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This paper aims to introduce an overview of several aspects of the so-called Artificial Intelligence, their potential impacts on economic and social dimensions, and suggestions for possible approaches of investiment based upon effective and mature techniques. In this fashion, it is important to address from educational and academic issues to industrial densities and profiles, relatively to a given region, country or continent. Even etymological adequacy and psychological consequences of the denomination "Artificial Intelligence" need some reflection, and suggestions for a lucid replacement are presented. In addition, suggestions about how can specific firms choose the right type of technique in order to improve profit and organizational efficiency. After all, what are the main transformations needed to amplify gains and structural improvements from the use of higher level technological mechanisms? Which connections can be established between the pillars of evolutionary economics and this field of knowledge? Which institutional contexts are able to benefit from AI tools, inducing constructive externalities to firms in terms of education, technical and scientific skills upgrading, so as to reach higher levels of employment in the long term and limit unemployment in the short one? Which branches of the so-called Artificial Intelligence are best suited to which types of activities? This work aims to contribute in the search for answers to these questions. This article may be considered a POSITION PAPER, containing opinions and suggestions for improvements - the purpose is not to offer new quantitative results, just to highlight certain practices with high autophagic potential, in economic and (mainly) social dimensions.

This work addresses the problem of sampling from Gaussian probability distributions by means of uniform samples obtained deterministically and directly from space-filling curves (SFCs), a purely topological concept. To that end, the well-known inverse cumulative distribution function method is used, with the help of the probit function,which is the inverse of the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Mainly due to the central limit theorem, the Gaussian distribution plays a fundamental role in probability theory and related areas, and that is why it has been chosen to be studied in the present paper. Numerical distributions (histograms) obtained with the proposed method, and in several levels of granularity, are compared to the theoretical normal PDF, along with other already established sampling methods, all using the cited probit function. Final results are validated with the Kullback-Leibler and two other divergence measures, and it will be possible to draw conclusions about the adequacy of the presented paradigm. As is amply known, the generation of uniform random numbers is a deterministic simulation of randomness using numerical operations. That said, sequences resulting from this kind of procedure are not truly random. Even so, and to be coherent with the literature, the expression ”random number” will be used along the text to mean ”pseudo-random number”.

This paper presents an extension of the resuts obtained in previous work by the author concerning the application of global optimization techniques to the design of finite strategic games with mixed strategies. In that publication the Fuzzy ASA global optimization method was applied to many examples of synthesis of strategic games with one previously specified Nash equilibrium, evidencing its ability in finding payoff functions whose respective games present those equilibria, possibly among others. That is to say, it was shown it is possible to establish in advance a Nash equilibrium for a generic finite state strategic game and to compute payoff functions that will make it feasible to reach the chosen equilibrium, allowing players to converge to the desired profile, considering that it is an equilibrium of the game as well. Going beyond this state of affairs, the present article shows that it is possible to "impose" multiple Nash equilibria to finite strategic games by following the same reasoning as before, but with a slight change: using the same fundamental theorem of Richard D. McKelvey, modifying the original prescribed objective function and globally minimizing it. The proposed method, in principle, is able to find payoff functions that result in games featuring an arbitrary number of Nash equiibria, paving the way to a substantial number of potential applications.