Search

The Affordable Care Act Marketplaces may improve access to dental insurance, but little is known about the availability of such coverage. We used data from state and federal Marketplace sources to describe the availability of adult dental plans, including Stand-alone Dental Plans and those embedded in medical plans. We also examined the characteristics of counties with limited dental insurer participation and those that experienced a net loss of Stand-alone Dental Plan insurers between 2016 and 2023. We found that in 2023, at least one Stand-alone Dental Plan was offered in every state, and thirty-six states offered embedded dental plans. Most counties (63.6 percent) had access to more than five insurers offering adult dental plans, whereas approximately 4 percent had only one insurer offering adult dental plans. Counties in state-based Marketplaces, rural areas, and dentist shortage areas were more likely to be counties with limited dental insurer participation. The net loss of Stand-alone Dental Plans between 2016 and 2023 was more common in state-based Marketplaces and disadvantaged counties. Our findings can inform future policies to improve the dental insurance Marketplace and access to affordable dental care.

The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020 had a sudden and substantial impact on health care utilization for most, if not all, individuals. We study the impact the pandemic had on the population insured in the individual and small group markets under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010, using administrative claims data from January 2019 through December 2021. Our results demonstrated how health care utilization differed between the acute phase (i.e., 2020) and the post-acute phase (i.e., 2021) compared with the pre-pandemic phase. We found that in the ACA markets, most spending and utilization categories decreased drastically during the initial months of the pandemic and recovered by the end of 2021. While the role of telehealth among office visits decreased substantially by the end of 2021, it remained the main mode of delivery for mental health services., Competing Interests: Declaration of Conflicting InterestsThe author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Objective: To examine the impact of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) health insurance exchanges (Marketplace) on the rate of uninsured discharges in Texas., Data Source and Study Setting: Secondary discharge data from 2011 to 2019 from Texas., Study Design: We conducted a retrospective study estimating the effects of the ACA Marketplace using difference-in-difference regressions, with the main outcome being the uninsured discharge rate. We stratified our sample by patient's race, age, gender, urbanicity, major diagnostic categories (MDC), and emergent type of admissions., Data Collection/extraction Methods: We used Texas hospital discharge records for non-elderly adults collected by the state of Texas and included acute care hospitals who reported data from 2011 to 2019., Principal Findings: The expansion of insurance through ACA Marketplaces led to reductions in the uninsured discharge rate by 9.9% (95% CI, -17.5%, -2.3%) relative to the baseline mean. The effects of the ACA were felt strongest in counties with any share of Hispanic, in counties with a larger population of Black, and other racial groups, in counties with a significant share of female and older age individuals, in counties considered to be urban, in high-volume diagnoses, and emergent type of admissions., Conclusions: These findings indicate that the ACA facilitated a shift in hospital payor mix from uninsured to insured., (© 2024 The Author(s). Health Services Research published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Health Research and Educational Trust.)

As people lose Medicaid because of the end of the COVID-19 public health emergency, many states will route former Medicaid managed care enrollees into Affordable Care Act Marketplace coverage with the same carrier. In 2021, 52.1 percent of Medicaid managed care enrollees were enrolled by a carrier that also had a plan on the Marketplace in the same county.

In the Congressional Budget Office's projections of health insurance coverage, 92.3 percent of the US population, or 316 million people, have coverage in 2024, and 7.7 percent, or 26 million, are uninsured. The uninsured share of the population will rise over the course of the next decade, before settling at 8.9 percent in 2034, largely as a result of the end of COVID-19 pandemic-related Medicaid policies, the expiration of enhanced subsidies available through the Affordable Care Act health insurance Marketplaces, and a surge in immigration that began in 2022. The largest increase in the uninsured population will be among adults ages 19-44. Employment-based coverage will be the predominant source of health insurance, and as the population ages, Medicare enrollment will grow significantly. After greater-than-expected enrollment in 2023, Marketplace enrollment is projected to reach an all-time high of twenty-three million people in 2025.

The United States offers two markedly different subsidy structures for private health insurance. When covered through employer-based plans, employees and their dependents benefit from the exclusion from taxable income of the premiums. Individuals without access to employer coverage may obtain subsidies for Marketplace coverage. This paper seeks to understand how the public subsidies embedded in the privately financed portion of the U.S. healthcare system impact the payments families are required to make under both ESI and Marketplace coverage, and the implications for finance equity. Using the Household Component of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS-HC) and Marketplace premium data, we assess horizontal and vertical equity by calculating public subsidies for and expected family spending under each coverage source and using Lorenz curves and Gini and concentration coefficients. Our study pooled the 2018 and 2019 MEPS-HC to achieve a sample size of 10,593 observations. Our simulations showed a marked horizontal inequity for lower-income families with access to employer coverage who cannot obtain Marketplace subsidies. Relative to both the financing of employer coverage and earlier Marketplace tax credits, the more generous Marketplace premium subsidies, first made available in 2021 under the American Rescue Plan Act, substantially increased the vertical equity of Marketplace financing. While Marketplace subsidies have clearly improved equity within the United States, we conclude with a comparison to other OECD countries highlighting the persistence of inequities in the U.S. stemming from its noteworthy reliance on employer-based private health insurance., Competing Interests: Declaration of competing interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper., (Published by Elsevier Ltd.)

The Trump administration terminated cost-sharing reductions (CSRs) payments to health insurers in 2017, while still required insurers to provide CSRs to eligible enrollees in the Marketplace. Marketplace administration data reveals that, in response to this termination, insurers raised premiums to compensate for their loss. Consequently, premium increases led to more advanced premium tax credits for enrollees in the Marketplace. To investigate the impact of CSRs payment termination on low-income consumer insurance plan choices, I leverage variations in state price regulations and employed a difference-in-differences design. In a robustness analysis, I utilized differences in county income distributions to examine the effects of the termination on insurance choices. The results indicate that after the termination, more low-income enrollees opted for cheaper bronze plans, and fewer chose silver plans. These results suggest that alterations in subsidy channels may inadvertently encourage low-income individuals to purchase less expensive health insurance plans, highlighting an unintended consequence of the termination of cost-sharing subsidies., Competing Interests: The author declares that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest., (Copyright © 2024 Liu.)

