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Examines variety of positions regarding strategic principles that have been taken in the debate within systemic therapy movement. Considers strategic therapy in terms of distinction between therapeutic process and content and distinction between realist and antirealist epistemologies, arguing that there is more convergence among proponents of those positions than their writings might suggest. (Author/NB)

Contends that constructivist epistemology is not a new family therapy doctrine but reflects a shift from a nontraditional to a traditional use of the term "epistemology." Demonstrates how recent articulations of constructivism have resulted in some logical contradictions of earlier "epistemology" debates. Questions and considers application of constructivism to practice of psychotherapy. (Author/CM)

The notion of living in a post-truth world compels many who speak of truth in a commonsense way to use the term "objective truth." In various theoretical psychologies, by contrast, favor continues to be given to the affordances alleged to inhere in locally relativized psychological truths, over the epistemic violence observed in claims to objective psychological knowledge. Despite this sanguine view of epistemic relativity, it, too, has conduced to epistemic violence throughout history, resulting in the further oppression of othered peoples, by way of objectively false assertions cunningly disguised as objective truth. I analyze ways in which such typical relativist assertions as "Proposition X is true for some but not for all" creates epistemic muddles obscured by "prepositional attitudes." Particular attention is given to ways in which (a) the "true-for" relativist/nonobjectivist epistemology that many theorists advocate depends on the non(true-for)relativist knowledge they reject, and (b) objectively false claims about othered peoples may have mislead progressively-minded scholars into believing that the cause of epistemic violence lies in an objectivist epistemology, a belief that keeps hidden from them the social-justice affordances that inhere in that very epistemology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to both popular and professional indicators, the push for the positive attitude in America is on the rise. After considering the popular culture zeitgeist, I compare and contrast two recent professional psychology movements--those of positive psychology and postmodern therapy--both of which rest on a foundation of optimism and positive thinking despite their opposing views about a proper philosophy of science. I then pr0sent cross-cultural empirical research that calls into question the typical (North American) assumption that a positive attitude is necessary for (a sense of) well-being. I also consider findings in health psychology, clinical/ counseling psychology, and organizational behavioral science, findings which call into question the assumption that accentuating the positive (and eliminating the negative) is necessarily beneficial in terms of physical and mental health. The clinical/therapeutic implications of this analysis are addressed, as I put forth my conjecture about the existence of what I call the 'tyranny of the positive attitude' in the form of a question: If there indeed now exists unprecedented pressure to accentuate the positive, could it then be that the pressure itself to be happy and optimistic contributes to at least some forms of unhappiness? Keywords: positive attitude; positive psychology; negativity; postmodernism; realism; objectivism; antirealism; empathy: emotional expression

The attitudes and behaviors examined in this special section--namely, negativity, complaining, pessimism, and 'false' hope--have not typically been viewed as virtuous either in popular culture or in professional psychology. In reconsidering these attitudes and behaviors, each of the authors demonstrates how there may actually be virtue, or at least something positive, in what has typically been cast in a negative light. Keywords: virtue; positive psychology; negativity; complaining; pessimism; 'false' hope

