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The burden social theorists must be willing to accept, respond to, and act upon pertains to the difficulties that predictably accompany all efforts to convey to nontheorists the unwelcome fact of heteronomy – that as actors, we are not as autonomous as we were told and prefer to assume – and to spell out what heteronomy in the form in which it has been shaping the developmental trajectory of modern societies means for professional theorists. I introduce the concept of “vitacide,” designed to capture that termination of life is a potential vanishing point of the heteronomous processes that have been shaping modern societies continuing to accelerate and intensify in ways that prefigure our future, but not on our human or social terms. Heteronomy pointing toward vitacide should compel us as social theorists to consider critically both the constructive and destructive trajectory that social change appears to have been following for more than two centuries, irrespective of whether the resulting prospect is to our liking or not. In this context, the classical critical theorists of the early Frankfurt School, especially Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, pursued what turned out to be an evolving interest in rackets, the authoritarian personality, and the administered society – concepts that served as foils for delineating the kind of theoretical stance that is becoming more and more important as we are moving into an increasingly uncertain future.

The neglect of Goethe, his work in general, and Faust in particular, in English-speaking countries, is notorious. While Shakespeare’s plays have been prominent and widely performed in German-speaking countries, the same is not true for Goethe in the English-speaking world. Focusing non-exclusively on Faust, and cutting a link to Thomas Mann’s Doctor Faustus, I will endeavor to delineate problematic aspects of American ideology, and what it would take, within U.S. sociology, to be cognizant of the latter. Georg Lukacs wrote about Goethe and Faust, and so did Theodor W. Adorno and Leo Loewenthal, highlighting its importance to critical theory. The goal is to delineate a critical theory of American ideology that cannot be developed from a perspective from within the US alone, and of the role Shakespeare’s work has been playing in normalizing the prevalence and workings key aspects of this ideology.

ICT and the increasing availability of digital data are dramatically changing the processes of research and knowledge production in the social sciences and humanities (SSH). Whereas the methodological momentum in digital humanities and computational social sciences is already immense, theory development in the SSH is much less dynamic and consists mainly of digital resurrections of the classics of our fields. The contributions to this virtual special issue of Technological Forecasting and Social Change do, therefore, not constitute efforts at presenting new social theories of the digital transformation, but rather, efforts at digitally transforming social theory. This introduction presents an overview of the topic and the contributions and outlines key elements of a research agenda on the digital transformation of social theory.

Despite Honneth’s claim to have advanced critical theory not just beyond the early Frankfurt School especially of Horkheimer, Marcuse, and Adorno, but also of Jurgen Habermas, the specific configuration and overall orientation of his theory of recognition should be understood as an instance of traditional rather than critical theory, even though he retains elements of the latter. This applies especially insofar as Honneth appears not to have examined how the concrete socio-historical circumstances in West Germany, especially from 1949 until 1990, shaped and continue to be reflected in his own theoretical agenda. Judged on its own terms, and evaluated and interpreted according to its own standards, Honneth’s theory constitutes an undeniable achievement. Yet, as Honneth declared in an interview he gave in 2000, he did not think of himself as a social theorist. Indeed, if judged in terms of critical theory, especially if we take as the “gold standard” for the latter the writings by Horkheimer, Marcuse, and Adorno during the 1930s and the 1940s, Honneth’s theory of recognition should be recognized as a systematic effort to develop critical liberalism as a positive rather than critical political philosophy.

