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In the 1990s until the early 2000s, developing countries enthusiastically concluded iInternational investment agreements (IIAs), particularly bilateral investment treaties, with each other and developed countries in the hope of encouraging foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. This enthusiasm waned after it became evident that the recourse to binding international arbitration by firms left governments liable for their public policy decisions. Furthermore, numerous studies failed to definitively prove a relationship between signing IIAs and FDI inflows. An important, and broadly recognized weakeness of these studies, was the inability to distinguish between the levels of protection found in different agreements. This paper seeks to contribute to this debate on the effects of IIAs by differentiating between the textual content of investment agreements according to their quality (high or low protection for foreign investors) and integrating this independent variable into a gravity model. This methodology should improve our ability to make scientific inferences regarding the effect of investment agreement on FDI flows. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the consequences of the breakdown of talks on the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the generalized shift from multilateralism to bilateralism in the Americas for the region's emerging foreign investment regime. The paper argues that multilateral processes have historically benefited Latin American countries when their interests have diverged from those of the US. In terms of investment, the foreign investment regime advanced by the United States (in bilateral investment treaties) differs significantly from that advanced by sub-regional powers such as Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, particularly regarding investment rules on national treatment and performance requirements. This suggests that, in the absence of multilateral negotiations, US norms on investment and development will progressively define the emerging hemispheric investment regime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper draws on the constructivist tradition of international relations in order to ask whether the emerging norms on corporate social responsibility in the Americas represent a regime or emerging regime. Recent work (Kell and Ruggie 1999) has attempted to defend the UN General Secretary?s Global Compact program in these terms, but without the theoretical rigor required for theory testing. In contrast, this article advances a theoretical argument, which seeks to theorize CSR as an emerging constructivist regime with specific mechanisms that affect actor behaviour, and generates testable propositions. The paper argues that the promotion of corporate social responsibility by businesses and governments has inadvertently shifted the terrain on which businesses interact with other actors from one of power (where business was clearly dominant) to a terrain of legitimacy. This implies that actors that control ?legitmacy? resources, such as community civil society organizations (CSOs), should see their negotiating power increase vis-à-vis businesses. In this respect, CSR generates a framework of norms and practices that enables negotiation and contestation between CSOs and TNCs about the social impact of foreign investment. Both transnational corporations (TNCs) and CSOs are now involved in community-level negotiations, supported by transnational links which confer resources, power and legitimacy (Grugel 2000; Huddock 1999; Keck and Sikkink 1997). This hypothesis, that a CSR regime affects actor behaviour and outcomes, will be tested by examining several cases of TNC-CSO negotiations in the Americas. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]