Objective: To estimate the impact of the major components of the ACA (Medicaid expansion, subsidized Marketplace plans, and insurance market reforms) on health care access and self-assessed health during the first 2 years of the Trump administration (2017 and 2018)., Data Source: The 2011-2018 waves of the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS), with the sample restricted to nonelderly adults. The BRFSS is a commonly used data source in the ACA literature due to its large number of questions related to access and self-assessed health. In addition, it is large enough to precisely estimate the effects of state policy interventions, with over 300 000 observations per year., Design: We estimate difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) models to separately identify the effects of the private and Medicaid expansion portions of the ACA using an identification strategy initially developed in Courtemanche et al (2017). The differences come from: (a) time, (b) state Medicaid expansion status, and (c) local area pre-2014 uninsured rates. We examine ten outcome variables, including four measures of access and six measures of self-assessed health. We also examine differences by income and race/ethnicity., Principal Findings: Despite changes in ACA administration and the political debate surrounding the ACA during 2017 and 2018, including these fourth and fifth years of postreform data suggests continued gains in coverage. In addition, the improvements in reported excellent health that emerged with a lag after ACA implementation continued during 2017 and 2018., Conclusions: While gains in access and self-assessed health continued in the first 2 years of the Trump administration, the ongoing debate at both the federal and state level surrounding the future of the ACA suggests the need to continue monitoring how the law impacts these and many other important outcomes over time., (© 2020 The Authors. Health Services Research published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Health Research and Educational Trust.)

Aims: This study examined the extent to which Marketplace health insurance subscribers re-enroll a second year. Among re-enrollees, we sought to examine movement to more and less generous insurance plans (based on actuarial value), and the extent to which adverse selection, adverse retention, and aging in place are evident from re-enrollment choices made. Methods: Re-enrollment from 2015 to 2016 and 2016 to 2017 and movement to more and less generous insurance plans was examined using enrollment and insurance claims data from two US Federally-facilitated Marketplace insurance carriers operating in the state of New Mexico for 2015-2017. Insurance plans are assigned to metal levels based on estimated plan actuarial value: Bronze (60%), Silver (70%), and Gold (80%). Odds ratios (ORs) and 95% confidence intervals (OR CI) were estimated using logistic regressions for subscribers with base-year healthcare utilization. ORs were estimated for (1) re-enrollment in the year following the base year, and (2) movement to a higher or lower actuarial value plan. Results: Approximately 50% of subscribers re-enrolled with the same carrier for 2016 and 60% for 2017. Being enrolled 12 months was the strongest predictor for second year re-enrollment. Older individuals were more likely to re-enroll. Re-enrollment was lower for the insurance carrier with higher second year premium changes. Chronic condition utilization characteristics were positively associated with re-enrollment. Approximately 12% of Bronze subscribers moved to Silver or Gold, and had higher utilization after re-enrollment. Among Silver subscribers, 6% moved to Gold and 6% to Bronze. Approximately 37% of Gold subscribers moved to Silver or Bronze. Discussion: Re-enrollment was similar to published non-group insurance rates. Adverse selection and aging in place were observed. Evidence was weak for adverse retention. Some coverage change choices were rational, while others suggest subscribers may have difficulty making insurance choice decisions.

Importance: Several recent policy proposals have sought to expand the role of Medicaid in providing health insurance for low-income Americans, but there is little recent information on how physician participation in Medicaid compares with alternative forms of coverage for low-income Americans., Objective: To compare the number of office-based physicians included in Medicaid managed care and health insurance exchange plans that operate in the same geographic markets., Design, Setting, and Participants: This cross-sectional study used administrative data from physician network directories and survey data from office-based physicians for Kansas, Nebraska, New York, Tennessee, and Washington. The number of participants totaled 67 057 office-based physicians in the 5 sample states. Data were collected and analyzed from May 2018 to June 2019., Exposures: Physician participation in a Medicaid managed care or health insurance exchange plan network., Main Outcomes and Measures: The percentage of office-based physicians in a county who indicated during a phone survey that they participated in Medicaid; the percentage of office-based physicians in a county who participated in each Medicaid managed care and health insurance exchange plan network; and the percentage of office-based physicians in a county who participated in at least 1 Medicaid managed care plan or, separately, at least 1 health insurance exchange plan., Results: Of the 67 057 office-based physicians in our sample, 49 983 reported in a telephone survey that they accepted Medicaid. This survey-based measure undercounted the percentage of physicians participating in Medicaid by 5.2% (95% CI, 2.3%-8.1%; P < .001) relative to a measure based on physician network directories. Medicaid managed care physician networks covered a median (interquartile range) of 63.4% (48.0%-81.3%) of office-based physicians compared with health insurance exchange physician networks, which covered 51.0% (31.0%-70.5%). In adjusted analyses, Medicaid managed care plans covered 6.2% (95% CI, 3.2%-9.3%, P < .001) more office-based physicians than health insurance exchange plans operating in the same counties. In the states where the same insurers participated in both markets (New York, Tennessee, Washington), the Medicaid managed care physician networks were 6.5% (95% CI, 3.2%-9.8%, P < .001) larger than the health insurance exchange networks offered by the same insurer., Conclusions and Relevance: In this cross-sectional study of physician network data, Medicaid managed care physician networks included more office-based physicians than the physician networks of health insurance exchange plans operating in the same geographic markets. This suggests that Medicaid remains a viable option for expanding coverage in the United States.

One of the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) signature reforms was creating centralized Health Insurance Marketplaces to offer comprehensive coverage in the form of comprehensive insurance complying with the ACA's coverage standards. Yet, even after the ACA's implementation, millions of people were covered through noncompliant plans, primarily in the form of continued enrollment in "grandmothered" and "grandfathered" plans that predated ACA's full implementation and were allowed under federal and state regulations. Newly proposed and enacted federal legislation may grow the noncompliant segment in future years, and the employment losses of 2020 may grow reliance on individual market coverage further. These factors make it important to understand how the noncompliant segment affects the compliant segment, including the Marketplaces. We show, first, that the noncompliant segment of the individual insurance market substantially outperformed the compliant segment, charging lower premiums but with vastly lower costs, suggesting that insurers have a strong incentive to enter the noncompliant segment. We show, next, that state's decisions to allow grandmothered plans is associated with stronger financial performance of the noncompliant market, but weaker performance of the compliant segment, as noncompliant plans attract lower-cost enrollees. This finding indicates important linkages between the noncompliant and compliant segments and highlights the role state policy can play in the individual insurance market. Taken together, our results point to substantial cream-skimming, with noncompliant plans enrolling the healthiest enrollees, resulting in higher average claims cost in the compliant segment.

