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Some recent views question the concept of sovereignty (especially the sovereignty of states), arguing that sovereignty is to be abandoned as a historical concept, because it existed in the world of the Westphalian system (created after 1648), where states were the major players, centers of power and objects of interest. Instead, we suggest that sovereignty should be perceived again as a “supreme power” (summa potestas), meaning a return to the pre-Bodinian concept of sovereignty and perceive it as a “power to exert control”. With regard to cyberspace, this does not mean direct control of all entities in the cyberspace, but only those that provide services which are perceived as “essential” or “critical” for the security and interests of the state. That is actually the approach taken with regard to ensuring the safety of 5G networks—through control imposed on the network operators, as required by the respective EU legislation and the EU Toolbox on 5G Networks specifically.

Traditionally, the idea of a sovereign is being connected either with an absolutist ruler (later replaced by “the people”) at the national level, or the nation-state at the international level – at least in the conditions of the Westphalian system created in 1648. Today, on the contrary, we are witnessing a “post-” situation in many respects – post-modernism, post-positivism, but also post-statism – basically being a sort of return to the pre-Westphalian system (see Ondrej Hamuľák, “Lessons from the ‘Constitutional Mythology’ or How to Reconcile the Concept of State Sovereignty with European Integration,” DANUBE: Law, Economics and Social Issues Review Vol. 6, No. 2 (2015); or Danuta Kabat-Rudnicka, “Autonomy or Sovereignty: the Case of the European Union,” International and Comparative Law Review Vol. 20, No. 2 (2020)). However, paternalistic views, prevailing especially in times of crisis and uncertainty, desperately search for a sovereign to lead us from the crises. With regard to cyberattacks and insecurity in the cyberspace this means an effort to subordinate cyberspace to state sovereignty. Still, given the limitations of traditional state-based monopolies of power and legislation, the state as an “analogue sovereign” shrinks in the digital cyberspace rather to a co-sovereign, co-ordinator, or in feudal terms a “senior” vis-à-vis their vassals. The actual ensuring of the tasks of state as a “digital sovereign” is namely often being entrusted to non-state (essentially private-owned) entities, under the threat of legal sanctions. The current situation of constructing “digital sovereignty” of traditional states or of the EU is thus marked by the necessity of cooperation between the state power and those non-state entities which are falling under its analogue jurisdiction.

The question of the application and impact of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (‘Charter’) in quotidian practice of human rights protection and review is a strategic one. Given the predominantly decentralised effects of EU law and with the due account to the wide interpretation of the scope of the Charter’s application (Art. 51(1)) presented by the CJEU (C-617/10 Fransson), the national dimension of the application of the Charter forms the crucial issue for the functioning of the EU system of fundamental rights protection. The Charter itself has a big potential to influence the content, nature and mechanisms of the fundamental rights protection at the national level. The present paper focuses on this phenomena in connection to the case-law, opinions and workload of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (‘TK’). It analyses the approach of TK towards the Charter in abstract manner as well as the (non)appearance of the Charter in the reasoning of the court in concrete cases. The article reports on the main cases and analyses the reasons of the aloof approach of the TK towards the EU human rights catalogue.

The aim of this paper is to evaluate and differentiate between the phenomena of cyberwarfare and information warfare, as manifestations of what we perceive as postmodern warfare. We describe and analyse the current examples of the use the postmodern warfare and the reactions of states and international bodies to these phenomena. The subject matter of this paper is the relationship between new types of postmodern conflicts and the law of armed conflicts (law of war). Based on ICJ case law, it is clear that under current legal rules of international law of war, cyber attacks as well as information attacks (often performed in the cyberspace as well) can only be perceived as “war” if executed in addition to classical kinetic warfare, which is often not the case. In most cases perceived “only” as a non-linear warfare (postmodern conflict), this practice nevertheless must be condemned as conduct contrary to the principles of international law and (possibly) a crime under national laws, unless this type of conduct will be recognized by the international community as a “war” proper, in its new, postmodern sense.

The article responds to the recent evolution in AI judiciary, especially as presented in China. The authors compare the basic methodological background of Western and Eastern legal systems, concluding that the West is rather inclined to post-positivist methodology in law, which seems incompatible with the full use of AI in legal decision-making. In China, with its more pragmatic approach, the actual process of decision-making might be closer to a new form of technological legal positivism, distinct from Western trends in jurisprudence. Finally, various forms of applicability of AI in law and judiciary are pondered upon, so as to use at least some positive aspects of AI in this sector--albeit with reservations regarding the decision-making proper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Artificial intelligence (AI) is developing rapidly. There are technologies available that fulfil several tasks better than humans can and even behave like humans to some extent. Thus, the situation prompts the question whether AI should be granted legal person- and/or agenthood? There have been similar situations in history where the legal status of slaves or indigenous peoples was discussed. Still, in those historical questions, the subjects under study were always natural persons, i.e., they were living beings belonging to the species Homo sapiens. We analyse the situation from moral-ethical and practical perspectives. The final conclusion is that the currently existing AIs are still so far removed from humans that there is simply no need to think seriously about legal person- or agenthood. Doing so would mean imposing obligations on the AI to follow. This, in turn, would mean that certain rights in relation to those obligations would have to be granted as well. By all evidence, this is something that humans are not ready to do yet and might never get that far. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The League of Nations, predecessor of the current United Nations, was the first world organization with a real impact on its members. The organization was created after the WWI in an attempt to establish a stable peace system among its members. Estonia, a country formed after the end of the war, was in a need of international recognition and protection. Hence, the membership was welcome as an anchor to liberty and freedom. This research analyses how the organization influenced Estonia and what were the major contributions of the country in the development of the League of Nations. The aim of the paper is to analyse the concrete impact of the membership on the position and recognition of Estonia as well as the influence of Estonia on the development of key activities of the League of Nations, in particular the questions of refugee protection and return of prisoners of war; protection of minorities (including the support to protection of rights of native American tribes) and attempts to establish the uniform global legal order. A special focus is given also to personal impact represented by the authority of Ragnar Nurkse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]