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Black-capped (Poecile atricapillus) and mountain chickadees (Poecile gambeli) have been used as amodel to examine cognitive functions including perception, episodic-like memory, and spatiallearning and orientation. Recently, these species have been used in two studies to examine therelationship between learning and novel environment exploration and novel environment explorationand dominance. In the current study we explored whether these two species show consistency inbehavior over time. In same species/same sex groups, male and female black-capped and mountainchickadees were released into a room and then captured by an experimenter with the procedurerepeated one week later. Males, but not females in both species show consistency in capture orderover both sessions. We discuss implications of this finding in the context of possible sampling biases.

To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2007.01.013 Byline: Steven Hamblin, Peter L. Hurd Abstract: Game theory is not only the primary method for the formal modelling of interactions between individuals, but it also underlies how biologists think about social interactions on an intuitive level. Most biologists equate game theory with the notion of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). Maynard Smith's definition of an ESS formalized an intuitive concept of stable population equilibria in game theory models. This has proven extremely useful, both to formal modelling efforts, and to a much wider range of biologists in general. The formal definition of an ESS often cannot be met for an entire class of games, extensive form games with nodes off the supported path. Games of this form are the most reasonable models for a great many animal behaviours. This means that formal ESSs will not exist for these games, even though evolutionary stable strategies, in the intuitive sense, do exist. More powerful analytical solution concepts, such as evolutionarily stable sets (ES sets), are required to describe stable endpoints formally, but finding such solutions can be extremely difficult. In this paper we use genetic algorithms as an alternative method of searching for such solutions in a well-studied game of biological communication. Using this technique, we show a previously unknown solution to this game. We discuss the properties of biological communication that make it a particularly difficult subject to model using ESSs as the solution concept, and suggest that these issues also apply to a larger class of social models. Author Affiliation: Department of Psychology, University of Alberta, Canada Article History: Received 27 September 2006; Revised 28 October 2006; Accepted 12 January 2007 Article Note: (miscellaneous) MS. number: A10572

To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2005.02.014 Byline: Peter L. Hurd, Magnus Enquist Abstract: The rapid increase in the understanding of biological communication has been largely theory driven. Game-theoretical models have completely changed how behavioural biologists think about communication. These theories are widely cited, but much of the theoretical work remains only vaguely understood by the wide majority of those who make use of it. Critical terms and concepts have not been sufficiently well defined to provide a solid common foundation for theoretical work as a unified whole. In this paper, we synthesize the relevant theoretical work, and describe its relation to more classical thinking within the study of animal behaviour. We present a taxonomy of biological communication and signals. This taxonomy is based upon the structure and properties of extensive-form game models of communication. We then classify many influential models of communication according to the structure of their extensive-form representations. Finally, we link signal taxonomy and extensive form to show how the temporal structure of a modelled interaction determines the type of signal the model will produce. We argue that this intuitive form of modelling is the correct one for unifying terminology and theory. Author Affiliation: (a) Department of Psychology, University of Alberta, Canada (a ) Department of Zoology, University of Stockholm, Sweden Article History: Received 6 March 2003; Revised 10 June 2003; Accepted 17 February 2005 Article Note: (miscellaneous) MS. number: A9569R

Animals often use discrete signals in aggressive interactions. A model of fighting that allows for conventional signalling of subjective resource value has been investigated. In the model, perfect signalling and non signalling were not evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs). ESSs were found whereby partial information was communicated, with discrete signalling of a range of values, and not a precise one.

The colour displays used by cichlids of the species Nannacara anomala during fights may serve to transmit assessment information and seem to indicate cooperative signalling between opponents. It is most likely that the signals act as alerting components or amplifiers to the performance signals that follow. It appears that the suppression of colour displays may have some competitive value. This research supports the hypothesis that fighting behaviour may have some cooperative aspects.