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The present research note examines how design features of consent forms impact response rates, privacy concerns, and respondents' knowledge of their rights. The 2018 implementation of the General Data Protection Regulation, also known as General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), has triggered widespread concern in the scientific community across the European Union. The concern is that the GDPR requirements for the processing of personal data may introduce severe limitations on certain types of research. A key requirement of the GDPR is that researchers must obtain informed consent from individuals whose personal data will be processed as part of the research. Consent must be freely given, specific, informed, unambiguous, and given actively via a clear affirmative action. However, in practice, there is a wide variation in the interpretation and implementation of the GDPR. Therefore, this study aims to investigate how to ensure informed consent without compromising the needs of academic research. To do so, we fielded a survey experiment with a 2 × 2 × 2 between-subjects design, varying key dimensions of the survey consent form. The results of this study document the advantages of using condensed information and in-text legal references (as opposed to a hyperlink). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the role of social media in the spread of conspiracy theories has received much attention, a key deficit in previous research is the lack of distinction between different types of platforms. This study places the role of social media affordances in facilitating the spread of conspiracy beliefs at the center of its enquiry. We examine the relationship between platform use and conspiracy theory beliefs related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Relying on the concept of technological affordances, we theorize that variation across key features make some platforms more fertile places for conspiracy beliefs than others. Using data from a crossnational dataset based on a two-wave online survey conducted in 17 countries before and after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, we show that Twitter has a negative effect on conspiracy beliefs—as opposed to all other platforms under examination which are found to have a positive effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior studies have reported a right-leaning bias in the media's reporting of how the public thinks of political issues, raising the question: Why, and to what extent, is this the case? One reason in particular has been discussed in this regard: Journalists judge public opinion to be more right leaning than it actually is (Beckers et al. 2021; Lewis et al. 2004). This paper therefore studies to what extent journalists misjudge audience opinion. The analyses are based on large-scale representative surveys of journalists (1993/2005) and the voting-age population (1994/2005) in Germany. Results show that German journalists (mis-)judge audience opinion to be more right-leaning than the audience sees itself. The results also show that journalists judge audience opinion to be to the right of their own stances, and that journalists in federal states with a right-leaning government and in West Germany judge audience opinion to be even further to the right. Audience feedback does not push journalists' judgements of their audience towards the right, however. These results are discussed vis-à-vis research showing that there is a consistent bias in the depiction of opinions expressed by ordinary citizens, and research documenting that political elites overestimate public support for right-wing policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous studies have shown that experts appearing in the media are increasingly speculating about trends and developments rather than presenting their own research. With respect to political journalism, this raises the question of whether increased use of expert sources has also led to an increased focus on process relative to substance in election news coverage. The study, conducted in 1998 and 2007, surveys what types of experts are referred to in the election coverage, what topics the experts comment on (in particular whether they focus on substance or process), and whether the number and types of experts as well as topics have changed over time. As expected, there is an increase in newspapers’ references to experts in their election campaign coverage. However, contrary to our expectations, in both 1998 and 2007, there is an equal number of articles referring to the election campaign’s political content (i.e., they mentioned the topics promoted by the political actors during the campaign) and to the political process. And extremely few articles included meta-discussions.

The transition from low- to high-choice media environments has had far-reaching implications for citizens' media use and its relationship with political knowledge. However, there is still a lack of comparative research on how citizens combine the usage of different media and how that is related to political knowledge. To fill this void, we use a unique cross-national survey about the online and offline media use habits of more than 28,000 individuals in 17 European countries. Our aim is to (i) profile different types of news consumers and (ii) understand how each user profile is linked to political knowledge acquisition. Our results show that five user profiles – news minimalists, social media news users, traditionalists, online news seekers, and hyper news consumers – can be identified, although the prevalence of these profiles varies across countries. Findings further show that both traditional and online-based news diets are correlated with higher political knowledge. However, online-based news use is more widespread in Southern Europe, where it is associated with lower levels of political knowledge than in Northern Europe. By focusing on news audiences, this study provides a comprehensive and fine-grained analysis of how contemporary European political information environments perform and contribute to an informed citizenry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]