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The article titled "Evald Ilyenkov: 'On the State of Philosophy [Letter to the Central Committee of the Party]'" provides an analysis of the current state of philosophy and its role in the communist transformation of the world. The author argues that philosophy's influence is diminishing, with other schools and concepts gaining more prominence. They criticize the dominance of neopositivism in the natural sciences and the rise of anthropological and existential approaches in the humanities. The author also highlights the confusion surrounding the understanding of philosophy as a distinct science and calls for the development of a theory of dialectics before philosophers can intervene in other sciences. The text also discusses the training of philosophical cadres at Moscow State University, criticizing the lack of clarity and neglect of dialectical materialism in current philosophical education. [Extracted from the article]

The text examines the interconnection between tragedy, logic, and action in Hegel's works, notably in "Outlines of the Philosophy of Right." Hegel correlates tragedy with negativity and reconciliation, influenced by ancient tragedy and Christian consciousness. Tragedy serves as a means for self-knowledge, where negativity and death are pivotal in unveiling the spirit's truth. Hegel's philosophy is enriched by the works of Aeschylus and Sophocles, depicting the ethical crisis in Athens and the ensuing reconciliation of opposing ethical forces. Hegel identifies tragic elements in Christianity, a religion that perceives death and contradiction not as endpoints but transitional phases in reality. Christian religious consciousness, marked by finitude and sin, seeks reconciliation between the mutable and immutable. Hegel's practical philosophy is grounded in a distinctive ontological logic, with dialectics as a core element, not a function of subjective thinking but the animating essence of matter. The focus of the article is Hegel's stance on the manifestation and reconciliation of freedom, assessing the relationship between individual will and universal practical law. He critiques the limited legal perspective of individual freedom, advocating for a deeper, ethical interpretation of freedom. This view is distanced from common sense and consensus and rooted in speculative understanding developed through scientific and philosophical methods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is still largely ignored that Hegelian dialect can be of great assistance to comprehend the intricacies of the production, experience, and contestation of space. Hegelian philosophy can significantly help to enrich geographical scholarship, although Hegel‐the‐geographer is yet to be discovered and properly recognised. Considering the metabolism of reason, the articulation between the particular and the universal, the externalisation and supersession of objectified consciousness, and the function of otherness in the production of space, among other insights of great socio‐spatial relevance, this article offers a comparative analysis between Hegel's minor geography (the more explicit and immediate considerations of space, spatial dimensions, and geometry) and the more substantial, major geography, which is immanent in the main body of his philosophical system. The most remarkable geographical accomplishments of Hegel are possibly the detailed investigation into the pursuit of higher reason through practical, collective action and the convergence of various shapes of consciousness that constitutes the politico‐spatial absolute. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper has two main aims. First, it examines the relation of Russian and Chinese Marxism against its Hegelian background. Secondly, it comments on recent Western research on Marxism in tracing the origins of Engels's anti-Hegelianism to materialist reactions to modern idealist philosophy. I maintain that Engels is a Schellingian, that Marx is a Hegelian, and that Marx's form of Hegelianism cannot be realized in practice. I consider different kinds of Marxism as efforts to realize Marx's theories and argue that, since Marx's theory cannot be realized, in the final analysis his view is no more than a dream. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to a major trend in Hegel scholarship, Hegel advocates a McDowell-style transformativist conception of the human mind. Central to this conception is a methodological dualism, according to which phenomena belonging to the rational mind, in contrast to those belonging to non-rational nature, must be accounted for from within the 'space of reasons.' In this paper I argue, by contrast, that Hegel rejects methodological dualism. For Hegel, a constitutive aspect of the rational mind is the activity of expression. I show how Hegel's philosophy of mind adequately accounts for low-level forms of expressivity without appealing to capacities connected to conceptual thought and judgment, and that he does so by drawing on methods similar to those employed within the empirical sciences of his time. Thus, for Hegel, the sphere of the rational mind is broader than the McDowellian space of reasons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is a response to Samantha Matherne's book, Cassirer, which provides a comprehensive guide to Ernst Cassirer's thought. It explores Cassirer's approach to cultural history as a history of philosophy, influenced by Kant and Hegel, and his dedication to revindicating the Enlightenment in a time of rising irrationalism and political extremism. The article discusses Cassirer's engagement in Kulturwissenschaft and his belief that philosophical thought is the ultimate product of culture. It also highlights the influence of Aby Warburg and the Warburg Institute on the development of Kulturwissenschaft, and how Cassirer's association with the Warburg Library shaped his philosophy of culture and historical research. The article argues for the relevance of Cassirer's work in today's world and suggests a return to his interdisciplinary approach to historical research. [Extracted from the article]

