Search

In various countries, forensic scientists have begun to express their expert opinion in terms of the likelihood of observing the evidence under the primary and under an alternative hypothesis (i.e. the likelihood-ratio approach). This development is often confined to technical domains such as fingerprint analyses. In forensic psychological expertise, likelihood ratios are largely absent. In this contribution, we explain how forensic psychologists can employ likelihood ratios, and we describe two illustrating cases. We also present two studies in which we examined how (Dutch) professional judges appreciate psychological expertise framed in likelihood ratios. Findings suggest that judges ( N = 39) appreciate a fictitious expert witness report framed in likelihood-ratios similarly to an opinion framed one-dimensionally. Judges’ ( N = 79) understanding of a psychological expert opinion framed in likelihood ratios was satisfactory as measured by self-report and an actual test We conclude that, as is custom in forensic technical domains, psychological expert opinion can be expressed in likelihoods. Two of the hypothesised flipsides, namely, lawyers’ dislike of likelihoods, and their lack of proper understanding, may be surmountable.

Are personality traits related to symptom overreporting and/or symptom underreporting? With this question in mind, we evaluated studies from 1979 to 2020 (k = 55), in which personality traits were linked to scores on stand-alone validity tests, including symptom validity tests (SVTs) and measures of socially desirable responding (SDR) and/or supernormality. As to symptom overreporting (k = 14), associations with depression, alexithymia, apathy, dissociation, and fantasy proneness varied widely from weak to strong (rs .27 to .79). For underreporting (k = 41), inconsistent links (rs − .43 to .63) were found with narcissism, whereas alexithymia and dissociation were often associated with lower SDR tendencies, although effect sizes were small. Taken together, the extant literature mainly consists of cross-sectional studies on single traits and contexts, mostly offering weak correlations that do not necessarily reflect causation. What this field lacks is an overarching theory relating traits to symptom reporting. Longitudinal studies involving a broad range of traits, samples, and incentives would be informative. Until such studies have been done, traits are best viewed as modest concomitants of symptom distortion.

We reviewed articles that appeared between 2000 and 2018 and that addressed fantasy proneness as measured by the Creative Experiences Questionnaire (CEQ) or the Inventory of Childhood Memories and Imaginings (ICMI). We searched Google Scholar to identify relevant articles and used the Hunter-Schmidt method to meta-analyze the correlates of fantasy proneness. We identified 132 articles describing 139 samples that together included 24,007 research participants. Effect sizes were large (rs > .50) for hallucinatory experiences, magical ideation, perceptual aberration, dissociation, and excessive daydreaming. Contrary to the popular idea that childhood trauma is a prominent precursor of fantasy proneness, we found that the effect sizes for self-reported trauma were small, as was also the case for depression, anxiety, and memory illusions (rs < .30). Strides in this research area can be made when future studies move beyond the fantasy proneness-trauma link to test causal models regarding the antecedents of maladaptive fantasizing.

Dissociative amnesia, defined as an inability to remember important autobiographical experiences, usually of a stressful nature, is a controversial phenomenon. We systematically reviewed 128 case studies of dissociative amnesia reported in 60 articles that appeared in peer-reviewed journals in English over the past 20 years (2000–2020). Our aim was to examine to what extent these cases met core features of dissociative amnesia. All cases were about reports of autobiographical memory loss, but the evidence offered in support of a dissociative amnesia interpretation was often weak and plagued by an ambiguous heterogeneity with respect to nature, etiology, and differential diagnoses of alleged memory loss. Most case studies failed to rule out plausible alternative explanations of dissociative amnesia, such as ordinary forgetting and malingering. We encourage clinicians and researchers to more critically investigate alleged cases of dissociative amnesia and provide criteria for how a dissociative amnesia case ideally would look like.

When patients fail symptom validity tests (SVTs) and/or performance validity tests (PVTs), their self-reported symptoms and test profiles are unreliable and cannot be taken for granted. There are many well-established causes of poor symptom validity and malingering is only of them. Some authors have proposed that a cry for help may underlie poor symptom validity. In this commentary, we argue that cry for help is a (1) metaphorical concept that is (2) difficult to operationalize and, at present, (3) impossible to falsify. We conclude that clinicians or forensic experts should not invoke cry for help as an explanation for poor symptom validity. To encourage conceptual clarity, we propose a tentative framework for explaining poor symptom validity.

