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This chapter applies a modified dependency theory prism to the case of the Mauritius Special Economic Zone, and examines how Mauritius has been facilitating its own underdevelopment by employing strategies that reproduce dependency. While Mauritius is a particular case, with its own specificities, this theoretically informed approach enables a set of questions to be raised about the broader African tensions in efforts to merge cooperation with dependency, socialism with neoliberal capitalism, and Chinese socialist capitalism with African particularism. Drawing on fieldwork, the chapter raises questions about the nature, status and implications of dependency dynamics today. Instead of treating Special Economic Zones as empirical events, it argues that the absence of a theoretical prism, and the resulting dominant understanding of these zones as insular entities, matters.

At the 2006 Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, President Hu Jintao announced the establishment of Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa (CSEZAs) in the spirit of mutual development and cooperation. The Chinese government launched seven such projects across Nigeria, Ethiopia, Egypt, Zambia and Mauritius. In most of these countries, there was social outcry over land expropriation for the construction of the CSEZAs and the resultant displacement of existing settlers. Seven years since their launch, the delayed CSEZA development only exacerbate the frustration of the host African communities as they contemplate whether the land they appropriated for the zone, at the expense of rural livelihoods, is getting an appropriate usage. The case of Mauritius is particularly salient considering its size, location and outward economic dependence.

Strategically situated in the Indian Ocean—yet with neither defence forces nor any natural resources to trade—Mauritius relies on FDI, market access and military assistance for its survival. Due to its colonial links, Mauritius has benefited from a series of preferences from the UK (e.g. Commonwealth Sugar Agreement) and from its Francophone membership (e.g. France Telecom investment). Its colonial past, coupled with a consequent ethnically unbalanced demography composed of 68 % of Indian descent, 27 % of African descent, 3 % of Chinese descent and 2 % of Franco-Mauritian, Mauritius is liable to be cautious in its affiliation during exercises of international diplomacy. This is particularly relevant in the interplay between China and India on the Mauritian investment scenario. Aware of the Mahanian conflict between the two regional competitors regarding influence over the Indian Ocean, Mauritius aptly uses its active diaspora links with one as a negotiation leverage to incite investment cooperation from the other. It is in under a similar practice that Mauritius has secured the two biggest investment projects in its history: The Mauritius JinFei Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone by China (2006) and the NeoTown zone project by Indian developers (2010). What is remarkable is that Mauritius adopts a management method allowing it to secure its diaspora loyalty to both home countries; while India is granted investment monopoly in ICT and services, Chinese activism is welcomed in construction and manufacturing. The Mauritian negotiation strategy almost resembles Putnam’s two-level game (Putnam International Organization 42: 427–460, 1988) though in an inverted fashion, whereby the international is harmonized at the domestic level. However, the use of diaspora links as a bait to lure investment from China and India needs to be evaluated as it might become an excuse for Mauritius to overlook more viable investment partnership alternatives.