In this essay, I argue that Hegel's Absolute must be understood to be transcendent in the sense of being both immanent within the world and exceeding it. This account of transcendence invariably turns on Hegel's inheritance of the Christian tradition and, in particular, the metaphysics espoused through Christian Platonism. To support my argument I will examine the methodological immanentism of Hegel's phenomenology to show that such immanentism, while demanded by any phenomenology, is not necessarily imported into his metaphysics. I will then examine Hegel's Logic to show that the dialectic which his thought relies upon compels the finite subject to recognise that all finite things, including themselves, are grounded within the Absolute Idea. I will then examine whether we must understand the Absolute Idea as immanent or whether there is room to conceive of it as transcendent. I conclude the essay by showing that the sense of transcendence as found within Nicene Christianity provides an understanding of transcendence that is not only compatible with Hegel's thought but actually allows us to make better sense of his system than the immanentist interpretation of it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article revisits Feuerbach's "break with speculation" in the early 1840s in light of issues raised by the original Pantheism Controversy, initiated in 1785 by the publication of Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi's Letters on the Doctrine of Spinoza. The article first describes the concerns underlying Jacobi's repudiation of Spinozism, and rationalism more generally, in favor of a personalistic theism that disclaims the possibility of philosophical knowledge of God. It goes on to reconstruct Hegel's alternative to Jacobi's famous salto mortale before considering how Feuerbach's critique of Hegel's philosophy of religion, as well as the personalism of the so-called Positive Philosophy (inspired by the late Schelling), was influenced by both Spinoza and Jacobi in ways that have not yet received sufficient attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper has two purposes: to provide a contextualised account of the Young Hegelian theory of the state, and to argue that Marx began working on the manuscript known as his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law', not in the Summer of 1843, as most commentators assume, but at least as early as the Spring of 1842. The established narrative describes the Young Hegelians as 'liberals', and suggests that Marx 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law' represents his rejection of their liberalism and turn towards a more radical democratic and revolutionary position. Conversely, I argue that the Young Hegelians (notably Arnold Ruge and Bruno Bauer) were never liberal (at least not by any standard definition of that term) but articulated a radical and revolutionary theory of the state from the outset – one that understood freedom, not as independence, but as political participation, and that characterised the modern state, not as the guarantor of private rights, but as the institutional framework in which all citizens could realise their public freedom. In this sense, Marx's 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy Law' does not represent a break with the Young Hegelians theory of state, but a contribution to it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The book "Crossroads of cultures: Alexandre Koyré, Alexandre Kojève, Isaiah Berlin" explores the lives and works of three Russian émigré philosophers and their contributions to European philosophy. The authors aim to understand the philosophical heritage of these thinkers by examining their lesser-known interests and tracing their trajectories before they became famous. The book highlights the dialogues between Russian, European, and Jewish thought in the works of these philosophers. It also explores the problem of the relation between the individual and the Absolute, which is a central theme in their philosophical inquiries. The book offers a comprehensive and nuanced approach to understanding the philosophical paradigms and the role of Russian émigrés in the development of European philosophy. [Extracted from the article]