As the humanities suffer decline in the academy, some psychologists have turned to them as an especially apt way to advance a psychological science that reflects lived experience more accurately and robustly. Disciplinary psychology's adoption of the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of the natural sciences is often seen as a misapplication that has resulted in a science that diminishes if not demolishes subjectivity and misrepresents many. By contrast, the humanities are taken to be well positioned to infuse scientific psychology with myriad aspects of lived experience. I applaud all efforts to take the humanities seriously, by incorporating the theories, methods, and observations of the humanities in psychological science; the question is, how best to do this. On what understanding of the humanities should scientific psychology proceed? With these questions in mind, I review arguments about how psychological science can benefit from attention to the humanities. I also consider worries about a scientistic turn within the humane disciplines themselves, which turn mirrors worries about scientism in psychology. Contemporary examples of scholarship on the origins of ancient Greek philosophy and depictions of Christ in Renaissance art illustrate how the wars over truth and evidence that plague psychology are no less fierce in the humanities. I conclude that if psychologists apprehend the humanities with the critical understandings called for in psychological science, we may not only appreciate their contributions more completely and accurately, but may also deploy those contributions more substantially, in working to broaden and deepen psychological science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A primary target of Indigenous psychologists and critical psychologists is the epistemic violence found in mainstream research. The epistemic violence derives from two alleged mainstream tendencies: (a) omitting concepts/conceptions of othered peoples and (b) interpreting observed group differences to be caused by inherent inferiorities of othered peoples. In seeking remedial research practice, some theoretical psychologists distinguish (a) psychological knowledge from and for the folk, which they advocate and (b) psychological "knowledge" about the folk, the alleged source of objectification of othered peoples. Though seemingly self-evident, this for/about prepositional divide may not be clear. First, mainstream epistemic violence often depends on folk notions. Second, the use in science of folk concepts/conceptions has advanced oppressive purposes, whereas some mainstream findings may serve progressive goals. I exemplify with race concepts, especially racialized essentialism and dehumanization, and I demonstrate how mainstream science sometimes reveals mechanisms of othering that may inform progressive social reform efforts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An interpersonal theory of dangerousness asserts that dangerousness is a function of perceptions and attributions within an interpersonal context, rather than a stable personality trait. Using the guards and 78 inmates of a penal complex, the interpersonal theory of dangerousness was tested from a racial perspective. (Author)

The ways, in which the positive psychology movement's construction and presentation of itself are negative, are explored. The negative or dismissive reactions of some spokespersons for the movement to ideas or views that run counter to the movement's dominant message are elaborated.

In all of the articles of this special section (Beutler & Harwood, Erwin, Jopling, and Spence), the authors express their commitment to a conventional view of truth and objectivity, a view which serves as a precondition for their commitment to a true science of psychotherapy. In my concluding comments, I first describe the particular focus of each author's concerns about current standards of truth and objectivity in the field. I then anticipate the ways in which their arguments might be challenged by those who now challenge the possibility of truth and objectivity (in any conventional sense) within psychotherapy, or, more broadly, within the human sciences, or, more radically, within the physical sciences. [C] 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. J Clin Psychol 57: 53-62, 2001. Keywords: objectivity; truth; psychotherapy; postmodernism; constructionism; epistemology; antirealism

Raskin and Debany (this issue) profess my failure to appreciate how constructivism does not warrant an “anything-goes” relativism. In this reply, I explain how whether any postmodernist doctrine endorses an “anything-goes” epistemology (or a radical relativism) depends on the nature of the constraints that warrant its propositions. I revisit the three core postmodernist claims that I criticized in previous work, which criticism Raskin and Debany now in turn criticize. Emphasis is given to how an objectivist epistemology, contrary to postmodernist belief, does not entail certitude, and moreover incorporates (a) active and indirect knowing, (b) the situated origins of all empirical knowledge, and (c) a subject/object distinction for certain kinds of human/social kinds. I use the example of racist rhetoric to illustrate how discourse can and does affect extradiscursive realities, thereby implicating our moral obligation to seek objective truth as best we can. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The positive/negative distinction works well in many fields—for example, in mathematics negative numbers hold their own, and in medical pathology negative results are usually celebrated. But in positive psychology negativity should be replaced with positivity for flourishing/optimal functioning to occur. That the designation of the psychological states and processes deemed positive (good/desirable) and negative (bad/undesirable) is made a priori, independent of circumstantial particularity, both intrapersonal and interpersonal, does not seem to bother positive psychologists. But it should, as it results in conceptual muddles and dead ends that cannot be solved within their conceptual framework of positivity and negativity. Especially problematic is an ambiguity I find in positive psychologists’ a priori and a posteriori understandings of positivity and negativity, an ambiguity about constitutive and causal relations that pervades their science and the conclusions drawn from it. By eliminating their a priori dichotomy of positivity and negativity, positive psychologists might well find themselves in a better position to put back together the psychological reality that they have fractured in their ontologically dubious move of carving up psychological reality a priori into positive and negative phenomena. They then might find themselves better placed to “broaden and build” their own science of flourishing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Edward Pols died on 14 August 2005, in Brunswick, Maine, within weeks of completing his volume of philosophical essays, On Rational Agency, and his volume of poetry, Remembrance of Things [...]