At a time of increased societal urgency surrounding ecological crises from depleted fisheries (Longo, Clausen, and Clark 2015) to mineral extraction (Bunker and Ciccantell 2005) and potential pathways toward environmental justice (Martinez-Alier et al. 2016; Smith, Plummer, and Hughes 2016), this collection of papers re-examines ecologically unequal exchange (EUE) in historical and comparative perspective. The theory of EUE, grounded in Wallerstein’s (1974–2011) world-systems perspective and the work of Amin (1976), Bunker (1985), and Emmanuel (1972), posits that core or northern consumption and capital accumulation are based on peripheral or southern environmental degradation and extraction. In other words, structures of social and environmental inequality between the Global North and Global South are founded in the extraction of materials from, as well as the displacement of hazardous production processes and wastes to, the Global South (Frey, Gellert, and Dahms 2017; Hornborg and Martinez-Alier 2016; Jorgenson 2016a, 2016b; Jorgenson and Clark 2009a). These unequal relations underscore a large ecological debt owed to the periphery by the core countries; this debt is a key source for many of the previous and current environmental distribution conflicts that have taken place and continue to take place throughout the world-system (Hornborg and Martinez-Alier 2016; Martinez-Alier et al. 2016).

Ecologically unequal exchange denotes a seemingly inexorable process whose impetus is both global and planetary. The logic underlying ecologically unequal exchange suggests that rather than moving toward a reconciliation of society and nature, the history of modern capitalist society is pointing toward nature being turned into a “function” of society. Modern society thus appears as a type of socio-economic organization that is characterized by corresponding modes of politics and culture in whose context “nature” is being supplanted, to an ever greater extent, by artificial substitutes. Paradoxically, social, political, and cultural forms are being replaced by modes of “human” and “social” interaction (and corresponding, new institutional structures) that replicate and reinforce organizational, technological, and economic patterns at the heart of capitalism. It may be possible to avert this prospect; if so, equalizing ecological exchange around the globe will be a necessary step along the way. Such equalizing may well be the necessary first step in remedying the world-system’s impetus toward maintaining and amplifying existing forms of inequality that nation-states no longer can contain or alleviate.

In utopian/science fiction literature, comprehensive knowledge is a familiar motif that also inspires recent policies to screen society through surveillance. In the late 20th century, a digital archive promised to facilitate quick access to abundant information and effective strategies to confront myriad challenges. Yet, today, the scale and scope of information accumulation in national and corporate repositories is reaching proportions whose intelligent processing excedes human capabilities, and triggering a shift in focus from dumb repository to artificial intelligence. Processing such accumulation of knowledge necessiates skills commonly attributed to divinity. Without a theory that recognizes this condition and informs the operations of artificial intelligence, the latter is likely to fail in human ways, e.g., by perceiving false patterns resulting from flawed theories assigning meaning to knowledge. For successful pattern recognition to occur, theories must rest on science fiction and a digital ontotheology of the machine as the form this archive assumes.

This chapter highlights how considering the contributions of critical theory would enhance the work of comparative–historical social scientists, by drawing attention to two dimensions that traditionally have been ignored in comparative–historical analysis. First, comparative–historical analysis tends to sideline the question of whether different social, political, cultural, and economic forms may in fact be expressive of an underlying, historical logic that must not be ignored. Second, comparative–historical analysts do not appear to consider that and how their research agenda may be an expression of the specificity of social–historical circumstances they endeavor to illuminate, but which, in a sense, is being objectified via comparative–historical social scientists’ preferred mode of analysis. For the most part, comparative–historical researchers seems to work from the assumption that there is no need for the examination of how their research agendas, questions, and tools are situated in and reflect the societal universe, beyond the scope of particular cases, similarities, and differences.

