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Introduction: Exertional tests have become a promising tool to assist clinicians in the management of concussions, however require expensive equipment, extensive spaces, and specialized clinician expertise. As such, we developed a test with minimal resource requirements encompassing key elements of sport and physical activity. The purpose of this study was to pilot test the Multimodal Exertional Test (MET) protocol in a sample of healthy interuniversity athletes. Methods: The MET comprises four stages, each featuring three distinct tasks. The test begins with engaging in squats, alternating reverse lunges, and hip hinges (Stage 1). The next stage progressively evolves into executing these tasks within specified time limits (Stage 2). Following this, the test advances to a stage that incorporates cognitive tasks (Stage 3), and the final stage demands greater levels of physical exertion, cognition, and multi-directional movements (Stage 4). Heart rate (HR) was obtained during each stage of the MET and participants' symptom severity scores were recorded following each task. Results: Fourteen healthy interuniversity athletes (n = 8 female, n = 6 male) participated in the study. HR was obtained for 10 of the 14 athletes (females: n = 6, males: n = 4). Increases in average and maximum HR were identified between pre-MET and Stage 1, and between Stages 3 and 4. Consistent with the tasks in each stage, there were no increases in average and maximum HR observed between MET Stages 1 to 3. Female athletes exhibited higher average and maximum HRs compared to male athletes during all four stages. All 14 athletes reported minimal changes in symptom severity following each task. Conclusion: Among healthy athletes, the MET elicits an increase in average and maximum HR throughout the protocol without symptom provocation. Female athletes exhibit higher HRs during all four stages in comparison to male athletes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The past two decades have witnessed a worldwide move by emerging markets to adopt explicit or implicit inflation targeting regimes. A notable and often discussed exception to this trend, of course, is China which follows a pegged exchange rate regime supported by capital controls. Another major exception is India. It is not clear how to characterize the monetary regime or identify the nominal monetary anchor in India. Is central bank policy in India following a predictable rule that is heavily influenced by a quasi inflation target? And how has the monetary regime been affected by the gradual process of financial liberalization in India? To address these points, we investigate monetary policy regime change in India using a Markov switching model to estimate a time-varying Taylor-type rule for the Reserve Bank of India. We find that the conduct of monetary policy over the last two decades can be characterized by two regimes, which we term 'Hawk' and 'Dove.' In the first of these two regimes, the central bank reveals a greater relative (though not absolute) weight on controlling inflation vis-à-vis narrowing the output gap. The central bank however was found to be in the "Dove" regime about half of our sample period, focusing more on the output gap and exchange rate targets to stimulate exports, rather than moderating inflation. India thus seems to be following its own direction in the conduct of monetary policy, seemingly not overly influenced by the emphasis on quasi-inflation targeting seen in many emerging markets. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.

We estimate the pricing of sovereign risk for sixty countries based on fiscal space (debt/tax;deficits/tax) and other economic fundamentals over 2005-10. We measure how accurately themodel predicts sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads, focusing in particular on the fivecountries in the South-West Eurozone Periphery (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain).Dynamic panel estimates of the model suggest that fiscal space and other macroeconomic factorsare statistically significant and economically important determinants of market-based sovereignrisk. Although the explanatory power of fiscal space measures drop during the crisis, the TEDspread, trade openness, external debt and inflation play a larger role. As expectations of marketvolatility jumped during the crisis, the weakly concavity of creditors’ payoff probably accountsfor the emergence of TED spread as a key pricing factor. However, risk-pricing of the South-West Eurozone Periphery countries is not predicted accurately by the model either in-sample orout-of-sample: unpredicted high spreads are evident during global crisis period, especially in2010 when the sovereign debt crisis swept over the periphery area. We “match” the peripherygroup with five middle income countries outside Europe that were closest in terms of fiscal spaceduring the European fiscal crisis. We find that Eurozone periphery default risk is priced muchhigher than the “matched” countries in 2010, even allowing for differences in fundamentals. Oneinterpretation is that the market has mispriced risk in the Eurozone periphery. An alternativeinterpretation is that the market is pricing not on current fundamentals but future fundamentals,expecting the periphery fiscal space to deteriorate markedly and posing a high risk of debtrestructuring. Adjustment challenges of the Eurozone periphery may be perceived aseconomically and politically more difficult than the matched group of middle income countriesbecause of exchange rate and monetary constraints.

This paper evaluates how the global financial crisis emanating from theU.S. was transmitted to emerging markets. Our focus is on the extent thatthe crisis caused external market pressures (EMP), and whether theabsorption of the shock was mainly through exchange rate depreciation orthe loss of international reserves. Controlling for variety of factorsassociated with EMP, we find clear evidence that emerging markets withhigher total foreign liabilities, including short- and long-term debt,equities, FDI and derivative products—had greater exposure and weremuch more vulnerable to the financial crisis. Countries with large balancesheet exposure -- high external portfolio liabilities exceeding internationalreserves—absorbed the global shock by allowing greater exchange ratedepreciation and comparatively less reserve loss. Despite the remarkablebuildup of international reserves by emerging markets during the periodprior to the financial crisis, countries relied primarily on exchange ratedepreciation rather than reserve loss to absorb most of the exchangemarket pressure shock. This could reflect a deliberate choice (“fear ofreserve loss” or competitive depreciations) or market actions that causedvery rapid exchange rate adjustment, especially in emerging markets withopen capital markets, overwhelming policy actions.

