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Problem definition: Quick response is a classic operations strategy that allows a retailer to place a rapid replenishment order during the selling season using information learned from early sales. The benefits of quick response are widely studied in the literature under the condition that the manufacturer's wholesale prices are exogenously given. Motivated by the practice of emerging small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) fashion brands, this paper revisits the value of quick response for a retailer when a manufacturer can strategically set its wholesale prices. Methodology/results: We develop a game-theoretic model consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. In contrast to the traditional quick response setting, the manufacturer can dynamically adjust wholesale prices for both regular and replenishment orders. First, we investigate whether and when quick response still benefits the retailer. We find that, under low or significantly high demand uncertainties, the firms share a common preferred ordering strategy, and quick response benefits the retailer as well as the supply chain. But, under moderately high demand uncertainty, the retailer's favored ordering strategy conflicts with the manufacturer's interest; as a result, the manufacturer would set wholesale prices to counter the retailer's ordering strategy, which makes quick response detrimental to the retailer. Second, we search for mechanisms that can resolve this conflict and restore the beneficial effect of quick response. We show that letting the manufacturer commit to wholesale prices up front is ineffective in fixing the problem. However, if the retailer can propose a take-it-or-leave-it wholesale price for the replenishment order (possibly with the replenishment quantity) once the regular wholesale price is set, then quick response leads to a win–win outcome for both firms. Managerial implications: The findings caution retailers with weak power (e.g., SMEs) when adopting quick response, especially when facing moderately high demand uncertainties. The retailer, although weak, should be aware of the retailer's natural ability to propose replenishment terms because, otherwise, the retailer can always forgo quick response; this opens up an opportunity to design more favorable arrangements. Funding: The work of J. Chen was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72171202, 72232007]; the work of Q. Hu was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72271057, 72091211]; the work of D. Shi was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant 72102205] and Shenzhen Stable Support Program for Higher Education Institutions; the work of F. Zhang was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 71929201, 72131004]. Supplemental Material: The online supplement is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.0561. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate the value of an innovative trade credit with rebate contract (TCRC) model in a stylised supply chain. In this supply chain, the capital-abundant manufacturer offers an integrated contract involving trade credit, minimum ordering and sales rebate contract to a capital-constrained retailer. To highlight the value of the TCRC model, we compare it with a traditional trade credit financing (TTCF) model in a 'selling to the newsvendor model'. First, we show that equilibrium strategies exist between the manufacturer and the retailer under the TCRC or TTCF model. Second, this study investigates equilibrium selection between the TCRC and TTCF models for the individual and the supply chain. Finally, we show the manufacturer's pricing policy, wherein the TCRC model outperforms the TTCF model for the players. Furthermore, we conduct a set of numerical experiments to show evidence for theoretical analysis and measure the operation efficiency of the TCRC model for players in the supply chain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2006.02.031 Byline: Rong Du (a), Qiying Hu (b), Shizhong Ai (a) Keywords: Decision analysis; Advertising; Stochastic optimal policies; Market utility Abstract: Firms are faced with uncertain sales responses even though they advertise appropriately. To help marketing managers make optimal budget decisions in this situation, we develop a stochastic model, depicting the problem of advertising budget decision as a special Markov decision process where a new objective, maximizing expected market utility, is proposed. In the model we introduce a two-dimension state variable including accumulative sales, which vary randomly with advertising budget, and the predicted probability that an advertising campaign obtains a full sales response. We make an analysis of the model on the premise of growing infinite market potential, deriving the property of optimal policies and that of optimal value function. These results are successfully used to make advertising budget decisions for a private university in Xi'an, China. Author Affiliation: (a) School of Economics and Management, Xidian University, 2 Taibai Road, Xi'an, Shaanxi 710071, China (b) College of Business and Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai 201800, China Article History: Received 15 October 2004; Accepted 15 February 2006

To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2004.06.025 Byline: Li Du (a), Qiying Hu (b), Liming Liu (c) Keywords: Joint venture; Profit sharing; Technology; Auction Abstract: Consider the scenario when two firms are setting up a joint venture. One firm has a set of technologies and knowhow for a new product while the other contributes the necessary capital for setting up and running the venture. The key issue that the two firms face in negotiating the joint venture is to determine a fair value for the technologies and knowhow. This paper presents an approach by which each firm bids a price for the technology with an objective to maximize their own profits from the joint venture. Provided that their bids satisfy a cooperation condition, the two firms settle on a price using a simple valuation formula. We analyze the impact of various factors on the decision process and provide numerical results to illustrate the bidding strategies. We conclude that in order to maximize their profits, it is often more important for both firms to increase the chance of cooperation than to increase their own shares of the joint venture. Author Affiliation: (a) School of Economics and Management, Xidian University, Xian 710071, China (b) College of International Business and Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai 201800, China (c) Department of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Hong Kong Article History: Received 29 April 2003; Accepted 24 June 2004 Article Note: (footnote) [star] This research has been supported in part by NSFC through grant 70271021 and by RGC through grant N_HKUST623/00.

We study a cardinality-constrained optimisation problem with nonnegative variables in this paper. This problem is often encountered in practice. Firstly, we study some properties on the optimal solutions of this optimisation problem under some conditions. An equivalent reformulation of the problem under consideration is proposed. Based on the reformulation, we present a successive convex approximation method for the cardinality constrained optimisation problem. We prove that the method converges to a KKT point of the reformulation problem. Under some conditions, the KKT points of the reformulation problem are local optimisers of the original problem. Our numerical results on a limited diversified mean–variance portfolio selection problem demonstrate some promising results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]