‘Critical Theory in the Twenty-First Century’ maps the various theories that have illuminated the patterns of economic transformation shaping forms of political, social and cultural life in modern society. This chapter argues that the underpinnings and consequences resulting from those apparently economic transformations are not simply and broadly economic in nature, but specifically capitalist. From the outset, critical theory has scrutinized how ‘the mighty cosmos of the modern economic order’ (Max Weber) is fraught with compounded levels of alienation. If, according to the present argument, we situate the origins of dialectical theorizing in Hegel’s and Marx’s respective critiques of alienation, efforts to explicate the history of the modern age have been based on two categories. For Hegel, ‘spirit’ as enlightened, self-reflexive intelligence was (and was to be understood as) the driver of historical change. By contrast, for Marx, as the nineteenth century wore on, spirit came to be supplanted by ‘capital’ as the dominant driver, with capital denoting an artificial, non-human form of intelligence. The first generation of Frankfurt School theorists defined critical theory as the program of deconstructing how the spread of capital is mediated (and concealed) politically, socially and cultural, albeit while abandoning the need to update Marx’s critique of political economy for the twentieth century. Since the onset of globalization during the latter part of the twentieth century, efforts in critical theory to highlight the problematic nature of modern society qua capitalism, especially those that have been influenced and inspired by Habermas and Honneth, de facto constitute efforts at normalizing the reign of capital and the realm of alienation. At the same time, it has become increasingly apparent that capital is no longer the driver of socio-historical change, and no longer serves as an adequate means to focus the kind of critique that is most needed and important, as human needs are interfering with the needs and operations of capital to an ever-increasing extent. Rather, similar to the historical period when capital began to replace spirit, we are currently undergoing a change in the trajectory of ‘human’ civilization: as capital is being supplanted by artifice, the latter is being revealed as the true specter behind the former, and proliferating indications suggest that we are in the process of entering what promises/threatens to be a posthuman civilization.

Abstract Many Americans are overwhelmed when confronted with questions relating to the European Union. And sociologists who are not working directly on related themes, as well as social theorists concerned with incarnations of modern society, have long ignored the peculiar character and historical implications of the developing European Union. But now a growing number of European theorists have begun to focus on the significance of European integration for the very discipline of sociology. To situate and evaluate some of this recent work, I deploy Gregg’s (2003) distinction between thick norms and thin politics. That distinction helps us see that developments in the European Union point toward the formation of a new kind of modern society.

Purpose To examine whether indigenous critiques of globalization and critical theories of modernity are compatible, and how they can complement each other so as to engender more realistic theories of modern society as inherently constructive and destructive, along with practical strategies to strengthen modernity as a culturally transformative project, as opposed to the formal modernization processes that rely on and reinforce modern societies as structures of social inequality. Methodology/approach Comparison and assessment of the foundations, orientations, and implications of indigenous critiques of globalization and the Frankfurt School’s critical theory of modern society, for furthering our understanding of challenges facing human civilization in the twenty-first century, and for opportunities to promote social justice. Findings Modern societies maintain order by compelling individuals to subscribe to propositions about their own and their society’s purportedly “superior” nature, especially when compared to indigenous cultures, to override observations about the de facto logic of modern societies that are in conflict with their purported logic. Research implications Social theorists need to make consistent efforts to critically reflect on how their own society, in terms of socio-historical circumstances as well as various types of implied biases, translates into research agendas and propositions that are highly problematic when applied to those who belong to or come from different socio-historical contexts. Originality/value An effort to engender a process of reciprocal engagement between one of the early traditions of critiquing modern societies and a more recent development originating in populations and parts of the world that historically have been the subject of both constructive and destructive modernization processes.

) combines neoclassical economic theory and Keynesianism with an appreciation of how economic patterns and processes are tied to concrete socio-historical circumstances, and exemplifies how economists should compute in their models the socio-cultural costs accompanying economic growth and development. Piketty’s concern with trends in economic inequality, returns from capital, and economic growth, addresses issues is also consistent with Marx’s critique of political economy. While Piketty deems Marx’s theory overly simplistic, Piketty’s contention that modern democratic nation-states should confront the problem of increasing economic inequality exaggerates governments’ ability to regulate the economy today. Basic income is indicative both of the diminished capacity of states to promote social welfare via established policy strategies, and the heightened need to scrutinize the specific logic of capital in the twenty-first century. Recent reinterpretations of Marx affirm the need to resist orthodox, dogmatic and non-critical readings of his analysis of the inner workings of capitalism, and are consonant with the idea of basic income.

