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In "Truth by Analysis: Games, Names, and Philosophy," Colin McGinn seeks to revitalize the traditional approach to conceptual analysis. He asserts that the definition of a concept involves specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for its application, a task he deems achievable. In pursuit of this goal, McGinn critiques opposing perspectives, including that of Wittgenstein. He explores various ways to define the concept of game, and at his best, he relies on Bernard Suits' definition. This paper argues that McGinn's attempts fall short and affirms the significance of Wittgenstein's insight. It critiques all definitions put forth by McGinn, particularly that of Suits, presenting counterexamples to challenge them. Furthermore, the paper uncovers deeper misconceptions underlying these criticisms: McGinn expects family resemblance to serve as both the necessary and sufficient conditions for applying a concept and perceives it as a theory explaining how concepts refer to their extensions, contrasting with Wittgenstein, who does not aim to develop a theory and does not propose family resemblance as a sufficient condition for a concept's application. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]