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This paper discusses the moral implications of harming someone – in this case primarily non-human beings – in order to provide benefits for others, primarily human beings. It makes the central argument that human beings, by their very nature as potentially compassionate and rational beings, cannot continue to support activities which cause harm to others, regardless of species and whether benefits would be derived.

Eric Olson’s animalist view relies on the premise that person is not a fit candidate to be a substance concept, in Wiggins’s terminology. Instead, he claims, animal is what best serves as the answer to what we most fundamentally are and what determines our persistence conditions. Pro-posing a thought experiment concerning inorganic replacement, I aim to show that Olson’s animalist view cannot accommodate our very strong intuitions about such cases. My claim is then that animalism either fails on its own grounds or requires some tuning regarding what exactly an organism is and its persistence conditions. I will examine Matthew Liao’s attempt to accommodate such intuitions within an animalist view. I will also describe the basics about Olson’s animalist view but let us first look at the rough outline of my thought experiment. The essentials are as follows, the rest I will provide later, as we go along.

The article tackles selected representations of animals in Ivan Laučík’s (1944 – 2004) poetry. From the wide range of animals which the poet invites into his verse, it focuses on the motifs of insects, birds, and whales. In the world of Laučík’s poetry, insects serve as a litmus test for the quality and viability of an ecosystem. The poet, however, also handles insects in relation to the question of the expressive possibilities of language. Laučík’s ethical and ecological worldview also encompasses numerous motifs of birds which serve functions similar to those of insects. The motif of the whale occupies an important position in the poet’s debut collection, Pohyblivý v pohyblivom ([Mobile within mobility] 1968) and is also an indicator of how people relate to fauna and nature in general: as either conquerors or explorers. The ideal of a peaceful cohabitation of humankind with other animals can be glimpsed in Laučík’s handling of the human as a “human animal.” Such ethos can be observed both in individual poems and in the poet’s system of values in general. It accentuates an eco-friendly attitude towards nature to which the human is radically related.

The article tackles selected representations of animals in Ivan Laučík’s (1944 – 2004) poetry. From the wide range of animals which the poet invites into his verse, it focuses on the motifs of insects, birds, and whales. In the world of Laučík’s poetry, insects serve as a litmus test for the quality and viability of an ecosystem. The poet, however, also handles insects in relation to the question of the expressive possibilities of language. Laučík’s ethical and ecological worldview also encompasses numerous motifs of birds which serve functions similar to those of insects. The motif of the whale occupies an important position in the poet’s debut collection, Pohyblivý v pohyblivom ([Mobile within mobility] 1968) and is also an indicator of how people relate to fauna and nature in general: as either conquerors or explorers. The ideal of a peaceful cohabitation of humankind with other animals can be glimpsed in Laučík’s handling of the human as a “human animal.” Such ethos can be observed both in individual poems and in the poet’s system of values in general. It accentuates an eco-friendly attitude towards nature to which the human is radically related. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the moral implications of harming someone – in this case primarily non-human beings – in order to provide benefits for others, primarily human beings. It makes the central argument that human beings, by their very nature as potentially compassionate and rational beings, cannot continue to support activities which cause harm to others, regardless of species and whether benefits would be derived.

Theory of Eric Olson’s animalism is evaluated in the article in relation to his debate with the proponents of psychological approach to personal identity problem. Olson aims to show the irrelevance of psychology to the issue and to finish the debate by means of introducing the fetus problem. It is argued that theory of animalism has its certain strong points in comparison with Lynne Baker’s constitution view and Jeff McMahan’s embodied part approach; it does not contain any contradictions and rests on few theoretical assumptions. Nevertheless, it is claimed that animalism does not finish the debate, because it does not take into consideration that a person has a strong self-concern about her future. So the essential part of the general personal identity problem is simply ignored by Olson’s animalism

The article critically represents Derek Parfit’s view on personal identity and its connection with our bodies. During the discussion with animalists who claim that persons are identical with bodies Parfit defends Lockean view and concludes that person isn’t identical with human being and easily can exist beyond it. Yet it seems obvious that person isn’t identical with body, such views lead to the controversial effects. For example, Parfit claims that abortion or euthanasia wouldn’t be a crime. This article discusses some of the most debatable basics of Parfit’s position and suggests at least three points worth of next thinking. At first, the author highlights that the so-called psychological criterion of personal identity is rather conventional. At second, the real experience of personal life doesn’t match with the famous Lockean definition, because we have no any continuity. At third, D. Parfit doesn’t explain what it means to be an animal (or human animal). If there is some biological «base» of a person (head, cerebrum, or part of a cerebrum), it still stays an animal. In the conclusion of the article the author suggests that we are not human beings, nor persons. But it doesn’t mean that we can’t become them

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