This document introduces a special issue of Studies in East European Thought that focuses on the connection between philosopher Alexandre Kojève and Russian philosophy. It explores Kojève's Russian origins, his engagement with Russian thought, and the impact of Russian and Soviet imperialism on defining a Russian philosophical canon. The document acknowledges the controversy surrounding Kojève's political views and his association with Soviet intelligence agents. The text emphasizes the need to critically evaluate and retell the history of philosophy, including the contributions of Russian philosophers who have been marginalized in the Western canon. The special issue includes articles that analyze Kojève's relationship to Russian religious philosophy, his political philosophy, his engagement with Russian Hegelianism, his interest in Kant, and his photography. The aim of the special issue is to provide a diverse and comprehensive understanding of Kojève's philosophical system within the context of Russian thought. [Extracted from the article]

This paper analyzes Russian-French philosopher Alexandre Kojève's dialogue with proponents of Hegelianism and phenomenology in Soviet Russia of the 1920–30s. Considering works by Dmytro Chyzhevsky, Ivan Ilyin, Gustav Shpet, and Alexandre Koyré, I retrace Hegelian themes in Kojève, focusing on the relation between method and time. I argue that original reflections on method played a key role in both Russian Hegelianism and Kojève's work, from his famous Hegel lectures to the late fragments of a system. As I demonstrate, Kojève's Hegelianism was significantly shaped by his encounter with Ilyin's 1918 commentary on Hegel, a detailed study of the relation between method and the experience of time. However, in Kojève's hands, Ilyin's ideas were transformed, some radicalized, others abandoned. Comparatively reading texts by these thinkers in their respective contexts, I resituate and evaluate claims that Hegel's method was less dialectical than phenomenological. I finally argue that early Soviet Hegelian discourses not only shaped the trajectory of Kojève's Hegelianism but also radically anticipated concepts of time in French post-structuralism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How far go the links of Hegel to Aristotle? In what sense can we say that Hegel's philosophy aspires to be the consummation of the aristotelian one? In this article we analyze the meaning and equivalence of the concepts of νοῦς and ... of the paragraph Met. Λ 7, 1072b18-30, in Hegelian philosophy. Especially with the concept of "effective reality" (Wirklichkeit). In the ancient world, imitatio auctoris was cultivated as a conscious eagerness to understand and appropriate a content that was considered valuable and true. The imitatio did not consist in the crude repetition of an author, but in the effort to improve the understanding of a truth that one wishes to illuminate. Hegel imitates Aristotle to the point of emulating him. He overcomes the past without completely eliminating it. He contains it, updates it and keeps it alive. The Hegelian Aufhebung is imitatio of the classics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the scope and limits of Hegel as an interpreter and interlocutor of the history of ancient philosophy. The importance of reading and understanding Hegelian interpretations of the classics is highlighted, as well as the hermeneutical criteria used by Hegel. Although Hegel has had a significant impact on philosophy, doubts are raised about his role as a historian and the possibility of distorting classical thought to adapt it to his own philosophical system. The text talks about the writer Johann Joachim Winckelmann and his study of the Greek language to read works by authors such as Sophocles, Euripides, Livy, Cicero, Longinus, and Epictetus. Additionally, it is mentioned that Hegel fully expressed his late philosophy in his Principles of the Philosophy of Right. Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy are considered an important source for understanding his thought and address topics such as the philosophy of art and the philosophy of religion. The text discusses the importance of the philosophical tradition and progress in the history of philosophy from Hegel's perspective. In this text, the idea that one cannot go back to the past and adopt ancient philosophies as one's own in the present is discussed. Hegel defends private property, the importance of the family, and individual freedom in civil society. The article analyzes the scope and limits of Hegel as an interpreter and interlocutor of classical thought. It is emphasized that Hegel considers Greek and Latin thinkers as living and valuable references, unlike many modern thinkers who dismiss them. Additionally, Hegel was the first modern philosopher to be a detailed historian of ancient philosophy, although his approach is not as rigorous as contemporary scholarship. The author suggests that Hegel's Lectures may be confusing for inexperienced readers, but they are valuable for those familiar with classical sources and Hegelian thought. [Extracted from the article]

