battery technology has come since its first demonstration, the high energy demands needed to electrify the automotive industry have not yet been met with the current technology. One possible cathode material are the Li-rich layered oxide compounds xLi2MnO3.(1-x)LiMO2 (M= Ni, Mn, Co) (0.5=-1. In this class of compounds, lithium ions reside in both lithium layer and transition metal layer of close packed oxygen framework, typical from O3 type layered oxides like LiCoO2.1 , 2 Large irreversible capacities are often observed in these materials due to irreversible oxygen loss or side reactions stemming for the electrolyte. It has been also observed using ex-situ NMR that lithium reinsertion back into the transition metal layer is little to none. However, these studies have not revealed the dynamic process of lithium migration for the Li-rich material under operandoelectrochemical cycling conditions. Neutron scattering has several distinct advantages for battery studies: 1) The sensitivity of neutron to light elements such as lithium and oxygen are significant in order to determine their position in the crystal structure; 2) Compares to the X-ray, the neutron shows larger scattering contrast between neighboring elements in the periodic table specifically the scattering lengths; and 3) The deep penetration capability of neutron allows simultaneous observation of the cathode and anode.3 However, challenges exist in broadening the application of operando neutron diffraction for Li-ion batteries research. First, limited by the generation reactions of neutrons, the neutron flux is usually several orders of magntitude lower than X-rays. In another words, longer acquisition times as well as larger amounts of samples are required for neutron diffraction experiments. In addition, the existence of hydrogen, which has a large incoherent neutron-scattering cross-section, is detrimental to the signal-to-noise ratio of neutron diffraction pattern. Separators (polyethylene based porous membrane) and poly carbonate based electrolyte solutions contain a considerate amount of hydrogen. These two major reasons pose significant challenges to operando neutron diffraction for lithium ion battery research although it is such a powerful technique for light elements like lithium. In order to gain more in-depth insights about the lithium (de-)intercalation mechanisms in Li-rich layered oxides, track particularly the lithium ions in transition metal layer, operando neutron diffraction experiments were designed to quantitatively observe lithium migration in this type of oxides during the electrochemical process. In this study, we use amorphous silicon as an anode for the neutron diffraction battery design in order to avoid any overlap of signal that may be associated with the anode material. We perform operando neutron diffraction to probe lithium and oxygen for a high Li-rich (HLR), Li[Lix/3Ni(3/8-3x/8)Co(1/4-x/4)Mn(3/8+7x/24)O2 (x = 0.6) material, and low Li-rich (LLR), Li[Lix/3Ni(1/3-x/3)Co(1/3-x/3)Mn(1/3+x/3)O2 (x = 0.24) material with varying degrees of the high voltage plateau. In conjunction with the operando neutron diffraction, density functional theory (DFT) calculations were used to explore the incorporation of dilute oxygen vacancy, its affect on the lattice mechanics and oxygen positions. We also observe site-dependent lithium migration taking place during different stage of charging/discharge processes. Furthermore, this work demonstrates the potential of investigating dynamic changes of light elements in large format (10-100 times larger format than the typical operando cells for synchrotron X-ray diffraction) prismatic and cylindrical batteries under realistic cycling condition via operando neutron diffraction method. Acknowledgements UCSD’s efforts are supported by the Assistant Secretary for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Office of Vehicle Technologies of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) under Contract No. DE-AC02-05CH11231, Subcontract No. 7073923, under the Advanced Battery Materials Research (BMR) Program. The neutron experiments benefited from the SNS user facility, sponsored by the office of Basic Energy Sciences (BES), the Office of Science of the DOE. H.L. acknowledges the financial support from the China Scholarship Council under Award No. 2011631005. This work used the Extreme Science and Engineering Discovery Environment (XSEDE), which is supported by National Science Foundation grant number ACI-1053575. Reference 1. H. Liu, D. Qian, M. G. Verde, M. Zhang, L. Baggetto, K. An, Y. Chen, K. J. Carroll, D. Lau, M. Chi, G. M. Veith and Y. S. Meng, Acs Appl Mater Inter, 2015, 7, 19189-19200. 2. M. G. Verde, H. D. Liu, K. J. Carroll, L. Baggetto, G. M. Veith and Y. S. Meng, Acs Appl Mater Inter, 2014, 6, 18868-18877. 3. H. D. Liu, C. R. Fell, K. An, L. Cai and Y. S. Meng, J Power Sources, 2013, 240, 772-778. Figure 1

In a discussion at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, it became apparent that there were many similarities between insurgent behavior and gang behavior - similarities that would make a more rigorous analysis worthwhile. With this theme in mind, the faculty of the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, experts in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, were enlisted to address these similarities and to share their theories, models, and ideas from their own disciplines of political science, sociology, anthropology, international relations, and more. This collection of short papers is the result.