This article investigates changes in the affordability of individual health plans (Marketplace plans) that were compliant with the Affordable Care Act following the termination of cost-sharing reduction subsidy payments in 2017. We examined how states' and insurers' responses to these cuts affected enrollees differently depending on whether they lived in rural or urban geographic areas and were or were not eligible for Advance Premium Tax Credits. Using data for 2014-19 from the Health Insurance Exchange Compare database and other sources, we found that subsidy-eligible enrollees in rural markets gained access to Marketplace plans that were more affordable than those available to their urban counterparts, after the cuts affected premiums in 2018. Average minimum net monthly premiums for subsidized enrollees in majority-rural geographic rating areas decreased from $288 in 2017 to $162 in 2019, while those of their urban counterparts decreased from $275 to $180. In contrast, rural enrollees without subsidies faced the least affordable premiums for Marketplace plans.

Context: Political partisanship can influence whether individuals enroll in government programs. In particular, Republicans, ceteris paribus, are less likely to enroll in Affordable Care Act (ACA) individual marketplace insurance than Democrats. The logic of adverse selection suggests low uptake among Republicans would generally put upward pressure on marketplace premiums, especially in geographic areas with more Republican partisans., Methods: Using data from Healthcare.gov at the rating area level, this article examines the association between Republican vote share and growth in ACA marketplace premiums, being careful to account for potential confounding variables., Findings: Insurers have increased marketplace premiums at higher rates in areas with more Republican voters. In the preferred model specification, a 10-percentage-point difference in Republican vote share is associated with a 3.2-percentage-point increase in average premium growth for a standard plan. A variety of robustness and placebo checks suggest the relationship is driven by partisanship., Conclusions: Partisan polarization can threaten the successful implementation of policies that rely on high levels of citizen participation., (Copyright © 2019 by Duke University Press.)

Context: On January 20, 2017, President Donald Trump penned his first executive order, which aimed to "minimiz[e] the economic burden" of the Affordable Care Act, signaling his intent to make good on promises to repeal and replace the law. This executive order, along with concurrent changes in political messaging associated with the transition in power and reductions in HealthCare.gov advertising, lowered Health Insurance Marketplace enrollment at the end of the 2017 open enrollment period., Methods: The authors used difference-in-differences and event-study models with weekly county-level Marketplace application data from 1,476 counties in 37 states to estimate the incremental enrollment loss in the postinauguration period., Findings: Estimates indicate a population-weighted decline of over 700 applications per county-week during the final 2 weeks of the 2017 open enrollment period relative to 2016, corresponding to a nearly 30% decline in applications submitted. A more flexible event-study approach that better accounts for time shifting of enrollment across open enrollment periods found a similar decline of approximately 660 applications per county-week associated with the postinauguration period (-24%)., Conclusions: The lack of political support for the law by the incoming administration seemingly had an immediate and significant downward effect on Marketplace enrollment nationwide., (Copyright © 2019 by Duke University Press.)

When passed in 2010, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) became the greatest piece of health care reform in the United States since the creation of Medicare and Medicaid. In the 9 years since its passage, the law has ushered in a drastic decrease in the number of uninsured Americans and has encouraged delivery system innovation. However, the ACA has not been uniformly embraced, and states differ in their implementation of the law and in their individual health insurance marketplace's successfulness. Furthermore, under the Trump administration the law's future and the stability of the individual market have been uncertain. Throughout, however, California has been a leader. Today, the state's marketplace, known as Covered California, offers comprehensive, standardized health plans to over 1.3 million consumers. California's success with the ACA is largely attributable to its historical receptiveness to health reform; its early adoption of the law; its decision to have Covered California operate as an active purchaser, help shape the plans sold through the marketplace, and design a consumer-friendly enrollment experience; its engagement with stakeholders and community partners to encourage enrollment; and Covered California's commitment to continually innovate, improve, and anticipate the needs of the individual market as the law moves forward., (Copyright © 2019 by Petra W. Rasmussen and Gerald F. Kominski.)

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) reformed and expanded healthcare coverage with an exchange-based health insurance program. While millions of Americans have benefited from enrollment in ACA marketplace insurance plans, many individuals are likely to be affected by potential future policy changes. Since few studies on the features of marketplace enrollees exist, we adopted a retrospective, cross-sectional study design using 2016 National Health Interview data to identify sociodemographic and health characteristics of enrollees, comparing them to those without insurance. Chi-square tests and logistic regression examined factors associated with enrollees. Adults with multiple chronic diseases (AOR = 1.90, 95% CI = 1.44, 2.50), a history of smoking (AOR = 2.44, 95% CI = 1.82, 3.26), females, married, age 50-64 years, higher educational attainment, and retirees (AOR = 1.86, 95% CI = 1.06, 3.27) were more likely to be enrollees. Since enrollees are largely higher risk individuals with greater healthcare needs, policies that modify the ACA should take these factors into account to reduce potential adverse impacts on enrollees.

Objectives: Before implementation of the Affordable Care Act, many uninsured women in Illinois received care through safety-net programs. The new law allowed them to acquire health insurance through Medicaid or the Illinois Health Exchange. We examined (1) the health care experiences of such women who previously used a safety-net program and acquired this new coverage and (2) persisting gaps in coverage for breast and cervical cancer services and other health care services., Methods: We interviewed a stratified random sample of 400 women aged 34-64 in Illinois each year during 2015-2017 (total N = 1200). We used multivariable logistic regression models to determine the association between health insurance status (Illinois Health Exchange vs Medicaid) and past 12-month gaps in coverage (ie, delaying care, not having a recent mammogram, having a medical cost, and having a medical cost not covered) for the 360 women who were former participants of the Illinois Breast and Cervical Cancer Program. We calculated odds ratios (ORs) and 95% confidence intervals (CIs), adjusting for race/ethnicity, age, income, and education., Results: We found no significant differences by health insurance status in the prevalence of delaying preventive, chronic, or sick care; timeliness of the most recent mammogram; and having a major medical cost. However, of women who reported a major medical cost, women with health insurance through the Illinois Health Exchange had a higher prevalence of not having a cost covered than women with Medicaid (adjusted OR = 4.86; 95% CI, 1.48-16.03)., Conclusions: The results of this study suggest that many women who gained health insurance lacked adequate coverage and services. Safety-net programs will likely continue to play an essential role in supporting women as they navigate a complex system.