This essay presents a certain defense of Hegel's doctrine of Incarnation. For Hegel, the logic of the Incarnation constitutes not only the highest insight of religion and theology but, arguably, the key to philosophy itself, as the perfected self-knowledge of the absolute. Such knowledge is what Hegel calls "absolute knowing", and marks the absolute reconciliation of the knowing subject and its object, substance, or in other words: of the domains of, as it were, historical knowledge and eternal truth. Hegel discovers in the Christian doctrine of Incarnation the logic of this very reconciliation of history and eternity: truth, or the absolute, coincides with the subject's knowledge of it, which not only includes but privileges the historical "dismemberment" involved in such knowing. Only in Christianity does God dismember himself, or become historical—sacrifice himself, die—in order to know and become himself. But this "death of God" is for Hegel the very meaning of modern subjectivity. For this reason, or if Hegel is right, the Hegelian subject constitutes the sole way in which the desire of philosophy—namely, for the other that truth is—can keep itself from becoming incoherent after the death of God. It is not merely that Hegel's doctrine of the subject remains valid despite the death of God; rather, the Hegelian subject, whose logic is incarnational and for this reason founds itself on the "death of God", stands as the sole coherent articulation of this event, even and especially in its Nietzschean guise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Social Sciences Institute / Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi is the property of Bingol University / Rectorate and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article offers a reading of the theories of contract and value developed in Hegel's Philosophy of Right. We show how the circular shape emblematic of Hegel's philosophy allows both to make sense of the ambiguous stance of Hegel towards liberalism and to clarify the relationship between the Hegelian conception of value and that developed by Marx and some of his continuators. The article then studies how Hegel's analyses of contract and value shed light on the dynamics of neoliberalism. These analyses are shown to anticipate both early descriptions of neoliberal capitalism (Bourdieu, Foucault) and contemporary works (Fraser, Honneth, Jaeggi). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reevaluates Adorno's theory of non-identity following from a critical examination of his reading of Hegel. The main discussion revolves around two theses central to both philosophers: 1. Conceptual thinking forms the centre of philosophical thought (identification). 2. Philosophical thought aspires to become everything (totality). The analysis of two distinct interpretations, one stricter and one more moderate, demonstrates that Adorno takes the hardline view. With the moderate view, however, not only do the limits of Hegelian philosophy become more pronounced, they also reveal novel systematic connections with pivotal concepts inherent to Critical Theory – connections that have notably lacked substantial consideration within relevant research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, the Hegelian concepts of bad infinity and true infinity are analyzed in the context of a review of the notion of infinity in the German philosophical tradition with which it engages. Punctually, we will address the formulations of the finitude-infinitude relation in the work of I. Kant, J. G. Fichte, and F. Schlegel before exposing Hegel’s interpretation of how transcendental philosophy and German romanticism approached this issue. Finally, we present the true way in which, according to Hegel, the infinite is to be understood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China and Maoism were intertwined with the fate of French Hegelianism due to Louis Althusser's ceaseless effort of bundling them with his anti-Hegelian project. Althusser reinvented Hegelianism as a matrix of One to challenge Western metaphysical tradition, which laid the ground for the continuous involvement between China/Maoism and the core concerns of contemporary French theory, namely differences, anti-determination, anti-reductivism, anti-essentialism, and anti-teleology. Althusser harnessed the complexity of revolutionary China and Maoist difference and unevenness to remake a Marxism of difference and a non-teleological imagination of history; paradoxically, he constrained their momentum at least in the period of For Marx and Reading Capital. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper presents Hegel's criticism of two central ideas of Pyrrhonism: the importance of stating only how things appear and Pyrrhonism as a way of life. After providing a sketch of the main features of Pyrrhonism, the paper lays out and critically evaluates Hegel's largely unexamined argument against Pyrrhonism in his early 1802 essay on skepticism. Hegel claims that the Pyrrhonist's appeal to appearance renders Pyrrhonism philosophically vacuous: insofar as Pyrrhonism merely describes the subjective contents of the Pyrrhonist's mind, it has no philosophical import. Sextus would not accept Hegel's criticism because the appeal to appearance could express the provisional rather than purely subjective character of Pyrrhonism. The paper proceeds by examining Hegel's argument in the Phenomenology that skepticism is contradictory on account of conjoining suspension of judgment with acquiescing in appearances as the guide to life. Sextus would reject Hegel's criticism by insisting on the distinction between judgment and appearance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This philosophical investigation interrogates the relationship between G.W.F. Hegel's concept of the master-slave dialectic in The Phenomenology of Spirit and the critique and reformulation of it by Frantz Fanon in Black Skin, White Masks. As a means of contextualization and expansion of Hegel's original textual account, I consider Susan Buck-Morss' seminal defense through grounding the dialectic in Hegel's possible historical knowledge of the Haitian Revolution. I