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Cuando Cuba entra en el año 2022, se avecinan crisis económicas y tensiones sociales. Este capítulo hace un recorrido por las dificultades externas que interactúan con los asuntos domésticos de la isla y los refuerzan. Más allá de la situación inmediata, reflexiona sobre las restricciones y las presiones internacionales subyacentes que configurarán las opciones para la nación cubana durante la próxima década. El análisis abarca las relaciones de Cuba con los Estados Unidos y con la Unión Europea, así como con Venezuela, México, China, Rusia y Canadá, y plantea en qué medida las vacunas contra la COVID-19 fabricadas en Cuba pueden relanzar la proyección del poder blando del país. Desde una perspectiva comparada, el régimen isleño y su perfil internacional siguen siendo en muchos sentidos diferentes de cualquier otro, y los esquemas predictivos basados en analogías falsas corren el riesgo de inducir a errores., As Cuba enters 2022, economic crisis and social tensions loom large. This chapter reviews the external difficulties that interact with and reinforce the island' domestic issues. Looking beyond the immediate situation it reflects on underlying international pressures and constraints that will shape the options for the Cuban nation over the next decade. Its analysis encompasses Cuba's relations with the US and with the EU, as well as those with Venezuela, Mexico, China, Russia and Canada, and it asks to what extent Cuban-made COVID-19 vaccines can re-boost the country's soft-power projection. Putting the Cuban case in comparative perspective, the island’s regime - and its international profile - are in many ways still unlike any other, and predictive schemas based on false analogies risk being misleading.

As Cuba enters 2022, economic crisis and social tensions loom large. This chapter reviews the external difficulties that interact with and reinforce the island's domestic issues. Looking beyond the immediate situation it reflects on underlying international pressures and constraints that will shape the options for the Cuban nation over the next decade. Its analysis encompasses Cuba's relations with the US and with the EU, as well as those with Venezuela, Mexico, China, Russia and Canada, and it asks to what extent Cuban-made COVID-19 vaccines can re-boost the country's soft-power projection. Putting the Cuban case in comparative perspective, the island’s regime - and its international profile - are in many ways still unlike any other, and predictive schemas based on false analogies risk being misleading.

As infection rates decrease, much of Latin America seems to be taking a breather from the onslaught of COVID-19. However access to vaccines is unequal, both within and between individual countries, while vaccine coverage is heterogeneous. Combined with uneven infection rates and the arrival of the highly contagious Delta variant, new epidemiological and policy challenges must be addressed. With 45 million registered infections and almost one-third of all COVID-19-related deaths worldwide, Latin America has become a global hotspot in the pandemic. While Chile and Costa Rica have higher vaccination rates than Germany or the United States, half of Latin America's population has yet to receive their first jab. What may come to the rescue are the high numbers of people who have acquired some immunity from past COVID-19 infections beyond those identified in official statistics. Vaccine diplomacy has changed colours. Initially, Latin America depended on vaccine shipments from China, India, and Russia. By now, the US and the multilateral COVAX initiative have become the largest providers. Policies will need to adjust to the resulting mix of vaccines of varying efficacy and varying international recognition. To reduce external dependence, the region will need to build up its capacity to develop and mass-produce vaccines, diagnostic equipment, and mRNA technology. The vaccines developed in Cuba could become part of the vaccine portfolio the continent will need for many years to come. The pandemic has exposed the region's structural weaknesses. Public-health funding must be stepped up; ad hoc social-policy measures taken in the pandemic should be harnessed to make social safety nets more resilient and inclusive. A strong vaccination drive remains key to keeping the pandemic at bay. As immunity - whether from past infection or vaccination - will eventually wane, vaccination may need to be integrated into routine preventive healthcare. Cooperation transcending ideological left-r

The economic crisis in the wake of the COVID pandemic is putting Cuba's socialism to a severe test. The government in Havana has added a fundamental reform of the economy, institutional structure and social policies to the agenda. This volume brings together contributions from leading international experts as well as from the island itself, analysing the economic, political and social challenges Cuba is facing today.