Health Insurance Marketplaces have received considerable attention for their narrow network health plans. Yet, little is known about consumer tastes for network breadth and how they affect plan selection. I estimate demand for health plans in California's Marketplace, Covered California. Using 2017 individual enrollment data and provider network directories, I develop a geospatial measure of network breadth that reflects the physical locations of households and network providers. I find that households are sensitive to network breath in their plan choices. Mean willingness to pay for a broad network plan relative to a narrow network plan, defined as a two standard deviation, 17.44 percentage point increase in network breadth, is $45.83 in post-subsidy monthly premiums. Variation in WTP indicates a selection mechanism exists whereby older households sort into broader network plans. I also find that households are highly premium sensitive, which may be a result of plan standardization in Covered California., (Copyright © 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

The individual and small-group health insurance markets have experienced considerable changes since the passage of the Affordable Care Act in 2010, affecting access, choice, and affordability for enrollees in these markets. We examined how health plan access, choice, and affordability varied between the individual on-Marketplace, individual off-Marketplace, and small-group markets in 2018. We found relatively similar outcomes across the three markets with respect to deductibles and out-of-pocket spending maximums. However, the small-group market maintained greater plan choice and lower premiums-outcomes that appear to be associated with higher insurer participation. States may consider a variety of policy proposals such as reinsurance or the introduction of a public option to increase insurer participation and improve the plan choices offered in the individual market.

The health insurance Marketplaces established by the Affordable Care Act include features designed to simplify the process of choosing a health plan in the individual, or nongroup, insurance market. While most individual health insurance enrollees purchase plans through the federal and state-based Marketplaces, millions also purchase plans directly from an insurance carrier (off Marketplace). This study was a descriptive comparison of the decision-making processes and shopping experiences of consumers in two states who purchased a health insurance plan from the same large insurer in 2017, either through the federal Marketplaces or off Marketplace. In a survey, those who selected plans through the Marketplaces reported less difficulty finding the best or most affordable plan than did those enrolling off Marketplace. Respondents in families with chronic health conditions who enrolled through the Marketplaces reported better overall experiences than those who enrolled off Marketplace. Respondents with low health insurance literacy reported poor experiences in enrolling both through the Marketplaces and off Marketplace. Access to consumer assistance in the individual health insurance market should target off-Marketplace populations as well as all populations with low health insurance literacy.

Background: The main objective of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was to make health insurance affordable to all Americans while addressing the lack of coverage for 48 million people. In the face of rapidly increasing enrollment and rising demand for inexpensive plans, insurance providers are limiting in-network physicians. Provider networks offering plans with limited in-network physicians have become known as "narrow networks.", Objective: To assesses the adequacy of ACA marketplace plans for outpatient neurosurgery in Louisiana., Methods: The Marketplace Public Use Files were searched for all "silver" plans. A total of 7 silver plans were identified in Louisiana. Using the plans' online directories, a search of in-network neurosurgeons in Louisiana parishes with >100 000 population was performed. The primary outcome was lack of in-network neurosurgeon(s) in silver plans within 50 miles of selected zip code for each parish with >100 000 population. Plans without in-network neurosurgeon(s) are labeled as neurosurgeon-deficient plans., Results: Several plans in Louisiana are neurosurgeon deficient, ie no in-network neurosurgeon within 50 miles of the designated parish zip code. Company A's plan 3 is deficient in all 5 parishes, while company C and company D silver plans are deficient in 4 out of 14 (29%). Combined results from all counties and plans demonstrate that 43% (3 out of 7) of all silver plans in Louisiana are neurosurgeon deficient in at least 4 parishes with population >100 000., Conclusion: In Louisiana, narrow networks have limited access to neurosurgical care for those patients with ACA silver plans.

The tax penalty for noncompliance with the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate is to be eliminated starting in 2019. We investigated the potential impact of this change on enrollees' decisions to purchase insurance and on individual-market premiums. In a survey of enrollees in the individual market in California in 2017, 19 percent reported that they would not have purchased insurance had there been no penalty. We estimated that premiums would increase by 4-7 percent if these enrollees were not in the risk pool. The percentages of enrollees who would forgo insurance were higher among those with lower income and education, Hispanics, and those who had been uninsured in the prior year, relative to the comparison groups. Compared to older enrollees and those with two or more chronic conditions, respectively, younger enrollees and those with no chronic conditions were also more likely to say that they would not have purchased insurance. Eliminating the mandate penalty alone is unlikely to destabilize the California individual market but could erode coverage gains, especially among groups whose members have historically been less likely to be insured.

