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Existing research on advertising structures in a supply chain has mainly been conducted with symmetric quality information and the interaction between quality information disclosure and advertising has not been clarified. To identify the optimal advertising structure and disclosure strategy for a manufacturer, we explore manufacturer advertising and cooperative advertising in the context of product quality information asymmetry. We examine the implications of the manufacturer's product quality information disclosure on his advertising strategies and the impact of advertising on quality information disclosure decisions. When cooperative advertising is more effective than manufacturer advertising and the product quality is low, the manufacturer should adopt manufacturer advertising, which leads to higher perceived quality and improves the retailer's economic condition. We find that advertising can inspire the manufacturer to disclose more product quality information regardless of the advertising structure, which occurs when the effectiveness of advertising is large. Furthermore, the manufacturer, the retailer, and consumers can benefit from cooperative advertising when cooperative advertising is more effective than manufacturer advertising and the product quality is high. We also consider an extension where the manufacturer and retailer advertise simultaneously and find that advertising leads to more quality information being disclosed when the disclosure cost is low. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the emergency production of medical products, the supplier with raw materials is often the leader in the game and has the advantage of determining the supply chain structure. Previous research on supply chain structure mostly focuses on how the leader uses this advantage to obtain the optimal profit, ignoring the strategic compensation of the follower under this disadvantage. This paper explores how the follower can get the optimal profit through contract design and production time in a supply chain composed of two buyers (integrated buyer and non-integrated buyer) and a supplier. In the case of shortage of medical products, firms form a completely decentralized or partially decentralized (the supplier and a buyer form a vertically integrated entity) structure for emergency production. The results show that the integrated buyer can obtain more profits in the partially decentralized structure. In addition, in the partially decentralized structure, the non-integrated buyer is more sensitive to production time. Surprisingly, in emergency production, the more purchases the non-integrated buyer makes, the higher the wholesale price of the supplier. However, under certain conditions, this abnormal phenomenon increases the possibility of the buyer obtaining the optimal profit, and weakens the influence of supply chain structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the previous literature on green technology adoption has not fully considered information sharing, we consider the impact of demand information sharing on the adoption of green technologies by risk‐averse farmers in a vertical agricultural supply chain. We find that government subsidies and information sharing do not always promote farmers' adoption of green technologies. The accuracy of the information plays a vital role in promoting farmers' adoption of green technologies; however, the increased green technology adoption induced by more accurate information may be detrimental to farmer welfare in the presence of production diseconomies. Information sharing can reduce the amount of government subsidies for promoting green technology adoption, thereby suggesting the substitutable role of information and monetary instruments. Nonetheless, information‐sharing may lead to lower water savings and thus should be adopted with caution. Risk aversion has a nontrivial impact on agricultural technology adoption: farmers are more likely to adopt traditional agricultural technologies when their risk aversion is either very low or very high. Finally, we validate our decision model with U.S. Department of Agriculture cotton production data and propose management insights to help farmers make appropriate adoption decisions under information asymmetry and risk‐averse attitudes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the previous literature overlooks value-added service in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), we consider new research problems with embedding value-added service into remanufacturing models. In this paper, we mainly study the role of value-added service in a CLSC and investigate how the value-added service influences profits and other decision variables. Then, we evaluate the performance of the CLSC in different service structures, where a manufacturer or a retailer provide the value-added service. Systematic comparisons and numerical studies show that the supply chain is more effective when service is provided by a manufacturer rather than by a retailer. Also, value-added service improves the whole supply chain performance and plays a regulatory role in a CLSC and influences the decisions of supply chain members. We also show that while a service cost-sharing mechanism can only optimise rather than achieve the supply chain coordination, and the degree of optimisation depends on cost-sharing percentage, the two-part tariff contract can be an effective mechanism to coordinate decentralised service scenarios by generating the same supply chain performance in a centralised service architecture model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Motivated by vigorous development of keyword auctions, this paper analyzes the reserve price policies in keyword auction with advertisers' endogenous investment and risk-averse search engine. We explore advertisers' optimal investment and equilibrium bidding strategies and derive the determination functions where utility-maximizing reserve price and efficient reserve price which maximizes the social welfare satisfy respectively. The results show that advertisers' equilibrium bidding is monotonously increasing in bidders' valuations, the number of advertisers, as well as the reserve price. Meanwhile, advertisers' optimal investment is negatively correlated with reserve price and the number of advertisers. By numerical examples, the utility-maximizing reserve price decreases with the risk aversion parameter and the number of advertisers. Search engine's expected utility increases with risk aversion parameter and decreases with the number of advertisers. Moreover, we declare that search engine can use reserve price as a regulatory tool to increase the utility. But there is an upper bound on search engine's utility. It is interesting to find the efficient reserve price equals to zero. Hence there is a trade-off between total efficiency and search engine's utility by search engine that has incentive to withhold reserve price that would benefit social welfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]