Aside from the health challenge, the COVID-19 pandemic has brought an unprecedented social crisis to Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). To avoid a humanitarian disaster, governments across the region have responded with a marked expansion of social protection measures. These, however, vary greatly with regard to speed, breadth, and sufficiency. People cannot stay at home if they cannot feed their families. Governments recognised at varying speeds that income assistance measures are central to an effective epidemiological strategy. Both the lockdown measures and the associated economic crises have highlighted the gaps in existing social protections in Latin America, as half of the region's employed population works in the informal sector. Many of these workers lost their income virtually overnight. To cover the needs of informal workers, the most effective governments established relatively inclusive eligibility criteria for cash assistance that allowed low-income households to self-identify and apply. The result is an extended registry that has expanded state capacity, on which further social protection policies can build. The region's two largest economies, Mexico and Brazil, have both suffered high pandemic-related infection and mortality rates, but sharply differ in their social policy approach. The left-wing Mexican government stands out for not establishing any nationwide cash assistance programme in the wake of COVID-19. By contrast, Brazil underwent a massive, opposition-driven expansion of social protection coverage, which eventually boosted the right-wing government's approval ratings among the poor. This year's Nobel Peace Prize awarded to the World Food Programme on 9 October recognizes the fundamental human need for sustenance. The social protection floors that were established ad hoc in the course of the COVID-19 crisis in Latin America need to now be extended to ensure that families can continue to feed themselves. The policy expansion efforts of t

The COVID-19 pandemic is testing the societies of the world's most unequal continent, where many depend on informal work for their livelihood. Social-distancing measures directly affect their livelihoods, and make immediate social assistance imperative. The crisis is also testing political leadership, as some presidents are emerging as strong, unifying leaders, while others flounder, in a continent where historically trust in formal institutions is low. Decisive leadership has proven crucial for implementing wide-ranging lockdowns, and for the immediate commitment to social assistance. The presidents of Argentina and Peru stand out as examples of fast and coordinated responses. The potential abuse of extraordinary powers raises concerns for the medium run. In Chile and Bolivia, governments struggling with legitimacy after last year's massive protests have had to postpone a constitutional convention vote in the former and presidential elections in the latter. Many governments have quickly promised social assistance. An enormous economic rescue package in Chile stands out for its stinginess towards the most vulnerable. Where populist presidents from the right (Brazil) or left (Mexico) deny the seriousness of the pandemic, subnational and other authorities seek to fill the leadership vacuum - but policy implementation is harmed. The heaviest price will be paid by the most vulnerable. Latin America will suffer from post-crisis external shocks. With little aid coming from the United States or Europe, China emerges as a key hope for shipments of face masks, test kits, and protective gear. As COVID spreads - with higher or flatter curves - health systems will struggle to treat the severely affected. Lockdowns will be differentially respected, as promises of emergency social assistance need to be immediately delivered. Where the executive uses the moment at hand for narrow political gains, sharp political conflict is likely to ensue. Multilateral initiatives to secure socia