This paper appeared in the Journal of Information Warfare, 3 (2), July 2004, 27-39. 'Cyberwar' is information warfare directed at the software of information systems. It represents an increasing threat to our militaries and civilian infrastructures. Six principles of military deception are enumerated and applied to cyberwar. Two taxonomies of deception methods for cyberwar are then provided, making both offensive and defensive analogies from deception strategies and tactics in conventional war to this new arena. One taxonomy has been published in the military literature, and the other is based on case theory in linguistics. The application of both taxonomies to cyberwar is new. We then show how to quantify and rank proposed deceptions for planning using 'suitability' numbers associated with the taxonomies. The paper provides planners for cyberwar with a more comprehensive enumeration than any yet published to the tactics and strategies that they and their enemies may use. Some analogies to deception in conventional warfare hold, but many do not, and careful thought and preparation must be applied to any deception effort. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This report documents our accomplishments during Phase II of the Intelligent Software Decoys Project, including the development of a theory of cyber deception, tools for conduction cyber-based deception, and issues pertaining to the acceptable use of cyber deception within the context of homeland security and homeland defense. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Naval Special Warfare (NSW) seeks to improve their Lessons Learned Program (LLP) to better transfer and conserve knowledge within the community and maintain a competitive advantage over adversaries. What actions are needed to improve the program so that the knowledge created is easily transferred and conserved for future use? This thesis explores the existing LLP, identifies shortfalls, and determines what, if any, technology should be applied to improve the program. Specifically, it applies organizational design, information science theory, and user interviews to analyze the LLP, and then presents the interview findings and develops a conceptual model for program improvement. This research finds that NSW should apply the Awareness, Accessibility, and Use (AAU) model to address the three most prominent human-centric shortfalls within the LLP before applying any new technology. Addressing the lack of awareness, poor accessibility, and low use that exists within the program is a first step toward building a solid foundation that will better support the emerging technology that NSW wants to leverage in the future. Lieutenant, United States Navy Lieutenant, United States Navy Reserve Approved for public release. distribution is unlimited

This thesis uncovers how the application of tactical deception to special operations can improve the likelihood of achieving mission completion. By inducing hesitation, confusion, and chaos into the operational environment, special operations forces could potentially influence and manipulate the psyche of an adversary to amplify friendly capabilities on the objective. Three historical case studies are presented where tactical deception was successfully implemented during surgical strike operations, such as direct action or hostage rescue missions, to evaluate how deception affects the assault force's progress during the course of a mission. The author shows that the assault force's advantage over an adversary is highly dependent on the duration and effectiveness of the deception when it is applied at the initial point of vulnerability. Through the use of the special operations deception curve, this thesis illustrates how successful tactical deception in a mission can be used to achieve relative superiority earlier, maintain relative superiority longer, and reduce the area of vulnerability experienced by special operation forces. Lieutenant, United States Navy Approved for public release. distribution is unlimited