I estimate demand for health insurance using consumer-level data from the California and Washington ACA exchanges. I use the demand estimates to simulate the impact of policies targeting adverse selection, including subsidies and the individual mandate. I find (1) own-premium elasticities of -7.2 to -10.6 and insurance coverage elasticities of -1.1 to -1.2; (2) limited response to the mandate penalty amount, but significant response to the penalty's existence, suggesting consumers have a "taste for compliance"; (3) mandate repeal slightly increases consumer surplus because the ACA's price-linked subsidies shield most consumers from premium increases resulting from repeal and some consumers are not compelled to purchase insurance against their will; and (4) mandate repeal decreases consumer surplus if ACA subsidies are replaced with vouchers that expose consumers to premium increases. The economic rationale for the mandate depends on the extent of adverse selection and the presence of other policies targeting selection., (Copyright © 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Background: Midyear disenrollment from Marketplace coverage may have detrimental effects on continuity of care and risk pool stability of individual health insurance markets., Objective: The main objective of this study was to assess associations between insurance plan characteristics, individual and area-level demographics, and disenrollment from Marketplace coverage., Data: All payer claims data from individual market enrollees, 2014-2016., Study Design: We estimated Cox proportional hazards models to assess the relationship between plan actuarial value and Marketplace enrollment. The primary outcome was disenrollment from Marketplace coverage before the end of the year. We also calculated the proportion of enrollees who transitioned to other coverage after leaving the Marketplace, and identified demographic and area-level factors associated with early disenrollment. Finally, we compared monthly utilization rates between those who disenrolled early and those who maintained coverage., Results: Nearly 1 in 4 Marketplace beneficiaries disenrolled midyear. The hazard rate of disenrollment was 30% lower for individuals in plans receiving cost-sharing reductions and 21% lower for those enrolled in gold plans, compared with silver plans without cost-sharing subsidies. Young adults had a 70% increased hazard of disenrollment compared with older adults. Those who disenrolled midyear had greater hospital and emergency department utilization before disenrollment compared with those who maintained continuous coverage., Conclusions: Plan generosity is significantly associated with lower disenrollment rates from Marketplace coverage. Reducing churning in Affordable Care Act Marketplaces may improve continuity of care and insurers' ability to accurately forecast the health care costs of their enrollees.

Since 2014, average premiums for health plans available in the Affordable Care Act marketplaces have increased. We examine how premium price changes affected the amount consumers pay after subsidies for the lowest-cost bronze and silver plans available by age in the federally facilitated exchanges. Between 2015 and 2016, benchmark plan premiums increased in 83.3% of counties. Overall, rising benchmark premiums were associated with lower average after-subsidy premiums for the lowest-cost bronze and silver plans for older subsidy-eligible adults, but with higher after-subsidy premiums for younger adults purchasing the same plans, regardless of income. With recent discussions to replace or overhaul the Affordable Care Act, it is critical that we learn from the successes and failures of the current policy. Our findings suggest that the subsidy design, which makes rising premiums costlier for younger adults looking to purchase an entry-level plan, may be contributing to adverse selection and instability in the marketplace.

Private insurance market risk pools are likely to be directly affected by expansions of public insurance, in turn affecting premiums. We investigate the effects of Medicaid expansion on private health insurance markets using data on the plans offered through the health insurance "Marketplaces" (also known as Exchanges) established by the Affordable Care Act. We employ geographic matching to compare premiums for private plans in neighboring counties that straddle expansion and nonexpansion states and find that premiums of Marketplace plans are 11% lower in Medicaid expansion states, controlling for demographic and health characteristics as well as measures of health care access. These results are consistent with evidence on the composition of the private insurance risk pool in expansion versus nonexpansion states and associated differences in expected health spending., (© 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.)

Issue: In 2017, health insurance marketplaces in some states were thriving, while those in other states were struggling. What explains these differences?, Goal: Identify factors that explain differences in issuers’ participation levels in state insurance marketplaces., Methods: Analysis of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s HIX Compare dataset, and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners’ 2010 Supplemental Health Care Exhibit Report., Findings and Conclusions: State policies and insurance regulations were key factors affecting the number of issuers participating in the marketplaces in 2017. Marketplaces run by states had more issuers than states that rely on the federally facilitated marketplace. States with fewer than four issuers tended to have policies in place that could have been destabilizing--for example, permitting the sale of plans not compliant with the Affordable Care Act’s requirements regarding essential health benefits or guaranteed issue. Consumers in states that did not take steps to enforce these insurance market reforms still benefited from their protections, however; they were just enforced at the federal level. States with more issuers were also more likely to have expanded Medicaid. States with fewer issuers tended to be rural and have smaller populations, more concentrated hospital markets, and lower physician-to-population ratios.

Issue: The Affordable Care Act (ACA) made it easier for older adults and those with medical conditions to enroll in individual-market coverage by eliminating risk rating and limiting age rating. While the ACA also encourages young and healthy people to enroll through subsidies and the individual mandate, it’s not clear whether these incentives have been sufficient to prevent the risk pool from becoming disproportionately old and sick., Goal: To assess whether patterns in individual-market participation changed following ACA implementation., Methods: Comparison of Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) data for the periods 2003–09 and 2014–15., Findings and Conclusion: The analysis found few differences in individual-insurance market participation before and after the ACA. Adverse selection occurred during both: people switching into individual insurance coverage after being uninsured were higher utilizers prior to the switch than were those who remained uninsured. Those who disenrolled from individual plans tended to be lower utilizers of care before switching compared with those who kept their coverage. The main difference was that more people--especially young adults--switched from Medicaid to individual insurance, and vice versa, after the ACA. Adverse enrollment or disenrollment in the individual market did not increase following ACA implementation. The combination of easing rating rules and encouraging participation appears to have maintained market stability.

Objective: The Affordable Care Act (ACA) introduced reforms to mitigate adverse selection into and within the individual insurance market. We examined the traits and predicted medical spending of enrollees in California post-ACA., Data Sources: Survey of 2,103 enrollees in individual market plans, on- and off-exchange, in 2014., Study Design: We compared actual versus potential participants using data from the 2014 California Health Interview Survey on respondents who were individually insured or uninsured. We predicted annual medical spending for each group using age, sex, self-rated health, body mass index, smoking status, and income., Principal Findings: Average predicted spending was similar for actual ($3,377, 95 percent CI [$3,280-$3,474]) and potential participants ($3,257 [$3,060-$3,454]); however, some vulnerable subgroups were underrepresented. On- versus off-exchange enrollees differed in sociodemographic and health traits with modest differences in spending ($3,448 [$3,330-$3,565] vs. $3,175 [$3,012-$3,338])., Conclusions: We did not find evidence of selection into the overall insurance pool in 2014; however, differences by exchange status reflect the importance of including off-exchange enrollees in analyses and the pool for risk adjustment. California's post-ACA individual market has been a relative success, highlighting the importance of state policies and outreach efforts to encourage participation in the market., (© Health Research and Educational Trust.)