A primera vista, es una cuestión de continuidad. En el 60 aniversario de la Revolución cubana, el referéndum propuesto por el gobierno sobre la reforma de la constitución de Cuba el 24 de febrero de 2019 consiguió nada menos que un 87% de votos afirmativos. Dos años después de la muerte de Fidel Castro, la constitución no solo continúa permitiendo un solo partido, sino que también sostiene que el país se guíe por las ideas de "Marx, Engels y Lenin". En el mismo momento en que la "generación histórica" entrega los puestos de mando del Estado a unos líderes más jóvenes, la constitución consagra el compromiso de Cuba con el "internacionalismo proletario" y expresa su convicción de que "solo en el socialismo y el comunismo el ser humano alcanza su dignidad plena" (Constitución de la República de Cuba 2019). El presidente Miguel Díaz-Canel, un año después de tomar el control de manos de Raúl Castro, lideró la campaña pública a favor del "sí" en el referéndum con el hashtag de twitter "#somoscontinuidad". Así pues, ¿nada nuevo bajo el sol del Caribe?. No exactamente. Un despliegue público tan exagerado de "continuismo" no sería necesario si los dirigentes no tuviesen dudas al respecto. Ha habido tantos cambios en la sociedad de la isla, así como en el mundo que rodea a Cuba, que en la era post-Castro "continuidad" no puede traducirse simplemente como "seguir haciendo lo de siempre". Este artículo esbozará los cambios y los retos a los que se enfrenta Cuba. Argumenta que si bien el gobierno de Díaz-Canel ha sido tímido en las reformas políticas concretas, trata de establecer un estilo diferente de gobernanza en el socialismo cubano. Aunque a un ritmo lento, podría estar evolucionando una nueva cultura social y política. Sin embargo, la combinación de la crisis en Venezuela con el endurecimiento de las sanciones estadounidenses amenaza con llevarse por delante el fundamento económico sobre el que descansa el enfoque gradualista de Díaz-Canel. Antes bien, el gobierno cubano

Am 19. April wird Kubas Nationalversammlung einen Nachfolger für Raúl Castro im Amt des Staatspräsidenten benennen. Doch das Ende der Ära Castro vollzieht sich in Zeitlupe: Der 86-jährige General bleibt Vorsitzender der Kommunistischen Partei und damit der mächtige Mann im Hintergrund. Dennoch stehen Veränderungen an. Der designierte Nachfolger Miguel Díaz-Canel ist kein charismatischer Führer, sondern der Typus des loyalen Parteikaders. Er verkörpert den lange versprochenen Generationswechsel. Umso wichtiger ist es der kubanischen Führung, Erwartungen auf weitergehenden Wandel zu dämpfen. Die Geschlossenheit der Elite bleibt oberstes politisches Gebot. Raúl Castro hat strukturelle Reformen auf die politische Tagesordnung gesetzt. Die Umsetzung blieb jedoch vielfach aus. Angesichts der schwierigen Wirtschaftslage wird die neue Regierung diese Reformagenda jedoch wieder aufgreifen müssen, da sonst das weitere Absinken des Lebensstandards droht. Unmittelbarer Handlungsbedarf besteht bei der Zusammenführung der beiden im Land zirkulierenden Währungen. Mit diesem Schritt sind jedoch auch Veränderungen in Wechselkurs und relativem Preisgefüge verbunden, deren soziale Kosten schwer abzusehen sind. Die neue Regierung wird den Kurs diversifizierter Außenbeziehungen fortsetzen. Allerdings wurden Räume für NGOs und internationale Akteure zunehmend eingeschränkt. Akute Devisenknappheit und zentralisierte Strukturen halten Handel und Investitionen auf niedrigem Niveau. Der Veränderungsdruck in Kuba bleibt hoch. Die Rückkehr zu einer graduellen Reformagenda scheint auf mittlere Sicht unvermeidlich. Eine politische Öffnung ist allerdings nicht zu erwarten. Auch wenn am 1. November 2017 das Kooperationsabkommen zwischen der EU und Kuba in Kraft getreten ist, bleibt Kuba ein schwieriger Partner.

When US President Barack Obama made his historic March 2016 visit to Havana, Cuban expectations of better times to come were high. As the United States goes to the polls to select its next president, it's clear that rapprochement with Cuba will be a key achievement of the Obama administration. But the slow pace of reform in Cuba is raising questions about President Raúl Castro's legacy. Frustration has begun to set in, with energy cuts paralysing production, the economy shrinking, and the country's economic "updating process" seemingly going in reverse. What is derailing Cuba's much-anticipated reform course?

