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We study robust equilibria in tournaments, where agents endowed with power form coalitions, and the coalition formed with the highest power prevails. We introduce the No-Threat Equilibrium (NTE), a stable partition where if a coalition deviates, then a new coalition could counter by forming an even stronger coalition. The NTE exists for any power function and preferences if and only if the set of feasible coalitions is a 'Helly' family. In contrast, the core is a partition in which no group of agents can profitably deviate by forming a feasible coalition, assuming that other agents do not react to such a deviation. The core is not empty for any power function and preferences if and only if the set of feasible coalitions has a 'hierarchical-structure'. The paper also adapts and characterizes other stability concepts to tournaments, including the α-core, β-core, farsighted core and bargaining set. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, a resource allocation problem is formulated to maximize the throughput of vehicular user equipments (VUEs) in both licensed, and unlicensed frequency bands under constraints of reliability, and latency for vehicular communications as well as the Quality of Service (QoS) for WiFi network based on a network system with coexisting VUEs, and WiFi user equipments (WUEs). In the system, the VUEs are able to access to the unlicensed frequency bands, and the interference among the VUEs, and WUEs are mitigated by the listen-before-talk (LBT) scheme or the duty cycle scheme. Due to the mixed integer nonlinear programming (MINLP) objective in the optimization problem, the problem is hard to be solved directly. Instead, we solve the problem by two steps. The number of VUEs offloaded to unlicensed frequency bands as well as the time factor for duty cycle scheme is firstly determined, and then, the optimization problem is converted into a convex optimization problem, which is solved by the proposed Lagrange Duality Method (LDM). Numerical results show the efficiency of our proposed application scenario compared to case with only LTE system or only WiFi system. Moreover, compared to traditional Greedy algorithm, the proposed algorithm performs better in terms of throughput with a guaranteed QoS of WUEs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract We provide a framework for the study of the allocation of a divisible resource from a planner to agents via intermediaries. Intermediaries simultaneously post fees for their services, and the planner optimally selects a subset of them to assist in the transmission of the resource. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a perfectly competitive equilibrium in which intermediaries selected by the planner collect no fees. Furthermore, these conditions are necessary and sufficient for the uniqueness of an equilibrium with the property that intermediaries not selected by the planner post zero prices. Furthermore, these conditions are necessary and sufficient to guarantee the uniqueness of equilibrium when intermediaries who are not selected post fees equal to zero. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]