While the Affordable Care Act has expanded health insurance to millions of Americans through the expansion of eligibility for Medicaid and the health insurance Marketplaces, concerns about Marketplace stability persist-given increasing premiums and multiple insurers exiting selected markets. Yet there has been little investigation of what factors underlie this pattern. We assessed the county-level prevalence of limited insurer participation (defined as having two or fewer distinct participating insurers) in Marketplaces in the period 2014-18. Overall, in 2015 and 2016 rates of insurer participation were largely stable, and approximately 80 percent of counties (containing 93 percent of US residents) had at least three Marketplace insurers. However, these proportions declined sharply starting in 2017, falling to 36 percent of counties and 60 percent of the population in 2018. We also examined county-level factors associated with limited insurer competition and found that it occurred disproportionately in rural counties, those with higher mortality rates, and those where insurers had lower medical loss ratios (that is, potentially higher profit margins), as well as in states where Republicans controlled the executive and legislative branches of government. Decreased competition was less common in states with higher proportions of residents who were Hispanic or ages 45-64 and states that chose to expand Medicaid.

California has heavily concentrated hospital, physician, and health insurance markets, but their current structure and functioning is not well understood. We assessed consolidation trends and performed an analysis of "hot spots"-markets that potentially warrant concern and scrutiny by regulators in terms of both horizontal concentration (such as hospital-hospital mergers) and vertical integration (hospitals' acquisition of physician practices). In 2016, seven counties were high on all six measures used in our hot-spot analysis (four horizontal concentration and two vertical integration measures), and five counties were high on five. The percentage of physicians in practices owned by a hospital increased from about 25 percent in 2010 to more than 40 percent in 2016. The estimated impact of the increase in vertical integration from 2013 to 2016 in highly concentrated hospital markets was found to be associated with a 12 percent increase in Marketplace premiums. For physician outpatient services, the increase in vertical integration was also associated with a 9 percent increase in specialist prices and a 5 percent increase in primary care prices. Legislative proposals, actions by the state's attorney general, and other regulatory changes are suggested.

Purpose: Since 2014, when the Health Insurance Marketplaces (HIMs) authorized by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) were implemented, considerable premium changes have been observed in the marketplaces across the 50 states and the District of Columbia. This policy brief assesses the changes in average HIM plan premiums from 2014 to 2018, before accounting for subsidies, with an emphasis on the widening variation across rural and urban places, providing information during Congressional debates on the future of the program., Key Findings: (1) Insurance issuers reduced HIM participation across both rural and urban places (with 1.7 and 2.2 issuers, respectively), both in states that expanded Medicaid under the PPACA and in non-expansion states. (2) The average adjusted premium (before premium subsidy) continues to rise across all of the above categories, and the gap has widened between the 32 Medicaid expansion and 19 non-expansion states. Average premiums in rural counties are higher than average premiums in urban counties in both expansion and non-expansion states (by $43 per month and $27 per month, respectively). (3) Prior trends of lower premium changes at greater population densities are no longer observed in the 2018 data. (4) In 2018, 1,581 counties (52 perent) have one participating insurance issuer. Nationwide, 42 percent of all urban counties and 55 percent of all rural counties only have one issuer.

Issue: Recent changes to the Affordable Care Act, including elimination of the individual mandate penalty, the halting of federal payments for cost-sharing reductions, and expanded access to short-term plans, may reduce enrollment in the individual market., Goal: Analyze options to increase enrollment, accounting for recent policy changes., Methods: RAND’s COMPARE microsimulation model is used to analyze six policies that would expand access to tax credits, increase their generosity, and fund a reinsurance program., Key Findings and Conclusions: The options would increase individual market enrollment by 400,000 to 3.2 million in 2020. Net increases in total enrollment (300,000 to 2.4 million) are smaller because of offsetting decreases in employer-sponsored insurance. The largest gains are possible through two options: large-scale investment in reinsurance, and extension of tax credits to higher-income people combined with increases in the generosity of existing tax credits. If funded through a fee on health plans, reinsurance could be implemented without increasing the federal deficit. Additional taxpayer costs would increase by $1 billion to $23 billion, depending on the policy. While enhanced tax credits for young adults would lead to small coverage gains, they would entail the lowest costs to taxpayers among the six options.

Many insurers incurred financial losses in individual markets for health insurance during 2014, the first year of Affordable Care Act mandated changes. This analysis looks at key financial ratios of insurers to compare profitability in 2014 and 2013, identify factors driving financial performance, and contrast the financial performance of health insurers operating in state-run exchanges versus the federal exchange. Overall, the median loss of sampled insurers was -3.9%, no greater than their loss in 2013. Reduced administrative costs offset increases in medical losses. Insurers performed better in states with state-run exchanges than insurers in states using the federal exchange in 2014. Medical loss ratios are the underlying driver more than administrative costs in the difference in performance between states with federal versus state-run exchanges. Policy makers looking to improve the financial performance of the individual market should focus on features that differentiate the markets associated with state-run versus federal exchanges.

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) made private nongroup health insurance more accessible to nonelderly adults with chronic conditions, with enrollment growth occurring through the federal and state-based Marketplaces. During the July through December reference period in 2014-15, 45 percent of Marketplace enrollees ages 18-64 were treated for chronic conditions, compared with 35 percent of non-Marketplace nongroup enrollees and 38 percent of adults with employer-sponsored insurance. Marketplace enrollees also had higher service use than other privately insured adults did, which likely contributed to rising premiums in the nongroup market. As repeal of the ACA individual mandate takes effect in 2019, protecting coverage gains for adults with chronic conditions while stabilizing nongroup premiums may depend on state-level efforts to spread the risk of Marketplace enrollees' health care costs across a balanced insurance pool.

Descriptive studies have suggested that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA's) health insurance Marketplaces improved access to care. However, no evidence from quasi-experimental studies is available to support these findings. We used longitudinal survey data to compare previously uninsured adults with incomes that made them eligible for subsidized Marketplace coverage (138-400 percent of the federal poverty level) to those who had employer-sponsored insurance before the ACA with incomes in the same range. Among the previously uninsured group, the ACA led to a significant decline in the uninsurance rate, decreased barriers to medical care, increased the use of outpatient services and prescription drugs, and increased diagnoses of hypertension, compared to a control group with stable employer-sponsored insurance. Changes were largest among previously uninsured people with incomes of 138-250 percent of poverty, who were eligible for the ACA's cost-sharing reductions. Our quasi-experimental approach provides rigorous new evidence that the ACA's Marketplaces led to improvements in several important health care outcomes, particularly among low-income adults.

