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This article examines three key aetiological theories of autism (meta-representations, executive dysfunction and weak central coherence), which emerged within cognitive psychology in the latter half of the 1980s. Drawing upon Foucault’s notion of ‘forms of possible knowledge’, and in particular his concept of savoir or depth knowledge, two key claims are made. First, it is argued that a particular production of autism became available to questions of truth and falsity following a radical reconstruction of ‘the social’ in which human sociality was taken both to exclusively concern interpersonal interaction and to be continuous with non-social cognition. Second, it is suggested that this recon- struction of the social has affected the contemporary cultural experience of autism, shift- ing attention towards previously unacknowledged cognitive aspects of the condition. The article concludes by situating these claims in relation to other historical accounts of the emergence of autism and ongoing debates surrounding changing articulations of social action in the psy disciplines.

This thesis investigates autism as it has been understood in the cognitive and social (neuro)sciences, within the United Kingdom, since 1985. Of specific interest is how these sciences discover, construct, and experiment upon individuals who are understood as socially abnormal. Theoretically, the thesis is positioned between Foucauldian History and Philosophy of Science, Medical Sociology, and Science and Technology Studies. Empirically, two key sources of information are relied upon. Firstly, there is an extensive critical reading of the published literature from 1985 to the present. Secondly, twenty qualitative research interviews were conducted with academic researchers, based within the UK, and with core interests in psychology in general and autism in particular. It is firstly argued that the cognitive sciences rely upon a particular, historically novel, construction of the social in order to articulate autism as social disorder. It is then argued that, although autism is frequently reported as heterogeneous and illusory within the laboratory, social disorder appears self-evident when the autistic individual is required to interact with both the researcher and broader society. Following these findings it is argued that the researcher does not observe autism but, rather, that they achieve it. Finally it is argued that the language of autism is itself capable of ushering in novel conceptualisations of social conduct that may apply to all individuals and not just those diagnosed with the condition. Following these empirical findings it is argued that autism is best understood as the consequence of particular socio-historical conditions. It is asked if these socio-historical conditions may include a novel knowledge-power nexus arising in the mid-twentieth century, named here a socio-emotive politics, of which autism is just one consequence.

sessions and ask how diagnosticians distinguish between interactional resistance as, on the one hand, a diagnostic indicator and, on the other, as a reasonable choice from a range of possible responses. We find evidence of various forms of resistance during ADOS sessions, but it is a resistance to a line of conversational action that is often determined to be indicative of autism. However, and as we show, this attribution of resistance can be ambiguous. We conclude by arguing for reflexive practice during any diagnosis where talk is the problem, and for a commitment to acknowledge the potential impact of diagnostic procedures themselves upon results.

This thesis investigates autism as it has been understood in the cognitive and social (neuro)sciences, within the United Kingdom, since 1985. Of specific interest is how these sciences discover, construct, and experiment upon individuals who are understood as socially abnormal. Theoretically, the thesis is positioned between Foucauldian History and Philosophy of Science, Medical Sociology, and Science and Technology Studies. Empirically, two key sources of information are relied upon. Firstly, there is an extensive critical reading of the published literature from 1985 to the present. Secondly, twenty qualitative research interviews were conducted with academic researchers, based within the UK, and with core interests in psychology in general and autism in particular. It is firstly argued that the cognitive sciences rely upon a particular, historically novel, construction of the social in order to articulate autism as social disorder. It is then argued that, although autism is frequently reported as heterogeneous and illusory within the laboratory, social disorder appears self-evident when the autistic individual is required to interact with both the researcher and broader society. Following these findings it is argued that the researcher does not observe autism but, rather, that they achieve it. Finally it is argued that the language of autism is itself capable of ushering in novel conceptualisations of social conduct that may apply to all individuals and not just those diagnosed with the condition. Following these empirical findings it is argued that autism is best understood as the consequence of particular socio-historical conditions. It is asked if these socio-historical conditions may include a novel knowledge-power nexus arising in the mid-twentieth century, named here a socio-emotive politics, of which autism is just one consequence.