The Self-Report Symptom Inventory (SRSI) was developed to expand the toolbox of self-report instruments available to detect symptom overreporting. Such instruments, today known as symptom validity tests, play a crucial role in both forensic evaluations and in a range of clinical referral questions. The SRSI was originally designed in the German language; items were selected from a larger pool on the basis of empirical results. Scores on the Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology served as external criterion for the item selection procedure and empirical cut-score determination (gold standard). The SRSI is composed of five subscales describing potentially genuine symptoms and five pseudosymptoms subscales. Ten different language test versions have been developed so far. The article describes the background of the construction of the scale, the main empirical results with the SRSI, the conditions of use, and the limits of applicability. With research ongoing in several countries and with a variety of language versions, a larger body of empirical evidence can be expected to accumulate in the coming years.

Does Eye Movement and Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR) therapy affect the accuracy of memories? This recurrent issue in recent memory research bears relevance to expert witness work in the courtroom. In this review, we will argue that several crucial aspects of EMDR may be detrimental to memory. First, research has shown that eye movements undermine the quality and quantity of memory. Specifically, eye movements have been shown to decrease the vividness and emotionality of autobiographical experiences and amplify spontaneous false memory levels. Second, a sizeable proportion of EMDR practitioners endorse the controversial idea of repressed memories and discuss the topic of repressed memory in therapy. Third, in the Dutch EMDR protocol, patients are instructed to select the target image by using flawed metaphors of memory (e.g., memory works as a video). Such instructions may create demand characteristics to the effect that people over-interpret imagery during therapy as veridical memories. Collectively, the corpus of research suggests that several components of EMDR therapy (i.e., performing eye movements, therapist beliefs and therapeutic instructions) may undermine the accuracy of memory, which can be risky if patients, later on, serve as witnesses in legal proceedings. ispartof: MEMORY vol:29 issue:9 pages:1254-1262 ispartof: location:England status: published

Some self-report symptom validity tests, such as the Self-Report Symptom Inventory (SRSI), rely on a detection strategy that uses bizarre, extreme, or very rare symptoms. Thus, items are constructed to invite respondents with an invalid response style to affirm pseudosymptoms that are usually not experienced by genuine patients. However, these pseudosymptoms should not be easily recognizable, because otherwise sophisticated over-reporters could strategically avoid them and go undetected. Therefore, we tested how well future psychology professionals were able to differentiate between genuine complaints and pseudosymptoms in terms of their plausibility and prevalence.Psychology students (N = 87) received the items of the SRSI online and were given the task to rate each item as to its plausibility and prevalence in the community.Students evaluated genuine symptoms as significantly more plausible and more prevalent than pseudosymptoms. However, 56% of students rated pseudosymptoms as moderately plausible, whereas 17% rated them as moderately prevalent in the general public.Overall, it appears that psychology students are successful in distinguishing bizarre, unusual, or rare symptoms from genuine complaints. Yet, the majority of students still attributed relatively high prima facie plausibility to pseudosymptoms. We contend that if such a trusting attitude is true for psychology students, it may also be the case for young psychology practitioners, which, consequently, may diminish the probability of employing self-report validity measures in psychological assessments.

In two experiments, we tested the hypothesis that guilt feelings would elevate the probability of making a false confession. In Experiment 1 (N = 146), a confederate induced guilt feelings by asking participants to cheat on a task. The experimenter then falsely accused participants of having pressed a forbidden key, causing a computer crash. In Experiment 2 (N = 108), a confederate was punished every time participants could not answer a quiz question. The confederate later cheated in a game and asked participants to take the blame. In Experiment 1, 100 participants (68.5%) falsely confessed to pressing the key. In Experiment 2, 39 participants (36.1%) falsely confessed to cheating. Guilt manipulations had no effect on false confession rates. When exploring the effect of guilt feelings, five of eight tests were statistically non-significant. As yet, there is insufficient evidence to argue that guilt feelings are a major determinant of false confessions.

Expert witnesses and scholars sometimes disagree on whether suggestibility and compliance are related to people's tendency to falsely confess. Hence, the principal aim of this review was to amass the available evidence on the link between suggestibility and compliance and false confessions. We reviewed experimental data in which false confessions were experimentally evoked and suggestibility and compliance were measured. Furthermore, we reviewed field data of potential false confessions and their relationship with suggestibility and compliance. These diverse databases converge to the same conclusion. We unequivocally found that high levels of suggestibility (and to a lesser extent compliance) were associated with an increased vulnerability to falsely confess. Suggestibility measurements might be informative for expert witnesses who must evaluate the false confession potential in legal cases.

