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Despite the intimacy between the situation and our agency, “situation” remains an ambiguous concept in theory. Even within the context of situated theories of cognition and agency that take the organism-environment system as central in their investigations, the notion of “situation” has been undertheorized. Yet, whether affordances are relevant depends on the situation. Therefore, Van Dijk and Rietveld argue that we must understand the practical situation in which behavior occurs in order to know how we respond to the affordances that the materials and other people offer. Taking John Dewey’s notion of “situation” as the basis for investigation, I follow Shaun Gallagher’s analysis of how we are not just part of a situation, but we understand what an action is only in relation to a situation. Situations act like large-scale affordances, but this does not mean that affordances are inviting or soliciting as such. Because of the situational transactions with the environment that an agent has, the environment pushes and pulls the agent from and toward certain actions. This means that environments have expressive qualitative features that are non-subjective emotional qualities and social gestalt. I propose four overlapping but distinct features or axes of analysis of situations that can be identified and analyzed in terms of how they shape our agency: complexity, determinedness, the establishment of expectations, and restrictiveness. Situations can be more or less complex in a spatial, temporal, or layered way. They can also be more or less determined, meaning that the agent’s actions are more or less obvious. Third, they can be characterized as socially established, meaning that certain behavior is expected. Finally, situations are more or less restricted, denoting the number of activities available to an agent.

In the second half of the twentieth century, habit had received little attention in the cognitive sciences and philosophy of cognition. This despite the extensive theoretical attention habit received in phenomenology and pragmatism. This is because due to influence of behaviorism and the cognitivist revolution, habit was reduced to mechanical stimulus-response reaction that is learned through drill and repetition, and therefore habit cannot be considered intelligent. In this article I argue that a richer and more accurate notion of habit is possible through an embodied vision of cognition, namely enactivism and ecological psychology. This means that we can consider habit as intelligent without equating habit with reflective thought. Such a notion is possible because both enactivism and ecological psychology have their conceptual roots in pragmatism and phenomenology. Secondly, an embodied vison of cognition can describe how our habits are formed from sensorimotor contingencies and are self-organizing patterns of behavior in interaction with an environment. This can be described through the metaphor of ‘laying down a path’, whereby taking a shortcut across a field of grass a path is formed, which enables walking across the field of grass. Laying down a path is more than a metaphor, but also an example of the sociomaterial dimension of habit. Habits are always formed in an interaction between an organism and an environment that is, in our case both material and social.

Despite on-going debates in philosophy and cognitive science, dual process theory (DPT) remains a popular framework for theorizing about human cognition. Its central hypothesis is that cognitive processing can be subsumed under two generic types. In this paper, we argue that the putative success and popularity of this framework remains overstated and gives rise to certain misunderstandings. If DPT has predictive and/or explanatory power, it is through offering descriptions of cognitive phenomena via functional analysis. But functional descriptions require an individuation strategy. To date, there has been no systematic exploration of how Type 1 and Type 2 are functionally individuated. Following recent debates in philosophy of cognitive science, we consider three individuation strategies (i.e., abstraction, reification, fictionalization) and assess the legitimacy of each in relation to DPT. This leads us to the verdict that the most viable route for justifying DPT is to construe Type 1 and Type 2 processes as reifications. We conclude that, construed as reifications, the common rationales offered by proponents of DPT for demarcating Type 1 and Type 2 processes do not escape criticism and require further theoretical justification.