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The article focuses on the National Hockey League's (NHL) Long-Term Injured Reserve (LTIR) rules and their impact on salary cap management and competitive parity among teams. It explores the liability that the NHL faces due to the appearance of LTIR rule exploitation and unequal outcomes among teams. It further suggests possible remedies to address the issue, such as reducing LTIR cap benefits for teams that designate players in their mid-thirties or older.

Looking through the lens of the D.C. District Court’s 2020 decision on President Trump’s TikTok “ban” (TikTok v. Trump), this article assesses whether U.S. law can address national security concerns raised by cross border data trade while accommodating the needs of industry. The type of data valued by foreign rivals of the United States has gradually shifted in accordance with technological progress and geopolitical dynamics. During the 2000’s and early 2010’s, cyber-based foreign economic collection campaigns targeting the U.S. focused on high-value IP data and trade secrets. However, in the past few years, increasing societal reliance on the internet in tandem with advances in data processing and algorithms has produced a new type of data-related security concern: foreign adversarial mass bulk collection of quotidian U.S. person data, including biometric data (for example, facial photographs). The apparent threat posed by foreign mass collection of such data – which has been publicly and prominently emphasized by the U.S. Intelligence community (“IC”) – gives rise to a philosophical conflict. On one hand, the IC and privacy advocates regard foreign adversarial access as a threat. On the other hand, business interests have grown heavily reliant on data trade. In some industries, such as the music business in the streaming era, data collection and trade may be pivotal to profitability and growth. TikTok, which originally began as a music-sharing platform, is alone worth $400 billion. Reconciling these opposing priorities and formulating a policy solution to such foreign data collection appears difficult under existing U.S. legal authorities. For example, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”)—under which foreign access to data might be restricted—may not be cleanly applicable to this cross-border data trade. IEEPA, which is the main U.S. framework for sanctions, has been traditionally applied to dictatorships and rogue regimes in response to terrorism sponsorship, weapons proliferation, slavery, corruption, war crimes, and genocide. Even though foreign collection of quotidian U.S. person data poses national security liabilities, the invocation of such a powerful legal mechanism as a response to bulk data collection may not be considered proportional or reasonable. Beyond this, the IEEPA statute (passed in 1977) forecloses sanctions prohibiting or constraining “personal communication[s] which do not involve a transfer of anything of value” or the exportation of “informational materials.” The D.C. District Court’s 2020 ruling in TikTok v. Trump construed quotidian U.S. data and TikTok content as falling within this language; thus, the applic)ability of IEEPA to restricting data trade on national security grounds appears legally uncertain. Likewise, CFIUS—the framework for screening foreign adversarial investments in U.S. companies—does not appear to represent a full solution to regulating foreign adversarial access to quotidian U.S. data. CFIUS was expanded between 2018-2020 to theoretically cover foreign minority stake investments giving rise to U.S. data collection. However, in any case, U.S. federal law widely permits the selling of data, and this is reflected in the emergence of a lucrative data brokerage industry. A foreign party seeking U.S. data may not need to invest in a company if it can simply buy such data from a broker. Furthermore, the Federal Trade Commission—responsible for keeping an eye on data trade in practice – does not appear to have a relationship with CFIUS and disclaims a “national security”-related role. In short, TikTok v. Trump traces a challenging reality: even though constitutional law (Dames & Moore v. Regan) confers overwhelming authority on executive branch administrative national security mechanisms such as IEEPA and CFIUS, the applicability of these frameworks to properly regulate foreign bulk data collection, including some highly sensitive personal data, has proven unclear. Additional new legislation may be necessary to balance security concerns with private sector interests in unrestricted data trade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the importance of judicial biographies in performing biographical analysis of judges focused on their judicial philosophy and the rule of law. Topics discussed include the origin of the judicial independence from the case Marbury v. Madison that introduced the authority of court to rule unconstitutional a law passed by U.S Congress, violation of the Eighth Amendment through death penalty judgments, and Texas death penalty case Callins v. Collins.

In this article, the authors address the question related to the most significant legacy left by the September 11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. According to the authors, the key to understand the terrorist attacks is to relate the war on terrorism with the Cold War from 1945-89. They states that the success against Islamist organization al Qaeda requires smooth transition from a large U.S. military to an effective military.

The article explores the vulnerabilities of cyberspace. It discusses the difficulties in characterizing cyber-events and the variant motivations of hackers. It reviews several solutions and approaches for addressing major hurdles in cybersecurity, such as governmental cybersecurity assistance for the private sector and sharing critical information between the private sector and public sector.