We examine the inflation targeting (IT) experiences of emerging market economies, focusing especially on the roles of the real exchange rate and the distinction between commodity and non-commodity exporting nations. In the context of a simple empirical model, estimated with panel data for 17 emerging markets using both IT and non-IT observations, we find a significant and stable response running from inflation to policy interest rates in emerging markets that are following publically announced IT policies. By contrast, central banks respond much less to inflation in non-IT regimes. IT emerging markets follow a “mixed IT strategy” whereby both inflation and real exchange rates are important determinants of policy interest rates. The response to real exchange rates is much stronger in non-IT countries, however, suggesting that policymakers are more constrained in the IT regime—they are attempting to simultaneously target both inflation and real exchange rates and these objectives are not always consistent. We also find that the response to real exchange rates is strongest in those countries following IT policies that are relatively intensive in exporting basic commodities. We present a simple model that explains this empirical result.

Studies of central bank intervention are complicated by the fact that we typically observe intervention only during periods of turbulent exchange markets. Furthermore, entering the market during these particular periods is a conscious “self-selection” choice made by the intervening central bank. We estimate the “counterfactual” exchange rate movements that allow us to determine what would have occurred in the absence of intervention and we introduce the method of propensity score matching to the intervention literature in order to estimate the “average treatment effect” (ATE) of intervention. Specifically, we estimate the ATE for daily Bank of Japan intervention over the January 1999 to March 2004 period. This sample encompasses a remarkable variation in intervention frequencies as well as unprecedented frequent intervention towards the latter part of the period. We find that the effects of intervention vary dramatically and inversely with the frequency of intervention: Intervention is effective over the 1999 to 2002 period, ineffective during 2003 and counterproductive during the first quarter of 2004.

Are countries with unregulated capital flows more vulnerable to currency crises? Efforts to answer this question properly must control for “self selection” bias since countries with liberalized capital accounts may also have more sound economic policies and institutions that make them less likely to experience crises. We employ a matching and propensity score methodology to address this issue in a panel analysis of developing countries. Our results suggest that, after controlling for sample selection bias, countries with liberalized capital accounts experience a lower likelihood of currency crises. That is, when two countries have the same likelihood of allowing free movement of capital (based on historical evidence and a very similar set of economic and political characteristics)—and one country imposes controls and the other does not-- the country without controls has a lower likelihood of experiencing a currency crisis. This result is at odds with the conventional wisdom and suggests that the benefits of capital market liberalization for external stability are substantial.

Sudden Stops are the simultaneous occurrence of a currency/balance of payments crisis with a reversal in capital flows (Calvo, 1998). We investigate the output effects of financial crises in emerging markets, focusing on whether sudden-stop crises are a unique phenomenon and whether they entail an especially large and abrupt pattern of output collapse (a “Mexican wave”). Despite an emerging theoretical literature on Sudden Stops, empirical work to date has not precisely identified their occurrences nor measured their subsequent output effects in broad samples. Analysis of Sudden Stops may provide the key to understanding why some currency/balance of payments crises entail very large output losses, while others are frequently followed by expansions. Using a panel data set over the 1975-97 period and covering 24 emerging-market economies, we distinguish between the output effects of currency crises, capital inflow reversals, and sudden-stop crises. We find that sudden-stop crises have a large negative, but short-lived, impact on output growth over and above that found with currency crises. A currency crisis typically reduces output by about 2-3 percent, while a Sudden Stop reduces output by an additional 6-8 percent in the year of the crisis. The cumulative output loss of a Sudden Stop is even larger, around 13-15 percent over a three-year period. Our model estimates correspond closely to the output dynamics of the ‘Mexican wave’ (such as seen in Mexico in 1995, Turkey in 1994 and elsewhere), and out-of-sample predictions of the model explain well the sudden (and seemingly unexpected) collapse in output associated with the 1997-98 Asian Crisis. The empirical results are robust to alternative model specifications, lag structures and using estimation procedures (IV and GMM) that correct for bias associated with estimation of dynamic panel models with country-specific effects. Our study supports the hypothesis that sudden stops have a much larger adverse effect on output than other forms of currency attack, and explains the wide divergence in economies’ performances following international financial crises. Establishing this empirical regularity for emerging market economies is the first step in empirically identifying the transmission mechanism through which sudden stops have such large output effects.

Japanese official intervention in the foreign exchange market is of by far the largest magnitude in the world, despite little or no evidence that it is effective in moving exchange rates. Up until recently, however, official data on intervention has not been available for Japan. This paper investigates the effectiveness of intervention using recently published official daily data and an event study methodology. The event study better fits the stochastic properties of intervention and exchange rate data, i.e. intense and sporadic bursts of intervention activity juxtaposed against a yen/dollar rate continuously changing, than standard time-series approaches. Focusing on daily Japanese and US official intervention operations, we identify separate intervention “episodes” and analyze the subsequent effect on the exchange rate. Using the non-parametric sign test and matched-sample test, we find strong evidence that sterilized intervention systemically affects the exchange rate in the short-run (less than one month). This result holds even when intervention is not associated with (simultaneous) interest rate changes, whether or not intervention is “secret” (in the sense of no official reports or rumors of intervention reported over the newswires), and against other robustness checks. Large-scale (amounts over $1 billion) intervention, coordinated with the Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve working in unison, give the highest success rate. During the period that the Bank of Japan has reduced interbank rates to 0.5 percent and below (from September 1995), however, only one intervention operation has been coordinated with the Fed and the success rate has been correspondingly low.