At the close of a collection of analyses and reflections relating to whether and how universities should and do play roles in promoting social justice— intellectually, practically, pedagogically, politically, or by means of public policy—it is necessary to begin to address explicitly the broader issues and perspectives to keep in mind, to consider the present and future status of social justice as a social and political goal in human civilization. More specifically, how does the project of advancing social justice present itself in the twenty-first century as a context that appears to be fraught to an increasing extent by doubts about the prospects for greater democracy, social welfare, and equal opportunities for individuals around the globe? From the vantage point of social theory—as the rigorous effort to locate the social justice project and its current status within the modern age overall, and to reflect upon its practical-political feasibility—we need to ask: how important is it, in industrialized societies as the purported vanguard of advancing and sustaining social progress (given the economic resources at their disposal), to illuminate critically the willingness among political and economic elites, to allocate (or, to support the allocation of) resources required to promote and pursue social justice—as a medium-term objective that is central to the legitimacy of modern politics, society, and economics?

I think it is useful to contrast two different ways of thinking about the moral foundations of what can be called “critical emancipatory social science.” The first emphasizes the ways in which existing institutions and social structures generate human suffering and obstruct human flourishing. The second emphasizes the ways in which existing institutions and social structures distribute the conditions for suffering and flourishing unfairly. The first of these anchors the moral critique of the world as it is in terms of human interests, the second in terms of social justice. I think both of these are important. The world would be a better place if suffering and flourishing were less unequally distributed, and it would be a better place if there was less suffering and more flourishing. Both matter. But if I had to say which of these ideas was the more fundamental to my work, I would have to say that it was the first. This is why, in my 2012 presidential address at the American Sociological Association, I argued that the fundamental propositions of a critical emancipatory social science were the following: Foundational proposition of critical social science: Many forms of human suffering and many deficits in human flourishing are the result of existing institutions and social structures. Foundational proposition of emancipatory social science: Transforming existing institutions and social structures in the right way has the potential to substantially reduce human suffering and expand the possibilities for human flourishing.

Purpose – The discourse about civil society is closely tied to the role of collective action in general, and of social movements in particular. Yet the origins of the recent emphasis on civil society are located in the 1980s – the time period during which the wave of neoliberalism began its rise and spread. Design/methodology/approach – In order to properly situate the concept of civil society and related debates, they must be linked to efforts to delegitimate and demonize the state that also started gaining momentum during that decade. Findings – The historical context of its emergence suggests that civil society may not be so much an analytical category for purposes of social research, but a theoretical category that is imbued with political content, both positively and negatively – both as a means to promote progressive ends, and as an expression of the context in which those ends started to face mounting resistance. Research limitations/implications – At the very least, the concept of civil society has a tendency to distract – both by design and by default – from important questions and challenges, such as those related to the role and persistence of structures of inequality in early 21st century global civilization. Originality/value – A promising starting point to circumnavigate the counterproductive consequences of the use and abuse of the civil society concept and debate for social research may be its explicitly dynamic conceptualization.

The thing about naivete is its hermetic tendency. One imagines having graduated out of it, but imagination proves only its own potentials. It is of course good to be held to account by the question that circulates through so much of our belletristic literatures (as in, for instance, Edward St Aubyn's Bad News): How can one think one's way out of a problem, when the problem is the way one thinks? Yet an extra layer of diagnosis need not result in anything beyond itself. I can easily glimpse the chiaroscuro of another mind and thus know of the limits of my knowledge of its furnishings without knowing what they (the limits or the furnishings) are, or even whether the clarity is meant to be hidden by, more than hide, the dimness. But is inner presentation/apprehension of one's own self-portrait any more diamantine, any less naive, in its “obviousness”? And if it should be, at any moment, where/what are the reliably timely markers? When, therefore, I experience increasingly complex realities – layer upon layer, cut and recut and repackaged – without commensurate increases in production of value, am I experiencing a mind-blindness?– An out-take from “After Fin de partie”