This thesis seeks to determine how the United States should facilitate and advise the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) regarding local Afghan security forces. Through in-depth analysis of relevant case studies (Afghan Local Police, Indian Territorial Army, Peruvian Rondas Campesinas, Afghan Arbakai), this thesis gleans critical lessons, positive and negative, to inform the development of an appropriate local security program for modern-day Afghan society. Given Afghanistan’s tribal nature, challenging geography, and the inability of GIRoA to secure its population with national forces, there is a need for effective local security elements that can protect their communities without challenging the survival of the central government. When developing local security elements, GIRoA should incorporate traditional governance, establish an appropriate link between local security elements and the military, and adapt force structures to judiciously selected areas. Additionally, GIRoA should create training and employment regimens for local security elements that preserve their intended use as small, defensive forces and impose minimal disruption to community life. http://archive.org/details/localsecurityina1094561233 Major, United States Army Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Small European states such as the Netherlands and Denmark, which face increasingly complex security challenges, lack the capacity to meet increasing intelligence requirements. Since intelligence is vital to counter or prevent threats to national interests, small-state leaders must reduce these current intelligence gaps. This study focuses on how small European states’ SOF can contribute most efficiently and effectively to the national intelligence capacity to anticipate and counter threats from foreign regions. Based on literature and interviews with Dutch and Danish civil and military officials, this study identifies ways in which SOF can contribute to national intelligence capacity. The options include: SOF training the military intelligence service, SOF enabling military intelligence operations through integrated support, and SOF operating independently as an information provider for national decision making. This study, based on analysis of these options, suggests that a combination of integrating SOF into intelligence operations and allowing SOF to conduct information collection operations independently represents the most effective and efficient way to contribute to the national intelligence capacity. In that regard, the integrated option is more congruent with operations in non-permissive areas, and SOF as independent collectors with permissive areas. http://archive.org/details/thestrategicutil1094561378 Major, Army, Netherlands Commander, Navy, Denmark Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

The Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine in 2014 saw a series of violent events leading to the ousting of then-President Yanukovych. Opposition to the revolution spiraled into the annexation of Crimea by Russia and ongoing skirmishes in eastern and southern Ukraine. Akin to the Arab Spring in 2011 that illustrated the influence of new media in galvanizing disparate groups to revolt against state authorities, we show that the analysis of sentiments through social media messages relating to the Euromaidan movement in Ukraine from 2013 to 2014 can reveal evidence of nascent plots against Ukrainian state authorities. We systematically examined the exonyms in native languages used by the groups for and against the Euromaidan movement in reference to outsider groups during their mobilization in Ukraine, and conducted a series of statistical tests to analyze the significance of social media-derived sentiment metrics in predicting violence across different periods of political administration in Ukraine. Our analysis of the Euromaidan mobilization indicates that the application of algorithms coded to detect and measure prevalent dissent expressed in native lexicons through social media can be used to substantially improve the accuracy of geospatial forecasts of violent events. https://hdl.handle.net/10945/61332 Lieutenant Commander, Navy, Singapore Commander, Navy, Singapore Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

The foreign policy system of any state is complex and dynamic. Dynamic complexity arises because of multiple feedbacks, non-linearity, multiple interconnections and strong interactions, time delay, and the ability of the agents within the system to adapt. Although there is a tendency to rely on reductionist approaches to establish causal relationships, reductionist approaches tend to provide one-dimensional perspectives and are ill-suited for complex problems with multiple interrelated components. This thesis shows how adopting a systems thinking approach to examining the Chinese foreign policy system may result in a better understanding of the overall system and its specific subsystems. By converting the variables into a causal loop diagram (CLD), the policy-maker can consider developments through a more holistic perspective and gain insights on feedback, hidden interdependencies, and multiple interrelated components. The CLDs developed provide illustrations of the complex, multi-dimensional interactive effects of key variables that affect the foreign policy decision-making process in China. With the identification of reinforcing and balancing loops, the policy-maker can gain a better understanding of how system effects can ultimately have an impact on policy outcomes, and perhaps make better-informed decisions. https://hdl.handle.net/10945/59591 Civilian, Ministry of Defense, Singapore Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Russia threatens Eastern Europe, overtly and covertly, with offensive cyber-attacks, by shooting down aircraft, and through violations of international law such as the annexation of Crimea. The current economic sanctions are not deterring Russia from acting aggressively. Nuclear deterrence is not an appropriate or proportional deterrent of, or response to, these threats. The previous presidential administration held that Ukraine is not important enough to the United States to warrant conventional intervention. How can the United States military support a political warfare campaign to advance its national interests and deter Russia from advancing in Eastern European non-NATO states? This thesis examines how specific Title 10 authorities might allow an appropriate deterrent to such threats. With the absence of other options, United States Special Operations Forces are uniquely organized, trained, and equipped to operate in these environments and may provide a solution. In order to deter Russian aggression, selected Title 10 tasks require blending and assessing the following factors: strategy, tangible value at risk, tripwires, and risk of escalation. Special operations can help achieve deterrence against Russia. http://archive.org/details/specialoperation1094559640 Major, United States Air Force Major, United States Air Force Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Defense Analysis Poster How can the United States military support a political warfare strategy to advance its national interest and deter Russia from advancing their own? Air Force Special Operations Command, 24th Special Operations Wing