What does believing in repressed memory mean? In a recent article in this journal, Brewin, Li, Ntarantana, Unsworth, and McNeilis (2019, Study 3) argued that when people are asked to indicate their belief in repressed memory, they might actually think of deliberate memory suppression rather than unconscious repressed memory. They further argued that in contrast to belief in unconscious repressed memory, belief in deliberate memory suppression is not scientifically controversial. In this commentary, we show that they are incorrect on both counts. Although Brewin and colleagues surveyed people to indicate their belief in deliberate memory suppression, they neglected to ask their participants whether they (also) believed in unconscious repressed memory. We asked people from the general population whether they believed that traumatic experiences can be unconsciously repressed for many years and then recovered. In 2 studies of the general population, we found high endorsement rates (Study 1 [N = 230]: 59.2% [n = 45]; Study 2 [N = 79]: 67.1% [n = 53]) of the belief in unconscious repressed memory. These endorsement rates did not statistically differ from endorsement rates to statements on repressed memory and deliberate memory suppression. In contrast to what Brewin et al. argued, belief in unconscious repressed memory among lay people is alive and well. Finally, we contend that Brewin et al. overstated the scientific evidence bearing on deliberate repression (suppression). (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Abstract. The recently developed Self-Report Symptom Inventory (SRSI) intends to provide an alternative approach to the detection of symptom over-reporting. Unlike other measures, the SRSI includes both non-existent symptoms (i.e., pseudosymptoms) and genuine symptoms. Previous research using the German SRSI showed that people who exaggerate their complaints over-endorse both types of symptoms. In the current simulation experiment, we tested whether the Dutch and English SRSI are effective in identifying over-reporting by comparing SRSI scores of an honest group ( n = 51) with those of two experimental simulator groups (pain, n = 54; anxiety, n = 53). The pain and anxiety simulators endorsed significantly more genuine symptoms and pseudosymptoms than honest participants (ηp2 = .50 and ηp2 = .30, respectively). Furthermore, pain and anxiety over-reporters specifically over-endorsed symptoms corresponding to their simulation instructions (Cohen’s ds > 0.77). Using the recommended cut-off score, the SRSI detected 48% of pain over-reporters and 73% of anxiety over-reporters, with areas under the curve (AUC) ranging from .88 to .91. These results indicate that the SRSI is a promising tool for identifying over-reporting, but further research with clinical samples is needed.

We explored under-reporting of mental health symptoms and its correlates in adults receiving psychological treatment. We administered the Supernormality Scale (SS, Cima et al., 2003), the Minnesota Multiple Personality Inventory-2 (Restructured Form) (MMPI-2, Butcher et al., 1989), the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI, Raskin & Terry, 1979), and the Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-2, Beck et al., 1996) to 147 patients at the start of their treatment. Supernormality (i.e., denial of common symptoms) was positively associated with MMPI faking good parameters supporting the construct validity of the SS. Narcissism was negatively related to self-reported depression symptoms, but this association failed to reach significance (r = -.15, p = .07). This suggests that patients high on grandiose/overt narcissism might tend to deny common symptoms. The link between supernormality and depression symptoms as measured by the BDI was substantial and negative (r = -0.72). Our data suggest that supernormality is associated with constricted self-reports of depression. Given the clinical relevance of symptom under-reporting, our preliminary findings require a large-scale replication.

Clinicians tend to overestimate their ability to recognize feigning behavior in psychiatric patients, especially if it concerns patients who have been admitted for observation. Feigning can be either externally motivated (e.g., for financial compensation, known as malingering) or internally motivated (e.g., to assume the "sick role," known as factitious disorder). Persistent presentation of severe symptoms is usually associated with the factitious disorder. We present two patients with strong external incentives who consistently and convincingly feigned severe psychiatric symptoms during a protracted period of inpatient observation in a specialized center; both were engaged in a procedure for medical asylum. The first case presented with the clinical picture of a psychotic depression with severe motor symptoms, and the second case showed symptoms of a chronic post-traumatic stress disorder with secondary psychotic symptoms. Both cases were thoroughly investigated but feigning was overlooked, and unnecessary and harmful treatment interventions were given. To prevent iatrogenic damage, we recommend a critical attitude that takes malingering as an option into account in settings where patients are often involved in high stake legal procedures. A clinical sign that might indicate feigning is therapy-resistant symptoms. To rule out feigning a comprehensive, multimethod approach is required, but an active stance toward collateral information is essential. Specialized psychological tests may be useful for preliminary screening, but for their use in culturally diverse populations as in refugee mental health more research is needed.

