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The EU Water Framework Directive (Directive 2000/60 EC) provides numerous requirements, including achievement of good status of all water bodies by 2015. However, meeting this environmental target brings substantial costs. In justified cases, member states may request an extension of the deadline based on disproportionality of costs of meeting the WFD requirements. Definition of disproportionate costs must be based on economic analysis and on the WFD general requirements. This thesis provides a review of proportionate costs in the context of the WFD, identifies main requirements for its practical definition as an exemption and provides a review of foreign methodical approaches to define cost proportionality. It is clear that the Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) and the Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) are most commonly used methods to determine the cost proportionality treshold. This thesis discuss the relevance of these methods to define cost proportionality to reach good status of water bodies. The thesis also provides methodology to assess cost proportionality based on modified CBA and analyses ecosystem services of water bodies. In addition, the thesis points out the methodological complications and uncertainties of suggested methodology. Main methodological issues are connected with definition of right scale of analysis and synergy effects of measures, analysis of costs and definition of suitable measures and analysis of benefits and quantification of ecosystem services of water bodies.

Growing populations of wild pigs are causing economic damage, societal risk and the risk of spreading infectious diseases. Czech Wildlife Management defines a wild boar as a renewable natural resource not owned by specific subject and sets hunter's liability for economic damage caused by it. For the purpose of the work was prepared questionnaires addressed to the farming agricultural subjects and representatives of hunter's association in the Czech republic. The author confirmed his hypothesis that the current institutional game management of wild boars leads only to a limited negotiation between hunters and farmers due to bad enforcement of economic damages. Thesis proves, that in most cases economic damagesare not enforced by farming subject. Hunters are in the position of free riders participating in the unwillingness and lack of incentives for farmers to enforce economic damages or to enforce non-equivalent to the amount of damages. It shows that the current institutional adjustment does not support the principle of personal liability and motivation, and does not optimize populations of wild boar and thereby reduce the economic damage.