The types of attribution for influence activities span a spectrum that includes true attribution, non-attribution, concurring partner attribution, and false attribution. The U.S. Department of Defense sits in a unique position among U.S. agencies, as it must remain capable of conducting influence activities across that spectrum. This includes activities such as public affairs, military information support operations, and military deception. While U.S. military doctrine clearly defines and delineates the various types of attribution for influence activities and messages, notably absent is when and how attribution should be used. There is also little scholarly literature that specifically explores the issue of attribution. Despite this dearth of information, an analysis of historical cases can help identify the conditions best suited for the various types of attribution. This thesis explores those cases and identifies relative power as a potential variable to determine attribution. It tests the hypothesis that false and non-attribution methods are most effective when in a relatively weak position, and as operational success and relative power are achieved, influence activities with true attribution become more effective. http://archive.org/details/attributionininf1094556787 Major, United States Army Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Over the last 100 years, strong state actors have struggled to achieve policy goals when involved in conflicts with weaker actors. Irregular Warfare has become the tool of choice for weak opponents to wage war against strong actors such as the United States. Weak actors are achieving more frequent success against powerful opponents by using indirect strategies. This thesis examines the conflict interaction between weak and strong actors. For the strong actor, this thesis identifies that when there is limited political maneuver space, limited resources, and the importance of the objective is less than vital to national security interests, an indirect strategy becomes the most practical approach to combat a weaker opponent using an indirect approach. Using the aforementioned methodology, this thesis concludes that U.S. Army Special Forces have a comparative advantage over conventional forces to provide the National Command Authorities with a means to address indirect threats from weaker actors. http://archive.org/details/strategicchoiceu1094553031 Major, United States Army Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Military deception (MILDEC) operations have a long and illustrious place in America's battlefield history. To great effect, MILDEC has enabled countless victories in every U.S. conflict since the Revolutionary War. However, the United States has allowed its deception capability to atrophy. Possible explanations for our MILDEC divestiture range from structural insufficiencies to an ethical framework that emphasizes truth and transparency. Simultaneously, the onset of the Information Age has leveled the playing field between state and non-state actors (NSA) and proved that lasting victory cannot be achieved by force alone. Yet, due in part to the difficulty involved in quantifiably measuring information strategy, the contemporary military's acceptance and understanding of information warfare has been limited. This necessitates the re-examination of U.S. information strategy formulation to address more effectively the challenges and complexities encountered in the human domain. To overcome this impediment, this thesis examines the intangible aspects of information warfare and proposes a structured decision-making tool capable of generating precise computations of optimal information strategies. By Force or by Fraud is a quantitative assessment of MILDEC's utility on the modern battlefield that is qualitatively tested against historic cases of information warfare. http://archive.org/details/byforceorbyfraud1094549457 Major, United States Army Major, United States Army Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Policy makers and military strategists should understand how to effect regime change in an unconventional warfare (UW) environment. With this understanding, campaign and operational strategies can be more accurately formulated. This thesis uses four historical case studies where successful regime change was implemented through UW and draws conclusions about essential components that can be used for future planning. A UW planning framework was developed, which consists of planning considerations, lines of effort and insurgent imperatives for success. The planning considerations that must be understood are the nature, strengths and vulnerabilities of the target regime, the level of insurgent influence and social ties to the population. The four critical lines of effort for planning and executing UW with the goal of regime change were identified as: psychological operations, intelligence operations, disruption operations and logistical support. These four lines of effort are effective at fostering the insurgent imperatives that are highly correlated with success: motivation and commitment, tangible support, flexibility and adaptability. http://archive.org/details/startingpointpro1094542599 Major, United States Army Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Cross-border ground raids by state-backed security forces can have a detrimental impact on guerrillas ability to wage war. External support in neighboring countries can be an important source of strength to insurgent forces. However, cross-border raids and their security gains come at a political cost. This thesis examines the conflicts in Malaya (19461950), Nicaragua (19811990), Algeria (19541962), Namibia (19601989), South Vietnam (19601975), and Afghanistan (19781992) to identify operational and strategic-level considerations in planning cross-border operations to reduce the political costs of such operations. The study examines the relationship between security gains and political costs, including subsets of factors intrinsic to both variables. The research presents lessons applicable to the contemporary counterterrorism environment and suggests how military and political counterinsurgents can combine lines of effort in conducting cross-border operations against external insurgent sanctuaries. http://archive.org/details/borderjumpingstr1094534628 Major, United States Army Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