Previous studies found that misleading feedback may increase self-reported symptoms. Does this reflect social demand or internalized misinformation? We investigated whether suggestive misinformation may escalate symptoms when it is provided in a context that minimizes social demand. Eighty participants completed the Checklist for Symptoms in Daily Life twice. Between test and retest, participants were given standardized symptom feedback through a bogus computer program that allegedly produced an analysis of their symptom ratings. The feedback pertained to randomly selected symptom ratings of participants: accurate feedback on four ratings (controls) and manipulated feedback (i.e., misinformation) on two other ratings (i.e., targets), which we increased by two full-scale points. Forty-nine (66%) participants accepted both target manipulations, of whom 35 (71%) confabulated explanations for the inflated ratings. Critically, at retest, participants who accepted the misinformation increased their ratings for target symptoms dramatically, whereas ratings for control symptoms and relevant ratings by participants who rejected the misinformation increased moderately. Our findings may help to understand iatrogenic effects of psychotherapy.

Brand et al.’s (2018) response—as well as previous works by some of the authors—reveal a recurrent and concerning picture of using lengthy, but flawed, arguments to promote the concept of dissociative amnesia. Our focus here is not so much on the weak-to-moderate correlation between measures of trauma and dissociation—we concentrate more on the weak evidence for dissociative amnesia. If triers of fact accept there is a correlation between trauma and feeling depersonalized or experiencing memory errors, we foresee relatively few legal consequences. However, if the leap is made to accept that trauma causes dissociative amnesia (or dissociative identity disorder) then it opens the door to repressed memory testimony being trusted in the courtroom, which in the past has had negative consequences. The problem with the concept and theory of dissociative amnesia is that there is an easy-to-miss claim of extraordinary remembering that contradicts findings and theories in memory research. Incorrect beliefs in such extraordinary remembering that can have severe repercussions in court. We document some areas of agreement with Brand et al., but reiterate that there is a lack of evidence for themechanisms proposed in dissociative amnesia.

In an often-cited study, Murdock et al. (2010) found that therapists are more likely to attribute premature treatment termination to client characteristics than to themselves, a finding that the authors interpreted in terms of a Self-Serving Bias (SSB). We replicated and extended the study of Murdock et al. (2010, study 2), Psychologists and psychotherapists (N = 91) read two case vignettes about premature treatment terminations of clients that in a between-subjects set-up, were either described as own clients or other therapists' clients. Next, participants used three attribution subscales (blaming therapist, client, and situation) to evaluate potential causes for the premature terminations. This way, we tested whether participants would manifest SSB. We also investigated whether therapists' -scores on self-confidence and need for closure were linked to SSB tendencies. Unlike Murdock et al. (2010), we found no overall SSB. However, a stronger need for closure was related to more SSB tendencies (i.e., less endorsement of "blame therapist" attributions) in the own-client-condition (r = -.35, p

Objective: The Self-Report Symptom Inventory (SRSI) is a new symptom validity test that, unlike other symptom over-reporting measures, contains both genuine symptom and pseudosymptom scales. We tested whether its pseudosymptom scale is sensitive to genuine psychopathology and evaluated its discriminant validity in an instructed feigning experiment that relied on carefully selected forensic inpatients (n = 40). Method: We administered the SRSI twice: we instructed patients to respond honestly to the SRSI (T1) and then to exaggerate their symptoms in a convincing way (T2). Results: On T1, the pseudosymptom scale was insensitive to patients’ actual psychopathology. Two patients (5%) had scores exceeding the liberal cut point (specificity = 0.95) and no patient scored above the more stringent cut point (specificity = 1.0). Also, the SRSI cut scores and ratio index discriminated well between honest (T1) and exaggerated (T2) responses (AUCs were 0.98 and 0.95, respectively). Conclusions: Given the relatively few false positives, our data suggest that the pseudosymptom scale of the SRSI is a useful measure of symptom over-reporting in forensic treatment settings.