This article examines three key aetiological theories of autism (meta-representations, executive dysfunction and weak central coherence), which emerged within cognitive psychology in the latter half of the 1980s. Drawing upon Foucault’s notion of ‘forms of possible knowledge’, and in particular his concept of savoir or depth knowledge, two key claims are made. First, it is argued that a particular production of autism became available to questions of truth and falsity following a radical reconstruction of ‘the social’ in which human sociality was taken both to exclusively concern interpersonal interaction and to be continuous with non-social cognition. Second, it is suggested that this recon- struction of the social has affected the contemporary cultural experience of autism, shift- ing attention towards previously unacknowledged cognitive aspects of the condition. The article concludes by situating these claims in relation to other historical accounts of the emergence of autism and ongoing debates surrounding changing articulations of social action in the psy disciplines.

This thesis investigates autism as it has been understood in the cognitive and social (neuro)sciences, within the United Kingdom, since 1985. Of specific interest is how these sciences discover, construct, and experiment upon individuals who are understood as socially abnormal. Theoretically, the thesis is positioned between Foucauldian History and Philosophy of Science, Medical Sociology, and Science and Technology Studies. Empirically, two key sources of information are relied upon. Firstly, there is an extensive critical reading of the published literature from 1985 to the present. Secondly, twenty qualitative research interviews were conducted with academic researchers, based within the UK, and with core interests in psychology in general and autism in particular. It is firstly argued that the cognitive sciences rely upon a particular, historically novel, construction of the social in order to articulate autism as social disorder. It is then argued that, although autism is frequently reported as heterogeneous and illusory within the laboratory, social disorder appears self-evident when the autistic individual is required to interact with both the researcher and broader society. Following these findings it is argued that the researcher does not observe autism but, rather, that they achieve it. Finally it is argued that the language of autism is itself capable of ushering in novel conceptualisations of social conduct that may apply to all individuals and not just those diagnosed with the condition. Following these empirical findings it is argued that autism is best understood as the consequence of particular socio-historical conditions. It is asked if these socio-historical conditions may include a novel knowledge-power nexus arising in the mid-twentieth century, named here a socio-emotive politics, of which autism is just one consequence.

This thesis investigates autism as it has been understood in the cognitive and social (neuro)sciences, within the United Kingdom, since 1985. Of specific interest is how these sciences discover, construct, and experiment upon individuals who are understood as socially abnormal. Theoretically, the thesis is positioned between Foucauldian History and Philosophy of Science, Medical Sociology, and Science and Technology Studies. Empirically, two key sources of information are relied upon. Firstly, there is an extensive critical reading of the published literature from 1985 to the present. Secondly, twenty qualitative research interviews were conducted with academic researchers, based within the UK, and with core interests in psychology in general and autism in particular. It is firstly argued that the cognitive sciences rely upon a particular, historically novel, construction of the social in order to articulate autism as social disorder. It is then argued that, although autism is frequently reported as heterogeneous and illusory within the laboratory, social disorder appears self-evident when the autistic individual is required to interact with both the researcher and broader society. Following these findings it is argued that the researcher does not observe autism but, rather, that they achieve it. Finally it is argued that the language of autism is itself capable of ushering in novel conceptualisations of social conduct that may apply to all individuals and not just those diagnosed with the condition. Following these empirical findings it is argued that autism is best understood as the consequence of particular socio-historical conditions. It is asked if these socio-historical conditions may include a novel knowledge-power nexus arising in the mid-twentieth century, named here a socio-emotive politics, of which autism is just one consequence.

sessions and ask how diagnosticians distinguish between interactional resistance as, on the one hand, a diagnostic indicator and, on the other, as a reasonable choice from a range of possible responses. We find evidence of various forms of resistance during ADOS sessions, but it is a resistance to a line of conversational action that is often determined to be indicative of autism. However, and as we show, this attribution of resistance can be ambiguous. We conclude by arguing for reflexive practice during any diagnosis where talk is the problem, and for a commitment to acknowledge the potential impact of diagnostic procedures themselves upon results.

This article examines three key aetiological theories of autism (meta-representations, executive dysfunction and weak central coherence), which emerged within cognitive psychology in the latter half of the 1980s. Drawing upon Foucault’s notion of ‘forms of possible knowledge’, and in particular his concept of savoir or depth knowledge, two key claims are made. First, it is argued that a particular production of autism became available to questions of truth and falsity following a radical reconstruction of ‘the social’ in which human sociality was taken both to exclusively concern interpersonal interaction and to be continuous with non-social cognition. Second, it is suggested that this recon- struction of the social has affected the contemporary cultural experience of autism, shift- ing attention towards previously unacknowledged cognitive aspects of the condition. The article concludes by situating these claims in relation to other historical accounts of the emergence of autism and ongoing debates surrounding changing articulations of social action in the psy disciplines.

