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Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) cause severe hemorrhagic disease in terrestrial poultry and are a threat to the poultry industry, wild life, and human health. HPAIVs arise from low pathogenic avian influenza viruses (LPAIVs), which circulate in wild aquatic birds. HPAIV emergence is thought to occur in poultry and not wild aquatic birds, but the reason for this species-restriction is not known. We hypothesized that, due to species-specific tropism and replication, intrahost HPAIV selection is favored in poultry and disfavored in wild aquatic birds. We tested this hypothesis by co-inoculating chickens, representative of poultry, and ducks, representative of wild aquatic birds, with a mixture of H7N7 HPAIV and LPAIV, mimicking HPAIV emergence in an experimental setting. Virus selection was monitored in swabs and tissues by RT-qPCR and immunostaining of differential N-terminal epitope tags that were added to the hemagglutinin protein. HPAIV was selected in four of six co-inoculated chickens, whereas LPAIV remained the major population in co-inoculated ducks on the long-term, despite detection of infectious HPAIV in tissues at early time points. Collectively, our data support the hypothesis that HPAIVs are more likely to be selected at the intrahost level in poultry than in wild aquatic birds and point towards species-specific differences in HPAIV and LPAIV tropism and replication levels as possible explanations.

Introduction: Our aim was to gain insight into the effect of COVID-19 measures on SARS-CoV-2 incidence in secondary schools and the association with classroom CO 2 concentration and airborne contamination. Methods: Between October 2020—June 2021, 18 schools weekly reported SARS-CoV-2 incidence and completed surveys on school-initiated COVID-19 measures (e.g. improving hygiene or minimizing contacts). CO 2 was measured in occupied classrooms twice, and SARS-CoV-2 air contamination longitudinally using electrostatic dust collectors (EDC) and analyzed using RT-qPCR. National COVID-19 policy measures varied during pre-lockdown, lockdown and post-lockdown periods. During the entire study, schools were recommended to improve ventilation. SARS-CoV-2 incidence rate ratios (IRR) were estimated by Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) models. Results: During 18 weeks follow-up (range: 10–22) SARS-CoV-2 school-incidence decreased during national lockdown (adjusted IRR: 0.41, 95%CI: 0.21–0.80) and post-lockdown (IRR: 0.60, 0.39–0.93) compared to pre-lockdown. School-initiated COVID-19 measures had no additional effect. Pre-lockdown, IRRs per 10% increase in time CO 2 exceeded 400, 550 and 800 ppm above outdoor level respectively, were 1.08 (1.00–1.16), 1.10 (1.02–1.19), and 1.08 (0.95–1.22). Post-lockdown, CO 2-concentrations were considerably lower and not associated with SARS-CoV-2 incidence. No SARS-CoV-2 RNA was detected in any of the EDC samples. Conclusion: During a period with low SARS-CoV-2 population immunity and increased attention to ventilation, with CO 2 levels most of the time below acceptable thresholds, only the national policy during and post-lockdown of reduced class-occupancy, stringent quarantine, and contact testing reduced SARS-CoV-2 incidence in Dutch secondary schools. Widespread SARS-CoV-2 air contamination could not be demonstrated in schools under the prevailing conditions during the study., Environmental & Climate Design

Continued circulation of A/H5N1 influenzaviruses of the A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage in poultry has resulted in the diversificationin multiple genetic and antigenic clades. Since 2009, clade 2.3.4.4 hemagglutinin (HA) containing viruses harboring the internal and neuraminidase (NA) genes of other avian influenzaA viruses have been detected. As a result, various HA-NA combinations, such as A/H5N1, A/H5N2, A/H5N3, A/H5N5, A/H5N6, and A/H5N8 have been identified.As of January 2023, 83 humans have been infected with A/H5N6 viruses, thereby posing an apparent risk for public health. Here, as part of a risk assessment, the in vitro and in vivo characterization of A/H5N6 A/black-headed gull/Netherlands/29/2017 is described. This A/H5N6 virus was not transmitted between ferrets via the air but was of unexpectedly high pathogenicity compared to other described A/H5N6 viruses. The virus replicated and caused severe lesions not only in respiratory tissues but also in multiple extra-respiratory tissues, including brain, liver, pancreas, spleen, lymph nodes, and adrenal gland. Sequence analyses demonstrated that the well-known mammalian adaptation substitution D701N was positively selected in almost all ferrets. In the in vitro experiments, no other known viral phenotypic properties associated with mammalian adaptation or increased pathogenicity were identified.The lack of transmission via the air and the absence of mammalian adaptation markers suggest that the public health risk of this virus is low. The high pathogenicity of this virus in ferrets could not be explained by the known mammalian pathogenicity factors and should be further studied.