Issue: The Affordable Care Act (ACA) regulates the price of health plans sold in the nongroup market. Premiums cannot be based on gender or health status, and price increases related to age are limited. These changes have lowered premiums for older, sicker people but raised them for younger, healthier ones--especially young men ineligible for premium subsidies. This has raised concerns that the latter have failed to gain coverage., Goal: Compare the impact of the ACA's rating rules on the number of insured young men, older adults, and others., Methods: We compared overall and nongroup coverage trends pre- and post-ACA among demographic groups, comparing residents of states where the rule changes had little effect on premiums to states where the rules had greater effect., Findings: People whose premiums fell because of the ACA's rating rules were slightly more likely to get nongroup coverage than those whose premiums rose. All groups, including higher-income young men, gained coverage because of the combined effects of ACA changes., Conclusion: Coverage rose after the ACA took effect among all demographic groups. Taken together, the ACA's individual mandate, marketing efforts, and effects on how people perceive the value of having insurance outweighed the impacts of changes in rating and benefit rules.

Objective: The 2008 federal parity law and the 2010 Affordable Care Act (ACA) sought to expand access to behavioral health services. There was concern that health plans might discourage enrollment by individuals with behavioral health conditions who tend to be higher cost. This study compared behavioral health benefits available in the group insurance market (nonmarketplace) to those sold through the ACA marketplaces to check for evidence of less generous behavioral health coverage in marketplace plans., Methods: Data were from a 2014 nationally representative survey of commercial health plans regarding behavioral health services (80% response rate). The sample included the most common silver marketplace product and, as a comparison, the most common nonmarketplace product of the same type (for example, health maintenance organization or preferred provider organization) from each health plan (N=106 marketplace and nonmarketplace pairs, or 212 products)., Results: Marketplace and nonmarketplace products were similar in terms of coverage, prior authorization, and continuing review requirements. Marketplace products were more likely to employ narrow and tiered behavioral health provider networks. Narrow and tiered networks were more common in state than in federal marketplaces., Conclusions: Provider network design is a tool that health plans may use to control cost and possibly discourage enrollment by high-cost users, including those with behavioral health conditions. The ACA was successful in ensuring robust behavioral health coverage in marketplace plans. As the marketplaces evolve or are replaced, these data provide an important baseline to which future systems can be compared.

In response to regulatory changes at the federal level, states that run their own marketplaces have taken steps to stabilize their individual markets. In this comparison of state-based and federally-facilitated marketplaces from 2016-2018, we find that SBMs had slower premium increases (43% vs. 75%), and fewer carrier exits, than FFMs. The total population participating in FFMs declined by 10%, while the enrolled population in SBMs remained largely stable, increasing by 2%. We find that the performance of the ACA marketplaces varies by state and appears to cluster around marketplace types.

Objectives: To examine the association between annual premiums for health plans available in Federally Facilitated Marketplaces (FFMs) and the extent of competition and integration among physicians and hospitals, as well as the number of insurers., Study Design: We used observational data from the Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight on the annual premiums and other characteristics of plans, matched to measures of physician, hospital, and insurer market competitiveness and other characteristics of 411 rating areas in the 37 FFMs., Methods: We estimated multivariate models of the relationship between annual premiums and Herfindahl-Hirschman indices of hospitals and physician practices, controlling for the number of insurers, the extent of physician-hospital integration, and other plan and rating area characteristics., Results: Premiums for Marketplace plans were higher in rating areas in which physician, hospital, and insurance markets were less competitive. An increase from the 10th to the 90th percentile of physician concentration and hospital concentration was associated with increases of $393 and $189, respectively, in annual premiums for the Silver plan with the second lowest cost. A similar increase in the number of insurers was associated with a $421 decrease in premiums. Physician-hospital integration was not significantly associated with premiums., Conclusions: Premiums for FFM plans were higher in markets with greater concentrations of hospitals and physicians but fewer insurers. Higher premiums make health insurance less affordable for people purchasing unsubsidized coverage and raise the cost of Marketplace premium tax credits to the government.

Background: Millions of adults have gained insurance through the Affordable Care Act (ACA). However, disparities in access to care persist., Objective: This study examined differences in access to primary and specialty care among patients insured by private individual market insurance plans (both on-exchange and off-exchange) and Medicaid compared with those with employer-sponsored insurance., Research Design: Using data from the 2014 and 2015 California Health Interview Survey, logistic regression analyses were used to calculate the odds of being unable to access primary care providers, access specialty care providers and receive a needed doctor's appointment in a timely manner, with insurance type serving as the independent variable. Interaction terms examined if the expiration of the ACA's optional Medicaid primary care fee increase in 2014 modified any of these associations., Results: Findings showed poorer access to providers among those insured through Medicaid and the individual market (whether purchased through the state's health insurance exchange or off-exchange) relative to employer-based insurance. Poor access to primary care providers was seen among private coverage purchased via exchanges, relative to private coverage purchased on the individual market. In addition, findings showed that reduction of Medicaid fees coincided with reduced ability to see primary care providers. However, a similar trend was seen among those with employer-based coverage, which suggests that this change may not be attributable to reductions in Medicaid fees., Conclusion: Despite ACA-related gains in insurance coverage, those with on-exchange and off-exchange individual private insurance plans and Medicaid encounter more barriers to care than those with employer-based insurance.

Objectives: To evaluate rates of member compliance with Iowa's Medicaid expansion premium disincentive program., Methods: We used 2014 to 2015 Iowa Medicaid data to construct rolling 12-month cohorts of Wellness Plan and Marketplace Choice members (Iowa's 2 Medicaid expansion waiver programs for individuals ≤ 100% and 101%-138% of the federal poverty level, respectively), calculated completion rates for required activities (i.e., wellness examinations and health risk assessments), and identified factors associated with program compliance., Results: Overall, 18.5% of Wellness Plan and 12.5% of Marketplace Choice members completed both activities (P < .001). From 2014 to 2015, completion rates for both activities decreased for Wellness Plan members but increased for Marketplace Choice members. Members who were younger, male, or non-White were less likely to complete required activities., Conclusions: Approximately 81% of Wellness Plan members and 87% of Marketplace Choice members failed to comply with program requirements and should have been subject to paying premiums the following year or face disenrollment. Disparities in completion rates may exacerbate disparities in insurance coverage and health outcomes. Public Health Implications. As states consider establishing Medicaid premium disincentive programs, they should anticipate challenges to successful implementation.

