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Les elections europeennes permettent de dresser une geographie electorale simultanee, qui pose toutefois des problemes methodologiques, dont celui de la definition de familles politiques. Les resultats restent tres determines par les cadres etatiques. L’election de 2019 se situe dans un contexte de crise systemique. La position dominante des partis democrates-chretiens et conservateurs et des sociaux-democrates s’est fortement affaiblie depuis 2009. En revanche, les ecologistes et les liberaux progressent, mais plus encore les partis eurosceptiques et de droite-extreme. Le contraste geographique principal oppose les regions metropolitaines gagnantes de la mondialisation au reste des territoires, surtout les zones en declin economique et demographique. Mais l’euroscepticisme et la droite extreme se developpent aussi dans des regions prosperes non metropolitaines, qui pourraient etre menacees par les consequences de la globalisation et/ou qui nourrissent des sentiments identitaires.

Capital cities, now primarily understood as the political centers of nation-states, tend to be famous as host of the seat of government, but their fame may also refer to other prominent qualities. ...

This article examines the microgeography of diplomacy, particularly its localized embodiment in a corps diplomatique and international governmental organizations. Drawing on the case of The Hague, we map embassies and consider the locations of organizations engaged with interstate and transnational relations. The article raises questions about diplomatic form and function, whereby urban, economic, and political geographies intersect around issues of diplomacy, representation, and security. Our case study has implications for the study of other diplomatic centers and poses research questions about diplomacy as a spatial practice pertaining to diplomatic buildings, diplomatic clusters, para-diplomacy, and securitization.

Like many other cities in Europe, from the early 1990s, Amsterdam and The Hague have over time intensified their EU engagement. In both cities there has been a switch from a view on Europe as problem solver, threat or duty, towards Europe as a means of profiling and identity building, as reflected in a change from passive towards active behaviour vis-a-vis Europe. Whereas European activities initially were rather a formal practice, they have finally been put on the local political agendas. At the same time, this process of Europeanisation seems to fare under the aegis of a wider process of internationalisation. The basic driving force is not aimed at Europe at all.

German geopolitics emerged from the early 1920s. It was noticed in the Netherlands but not broadly embraced. In public discourse the term ‘geopolitics’ was hardly ever used between the First and Second World Wars but it became a bit more common with the looming threat of a second war and during the German occupation. Meanwhile Dutch geographers took note of the efforts of Haushofer and his circle. Around 1930, their initial reaction to this project took various forms – constructive criticism, co-operation and indignant dismissal – but the attention waned over the decade. During the occupation Nazi-friendly geographers discussed the launching of a new geopolitics. The generally shared Dutch preference for aloofness, neutrality and recourse to international law as the way to approach international relations precluded the formation of a large, responsive public for German geopolitics. The high status of German academia provided an initial audience of Dutch academic geographers.

The German science of geopolitics in the Netherlands, 1920-1945. In the 1920s, Karl Haushofer founded Geopolitik in Munchen as a form of applied political geography. German geopoliticians perceived territorial loss of their country after 1918 through the social darwinist lens. They considered states as types of organisms that rivalled over territories (Lebensraum). ‘Natural’ selection determined the outcome. Geopolitics was aligned with the nazis despite theoretical differences (space vs. race). The reception of German geopolitics among geographers in Dutch universities (especially in the geography departments of Utrecht and Amsterdam) during the Interbellum and the German occupation varied. Keen interest in the highly reputed sister-universities across the border did not result in uniform reactions to the academic implications of the nazi rise to power, as was also evident in other ideologically sensitive fields such as archeology and eugenetics. This article analyses the cooperation of S.R. Steinmetz and L. Van Vuuren, the main chair holders in Dutch human geography, in German geopolitical publications and the reactions of their successors. While H.N. ter Veen, Steinmetz’ eventual successor, strongly rejected the geopolitical project, J.G. Loohuis, Van Vuuren’s erstwhile student, reacted approvingly. He was the only academic geopolitician to work at a Dutch university, nominated during the war at the strong request of the occupation authorities.