maintain that despite a compelling picture, Buck-Morss' insights are unable to fully vindicate Hegel from the rebukes of Fanon, and as a result, Hegel's phenomenology necessitates a concrete analysis of the actual conscious experiences of the racialized and colonized subject in order to realize its aims. In pursuit of this critical methodology, I develop the upshot and positive movement of Fanon's critique through what I describe as a "phenomenology of flesh" in conversation with Maurice Merleau Ponty's The Visible and the Invisible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I return to the familiar territory of the Lord-Bondsman "dialectic" in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit in order to raise the question of the relation of Hegel's use of the theme of recognition there to Fichte's. Fichte had introduced the notion of recognition in his Foundations of Natural Right, to "deduce" the social existence of humans within relations of mutual recognition as a necessary condition of their very self-consciousness. However, there it also functioned as part of a solution to a problem within the work on which the theory of rights was meant to be based, the earlier Foundation of the Complete Wissenschaftslehre of 1794-5. In Hegel's classic account in chapter 4 of the Phenomenology we find recognition offered as a solution to a problem within an account of "self-consciousness" that has a number of clearly Fichtean features. But I suggest that to the degree that the lord-bondsman episode there expresses any "theory of recognition", it is not Hegel's own theory but rather his interpretation of Fichte's, a theory of which he is critical. Freed from this misleading assumption that the "lord-bondsman dialectic" represents something deep about Hegel's own philosophy, we might then be more able to get clearer about Hegel's actual views about recognition and the role it plays in his own philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article covers Valentin Asmus's first book Dialectical Materialism and Logic and response thereto among émigré and Soviet intellectuals. The interest in Asmus's first book is not only related to the demonstration of his ideas. It records and discusses the main problems that emerged in early Soviet theory of cognition, and reveals the existence of a latent Hegelian trend within it. Asmus presents the dialectical method by situating it within the development of philosophical ideas from Hegel to Marx. The article particularly focuses on the perception of Asmus's book "on the two shores," on the discussion of philosophy's subject and method. Lenin's name, featured in the book's title, turns out to be essentially absent from the study itself. Asmus argues that only thinking taken in its dialectical development can be the true subject of philosophy (30 years later, Evald Ilyenkov would assume this stance as well). The second part of the article considers critical responses to Asmus's first books in both émigré and Soviet press. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Valentin Asmus made a significant contribution to the formation of key interpretations, analyses and evaluations of Immanuel Kant's work in the Russian-Soviet tradition of studying the "history of foreign philosophy". This article shows precisely which principles and developmental models Asmus laid down in his interpretation of the transcendental dialectic section of Kant's philosophical system. The article attempts to show that in his reading of Kant, Asmus actively relies on Hegel's philosophical legacy, namely, on his theory of dialectics, the ontological status of contradiction and the highly significant role of "error" in the formation and advancement of knowledge. Asmus reads Kant through the lens of Hegel's philosophy and adheres to Hegelian philosophy as a benchmark of fidelity and heuristics, as a canon and organon, through which Kant's thought should be evaluated. Pursuing this path, he notes the significant progress of Kant's thought compared to the metaphysical philosophy of previous centuries, but points out the insufficiency of Kant's determination to fully think through contradictions ontologically and dialectically. Kant confines himself to pointing out the natural origin of the principle of "appearance" in the limits of reason, but is not ready to revise the foundations of classical logic, where any contradictions should be avoided. As a consequence, he settles on the epistemological interpretation of contradiction seeing it as an error of reason, albeit a natural one, leaving Asmus deeply disenchanted with his Hegelian expectations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper is about the Soviet philosopher Valentin Ferdinandovich Asmus (1894–1975) and his criticism of the fascist and Nazi appropriation of Hegel's philosophy. The status of the Hegelian legacy was very controversial in Marxism-Leninism throughout the Stalinist era. Unlike the majority of Soviet academics of this time, Asmus did not recognize any valid intellectual legacy at the base of German fascism. Asmus heavily criticized attempts to portray Hegel as a pro-fascist thinker. When many Soviet philosophers defended only the method, dialectics, Asmus defended Hegel's social and political views as humanistic and liberal. The first part of the article describes the "official" Soviet philosophy within the context of which Asmus had to act. The second part offers a comprehensive analysis of the criticism of Hegel's fascist interpretation in Asmus' Fascist Falsification of Classical German Philosophy (1942). