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This paper introduces the idea of the latecomer firm to explore how the four dragons of East Asia (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) learned to innovate in electronics. The paper examines the historical progress of technological development and sets out the institutional mechanisms by which firms acquired foreign technology. Using one case study from each country, the paper explores how East Asian firms learned process and product skills and know-how. Within the firms, subcontracting and original equipment manufacture (OEM) mechanisms acted as a training school for latecomers, enabling them to overcome entry barriers and to assimilate manufacturing and design technology. The needs of export customers drove the pace of learning and acted as a focusing device for technological assimilation, adaptation and innovation. To interpret the findings, a simple model of how latecomers linked their technological learning to export markets is put forward. In contrast with the research and development (R&D) and design-led strategies typical of leaders and followers, latecomers began with incremental improvements to manufacturing processes which led on to minor product innovations. The evidence suggests that the origins and paths of the East Asian latecomers continue to influence their strategies, structures and technological orientations.

Some technology analysts have suggested that developing countries (DCs) might be able to 'leapfrog' earlier technological paradigms and catch up in the field of electronics. This paper provides a partial test case of the leapfrogging argument, using evidence from Singapore's electronics industry. It shows that technology was accumulated through a gradual process of learning, rather than by leapfrogging. Indeed, corporate learning was incremental, painstaking, long-term and cumulative. Also in contrast with the leapfrogging hypothesis, firms tended to enter electronics at the mature phase of the product cycle rather than the early stage. Furthermore, much of the technology accumulated by Singapore's electronics industry was 'pre-electronic' in character, involving crafts, mechanical and precision engineering, electro-mechanical interfacing and basic manufacturing skills, rather than the software, computer and R&D skills usually associated with electronics. The evidence from Singapore suggests that industrial development in electronics involves a gradual and systematic accumulation of industrial, educational and infrastructural capabilities, many of which are associated with pre-electronic technological paradigms., INTRODUCTION The diffusion of the information technology paradigm and the rapid growth of the electronics industry have led some observers to believe that some developing countries (DCs) may be able [...]

In the context of fears of US industrial decline, particularly vis-a-vis Japan, important new developments in the semiconductor industry are examined. Design innovations and advanced manufacturing technology are key factors influencing competitiveness in this industry, and the notion of decoupling is posited to explain the industrial restructuring that is occurring. After reviewing US policies in this regard, the question of US decline v future US prosperity and dynamism is this sector is addressed. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)

This article introduces the concept of latecomer systems integration capability (LSIC) as a construct for theory development in the area of emergence and competitiveness of producers of complex capital goods from developing economies. The study draws on three bodies of the literature to conceptualize LSIC and then presents an in-depth case study of the development of LSIC in a major Iranian firm engaged in producing electricity generation systems. Although an exploratory study, the findings suggest that, in this case, LSIC evolved in a fairly short period of time from simple low-cost project management skills to innovative capabilities, supported by some sophisticated engineering and design know-how, leading to successes in local and overseas markets. The conclusion touches on the implications of the study for theory, business strategy, and policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The paper proposes that the notion of complex systems usefully describes a group of large scale, customized products and their associated supply industries. Examples include flight simulators (FSs), telecommunications exchanges, military systems, airplanes, chemical process plants and heavy electrical equipment. Complex systems, made up of many interconnected customized components, exhibit emerging properties through time as they respond to the evolving needs of large users. Taking the FS industry as a case history, the study identifies some of the basic rules governing innovation in this industry. These rules contrast sharply with those typically found in the 'conventional', market contest Schumpeterian model. Innovation in FS is coordinated by an institutional structure made up of suppliers, users, regulators, industry associations and professional bodies. In contrast with conventional market selection, new designs are negotiated prior to product development. Long-term stability among FS makers is observed, despite radical technological discontinuities, as industrial adjustment occurs via the exit and entry of specialist suppliers. There is no dominant design in the usual sense, nor do the conventional rules of volume competition and process-intensive innovation apply in FS. Competitive strategies remain focused upon design, engineering and prototype development, rather than incremental process innovation. Collaboration occurs among the innovation actors within institutions created by them to harness innovation and to allow new product markets to develop. Recognizing the limits of a single case, the paper suggests that other complex systems might exhibit similar processes for governing innovation and reducing risk and uncertainty in the absence of conventional Schumpeterian market mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]