The paper describes and analyses the successive geographical distributions of places where multilateral treaties have been signed over the life course of the state system. A large proportion of all negotiations occurred in just a few places and the collection of most frequently selected places shows considerable continuity over time. Treaty-making emerges as more of a secular trend than a cyclical pulse, being insignificantly impacted by economic cycles, and inconsistently impacted by hegemonic cycles. The work presents a measure of specialisation that helps to identify types of central venues in the multilateral treaty-making system. The actual selection of specific venues suggests functional and political considerations to have been most important. The sustained preference for national political centres expresses the importance of such considerations, while the actual choice of a venue in a specific case can be highly contingent.

member states and meant to give European cooperation a new, solemn anchor by calling the treaty a constitution, was firmly rejected in referenda. This rejection by the populations of two of the founding member states of treaty texts previously accepted by their governments, shocked many policy makers, in these two countries and at the European level. The two books under review provide partial answers to the question why the referenda produced such negative results and also why this outcome was to a large extent unexpected. And they provide

This article offers an analysis of the emerging scalar configuration of the governance of the European Union. It discusses how European integration stands for a move from a collection of territorially homogenous systems of rule towards a new assemblage of territories, authorities and rights. The paper first questions the stretchy territoriality of the seemingly obvious European level. Second it analyses the sectoral differences in the evolution of the width and the depth of integration, measured as the transfer of competencies to the EU level between the Rome Treaty (1958) and the Lisbon Treaty (200y). Third it turns to the day-to-day decision-making to assess the relations between players in EU governance and finally it looks more closely at the administrative wheels of the EU machinery.

Dans le discours public et les pratiques de la gestion urbaine, plusieurs modèles apportent des réponses à la question de savoir comment faire évoluer la/notre ville. Cet article présente une typologie d’une douzaine de ces modèles selon leur portée et leur approche du phénomène urbain. L’origine et la diffusion des modèles sont décrits depuis la ville fonctionnelle de Le Corbusier/CIAM.

The Hague, government centre of the Netherlands, has for a long time played a role as a centre in international judicial affairs. This was initially not the consequence of a deliberate foreign policy, but the outcome of a number of contingencies. There is now a political ambition to under-line the city's international profile. I briefly describe the history of the acquisition, maintenance and care of the international organisations established in The Hague, the contingencies and functional connections that account for this development and the actors involved in this process of international political centre-formation. Significant actors have been the national government of the Netherlands and other state parties, local government of The Hague, and international lobby groups. Copyright (c) 2006 by the Royal Dutch Geographical Society KNAG.

This paper deals with the residences of public authority across Europe from the emergence of the state system to the present. It is concerned with the addresses, the buildings, their surroundings and the symbolic significance from the point of view of builders and the public. The building styles have been heavily influenced by the examples of imperial and papal Rome, and a dominant model of a European capital city building has evolved. There are also some systematic differences, particularly for those countries with a dramatic history of constitutional change and for those with a decentralized process of state-building in the early stages of the process. In the second half of the 19th century, and probably again currently, the residences of public authority should be read in conjunction with the positioning of a series of civic institutions. The display of state authority has been increasingly accompanied by the representation of national identity. More recently, however, a touch of cosmopolitanism has been added in many capitals. The reading of these capitals is therefore now more ambiguous. This will probably intensify under the impact of the emerging European multilevel governance system. At the same time, this governance system has become increasingly based in Brussels. For this city to symbolically represent Europe is a very difficult ambition in the context of its multiple capital roles. However, Brussels has a long history of dealing successfully with such urban challenges in spite of major conflicts and drawbacks.