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My article investigates Marx's dissertation from the perspective of the categories of Hegelian logic employed in the writings on the critique of political economy and, in particular, in the analysis of the value-form (Wertform) in Capital. The aim of my contribution is to show how Marx's early writing is not intended as a mere 'exercice encore scolaire' (Althusser), but as the first documented confrontation with Hegel's logic. Marx's early writing displays a moment of elaboration and acquisition of Hegel's method. I argue that the Epicurean atom represents a developing contradiction, and that the dissertation follows a precise Darstellung, which extends from the metaphysical and physical principle to the abstract subjectivity of Epicurean atomism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

John Dewey's philosophy, as Richard Rorty observed, is historicist to the core. From the 1910s onwards, Dewey emphasised the need for a 'reconstruction' in philosophy, which could extract what was most valuable from the Western philosophical tradition and employ it in the attempt to grapple with the most pressing contemporary problems. In his autobiographical reflections, Dewey acknowledged that his early enthusiasm for Hegel's philosophy had left a 'permanent deposit in his thinking', a claim that has recently received considerable scholarly attention. Yet Dewey's intellectual development is marked by an increasing disenchantment with fundamental aspects of Hegelian philosophy, which he considered to be infected with a 'reactionary spirit'. In his mature writings, this essay argues, Dewey turned to a pre-Hegelian (and pre-Kantian) philosopher, David Hume, in order to establish the most important philosophical principles that he initially associated with Hegel on non-metaphysical, non-theological foundations. Hume, on Dewey's reading, was both sceptical and revolutionary; but his call for the transfer of the experimental method to moral subjects had not been heeded. Dewey's philosophical project both explained why, historically, a 'reactionary spirit' had returned to infect post-Humean philosophy, and why the revolution in philosophy for which Hume called was now more urgent than ever. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: This piece explores the philosophical origins of sense-making as defined in Brenda Dervin's methodology. Design/methodology/approach: This conceptual paper locates the origins of sense-making's rich ontological, epistemological and etymological heritage to the Classical Greece and the Pre-Socratic period. The Greek origins of sense-making's philosophical undercurrents surface again in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit before the idea is picked up again in twentieth century philosophy and library science. Findings: This is a conceptual paper and no empirical findings are presented. Originality/value: This paper makes an original contribution to the study of information seeking and to sense making theory and methodology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The place and role of Hegel(ianism) in the history of philosophy is a central topic within the historical-philosophical research. It is also the subject matter of Jon Stewart's recent book Hegel's Century. But its focus is on the European, rather than the global story. This paper offers a brief supplement in the form of a North American story, specifically, a narrative of the relationship between Hegelianism and pragmatism. Having covered Hegelian "proto-pragmatism" and pragmatism's (both classical and contemporary) Post-Hegelianism, the author offers his own outline of what he sees as the continuity between the two philosophies. It lies in the common historicism, holism, and syntheticism as well as in a common anti-Cartesianism, anti-Kantianism and anti-Platonism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the concept of life in the historiographical work of Spyridon Zambelios. Through a comparative reading with Hegel, it argues that the organicist philosophical background of Zambelios' national narrative is double-edged: on the one hand, life is linked to infinity in ways that lead to a redefinition of Zambelios' central notion of national 'ὁλομέλεια'. On the other, Spirit's immersion in natural life creates complications, which, as in Hegel, place the 'transition' from one historical period to the next under the auspices of death, and, in the final analysis, yield a notion, not of infinite, but of a 'weak' life which undermines the national narrative from within. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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What was Hegel to pragmatism? An inspiration? A source? To explore their relationship requires us to answer two main questions: (1) Was Hegel a pragmatist (or “proto-pragmatist”), and if so why? And (2) Is pragmatism Hegelian, and if so why? Interpretations differ, and further research is required. The author provides a basic overview of the developments within pragmatist philosophy and reveals its complex relationship with Hegelianism. He concludes that the two philosophies share common ground in various directions and that, without Hegel, pragmatism as we know it would probably not exist.

