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Korijen filozofskih razmimoilaženja u XIII. stoljeću proizlazi iz dvaju tipova metafizike: metafizike bitka i metafizike bîti, odnosno njihovih dvaju načina poimanja bića. Te dvije vrste metafizike karakteriziraju dvije dominantne filozofske škole XIII. stoljeća, dominikansku i franjevačku. Glavni predstavnik dominikanske škole, sveti Toma Akvinski, ujedno je i začetnik metafizike bitka, a franjevačku školu predstavljaju sveti Bonaventura i blaženi Duns Scot s dvjema osnovnim metafizikama bîti. U radu se polazeći od Akvinčeva, Bonaventurina i Duns Scotova načina poimanja bića i njegovih počela izvodi njihov odgovor na šest temeljnih metafizičkih pitanja: Kakva je metafizička struktura bića?, Koja je zadnja zbiljnost bića?, Kako objasniti apsolutnu jednostavnost Božju i složenost stvorenja?, Je li biće analogno ili univočno?, Kako se individualiziraju bîti? U radu se je kroz metafizičku analizu pokušalo pokazati da pozicije franjevačkih mislilaca, iako se zaustavljaju na plićoj razini promatranja bivstvovanja, onoj na kojoj je bivstvovanje po sebi uvijek nekakvo određeno bivstvovanje, ipak uvođenjem pojma postojanja uspijevaju stvoriti model koji uspješno metafizički opisuje stvorenost bića, no ne uspijevaju izreći stvarnu metafizičku strukturu bića, dok se metafizika bitka svetoga Tome Akvinskog prepoznaje kao ona metafizika koja zahvaća i izriče „jest“ bića u svojoj izvornosti te tako istinski objašnjava metafizičku strukturu bića., The root of philosophical disagreements in the 13th century arises from two types of metaphysics: the metaphysics of essence and the metaphysics of being, that is, their two ways of understanding being. These two types of metaphysics characterize the two dominant philosophical schools of the 13th century, Dominican and Franciscan. The main representative of the Dominican school is Saint Thomas Aquinas, withal the originator of the metaphysics of being, and the Franciscan school is represented by Saint Bonaventure and Blessed Duns Scotus with two basic metaphysics of essence. Starting from Aquinas, Bonaventure and Duns Scotus' way of understanding being and its beginnings, the paper derives their answer to six basic metaphysical questions: What is the metaphysical structure of being like? What is the ultimate reality of being? How to explain the absolute simplicity of God and the complexity of the created? Is being analogous or univocal? How are essences individualized? The paper tried to show through a metaphysical analysis that the positions of the Franciscan thinkers, although they stop at a shallower level of observation of being, the one where being in itself is always some kind of specified being; nevertheless, by introducing the concept of existence, they manage to create a model that successfully metaphysically describes the creation of being. But the Franciscan thinkers fail to express the real metaphysical structure of being, while the metaphysics of being of St. Thomas Aquinas is recognized as the metaphysics that grasps and expresses the existence of being in its originality and thus truly explains the metaphysical structure of being.

Najnovija enciklika pape Benedikta XVI Caritas in veritate, kao i prethodne enciklike posvećene socijalnoj tematici, najreprezentativniji su dio opusa katoličkog socijalnog nauka koji u svijetlu judeo-kršćanske Objave i općih načela kršćanske filozofije raščlanjuje aktualne svjetske društvene prilike. U članku se razložila prožetost socijalnog nauka Crkve filozofijom te ukazalo na metafizičke specifičnosti te filozofije, koja sačinjava, kako se je pokazalo, filozofski okvir enciklike Caritas in veritate. Analizom logike filozofskog diskursa Benedikta XVI koja inkorporira, u taj filozofski okvir, načelo besplatnosti kao izraz ljudskog bratstva, nastojalo se ukazati na doprinos enciklike Caritas in veritate aktualnim promišljanjima filozofije globalizacije., The latest encyclical letter by the Pope Benedict XVI Caritas in veritate, similar to the former encyclicals dedicated to social issues, is the most representative part of the Catholic social teaching which analyses current world issues in the light of Judeo-Christian Revelation and general principles of Christian philosophy. This article has expounded the philosophical background of Roman Catholic social teaching and indicated metaphysical peculiarities of that philosophy which builds, as it is shown, the philosophical foundation of the encyclical Caritas in veritate. By analyzing the logic of Benedict’s philosophical discourse, which in that philosophical frame includes the principle of gratuitousness as the expression of human fraternity, we tried to show the contribution of Caritas in veritate encyclical letter to current philosophical thought about globalization.