© The Author(s) 2019. Mental-health patients may report more symptoms than they actually experience. Experts and laypeople often view this overreporting as a sign of malingering. We show that there are multiple pathways to symptom overreporting: carryover effects from previous tests that lower the threshold for answering affirmatively to symptom items, suggestive misinformation that escalates symptom reports, inattentive responding that promotes indiscriminate endorsement of symptoms, and personality traits that bias symptom reports in an upward direction. A one-sided focus on malingering may distract from a research agenda that may contribute to knowledge accumulation in this domain. ispartof: Current Directions in Psychological Science vol:28 issue:3 pages:321-326 status: published

© The Author(s) 2018. Children are often viewed as poor eyewitnesses. Fact-finders, lawyers, and researchers assume that children are exceptionally prone to accept external suggestive (leading) questions and to create false memories. Is this assumption justified? This review will show it is not. First, studies on spontaneous false memories—elicited without any suggestive pressure—reveal that children are less likely than adults to produce them. Second, under certain circumstances, children are even less prone to accept external suggestions than adults. This counterintuitive finding happens when false suggestions contain information that is associatively related but in actuality not experienced by children or adults. Using empirically based interview protocols can maximize the retrieval of accurate memories in children and adults. Furthermore, expert witnesses should use alternative scenarios to better evaluate whether statements by children or adults are based on truth or fiction. ispartof: Policy Insights from the Behavioral and Brain Sciences. vol:6 issue:1 pages:87-93 status: published

We examined whether self-reported symptoms are affected by explicit and implicit misinformation. In Experiment 1, undergraduates (N = 60) rated how often they experienced common somatic and psychological symptoms. During a subsequent interview, they were exposed to misinformation about two of their ratings: one was inflated (upgraded misinformation), while another was deflated (downgraded misinformation). Close to 82% of the participants accepted the upward symptom misinformation, while 67% accepted the downward manipulation. Also, 27% confabulated reasons for upgraded symptom ratings, while 8% confabulated reasons for downgraded ratings. At a follow-up test, some days later, participants (n = 55) tended to escalate their symptom ratings in accordance with the upgraded misinformation. Such internalization was less clear for downgraded misinformation. There was no statistically significant relation between dissociativity and acceptance or internalization of symptom misinformation. In Experiment 2, a more subtle and implicit form of misinformation was employed. Undergraduates (N = 50) completed a checklist of common symptoms and were provided with feedback for some symptoms (targets) misleadingly suggesting that a slight majority of their peers experienced these targets on a regular basis. Next, participants rated the checklist again. Overall, symptom ratings went down for control but not for targets symptoms. Participants with escalated symptom ratings for targets had higher dissociativity scores than those who did not exhibit escalation. Taken together, our results suggest that upward symptom manipulations affect symptom self-reports more than downward manipulations and that dissociativity may play a role in symptom escalation when misinformation is subtle.

Forensic psychologists are sometimes faced with the task of educating triers of fact about the evidential weight of dissociative experiences reported by claimants in litigation procedures. In their two-part essay, Brand et al. (Psychological Injury and Law, 10, 283–297, 2017a; Psychological Injury and Law, 10, 298–312, 2017b) provide advice to experts who find themselves in such situation. We argue that the Brand et al. approach is problematic and might induce confirmation bias in experts. Their approach is not well connected to the extant literature on recovered memories, dissociative amnesia, memory distortions, and symptom validity testing. In some instances, Brand et al. (Psychological Injury and Law, 10, 283–297, 2017a; Psychological Injury and Law, 10, 298–312, 2017b) simplify the current body of knowledge about dissociation; in other instances, they ignore relevant empirical studies to an extent that is worrisome.

Practitioners always want to exclude the possibility that a patient is feigning symptoms. Some experts have suggested that an inconsistent symptom presentation across time (i.e., intraindividual variability) is indicative of feigning. We investigated how individuals with genuine pain-related symptoms (truth tellers; Study 1 n = 32; Study 2 n = 48) and people feigning such complaints (feigners; Study 1 n = 32; Study 2 n = 28) rated the intensity of their symptoms across a 5-day period. In both studies, feigners reported on all 5 days significantly higher symptom intensities than people with genuine complaints, but the two groups did not differ with regard to symptom (in)consistency. Thus, persistently inflated, rather than inconsistent, reports of symptom intensity over time are suggestive of feigning. The implications and limitations of our work are discussed.