Millions of uninsured Americans do not sign up for available coverage despite job loss or other factors that would make them eligible for special enrollment periods (SEPs). Such periods let people enroll in nongroup insurance outside the usual open enrollment period for Marketplace coverage. Concerned that risk adjustment results in underpayment for the health risks associated with SEP enrollees, carriers rarely market their products to consumers eligible for SEPs, and many do not pay agents and brokers to enroll such consumers. To address the apparent underpayments, federal officials added enrollment duration factors that, starting in 2017, increased risk scores for SEP enrollees and other part-year members. Using individual-market claims data for 2015 from two large carriers, we found that risk adjustment did, in fact, undercompensate plans for part-year members. However, underpayment was much larger for SEP enrollees than for part-year members who joined during open enrollment periods. Short-term, urgent health problems appeared to drive enrollment more for SEP enrollees than for part-year members who signed up during open enrollment. We also found that the federal government's enrollment duration factors will remedy underpayment for part-year members whose coverage begins during open enrollment but leave carriers significantly underpaid for SEP enrollees. For carriers to recruit rather than avoid SEP enrollees, further increases to risk adjustment for such enrollees are likely needed.

Objective: To assess the impact of Enroll America's field outreach activities on the number of individuals enrolled in Marketplace coverage during the first open enrollment period., Data Sources/study Setting: Marketplace enrollment for the initial open enrollment period linked with data on Enroll America's field activities and baseline local-area demographic, economic, and health services characteristics., Study Design: We used a quasi-experimental design, comparing Marketplace enrollment during the first open enrollment period in local areas drawn from Enroll America field states to a comparison group of local areas drawn from states that were not served by Enroll America's field effort, but that otherwise match up well with Enroll America states., Principal Findings: We find evidence of a large, positive effect of Enroll America's field outreach on Marketplace enrollment in non-Medicaid expansion states. Across model specifications, the Enroll America effects on Marketplace enrollment ranged between 10 and 15 percent, with most estimates statistically significant at the 5 percent level., Conclusions: Enroll America played an important role in the success of individual states' efforts to boost Marketplace enrollment. Enroll American's evidence-driven, grassroots approach could serve as a model for others interested in conducting similar outreach campaigns for Affordable Care Act-related coverage., (© Health Research and Educational Trust.)

Previous studies indicate that Internet searching was a major source of information for the public during the launch of the Affordable Care Act, but little is known about geographic variation in searching. Our objective was to examine factors associated with health insurance-related Google searches in 199 U.S. metro areas during the first open enrollment period (October 2013 through March 2014), by merging data from Google Trends with metro-area-level and state-level characteristics. Our results indicate substantial geographic variation in the volumes of searching across the United States, and these patterns were related to local uninsurance rates. Specifically, areas with higher uninsurance rates were more likely to search in higher volumes for "Obamacare" and "health insurance," after adjusting for sociodemographic, political, and insurance market characteristics. The enormous political, advocacy, and media attention to the Affordable Care Act's launch may have contributed to heightened Internet search activity, particularly in areas characterized by higher uninsurance.

Affordable Care Act (ACA) provisions implemented in 2014 provide a valuable case study regarding the merits of using public versus subsidized private insurance to help low-income people obtain and finance health care. In particular, nonelderly adults with incomes of 100-138 percent of the federal poverty level gained Medicaid eligibility if they lived in states that implemented the ACA's Medicaid expansion, whereas those in nonexpansion states became eligible for subsidized Marketplace coverage. Using data for 2008-15 from the National Health Interview Survey, we found that as of 2015, adults with family incomes in this range had experienced large declines in uninsurance rates in both expansion and nonexpansion states (the adjusted declines were 22 percentage points and 18 percentage points, respectively). Adults in expansion and nonexpansion states also experienced similar increases in having a usual source of care and primary care visits, and similar reductions in delayed receipt of medical care due to cost. There were, however, important differences: Adults in expansion states experienced larger reductions in out-of-pocket spending but also faced greater difficulty accessing physician care relative to adults in nonexpansion states.

We investigate determinants of market entry and premiums within the context of the Affordable Care Act's Marketplaces for individual insurance. Using Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) as the conceptual framework, we study how competition and firm heterogeneity relate to premiums in 36 states using Federally Facilitated or Supported Marketplaces in 2016. Our primary data source is the Qualified Health Plan Landscape File, augmented with market characteristics from the American Community Survey and Area Health Resource File as well as insurer-level information from federal Medical Loss Ratio annual reports. We first estimate a model of insurer entry and then investigate the relationship between a market's predicted number of entrants and insurer-level premiums. Our entry model results suggest that competition is increasing with the number of insurers, most notably as the market size increases from 3 to 4 entrants. Results from the premium regression suggest that each additional entrant is associated with approximately 4% lower premiums, controlling for other factors. An alternative explanation for the relationship between entrants and premiums is that more efficient insurers (who can price lower) are the ones that enter markets with many entrants, and this is reflected in lower premiums. An exploratory analysis of insurers' non-claims costs (a proxy for insurer efficiency) reveals that average costs among entrants are rising slightly with the number of insurers in the market. This pattern does not support the hypothesis that premiums decrease with more entrants because those entrants are more efficient, suggesting instead that the results are being driven mostly by price competition.

The prevalence of narrow provider networks on the ACA Marketplace is trending down. In 2017, 21% of plans had narrow networks, down from 25% in 2016. The largest single factor was that 70% of plans from National carriers exited the market and these plans had narrower networks than returning plans. Exits account for more than half of the decline in the prevalence of narrow networks, with the rest attributed to broadening networks among stable plans, particularly among Blues carriers. The narrow network strategy is expanding among traditional Medicaid carriers and remains steady among provider-based carriers and regional/local carriers.