U članku pod gornjim naslovom su sličnosti i razlike metafizičkih počela Aristotela i Tome Akvinskog iskazane analizom argumentacije koja je sržna za obje ove metafizike: o postojanju Nepokretnog pokretača, Čistog akta. Tom analizom je pokazano da, iako im argumentacija ima istu logičku strukturu i isto polazište – promjenu bića – ipak ih je razlika u shvaćanju metafizičkih počela samog bića dovela do različitih zaključaka. Tako je ovdje pokazano da je za Aristotelovu metafiziku supstancije zadnja zbiljnost (aktualnost) bića supstancijalna forma, koje svoje zadnje utemeljenje ima u Čistom aktu, Nepokretnom pokretaču, dok za metafiziku bitka Tome Akvinskog zadnja zbiljnost bića jest bitak, koji svoje zadnje utemeljenje ima također u Čistom aktu, ali koji je shvaćen kao Čisti akt bivstvovanja, Subzistentni bitak. Stoga je za Aristotela Čisti akt isključivo oblikovatelj ostale stvarnosti ukoliko je svršni uzrok te nema, niti može imati, kao Nepokretni pokretač, ikakav drugi uzročni utjecaj na ostalu stvarnost, dok je za Tomu Akvinskog Nepokretni pokretač nužno Čisti akt bivstvovanja čije djelovanje je stvaranje., In this article the similarities and differences of Aristotle’s and Thomas Aquinas’ metaphysical principles are set forth by analyzing the core arguments of their metaphysics: principally, those concerning the existence of the Unmoved Mover, also called Pure Act. The analysis shows that although their arguments have the same logical structure and the same starting point – the fact that beings change – different conceptions of the metaphysical principles of being nevertheless lead to different conclusions. Therefore, this article shows that within Aristotle’s metaphysics of substance, the ultimate actuality is the substantial form which has its last ground in Pure Act, the Unmoved Mover. On the other hand, Thomas Aquinas believes that the ultimate actuality is existence, which also has its last ground in Pure Act, but the Act of Existence, or Subsistent Existence. Therefore, Aristotle’s Pure Act is a mere giver of forms and the final cause of reality. This Pure Act does not have, nor it can have any other causal influence on the rest of reality, while Aquinas’ Unmoved Mover is necessarily the Pure Act of Existence whose activity we call creation.

U radu podijeljenom u tri dijela autor pokazuje da su antropološka promišljanja Stanleya Lewisa Jakija određena njegovim filozofskim realizmom. Specifičnost tog realizma, koji je prema Jakiju zahtjev zdravog razuma, jest to da je on s jedne strane metodološki, tj. obilježen percepcijom objekta kao prvim metodološkim korakom i, s druge, da je umjereni, tj. sukladan duhovno-tjelesnoj naravi čovjekasubjekta. U prvom poglavlju pokazano je da sama percepcija objekta u sebi uključuje dvije značajke, shvaćanje i svijest, koje nužno vode k zaključku o nematerijalnosti uma. U drugom je poglavlju izneseno da nijekanje zdravorazumske spoznaje slobode nije koherentno s realizmom, dok je u trećem poglavlju objašnjeno kako Jakijev umjereni realizam ukazuje na otajstvenost odnosa duše i tijela, potvrđujući tako neprihvatljivost svih mogućih redukcionizama tog odnosa., In this paper, which is divided into three sections, the author is trying to show how anthropological considerations of Stanley Lewis Jaki are determined by his philosophical realism. The distinctiveness of this realism, which Jaki believes to be a postulate of common sense, is on the one hand its methodological characteristic of being marked by the perception of object as its first methodological step, and on the other hand, its characteristic of being moderate, i.e. appropriate to spiritual-bodily nature of mansubject. The first section of the paper shows that the perception of object in itself includes two distinctive traits, understanding and consciousness, which necessarily lead to the conclusion of the immateriality of mind. In the second section the author argues that the denial of the fact of freedom, which is known by common sense, is incoherent with realism, while the third section explains how Jaki’s moderate realism points to the mystery of the relation between body and soul, rendering all possible reductionisms of that relation possible.

Rad je podijeljen u dva dijela. U prvom dijelu iznesena je Jakijeva pozicija, počevši s njegovim shvaćanjem količine koje se temelji na Aristotelovu tekstu iz Kategorija 6a 25, gdje se kaže da “kategorija količine ne dopušta više ili manje“. To svojstvo kategorije količine koje čini njezino poimanje jednoznačnim, prema Jakiju je jedinstveno, te je stoga radikalno razlikuje od svih ostalih kategorija i čini je nepovezivom s njima. Ta razlika, naglašava naš autor, utemeljuje specifičnu vlastitost fizičko-matematičke znanosti, koja je vezana isključivo uz količinsko, ostavljajući drugim znanostima i područjima ljudskog znanja istraživanje ostalih kategorija. U drugom dijelu rada iznesena je kritika gore navedene pozicije koja je pokazala: prvo, da prema Aristotelu kategorija količine nije jedina koja ne dopušta više i manje, te, drugo, da ontološka povezanost kvaliteta i količine čini materijalne kvalitete mjerljivima, što se iskazuje fizikalnim veličinama koje su temelj fiziko-matematičke znanosti., The paper is divided in two sections. In the first section Jaki’s position is outlined, beginning with his understanding of quantity which is based on Aristotle’s text in Categories 6a 25 where it is said that “Quantity does not, it appears, admit of variation of degree“. That characteristic of category of quantity which makes its conception univocal is, according to Jaki, unique and therefore radically differentiates quantity and makes it unconnectable with the rest of the categories. That difference, our author stresses, establishes the specific property of physico-mathematical science, which is related exclusively to the quantitative, leaving the research of the remaining categories to other sciences and areas of human knowledge. In the second part of the paper critique of the above mentioned position is carried out showing that: first of all, according to Aristotle the category of quantity is not the only category which does not admit of variation of degree, and secondly, that the ontological bond between quality and quantity is what makes material qualities measurable, which is expressed by physical units that are the foundation of physico-mathematical science.