Central nervous system (CNS) disease is the most common extra-respiratory tract complication of influenza A virus infections in humans. Remarkably, zoonotic highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus infections are more often associated with CNS disease than infections with seasonal influenza viruses. Evolution of avian influenza viruses has been extensively studied in the context of respiratory infections, but evolutionary processes in CNS infections remain poorly understood. We have previously observed that the ability of HPAI A/Indonesia/5/2005 (H5N1) virus to replicate in and spread throughout the CNS varies widely between individual ferrets. Based on these observations, we sought to understand the impact of entrance into and replication within the CNS on the evolutionary dynamics of virus populations. First, we identified and characterized three substitutions-PB1 E177G and A652T and NP I119M - detected in the CNS of a ferret infected with influenza A/Indonesia/5/2005 (H5N1) virus that developed a severe meningo-encephalitis. We found that some of these substitutions, individually or collectively, resulted in increased polymerase activity in vitro. Nevertheless, in vivo, the virus bearing the CNS-associated mutations retained its capacity to infect the CNS but showed reduced dispersion to other anatomical sites. Analyses of viral diversity in the nasal turbinate and olfactory bulb revealed the lack of a genetic bottleneck acting on virus populations accessing the CNS via this route. Furthermore, virus populations bearing the CNS-associated mutations showed signs of positive selection in the brainstem. These features of dispersion to the CNS are consistent with the action of selective processes, underlining the potential for H5N1 viruses to adapt to the CNS.

SARS-CoV-2 attaches to angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) to gain entry into cells after which the spike protein is cleaved by the transmembrane serine protease 2 (TMPRSS2) to facilitate viral-host membrane fusion. ACE2 and TMPRSS2 expression profiles have been analyzed at the genomic, transcriptomic, and single-cell RNAseq levels. However, transcriptomic data and actual protein validation convey conflicting information regarding the distribution of the biologically relevant protein receptor in whole tissues. To describe the organ-level architecture of receptor expression, related to the ability of ACE2 and TMPRSS2 to mediate infectivity, we performed a volumetric analysis of whole Syrian hamster lung lobes. Lung tissue of infected and control animals was stained using antibodies against ACE2 and TMPRSS2, combined with SARS-CoV-2 nucleoprotein staining. This was followed by light-sheet microscopy imaging to visualize their expression and related infection patterns. The data demonstrate that infection is restricted to sites containing both ACE2 and TMPRSS2, the latter is expressed in the primary and secondary bronchi whereas ACE2 is predominantly observed in the bronchioles and alveoli. Conversely, infection completely overlaps where ACE2 and TMPRSS2 co-localize in the tertiary bronchi, bronchioles, and alveoli.

Influenza B virus primarily infects humans, causing seasonal epidemics globally. Two antigenic variants-Victoria-like and Yamagata-like-were detected in the 1980s, of which the molecular basis of emergence is still incompletely understood. Here, the antigenic properties of a unique collection of historical virus isolates, sampled from 1962 to 2000 and passaged exclusively in mammalian cells to preserve antigenic properties, were determined with the hemagglutination inhibition assay and an antigenic map was built to quantify and visualize the divergence of the lineages. The antigenic map revealed only three distinct antigenic clusters-Early, Victoria, and Yamagata-with relatively little antigenic diversity in each cluster until 2000. Viruses with Victoria-like antigenic properties emerged around 1972 and diversified subsequently into two genetic lineages. Viruses with Yamagata-like antigenic properties evolved from one lineage and became clearly antigenically distinct from the Victoria-like viruses around 1988. Recombinant mutant viruses were tested to show that insertions and deletions (indels), as observed frequently in influenza B virus hemagglutinin, had little effect on antigenic properties. In contrast, amino-acid substitutions at positions 148, 149, 150, and 203, adjacent to the hemagglutinin receptor binding site, determined the main antigenic differences between the Early, Victoria-like, and Yamagata-like viruses. Surprisingly, substitutions at two of the four positions reverted in recent viruses of the Victoria lineage, resulting in antigenic properties similar to viruses circulating ∼50 y earlier. These data shed light on the antigenic diversification of influenza viruses and suggest there may be limits to the antigenic evolution of influenza B virus.