This study argues that the early philosophy of Semyon Liudvigovich Frank (1877–1950) exhibits significant intellectual correlations with nineteenth century German Idealist philosophy. The idealists in question are Immanuel Hermann Fichte (1796–1879), G.W.F. Hegel (1770–1831) and F.W.J. Schelling (1775–1854). It will be suggested that the critical tension of Frank's early philosophy is precisely a tension between his Hegelian and Schellingian tendencies. The paper will first introduce Frank's theory of a "personal absolute", exploring its surprising parallels with the religious philosophy of I. H. Fichte. The analysis then addresses the self-dispersal of Hegel's absolute, before finally turning to Schelling's immediate intuition of subject-object identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The status of realism in Foucault, despite being insistently elaborated, remains elliptical - in part thanks to its association with a set of propositions we could call fictionalist. By reading the texts where Foucault addresses the interarticulation of fiction, universalism and facticity, the article proposes a non-realist reading of his work, which is marked by the refusal not of the real as an object, but of its ontological evidence. Initially, it presents the insufficiencies of the interpretations that demand an ontology, such as Paul Veyne's, as well as of those that replace it with the exceptionality of creation, such as Michel de Certeau's, and the most promising approach to the reading proposed by Giorgio Agambem.. Next, it examines in detail the question of literature as a methodological paradigm, especially in Foucault's references to the work of René Char. Finally, it shows in which sense the enunciation of archeogenealogy's discourse is closer to Fichte's (non)realism - in its unlikely encounter with Blanchot - than to Hegelian dialectics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper discusses three talks, which were given at the meetings of the Philosophical Society of Berlin (Philosophische Gesellschaft zu Berlin) in the mid-1870s. In these talks, the principles of some main movements in contemporary philosophy (realism, absolute idealism, critical idealism) were elaborated and contrasted to each other. The paper focuses on the concepts of real-idealism and ideal-realism. All the discussants, Friedrich Frederichs, C. L. Michelet and J. H. von Kirchmann, introduce these concepts. Frederichs, an adherent of critical idealism, argues only for the standpoint of real-idealism. Michelet, G. W. F. Hegel's personal student and an adherent of absolute idealism, takes real-idealism and ideal-realism to be the two sides of the one coin. Kirchmann, an advocate of realism, regards real-idealism as an objective, and he is skeptical about the possibility to achieve it [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this essay, I argue that F.H. Bradley's controversial theory of "degrees of truth and reality" is the logical development of Hegel's own theory of truth when it is placed within the metaphysical system of the Science of Logic. Despite Bradley's own claim that with regards to the theory of degrees of truth and reality he is indebted even more than anywhere else to Hegel, this connection has been little examined in the secondary literature. Through a careful examination of both Bradley's works and the structure of Hegel's logic, it will become clear that Bradley's development of the theory is the only logical conclusion that the consistent Hegelian can make. This essay has clear ramifications for our understanding of Bradley's philosophy and, through uncovering the logical connections that led Bradley to develop the theory, I reveal an important implication of Hegel's thought that has been entirely overlooked. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the development of the modern concept of substance from Leibniz to Hegel. I will focus primarily on the problem of the inner and outer nature of substance. I will show that if one considers Hegel's discussion of substance against the background of the controversy between Leibniz and Kant about the inner and outer nature of substance, it becomes clear that for Hegel both Leibniz and Kant grasped the whole concept of substance only partially and in its abstract moments. This is because they both concentrate on one aspect of substance and absolutize it. Hegel, on the other hand, not only overcomes the fundamental difference between the inner and outer of substance, but also develops the connection between the different moments of substance, causality and interaction from the rationalist concept of substance itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of logical form, as influentially specified by Frege and Bolzano, is accompanied by a paradox: to capture some universal property of discourse, we must specify that property, thereby rendering it particular and thus unsuitable for the universal purpose. Thus, instead of a single form, we have rather a sequence of them, corresponding to the logics of Aristotle, Frege, Brouwer, and others. In this paper, I argue that Hegel’s conception of logical form focuses on this historical aspect of the problem. Thus, he does not create a new logical form, e.g., that of dialectical logic, as Marx, as well as Priest and others, believe, but makes the attitude towards “fixed determinations” of logic part of these determinations themselves. This corresponds to Hegel’s differentiation between three layers of logic: formal, dialectical, and