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To quantify the efficiency of decentralized retailer's dual-channel supply chain, we characterize the worst-case efficiency loss with the price of anarchy (PoA). Two Stackelberg game frameworks respectively in manufacturer and retailer dominant structures are discussed. In equilibrium, players gain more expected profits from occupying dominant position in the retailer's dual-channel supply chain. However, the retailer's dual-channel supply chain gets the same total expected profit in the manufacturer and retailer dominant structures. That is, the PoA in two dominant structures are the same. And, some executable policies to increase total expected profit and decrease efficiency loss in the retailer's dual-channel supply chain are obtained. Numerical study displays that efficiency loss in decentralized retailer's dual-channel supply chain is at least 20% and at most 33.3%.

The equilibrium pricing strategies of supply chain with dual-channel retailer and information asymmetry are studied. The results show that information sharing is always beneficial to retailers, and the value of information sharing is always non-negative. But there are conditions under which manufacturers can share information.

With the development of deep water port and marine engineering, more and more marine structures are located in open sea area. The measurement development of open sea area structure is restricted by abominable marine environment, no control point and difficult data transmission. Combined with the deep water offshore bucket-based breakwater, the displacement measurement technology of open sea structure is studied. The global navigation satellite system (GNSS) is built to realize real-time monitoring of bucket structure displacement. Different monitoring schemes are formulated based on the characteristics and precision of the structure in the sea conveyance floating stage, installation stage or operation stage. It is found that displacement in the structure along the axis of the breakwater is less than that perpendicular to the axis by monitoring data, and the displacement laws of horizontal displacement and settlement in each stage of the structure are obtained. It has very important guiding significance for the structure construction and post-construction stability control in open sea area.

Venture capital is a risky and long-term equity investment activity, and venture capitalists widely use the syndication, a jointly investment model, to finance entrepreneurial start-ups. And, the syndication’s successful operation is inseparable from trust between participants. Our paper focuses on trust governance between the leader and the follower, players in the syndication, through constructing an evolutionary game model. In the model, both players adopt Replicator-Dynamics-based learning rules and their strategy space is "Trust, No-Trust". The trust governance mechanism contains two aspects: punishment and reward, both of whose intensity are categorized into three levels, low, middle, and high level. After comprehensively computing and comparing players’ evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), we find relationships between the trust governance mechanism and players’ ESS. If both of the intensities of reward and punishment are at low level, then both the leader and the follower choose “No-Trust”. If both of the intensities of reward and punishment are at high level, then both the leader and the follower choose “Trust”. If the intensity of punishment is at low or middle level, and the intensity of reward is at middle level, then the leader chooses “Trust” and the follower does not. In the intensity of punishment is at middle level, and the intensity of reward is at low or middle level, then the leader chooses “Trust” and the follower does not. If the intensity of punishment is at low level and the intensity of reward is at high level, or if the intensity of punishment is at high level and the intensity of reward is at low level, player’s ESS combination shows a rather varied changes.