First of all, the paper describes the evolution of interstate cooperation and transnational group formation as integrative processes in the European state system, focusing on the political centers from where these processes emanate. Secondly, it depicts the current pattern of political centrality with respect to interstate cooperation and transnational group formation. The European Union and its predecessors are the products of unprecedented levels of interstate and transnational contact and have provided the conditions for further growth. This has also to some extent affected the nature of political centrality. The evidence for this paper is derived from quantitative data and literary impressions regarding the locations of peace congresses, the network of cosmopolitanism and world citizenship, the secretariats of international governmental and nongovernmental organizations and the venues of international meetings. Conclusions are that Europe is currently unusually richly endowed with international organizations and meeting places and that this builds on a long tradition. Many capital cities, certainly not merely major power centers, play very prominent roles. Brussels, London and Paris are in a class of their own. The emphasis on capitals has grown over time particularly as regards interstate cooperation. In processes of transnational group formation, capital cities are a trifle less prominent. University towns play a pretty important role in this regard, continuing a long tradition. They, after all, sheltered the Gelehrtenrepublik of the renaissance and were focal points of the Republique des Lettres of the ancien regime.

Capital cities are politico-administrative centers. They are command centers, they symbolize authority and also the unit that is governed. Primarily they are capitals of states, but other governance systems may also have capitals. In the European context there are now regional capital cities and at least the concept of a European capital. Particularly on account of their symbolic function but also for the uses made of its appearance in political life, the cityscape of capital cities is an interesting topic for research. There are different types of capital cities in Europe that give rise to different cityscapes. Existing urban networks and types of political regime are important in this respect. Although cityscapes are pretty stable, they are differently perceived over time and uses made of them also change. A research agenda for this intersection of historical, cultural and political geography should concentrate on the evolution of these cityscapes, their perception and the uses made of them in the acting out of politics.

From early modern times until the present, Russia (temporarily extended to the USSR) had two capital cities: Moscow and Petersburg. Moscow was the original capital, it was succeeded by Petersburg from the beginning of the 18th century. From the early 20th century onward Moscow again became the capital, but it became a different kind of capital at the end of the 20th century. The paper describes the evolution of the representation of the state function in the appearance of the capital cities by way of the state buildings, the monuments, the street names. In addition it analyses the fate of the former capitals (first Moscow, then Petersburg) in terms of their symbolic functions. Petersburg originated as a capital turned to the outside emphasizing Russia's European vocation, while Moscow was at first the inward looking capital city representing the distinctive spiritual values of Russia. Changes had to do with the changes in the nature of the successive political regimes and with the changing roles of the two cities within those regimes.

The Europe of the European Union has an ever more important set of policy arenas at the European level, still strong states, and a series of strong regions that put their demands on the table. The EU is deeply involved in its immediate surroundings and it acts in conjunction with member states in global policy forums. Europe is an unprecedented example of multi-level, multi-sector governance. Europe has been politically re-ordered on a number of occasions and this is one of them. In the current debate abundant use is made of historical examples. The new Europe is in need of institutional re-structuring. Following the traditions of European cooperation this is very slow in coming. Geographers should particularly be concerned with the consequences of terrioriality at several scales simultaneously.

Political geography is just a century old. It was initiated by Ratzel, who published his ‘Politische Geographie’ at about the same time that in the Hague the first Peace Congress was held. This was close to the location of the IGU 1996 congress where this paper was first presented. The continuing differences in approaching the subject of international relations and of polities at large are highlighted by these two events. Political geography is concerned with the territorial basis of the political order, the actual systems of territorial control and their economic and cultural conditions and consequences. The paper elaborates on these three problem areas and presents a research agenda derived from them.

