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When countries emerge from a civil war, accountability and compensation for harms done are crucial for peacebuilding. However, post-civil war governments face uncertain political contexts, delegation problems, difficulties building trust among former combatants, deficits of central administrative capacity, and incentives to reward supporters. Given these challenges, they are unlikely to be able to fairly distribute financial compensation. In Nepal, the awarding of internationally funded compensation for conflict-related losses provides a very tangible test regarding whether factional opportunism or broader public interest considerations guide post-conflict allocations. We hypothesize that without effective institutions, compensation will be skewed in favour of those in power and not proportional to harms suffered. Using individual-level data, we analyse who benefited from the post-conflict settlement, showing those killed by Maoist perpetrators, those sympathetic to the state and members of the state armed forces were more likely to be compensated, a biased, hence unfavourable, outcome for peacebuilding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A study examining recent developments in anti-dumping policies as a strategic counter point to trade liberalization is presented.

In this historical analysis of U.S. trade policy, we apply the median voter model to explain legislative decision making. In this model, the level of tariff protection is expected to change with changes in the median legislator. We show that this simple model does a remarkable job of explaining trade policy until the mid-1930s, when it breaks down. We offer several possible explanations for the breakdown of this model, focusing particularly on the impact of domestic and international institutional changes that may have altered the role of the median legislator in trade policy formation., I. INTRODUCTION Tariff and trade policies have an interesting and dynamic history in the United States. Of critical importance to this history is the role played by the U.S. Congress. [...]

In 1984 Congress amended the antidumping and countervailing duty laws, mandating that the International Trade Commission (ITC) 'cumulate' imports across countries when determining injury. We estimate that cumulation increases the probability of an affirmative injury determination by 20 to 30 percent and has changed the ITC's decision (from negative to affirmative) for about one-third of cumulated cases. We also show that the protective effect of cumulation increases as the number of countries involved increases, holding import market share constant. That is, cumulated imports have a super-additive effect on ITC decision-making., I. INTRODUCTION In recent decades, the rise in international competition has led many U.S. firms to seek protection from foreign imports. Particularly noteworthy in the 1980s was the increased use [...]

Title VII protection laws refer to trade regulations such as countervailing duty laws and anti-dumping laws. These regulations have become a favorite tool by firms and industries in seeking trade protection. Such laws are considered discriminatory by some analysts since they favor imports for a particular country while controlling trade in another. Although Title VII protection is politically desirable in a multilateral trade market, its economic impact is open to conflict.

Administrative protection brings few benefits, partly because declining industries tend to seek protection, which cannot, on its own, halt their decline. Curbing competition may also remove the stimulus for reform. Although there was an increase in the popularity of seeking administrative protection against foreign competitors during the 1980s, the import relief legislation has not proved efficient, since the performance of industries that sought escape clause relief has not improved.