On the basis of converging research, we concluded that the controversial topic of unconscious blockage of psychological trauma (i.e., repressed memory) remains very much alive in clinical, legal, and academic contexts. In his commentary, Brewin (this issue, p. 443) conducted a cocitation analysis and concluded that scholars do not adhere to the concept of unconscious repression. Furthermore, he argued that previous survey research did not specifically assess unconscious repression. Here, we present critical evidence that runs counter to his claims. First, we inspected his cocitation analysis and found that some scholars support notions that are closely related to unconscious repression. Furthermore, we conducted another analysis on the basis of articles' similarity. Again, we found examples of scholars specifically endorsing unconscious repressed memories. Second, as opposed to what Brewin reports, recent survey research now exists that bears directly on people's beliefs regarding unconscious repression. This work reveals that large percentages of people (e.g., students and eye-movement desensitization and reprocessing [EMDR] clinicians) endorse the concept of unconscious repressed memories. The belief in unconscious repressed memory can continue to contribute to harmful consequences in clinical, legal, and academic domains (e.g., false accusations of abuse). ispartof: PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE vol:16 issue:2 pages:454-460 ispartof: location:United States status: published

Eye movement desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR) is a widely used treatment for posttraumatic stress disorder. The idea behind EMDR is that lateral eye movements may mitigate the emotional impact of traumatic memories. Given the focus on changing patients' memories, it is important that EMDR practitioners have detailed knowledge about human memory. We explored beliefs and ideas about memory in samples of EMDR practitioners (Study 1: n = 12; Study 2: n = 41), students (Study 1: n = 35; Study 2: n = 24), and researchers (Study 2: n = 30). All groups seemed to be aware of the fallibility of memory. However, a majority of the surveyed EMDR practitioners (70-90%), students (around 90%), and researchers (66.7%) endorsed the controversial idea of repressed memories. Skepticism and endorsement of problematic ideas about memory-related topics may coexist within the same group. In clinical settings, this might be problematic, because a strong belief in repressed memories might lead therapists to suggestively seek for such memories in patients.

Inspired by theories of prosocial behavior, we tested the effect of relationship status and incentives on intended voluntary blame-taking in two experiments (Experiment 2 was pre-registered). Participants (NE1 = 211 and NE2 = 232) imagined a close family member, a close friend, or an acquaintance and read a scenario that described this person committing a minor traffic offense. The person offered either a monetary, social, or no incentive for taking the blame. Participants indicated their willingness to take the blame and reasons for and against blame-taking. Overall, a sizable proportion of participants indicated to be willing to take the blame (E1: 57.8%; E2: 34.9%). Blame-taking rates were higher for family members than close friends or acquaintances in both experiments, as expected. Unexpectedly, there was no difference between a close friend and an acquaintance in Experiment 2. Social incentives did not have an effect on voluntary blame-taking in either experiment. Neither did we find an interaction between relationship status and incentives. The results highlight the importance of kin relationships in the context of voluntary blame-taking.

Factitious disorder and malingering are two forms of abnormal illness behaviour in which mental or somatic symptoms are deliberately fabricated or grossly exaggerated or otherwise grossly misrepresented. They are forms of other-deceit, with the person in question assumed to be fully aware of this deceit. The central distinguishing feature of both is that factitious disorder is commonly thought to be motivated by internal incentives (primary gain: medical treatment, assuming the sick role), while malingering is directed towards an external goal (secondary gain, for example monetary compensation, sick leave). The utility of distinguishing between the two forms of feigning has long been questioned. Similarly, it must be questioned why factitious disorder is apprehended as a mental disorder in its own right. Neither the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) nor the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) contains useful diagnostic guidelines for reliably diagnosing feigned illness presentations; in particular, several decades of malingering research and conceptual developments have found no repercussion there.

Performing eye movements during memory retrieval is considered to be important for the therapeutic effect of eye movement desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR). We conducted a meta-analysis of laboratory studies that compared the effects of eye movements and/or alternative dual tasks (e.g., counting) on the vividness and emotionality of negative autobiographical memories with recall only (control) conditions. The databases PsycINFO and Web of Science were queried. Fifteen studies that involved 942 participants were included. Eye movements and alternative dual tasks produced similar vividness and emotionality decreases, with the impact on vividness being strong than that on emotionality. However, eye movements yielded a stronger overall vividness reduction than alternative dual tasks, although the associated effect size was small (Cohen’s d = .29). Because eye movements and alternative dual tasks produced comparable effects, one might conclude that both tasks are therapeutic equivalents. However, it should be acknowledged that only a limited number of laboratory studies were included in our meta-analysis, and the degree to which both procedures tax working memory was not independently established. Although our conclusion cannot be generalized to clinical practice, it does raise questions about the mode of action of EMDR.

Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR) is an effective treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder. However, literature on possible adverse memory effects of EMDR is scarce. Using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) false memory paradigm, we examined the susceptibility to spontaneous false memories after performing eye movements, as used in EMDR. In Experiment 1, 72 undergraduates received word lists containing negative and neutral associated words and immediately after this they were given a free recall and recognition test. In Experiment 2, 68 undergraduates underwent the free recall and recognition test 48 h later. During the free recall phase in both experiments, participants either performed eye movements or not (control condition). In Experiment 1, the two conditions did not differ statistically with regard to correct and false recall/recognition. In Experiment 2, correct memory rates were higher in the eye movement than in the control condition and this was accompanied by an increase in spontaneous false memories on both free recall and recognition. Although our experimental approach is far removed from clinical practice, our findings suggest that eye movements as used in EMDR might amplify both correct and false memory rates.

To check the credibility of impairments reported by refugees, so-called performance validity tests may be administered. We explored whether a psychotic condition may compromise performance on such test in patients admitted to a referral center for refugee mental health in the Netherlands (n = 231). We selected patients with no clear incentive to exaggerate their complaints (n = 80); psychotic patients in this subsample (n = 44) made significantly more errors on a simple forced-choice emotion recognition task than non-psychotic patients (n = 36), means being 9.0 (SD = 6.8) and 5.9 (SD = 5.1), respectively. Next, we selected patients with an incentive to deny complaints (n = 24); 79% of these patients had a psychotic disorder. Their failure rate on the emotion recognition test (21%) was the same as the failure rate of a control group of Dutch chronic psychotic patients (n = 47), but significantly above that (2%) of a control group of healthy controls (n = 51). We regard this as preliminary evidence that psychotic symptoms and/or antipsychotic medication may put a constraint on testing symptom credibility in refugees.

Background and objectives - The Modified Stroop Task (MST) effect refers to a prolonged reaction time (RT) in color-naming words related to an individual's disorder. Some authors argue that its absence in people who claim symptoms might be an indication of feigning.Method - We tested whether the MST effect is robust against feigning attempts and compared its absence as an index of feigning with over-reporting tendencies on a symptom questionnaire (i.e., the Self-Reported Symptom Inventory (SRSI)). We included participants (n = 22) who i) reported current high impact of aversive experiences (High scorers), ii) reported current low impact (Low scorers) of aversive experiences (n = 24), and iii) actors (n = 18) with low impact, but instructed to feign current high psychological impact of aversive life events (Simulators). We administered the MST, including impact-related, neutral, and feigning-related words, and the SRSI.Results - We found no MST effect for impact-related words in the high scorers group, or for feigning-related words in the simulators. Relative to high scorers and low scorers, simulators exhibited significantly longer RTs on all types of words and they also endorsed significantly more bogus symptoms on the SRSI. Thus, the SRSI was a more sensitive measure of feigning than the absence of an MST effect.Limitation - Some limitations are related to our reliance on a sub-clinical student sample, whereas others reflect the unresolved issues surrounding the MST. Thus, the generalizability of our results is uncertain.Conclusion - Our findings add to the doubts on the idea that the MST can be used to differentiate between genuine and feigned complaints.

Dissociative experiences and symptoms have sparked intense scrutiny and debate for more than a century. Two perspectives, the trauma model (TM), which postulates a direct and potent causal link between trauma and dissociation, and the sociocognitive model (SCM), which emphasizes social and cognitive variables (e.g., fantasy-proneness, media influences, suggestibility, suggestion, cognitive failures), currently vie for support. The intensive focus on controversies has stymied progress in understanding dissociation as much, if not more, than it has inspired research that transcends a single perspective. We assess strengths and limitations of these two perspectives and contend that neither provides a complete account of dissociation symptoms, which occur in the presence of many disorders. We provide a novel, narrative review of the link between dissociation and dissociative disorders and sleep disruptions, hyperassociativity, set shifts, deficits in meta-consciousness, and impaired self-regulation. We suggest that these transtheoretical variables (a) play a role in disorders that covary extensively with dissociative disorders (i.e., borderline personality disorder, schizophrenia spectrum disorders) and (b) provide the basis for overlapping foci of interests and potential collaborations among proponents of competing theoretical camps. Finally, we discuss limitations in knowledge and unresolved issues for future workers in the field to pursue.