The problems Yemen faces today seem insurmountable. The geographic divisions widened by imperialism were cemented by Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. His heavy-handed suppression of the Houthi rebellion on the border with Saudi Arabia, the Southern secessionist movement, and the Arab Spring protesters delegitimized the regime in the eyes of the Yemeni people. With President Saleh at the helm, water and oil resources were squandered and mismanaged. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has found this volatile, ungoverned environment a welcome area in which to recruit, equip, train, and conduct operations. That their antagonistic narrative continues to find a welcome audience in the tribal areas of Yemen and their securing of safe havens is testament to the failed policies of the Saleh regime. The United States has focused on eradicating AQAP since the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). In its counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign against AQAP, the United States has focused almost all its effort in working with the Yemeni government. While enjoying a modicum of success, this success has been limited to the elimination of AQAP operatives through kinetic strikes. Moreover, the gains were tempered by President Saleh, who at times acted in direct opposition to America's goals of eradicating AQAP. His recent removal will likely do little to counter the array of problems Yemen faces. In this light, America's foreign policy toward Yemen and AQAP is inadequate in securing our regional interests and needs to be overhauled. To delineate which COIN practices may work best, an investigation of past COIN campaigns was conducted. Malaya, Nicaragua, and Somalia were chosen to provide the widest possible range of tactics used in fighting an insurgency where the host nation government is illegitimate, and represent both success and failure. These three case studies formed the basis of three courses of action: working with the government, circumventing the government and working directly with the tribes, and assisting in the state failure. While all three courses of action have merit, only the third course of action addresses the root causes of the problems in Yemen. For this reason, the only way to eliminate AQAP as a threat to the United States is to work through the Yemeni tribes without the central government acting as a roadblock. http://archive.org/details/theunitedstatesn1094510610 US Army (USA) author

This study explores the cyclical nature of conflict in Afghanistan and the elusive condition of stability as coalition forces begin their anticipated drawdown in 2011, and complete transition of security to Afghan forces in 2014. Assuming that the basic societal elements of stability require a balancing of political, economic, and security structures to form a sense of national cohesion, this study seeks to determine if national cohesion is sufficient enough to break the cycle of conflict; and if so, what strategy with neighboring countries will foster this cohesion in order to disrupt the cycle of conflict? A regional approach is necessary to buttress any internal strategies attempted within Afghanistan; but to do so, the alliance of partner nations must first begin small and then grow from a strong central core. The core players in the region are Iran, India, and Pakistan, but the nature of their self-interested interactions has proven unprofitable and unsustainable in the long-term. To the degree that these countries can be assisted to move beyond their pursuance of self-interests, to form a cooperative regional alliance, then the goal of regional stability, as well as stability in Afghanistan, can become a reality. http://archive.org/details/changingafghcycl109455712 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Special Operations Forces (SOF) Headquarters and its predecessor the NATO SOF Coordination Center (NSCC) have made significant progress in special operations interoperability during its brief history. Despite the rapid progress, large gaps in communications, doctrine, intelligence sharing, equipment, and structure within NATO SOF units remain. The lessons learned from the past decade of persistent conflict and emergence of advanced communication capabilities offer an unprecedented window to analyze and enhance special operations interoperability within NATO and abroad. This research analyzes what systems and procedures increase special operations interoperability among coalition special operations forces, interagency, and diplomatic partners to enhance combined operations. The overarching hypothesis proposes that special operations coalitions with high levels of camaraderie, social and technical networking, and the presence of common threats enable enhanced special operations interoperability and effectiveness in combined operations. These dynamics coalesce to produce the accelerants of trust, responsibility, and access that contribute to elevate coalitions from marginal levels of integration to become trusted special operations networks. Enhanced special operations interoperability serves as a catalyst to facilitate communication and effectiveness among military, law enforcement, diplomatic, and interagency partners collaborating against common asymmetric threats. http://archive.org/details/creatingsofnetwo109455695 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