speculative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay examines two readings of Hegel, namely Robyn Marasco's The Highway of Despair: Critical Theory After Hegel and Stephen Houlgate's Hegel On Being to construct a Hegelian political theory. From radically different perspectives, both books ask what it means to be "critical." Some interpret being critical as implying avoiding ontological claims. Against this, I argue that Marxists should guard against reducing philosophy to history because this blinds us to the ontological conditions of historical narratives. Drawing on Houlgate's book, the essay argues that by investigating general ontological conditions, one could construct a new critical theory of forms of consciousness. For example, through reading Hegel's Logic and Phenomenology the essay suggests that recent experiences of despair might be connected to what Hegel calls the "unhappy consciousness," which stems from both misunderstanding ontology and specific historical conditions. Radical political theories can mobilize despair when they understand its ontological and social conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Tourism policy traditionally focuses on the nexus of tourist-resident interaction and has the duty to balance the often-conflicting interests. In policy practice and academia alike, the evaluation of the nexus seems to be dominated by utilitarian ideas and concepts focusing on the objective outcome. This perspective is closely linked to a Hegelian-induced philosophy of an objective mind. In contrast to that, the paper advocates for an imperative-based perspective, as proposed by Kant, to ensure a more humanistic approach. To facilitate that approach, it derives the ideas from the legal science technique of practical concordance to balance the freedoms and interests of all parties involved without proclaiming superior knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This text investigates the procedurality inaugurated by the action of subjects, which can be seen especially in the developments devoted to the play Antigone, in the Phenomenology of the Spirit. The conflict of irreducible rights entails the creation of a theory of action – in which the ends do not justify the means. Such an ethical requirement, always a posteriori, is imposed when the non-control of the relational world is verified, implying, finally, an open historicity. However, if simply being in the world is an action since it produces effects, we ask ourselves about the conditions (background in a situation governing expectations, but also the history of thought) and potentialities (disruptive emergence that organizes expectations, in becoming) of action. Thanks to externalizations that generate a problematic field, in the form of language, work and desire, we contract alterity relations and arrive at ourselves, through the other, fatally different from the starting point. It is up to philosophy to judge the implications of each particular action.

This text analyzes Laclau's theory of contradictions and its relation with the logic of propositions and Hegelian theory. According to Laclau, opposing propositions do not necessarily imply an antagonistic relation, but in an antagonistic relation, when it comes to not fully constituted identities, the structure of opposition cannot be reduced to the form of propositions. Moreover, Laclau understands opposition in a Hegelian sense, and shows that antagonisms do not allow themselves to be subsumed in the reflexive structure of thought. In the constitution of subjectivity by antagonism, an external other is assumed which is not conceptually subsumable, as that which escapes the laws of conformation of the subject itself and which is foreign to the chains of equivalence that subject positions constitute in each social field. In summary, the text stresses that for Laclau contradictions can be understood both in the sense of the logic of propositions and in the Hegelian sense, and that, in the case of an antagonistic relation, the structure of the opposition cannot be reduced to the form of propositions, but requires a deeper understanding of the reality that escapes the laws of conformation of the subject itself and the chains of equivalence of the subject positions in each social field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The text approaches the Hegelian dynamic between truth and certainty as it appear in the beginning of the Phenomenology as a question of truth and the sense of truth. Since this difference exceeds a merely epistemic stance and cannot be captured in terms of conceptual content, it leads to another mode of inquiry, namely, to that of a different relatedness to knowledge. Hegel's emphasis, as I will attempt to show, on thinking the question of self-relatedness of thought in terms of experience (which is always negative) in the first place, may provide a means to identify such a mode of self-relatedness that precedes the "self" of consciousness. Such an approach would put the question of the self both against its rigid modern critiques on the one hand, and its contemporary dissolution into naturalistic objectified oblivion on the other. In this way, the essay also challenges Heidegger's critical stance towards the Hegelian notion of "the experience of consciousness" by presenting it rather as a "consciousness of experience." For here this double genitive expresses a repetition or return that appears as a kind of afterimage of a still-life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]