This thesis investigates autism as it has been understood in the cognitive and social (neuro)sciences, within the United Kingdom, since 1985. Of specific interest is how these sciences discover, construct, and experiment upon individuals who are understood as socially abnormal. Theoretically, the thesis is positioned between Foucauldian History and Philosophy of Science, Medical Sociology, and Science and Technology Studies. Empirically, two key sources of information are relied upon. Firstly, there is an extensive critical reading of the published literature from 1985 to the present. Secondly, twenty qualitative research interviews were conducted with academic researchers, based within the UK, and with core interests in psychology in general and autism in particular. It is firstly argued that the cognitive sciences rely upon a particular, historically novel, construction of the social in order to articulate autism as social disorder. It is then argued that, although autism is frequently reported as heterogeneous and illusory within the laboratory, social disorder appears self-evident when the autistic individual is required to interact with both the researcher and broader society. Following these findings it is argued that the researcher does not observe autism but, rather, that they achieve it. Finally it is argued that the language of autism is itself capable of ushering in novel conceptualisations of social conduct that may apply to all individuals and not just those diagnosed with the condition. Following these empirical findings it is argued that autism is best understood as the consequence of particular socio-historical conditions. It is asked if these socio-historical conditions may include a novel knowledge-power nexus arising in the mid-twentieth century, named here a socio-emotive politics, of which autism is just one consequence.

sessions and ask how diagnosticians distinguish between interactional resistance as, on the one hand, a diagnostic indicator and, on the other, as a reasonable choice from a range of possible responses. We find evidence of various forms of resistance during ADOS sessions, but it is a resistance to a line of conversational action that is often determined to be indicative of autism. However, and as we show, this attribution of resistance can be ambiguous. We conclude by arguing for reflexive practice during any diagnosis where talk is the problem, and for a commitment to acknowledge the potential impact of diagnostic procedures themselves upon results.

sessions and ask how diagnosticians distinguish between interactional resistance as, on the one hand, a diagnostic indicator and, on the other, as a reasonable choice from a range of possible responses. We find evidence of various forms of resistance during ADOS sessions, but it is a resistance to a line of conversational action that is often determined to be indicative of autism. However, and as we show, this attribution of resistance can be ambiguous. We conclude by arguing for reflexive practice during any diagnosis where talk is the problem, and for a commitment to acknowledge the potential impact of diagnostic procedures themselves upon results.

This article examines three key aetiological theories of autism (meta-representations, executive dysfunction and weak central coherence), which emerged within cognitive psychology in the latter half of the 1980s. Drawing upon Foucault’s notion of ‘forms of possible knowledge’, and in particular his concept of savoir or depth knowledge, two key claims are made. First, it is argued that a particular production of autism became available to questions of truth and falsity following a radical reconstruction of ‘the social’ in which human sociality was taken both to exclusively concern interpersonal interaction and to be continuous with non-social cognition. Second, it is suggested that this recon- struction of the social has affected the contemporary cultural experience of autism, shift- ing attention towards previously unacknowledged cognitive aspects of the condition. The article concludes by situating these claims in relation to other historical accounts of the emergence of autism and ongoing debates surrounding changing articulations of social action in the psy disciplines.

This article examines three key aetiological theories of autism (meta-representations, executive dysfunction and weak central coherence), which emerged within cognitive psychology in the latter half of the 1980s. Drawing upon Foucault’s notion of ‘forms of possible knowledge’, and in particular his concept of savoir or depth knowledge, two key claims are made. First, it is argued that a particular production of autism became available to questions of truth and falsity following a radical reconstruction of ‘the social’ in which human sociality was taken both to exclusively concern interpersonal interaction and to be continuous with non-social cognition. Second, it is suggested that this recon- struction of the social has affected the contemporary cultural experience of autism, shift- ing attention towards previously unacknowledged cognitive aspects of the condition. The article concludes by situating these claims in relation to other historical accounts of the emergence of autism and ongoing debates surrounding changing articulations of social action in the psy disciplines.