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Abstract: Our task in the paper is to examine some recent experiments (in the period 1996–2002) bearing on the issue of whether there is dark matter in the universe in the form of neutralino WIMPs (weakly interacting massive particles). Our main focus is an experiment performed by the DAMA group that claims to have found an ‘annual modulation signature’ for the WIMP. DAMA''s result has been hotly contested by two other groups, EDELWEISS and CDMS, and we study the details of the experiments performed by all three groups. Our goal is to investigate the philosophic and sociological implications of this controversy. Particularly, using an innovative theoretical strategy suggested by (Copi, C. and L. M. Krauss (2003). Comparing interaction rate detectors for weakly interacting massive particles with annual modulation detectors. Physical Review D, 67, 103507), we suggest a new way of resolving discordant experimental data (extending a previous analysis by (Franklin, A. (2002). Selectivity and discord. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press). In addition, we are in a position to contribute substantively to the debate between realists and constructive empiricists. Finally, from a sociological standpoint, we remark that DAMA''s work has been valuable in mobilizing other research teams and providing them with a critical focus. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This article presents information related to the generality problem in philosophy. These problems are especially impressive because they target the coherence of reliabilism, leaving aside the issue of whether reliabilism even gets the right result assuming its coherence. Such problems stem from the issue of how one is to characterize a reliable process. In particular, a process can be described at varying levels of generality and depending on what level of description one is working at, one gets different results regarding the reliability of this process. For instance, a seemingly uncontroversial process for generating true beliefs involves a normal human being visually inspecting a mid-sized object in broad daylight and then forming beliefs on that basis.

In his recent article, Nicolas Rasmussen (2001) is harshly critical of what he terms `empirical philosophy of science', a philosophy that takes seriously the history of science in advancing philosophical pronouncements about science, He motivates his criticism by reflecting on recent history in microbiology involving the `discovery' of a new bacterial organelle, the mesosome, during the 1950's and 1960's, and the subsequent retraction of this discovery by experimental microbiologists during the late 1970's and early 1980's. In particular, he argues that there was a lack of constancy in the methods microbiologists used in approaching the issue of the existence of mesosomes, and that in fact a similar sort of `methodological flux' pervades all experimental work. My goal here is to refute Rasmussen's doctrine of flux, and in turn to re-establish order in our understanding of the methods and strategies of experimenters. My strategy in achieving this goal is to re-visit the same crucial research articles in the history of the mesosome episode that Rasmussen (2001) visits; and what I find upon returning to this literature is not flux, as Rasmussen seems to find, but a constancy of method in experimental reasoning, a constancy codified by what I call `reliable process reasoning'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In her 1996 book, Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge, Deborah Mayo argues that use- (or heuristic) novelty is not a criterion we need to consider in assessing the evidential value of observations. Using the notion of a “severe” test, Mayo claims that such novelty is valuable only when it leads to severity, and never otherwise. To illustrate her view, she examines the historical case involving the famous 1919 British eclipse expeditions that generated observations supporting Einstein''s theory of gravitation over Newton''s. My plan here is to defend use-novelty as a valuable methodological principle. I begin by exposing a weakness in Mayo''s criticism of use-novelty. Remedying this weakness re-establishes the worth of use-novelty under specific conditions; in particular, heuristically novel data are to be preferred, as I will say, “prima facie”. Armed with this revised version of use-novelty, I re-examine the history of the eclipse experiments and offer an interpretation of this episode that to an extent—and contrary to Mayo—restores the mildly heretical, Earman/Glymour evaluation of this episode offered in their (1980). I conclude by responding to criticism of my assessment of Mayo''s work. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Evaluates philosopher Sylvia Culp's robustness principles in the context of a specific experimental episode. Presentation of the experimental episode; Demonstration of the reliable process reasoning used by the experimental microgbiologists; Discussion of how experimental microbiologists justify their assertions regarding the reliablility of experimental processes.

Demonstrates how observations can have features of theory-dependence but are nevertheless able to objectively test scientific theories. Testing a theory through observations whose theoretical underpinning excludes the theory under test.

Thomas Kuhn (in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions) and Alan Musgrave (in 'Why Did Oxygen Supplant Phlogiston?') argue that it is impossible to precisely date discovery events and precisely identify discoverers. They defend this claim mainly on the grounds that so-called discoverers have in many cases misconceived the objects of discovery. In this paper, I argue that Kuhn and Musgrave arrive at their view because they lack a substantive account of how well discoverers must be able to conceptualize discovered objects. I remedy this deficiency by providing just such an account, and with this account I delineate how one can secure precision regarding the identity of discoverers and the times of discoveries. Near the end of my paper I bring my target of criticism up-to-date; it turns out that Steve Woolgar adopts an approach to discovery kindred to those of Kuhn and Musgrave and I close the paper by discussing what is at stake in rebutting him. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]