Past pandemic influenza viruses with sustained human-to-human transmissibility have emerged from animal influenza viruses. Employment of experimental models to assess the pandemic risk of emerging zoonotic influenza viruses provides critical information supporting public health efforts. Ferret transmission experiments have been utilized to predict the human-to-human transmission potential of novel influenza viruses. However, small sample sizes and a lack of standardized protocols can introduce interlaboratory variability, complicating interpretation of transmission experimental data. To assess the range of variation in ferret transmission experiments, a global exercise was conducted by 11 laboratories using two common stock H1N1 influenza viruses with different transmission characteristics in ferrets. Parameters known to affect transmission were standardized, including the inoculation route, dose, and volume, as well as a strict 1:1 donor/contact ratio for respiratory droplet transmission. Additional host and environmental parameters likely to affect influenza transmission kinetics were monitored and analyzed. The overall transmission outcomes for both viruses across 11 laboratories were concordant, suggesting the robustness of the ferret model for zoonotic influenza risk assessment. Among environmental parameters that varied across laboratories, donor-to-contact airflow directionality was associated with increased transmissibility. To attain high confidence in identifying viruses with moderate to high transmissibility or low transmissibility under a smaller number of participating laboratories, our analyses support the notion that as few as three but as many as five laboratories, respectively, would need to independently perform viral transmission experiments with concordant results. This exercise facilitates the development of a more homogenous protocol for ferret transmission experiments that are employed for the purposes of risk assessment. IMPORTANCE Followi

Seasonal influenza vaccination takes into account primarily hemagglutinin (HA)-specific neutralizing antibody responses. However, the accumulation of substitutions in the antigenic regions of HA (i.e., antigenic drift) occasionally results in a mismatch between the vaccine and circulating strains. To prevent poor vaccine performance, we investigated whether an antigenically matched neuraminidase (NA) may compensate for reduced vaccine efficacy due to a mismatched HA. Ferrets were vaccinated twice with adjuvanted split inactivated influenza vaccines containing homologous HA and NA (vacH3N2), only homologous HA (vacH3N1), only homologous NA (vacH1N2), heterologous HA and NA (vacH1N1), or phosphate-buffered saline (vacPBS), followed by challenge with H3N2 virus (A/Netherlands/16190/1968). Ferrets vaccinated with homologous HA (vacH3N2 and vacH3N1) displayed minimum fever and weight loss compared to vacH1N1 and vacPBS ferrets, while ferrets vaccinated with NA-matched vacH1N2 displayed intermediate fever and weight loss. Vaccination with vacH1N2 further led to a reduction in virus shedding from the nose and undetectable virus titers in the lower respiratory tract, similarly to when the homologous vacH3N2 was used. Some protection was observed upon vacH1N1 vaccination, but this was not comparable to that observed for vacH1N2, again highlighting the important role of NA in vaccine-induced protection. These results illustrate that NA antibodies can prevent severe disease caused by influenza virus infection and that an antigenically matched NA in seasonal vaccines might prevent lower respiratory tract complications. This underlines the importance of considering NA during the yearly vaccine strain selection process, which may be particularly beneficial in seasons when the HA component of the vaccine is mismatched. IMPORTANCE Despite the availability of vaccines, influenza virus infections continue to cause substantial morbidity and mortality in humans. Currently available

Het coronavirus zal niet de laatste pandemie zijn die we over ons heen krijgen. Om de haverklap springen virussen over van dieren naar de mens. Een mogelijke toekomstige boosdoener is de vogelgriep. Volgens dr. Sander Herfst (Erasmusmc) kan dat virus ook gevaarlijk worden voor ons. De vraag is: wanneer?