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The GDPR grants data subjects certain rights, like the right to access their data from companies, but in practice multiple problems exist with exercising these rights such as unknown data holders or interpreting the received data. Small and medium enterprises on the other hand need to facilitate the obligations given by the GDPR, but often lack proper systems, staff and other resources to do so effectively. For the GDPR to be effective in practice, these problems need to be addressed. With the work at hand we provide an overview of existing software solutions for these problems (from an internet research), discuss to which degree they solve the various problems and what issues remain., Comment: 46 pages

Citizens have gained many rights with the GDPR, e.g. the right to get a copy of their personal data. In practice, however, this is fraught with problems for citizens and small data holders. We present a literature review on solutions promising relief in the form of privacy dashboards for citizens and GDPR services for small data holders. Covered topics are analyzed, categorized and compared. This is ought to be a step towards both enabling citizens to exercise their GDPR rights and supporting small data holders to comply with their GDPR duties., Comment: 29 pages

Selecting a library out of numerous candidates can be a laborious and resource-intensive task. We present the $crypto_{lib}$ index, a tool for decision-makers to choose the best fitting cryptography library for a given context. To define our index, 15 library attributes were synthesized from findings based on a literature review and interviews with decision-makers. These attributes were afterwards validated and weighted via an online survey. In order to create the index value for a given library, the individual attributes are assessed using given evaluation criteria associated with the respective attribute. As a proof of concept and to give a practical usage example, the derivation of the $crypto_{lib}$ values for the libraries Bouncy Castle and Tink are shown in detail. Overall, by tailoring the weighting of the $crypto_{lib}$ attributes to their current use case, decision-makers are enabled to systematically select a cryptography library fitting best to their software project at hand in a guided, repeatable and reliable way., Comment: 12 pages, 2 figures, 5 tables, the long version of EICC 2022 publication

This work proposes the Crypto-Agility Maturity Model (CAMM for short), a maturity model for determining the state of crypto-agility of a given software or IT landscape. CAMM consists of five levels, for each level a set of requirements have been formulated based on literature review. Initial feedback from field experts confirms that CAMM has a well-designed structure and is easy to comprehend. Based on our model, the crytographic agility of an IT landscape can be systematically measured and improved step by step. We expect that this will enable companies and to respond better and faster to threats resulting from broken cryptographic schemes. This work serves to promote CAMM and encourage others to apply it in practice and develop it jointly., Comment: typos corrected

Besides the development of PQC algorithms, the actual migration of IT systems to such new schemes has to be considered, best by utilizing or establishing crypto-agility. Much work in this respect is currently conducted all over the world, making it hard to keep track of the many individual challenges and respective solutions that have been identified. In consequence, it is difficult to judge for both individual application scenarios and on a global scale, whether all (known) challenges have been addressed respectively or what their current state is. We provide a literature survey and a snapshot of the discovered challenges and solutions categorized in different areas. We use this as starting point for a community project to keep track of the ongoing efforts and the state of the art in this field. Thereby we offer a single entry-point into the subject reflecting the current state in a timely manner., Comment: 12 pages, 2 tables

Currently, PQC algorithms are being standardized to address the emerging threat to conventional asymmetric algorithms from quantum computing. These new algorithms must then be integrated into existing protocols, applications and infrastructures. Integration problems are to be expected, due to incompatibilities with existing standards and implementations on the one hand, but also due to a lack of knowledge among software developers about how to handle PQC algorithms. To illustrate incompatibilities, we integrate two different PQC algorithms into two different existing software products (the InboxPager email client for the Android OS and the TLS implementation of the Bouncy Castle crypto library). Here, we rely on the highly-abstract crypto library eUCRITE, which hides technical details about the correct usage of classical and PCQ algorithms and thus prevents some potential implementation errors., Comment: to be published at 17. Deutscher IT-Sicherheitskongress des BSI, 2021. in german, 12 pages

A good documentation is essential for a good usability of (security) APIs, i.e. especially for the correct use of the APIs. Requirements for good documentation of APIs have been described in several papers, but there is no technical implementation (hereinafter referred to as a documentation system) that implements these requirements. The requirements can be divided into requirements for the documentation system and requirements for the documentation content. Out of 13 identified requirements for a documentation system itself, 9 were implemented in a prototype and evaluated in a user study with 22 test persons using a cryptographic API. It turned out that the implementation of the requirement 'Enable quick use of the API' depends on the one hand on the quality of the content entered, but on the other hand also includes 5 other requirements or their implementation. The two other implemented requirements ('classic reference' and 'question and answer function') were hardly or not at all used by the test persons. Their usefulness and relevance should be investigated in a long-term study., Comment: 13 pages, in German

With the ongoing digitalisation of our everyday tasks, more and more eGovernment services make it possible for citizens to take care of their administrative obligations online. This type of services requires a certain assurance level for user authentication. To meet these requirements, a digital identity issued to the citizen is essential. Nowadays, due to the widespread use of smartphones, mobile user authentication is often favoured. This naturally supports two-factor authentication schemes (2FA). We use the term mobile derived identity to stress two aspects: a) the identity is enabled for mobile usage and b) the identity is somehow derived from a physical or digital proof of identity. This work reviews 21 systems that support mobile derived identities. One subset of the considered systems is already in place (public or private sector in Europe), another subset is subject to research. Our goal is to identify prevalent design and implementation aspects for these systems in order to gain a better understanding on best practises and common views on mobile derived identities. We found, that research prefers storing identity data on the mobile device itself whereas real world systems usually rely on cloud storage. 2FA is common in both worlds, however biometrics as second factor is the exception.