As the "Washington Consensus" reforms lose momentum, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) is calling to shift the focus from the content of policy choices to the political process of their implementation. The analysis of the paradigmatic case of telecommunications reform in Costa Rica underscores the importance of these "politics of policies". At the same time, however, it shows the shortcomings of an overly technocratic understanding of these: the failure of repeated liberalization initiatives was not only due to policy-makers' errors in steering the project through "the messy world of politics" (IDB), but it is also the policies' content that shaped the actors' responses. The liberalization project was able to muster bi-partisan support in the political arena; however it provoked broad popular mobilization against it, and thus became a catalyst for the disintegration of the country's long-standing two-party system. Although the IDB warns of a "trade-off" between representativeness and policy effectiveness, the analysis of the Costa Rican case shows quite to the contrary a causal link between the two: It is precisely a lack of representativeness that can crucially undermine policy effectiveness.

Nation-states are no longer contained by their borders. In times of mass migration and ever more dense transnational networks, states of all sizes and all migration profiles reach out to their emigrated citizens in wholly new ways. The variety of policies that target emigrants ("emigrant policies") is so vast that it seems to have become a new state function. For example, it is well known that states are expanding citizen participation beyond the nation's boundaries through voting rights and new modalities of representation and that they are opening channels for remittance transfer and offering specific investment opportunities to returning emigrants. However, other, less studied emigrant policies, comprise the symbolic incorporation of emigrants into the nation-state (e.g. through awards celebrating emigrants' achievements); social service provisions for non-residents (e.g. health and education); and the institutional inclusion of emigrants in consultative bodies, to name just a few. This book is the first to systematically take stock of the emigrant policies in place across 22 Latin American and Caribbean countries, as of 2015. By covering an entire geographical region and being based on rigorous data-collection, this will be a reference in a literature that has so far centered on a few specific cases. Also, our proposed definition of "emigrant policies" encompasses a wide range of policies that are aimed at emigrants beyond the "usual suspects" analyzed in the extant literature (electoral, citizenship, and economic policies), resulting in 112 different dimensions. This survey of such a broad sample of countries and policy dimensions will allow researchers to theorize and make comparisons on models of emigrant policy on a solid empirical and conceptual base.

Comparative Area Studies (CAS) emerges as a new approach in which scholars of Latin American Studies engage systematically with scholars working on other world regions. Adopting a focus on intra-, inter- and cross area comparisons, CAS builds on the traditional strengths of area studies. At the same time it enables scholars to have a stronger impact on overarching conceptual debates and it may provide new bridges between area studies scholars and the academic communities in the regions studied. However, a comparative area studies approach requires systematic cooperation among scholars of different world regions, and adequate organizational and institutional structures to support them.

Die "historische Generation" der kubanischen Revolution steht vor dem Abschied von der Macht, es wurde ein Reformweg hin zur vorsichtigen Öffnung des Landes eingeschlagen. Der Kultur kommt bei diesen Veränderungen eine entscheidende Rolle zu. Sie kann Räume schaffen, um die Veränderungen zu artikulieren und zu reflektieren, sie wächst in die Rolle einer Ersatzöffentlichkeit. Die deutsch-kubanischen Kulturbeziehungen haben eine lange Tradition und Kuba ist für Deutschland aufgrund der historischen Beziehungen zur DDR ein besonderer Partner. Gleichwohl gestalteten sich die deutsch-kubanischen Beziehungen seit den 1990er Jahren in der Praxis schwierig. Die Intensivierung der Beziehungen der letzten Jahre, die in dem Besuch von Außenminister Steinmeier in Havanna 2015 gipfelte, öffnet jedoch neue Perspektiven für die Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik (AKBP). Verhandlungen über Abkommen zu Kultur, Wirtschaft und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit wurden aufgenommen. Die vorliegende Studie gibt Einblicke in aktuelle Trends der Kultur- und Bildungslandschaft auf Kuba und stellt bereits bestehende Initiativen deutsch-kubanischer Kultur- und Bildungskooperation dar. Des Weiteren zeigt sie Möglichkeiten auf, diese Kooperationen weiterzuentwickeln, verweist aber auch auf eventuell dabei zu beachtende Hindernisse. Die Studie macht deutlich, dass die Rolle der AKBP vor allem darin besteht langfristig und dezentrale ausgelegte Zusammenarbeit zu fördern.