United States Security Force Assistance (SFA) provided to partner nations (PN) enjoys varying degrees of success. The conduct of a PN government can have a tremendous impact on the success of SFA efforts and, although it is often ignored, is not beyond the capability of the U.S. to influence. Additional factors within U.S. control, such as the establishment of clear goals and objectives, as well as unity and continuity of effort, often do not receive adequate emphasis in SFA operations. The way U.S. advisors are selected, trained, and employed can also have a significant impact on the success of SFA operations. Although General Purpose Forces (GPF) have assumed a greater advisory role in recent years, the training they currently receive is not adequate to make them effective advisors. This thesis will show that, in order for U.S. SFA missions to be successful, such operations must: be based on clearly stated goals and objectives agreed upon by both the U.S. and the PN government, be contingent upon a PN government adhering to prescribed standards of conduct, and employ advisory personnel and units that have received specialized training in advisory duties. http://archive.org/details/securityforcessi109455086 US Army (USA) author Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

The purpose of this study is to determine what actions can be taken by American military forces to set conditions for conducting effective Military Information Support Operations (MISO) campaigns in counterinsurgency (COIN) conflicts. To find these actions, hypotheses built upon tenets found in American military Psychological Operations (PSYOP) doctrine were compared to empirical observations of PSYOP conducted in three COIN case studies from the 1950s and 1960s. Because COIN literature is ripe with assertions, such as Dr. Kalev I. Sepp's, that "effective, pervasive psychological operations (PSYOP) campaigns" are inherent in successful COIN operations, it is ironic that few works discuss specific recommendations regarding the design and conduct of such campaigns. This study begins filling this literature gap by showing that MISO relationship to other operations holds greater significance in effective MISO campaign design than internal details, such as the level of centralization. This finding supports contemporary calls for a more unified group of inform and influence practitioners within the United States military, as well as calls for the United States government to draft a National Information Strategy to better leverage this important element of national power. http://archive.org/details/mindgamessetting109455014 US Army (US) author Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Since the initial invasion and ousting of the Taliban regime in 2001, International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and the United States (U.S.) military have lost the initiative and become sedentary in Afghanistan. This case study analysis considers if ISAF and the U.S. military are appropriately employing the current disposition of military forces to maximize effects against the insurgency in Afghanistan. This study objectively compares and contrasts the current ISAF and U.S. strategy with a district level FID/COIN methodology. This study explores why it is necessary to approach the problem at the district/village level to enhance the security, control, and influence of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRoA), and to eliminate systematically the conditions that have supported the insurgency in Afghanistan. http://archive.org/details/adistrictpproach109454465 US Army (USA) author. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

In various regions around the world, the United States suffers from a significant deficit in operational awareness. In areas like the Middle East, reliable information regarding local attitudes and concerns towards U.S. policy are often unknown or overlooked. U.S. actions and policies can sometimes unintentionally incite anger and resentment among segments of the world community. Additionally, the DoD has scarce few individuals who understand the cultural complexities of a given region and know key persons within. These shortfalls in operational awareness can provide an inadequate understanding of why tensions exist or how to address them properly. As a result, the U.S. is at times surprised by unfavorable events when it should be prepared and have adequate forewarning. To summarize, the U.S. has significant blindspots regarding operational awareness and an insufficient number of persons networked into these obscure regions. This thesis examines the potential of the Department of Defense (DoD) to increase operational awareness by fostering foreign relationships between DoD personnel and their foreign counterparts. This thesis further analyzes the value of encouraging U.S. military officers and NCOs to establish, maintain, and further develop personal and professional relationships with foreign military and defense civilians throughout their careers. Based upon an examination of the advantages foreign relationships can bring to secure U.S. policy objectives, courses of action and programs will be recommended to maximize the benefits from fostering foreign relationships within the DoD. http://archive.org/details/fosteringforeign109454887 US Army (USA) author. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.