‘Context’ has been a central notion in British-American electoral geography since the 1960s. Kevin Cox used it as the organizing concept for his seminal paper in Progress in Geography in 1969. The paper underlines the significance of Cox’s pioneering work and connects it to the work of two of the main authors during the following period: Ron Johnston and John Agnew. It then traces major lines of inquiry in electoral geography more generally and indicates the significance of notions of context in that wider frame. It ends with some indications of the now emerging research agenda for electoral geographers and with some notes on the gradual evaporation of earlier sharp divisions of a British-American realm of electoral geography versus others, and of strictly separated imaginations of sociologists/political scientists and geographers with respect to elections.La notion de ‘contexte’ a été d’une importance fondamentale dans la géographie électorale anglo-saxonne depuis les années soixante. Kevin Cox l’a utilisée pour organiser son article fondateur dans Progress in Geography en 1969. Le présent article souligne l’importance du travail innovateur de Cox et le relie aux travaux de deux des auteurs les plus importants de la période suivante, Ron Johnston et John Agnew. Cet article retrace ensuite les thèmes majeurs de géographie électorale et indique l’importance de différentes notions de contexte à l’intérieur de ce domaine plus étendu. Cet article conclut en indiquant un programme de recherche émergent pour les géographes électoraux et ainsi qu’avec quelques notes sur la dissolution graduelle des nettes divisions antérieures entre le domaine anglo-saxon de la géographie électorale et d’autres domaines, et entre les imaginations strictement séparées des sociologues et des politologues d’un côté et des géographes de l’autre en ce qui concerne les élections.

While the European Union aims at developing a common foreign policy and a common arms market, European states still collaborate poorly in the field of actual defence procurement. National firms (each furtively supported by its national government) often compete with each other as much as with American ones, European initiatives compete with Transatlantic ones. At the same time the relations between the European Defence and Security Policy (EDSP) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) remain a much debated issue. While the positions of the larger member states (France, UK and Germany) are well known in this field, the views and practices of the smaller member states are hardly discussed in the literature. This paper explores the geopolitical and geo-economical dimensions of policy making regarding military technology and production in the Netherlands. A neutral country until German invasion and occupation (1940-45), the Netherlands is a founding member of the European Communities and NATO, and a close ally of the US and the UK. Around 2000 it was in absolute terms the sixth spender in the EU regarding both military Research & Development and Equipment Procurement. What are the geopolitical and geo-economical arguments of the Dutch government to procure a new generation of jet fighters and to participate in the Joint Strike Fighter programme to develop and produce the Lockheed Martin-F-35 Lightning II rather than to purchase the French Rafale or the Eurofighter? What does this mean for the further development of the EU as a territorial actor in international affairs?

Geopolitics is a twentieth century expression rooted in nineteenth century European politics. The word was crafted around the turn of the century by a Swedish university professor who also had an interest in the politics of his country. It was picked up by German geographers and made into a household name by Karl Haushofer who directed a journal dedicated to the world views propagated by geopolitics. These supposedly lacked the usual Kirchturmschattenbeschraenktheit that inhibited German politics and the informed public but gave access to the grand design behind the day-to-day skirmishes in public affairs. Haushofer and his circle started their mission in the 1920s but were

How are “development” and “violence” related? What role does “political order” play as an intermediate modulator? Where is the geography in all this? These are the questions I want to tackle in this chapter. “Development” is by now a colloquial expression that needs some washing, cleaning, and pressing to be put to good use. “Violence” always was in and of the streets, but academic introspection has provided it with additional meaning that makes it a slightly ambiguous concept. “Political order” can use a tiny bit of elaboration at the outset. “Development” in conjunction with rich and poor countries is a notion mainly popularized after World War II that indicated the belief that state societies may normally pass through stages on their way from poor to rich (as individual humans do in their development from child to adult). They may be early or late, quick or slow, and they can be assisted from the outside or hindered. In hindsight one would perhaps have expected more discussion of the possible conditions of “abnormal” or “retarded” development in the case of countries. Subsequently the development of countries became increasingly encompassing (e.g., political, social), but it soon turned out that the concept was clearly overstretched in this way. In addition, “development” became part of controversies where dependency, essential difference, nonlinearity, and contingency in different packages were marshaled against the protagonists of modernization and the policy field that had been put to work to solve the “development issue.” After more than fifty years of trying, development as a practice and an intellectual field is not in good shape. The overall faith is waning and the funding does not grow, many of the recipes do not work, and the field has lost a clear demarcation though not its focus. At the same time much partial progress has been made (e.g., in the field of health and education and in regions such as East Asia). Basic notions of poverty and wealth and their backgrounds are better understood— there are many more data, better models, and more interpretive knowledge. Development is described in levels. Each level refers to an average and a distribution of certain attributes for the population of a country.