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Sinisan (SNS) has been used to treat psychosomatic diseases of the digestive system. But little is known about how SNS affects water immersion restraint stress (WIRS). To study the effects of SNS on colonic tissue injury in the WIRS model. Forty-eight Kunming (KM) mice were randomized into 6 groups (n = 8): The control and WIRS groups receiving deionized water; the SNS low-dose (SL, 3.12 g/kg/d), SNS middle-dose (SM, 6.24 g/kg/d), SNS high-dose (SH, 12.48 g/kg/d), and diazepam (DZ, 5 mg/kg/d) groups; each with two daily administrations for 5 consecutive days. The 5 treatment groups were subjected to WIRS for 24 h on day 6. The effects of SNS on colon tissue injury caused by WIRS were assessed by changes in colon histology, inflammatory cytokines, brain-gut peptides, and tight junction (TJ) proteins levels. 16S rRNA gene sequencing was used to detect the regulation of the gut microbiota. SNS pretreatment significantly reduced TNF-α (0.75- to 0.81-fold), IL-6 (0.77-fold), and IFN-γ (0.69-fold) levels; and increased TJ proteins levels, such as ZO-1 (4.06- to 5.27-fold), claudin-1 (3.33- to 5.14-fold), and occludin (6.46- to 11.82-fold). However, there was no significant difference between the levels of substance P (SP) and vasoactive intestinal peptide (VIP) in the control and WIRS groups. SNS regulated the composition of gut microbiota in WIRS mice. The positive effects of SNS on WIRS could provide a theoretical basis to treat stress-related gastrointestinal disorders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: In China, the coverage rate of work injury insurance was 23.2%in 2011, which was far lower than expected. The factors affecting the insurance's enrollment has very little known. This paper aims to study the existing coverage of work injury insurance scheme and its influencing factors., Methods: The data were collected from 2 836 workers who came from 9 industries in three cities of Zhejiang province using face-to-face questionnaire interview., Results: Of these 2836 workers, the work injury insurance coverage was 50.1%, and 29.6% were not sure if they were covered or not. The results showed that the awareness of occupational disease and industrial injury insurance was helpful in increasing the coverage rate. Besides, the logistic regression analysis showed that in certain circumstances working population shared higher coverage of work injury insurance. For examples, male workers with local household registration and longer working years; people who had been informed about occupational risk factors, and thus gained more training on the issue; people who had exposed to occupational hazards or involved in administrative duties; and people who had already insured by a medical insurance scheme. In the contrary, the heavier family burden with longer working hours per week they needed, the lower possibility they joined the insurance scheme., Conclusions: The coverage of work injury insurance is higher than native average level but much lower than the average international level. The awareness of occupational disease and injury insurance was closely associated with the coverage of work injury insurance. Therefore, it is imperative to popularize the knowledge on OHS for migrant workers, as well as to reinforce the supervision and management of the issue would have been an effective way to elevate the coverage rate of work injury insurance.

Objective: To investigate workers' willingness to participate and wiliness to pay for a hypothetical industrial injury insurance scheme, to analyze the influential factors, and to provide information for policy making of the government., Methods: Multistage cluster sampling was used to select subjects: In the first stage, 9 small, medium, orlarge enterprises were selected fromthree cities (counties) in Zhejiang province, China, according to the level of economic development, transportation convenience, and cooperation of government agencies; in the second stage, several workshops were randomly selected from each of the 9 enterprises. Face-to-face interviews among all workers in the workshops were conducted by trained interviewers using a pre-designed questionnaire., Results: It was found that 73.87% (2095) of all workers were willing to participate in the hypothetical work injury insurance scheme and to pay 2.21% of monthly wage (51.77 yuan) on average, and more than half of the workers were willing to pay less than 1%of monthly wage (35 yuan). Of the 741 workers who were not willing to participate, 327 thought that the premium should be borne by the state or enterprises, instead of individuals, and others were not willing to participate because of low income, unstable job, or poor understanding of the hypothetical industrial injury insurance scheme. Logistic regression analysis showed that workers with higher education levels, longer length of services, longer weekly working time, or more knowledge of occupational diseases showed higher willingness to participate in the scheme; workers who were exposed to physical hazards, had health records, or had participated in the existing medical insurance or industrial injury insurance were more willing to participate. Multiple linear regression analysis showed that with increasing average monthly wage, weekly working time, and self?health evaluation, the proportion of workers with willingness to pay increased; however, with increasing work intensity and awareness of occupational disease, the proportion of workers with willingness to pay decreased. The workers who were not covered by the industrial injury insurance paid more than those covered by the industrial injury insurance., Conclusion: The hypothetical industrial injury insurance scheme increased the applicability and advantage of independent third-party running and lifetime insurance, which significantly increased the workers' willingness to participate in or to pay for the insurance scheme. Therefore, the industrial injury insurance can be improved in these aspects to promote workers' willingness to participate in and to pay for the insurance scheme. This conclusion provided a reference for the solution of delayed or shirking corporate responsibility for paying the premium.