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We analyze the profitability of government-owned banks’ lending to their owners, using a unique data set of relatively homogeneous government-owned banks; the banks are all owned by similarly structured local governments in a single country. Making use of a natural experiment that altered the regulatory and competitive environment, we find evidence that such lending was used to transfer revenues from the banks to the governments. Some of the evidence is particularly pronounced in localities where the incumbent politicians face significant competition for reelection. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Previous work shows large differences in fees for S&P 500 index funds and other funds and suggests that investors suffer wealth losses investing in high-fee funds when similar low-fee funds are available. In contrast, the neoclassical model of mutual funds (Berk and van Binsbergen, 2015 , J. Financ. Econ. 118, 1–20) argues that percentage fees are irrelevant, as fund size will adjust in equilibrium such that net alphas are equal to zero. We show that fees matter from an investor perspective. We document (i) a strong negative association between net-of-fee fund performance and fees in a sample of all US and international equity funds, (ii) economically large, robust, persistent, and pervasive fee dispersion in the mutual fund industry, and (iii) important economic effects for investors. During the sample period, the mutual fund industry has generated a total value lost (i.e. a negative net value added) of 125 billion USD, coming predominantly from high-fee funds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The trading of shares of the same firm in multiple markets has become common over the last 30 years, but there is little empirical evidence on the extent to which investors actively exploit multimarket environments. We introduce a volume-based measure of multimarket trading to address this question. Analyzing a large set of cross-listed firms, we find higher multimarket trading among markets with similar designs and strong enforcement of insider trading laws and for firms with higher institutional ownership. These findings are important for firms evaluating the benefits of cross listing and for markets competing for order flow. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Inspection is an effective but also expensive quality assurance activity to find defects early during software development. The defect detection process, team size, and staff hours invested can have a considerable impact on the defect detection effectiveness and cost-benefit of an inspection. In this paper, we use empirical data and a probabilistic model to estimate this impact for nominal (noncommunicating) inspection teams in an experiment context. Further, the analysis investigates how cutting off the inspection after a certain time frame would influence inspection performance. Main findings of the investigation are: 1) Using combinations of different reading techniques in a team is considerably more effective than using the best single technique only (regardless of the observed level of effort). 2) For optimizing the inspection performance, determining the optimal process mix in a team is more important than adding an inspector (above a certain team size) in our model. 3) A high level of defect detection effectiveness is much more costly to achieve than a moderate level since the average cost for the defects found by the inspector last added to a team increases more than linearly with growing effort investment. The work provides an initial baseline of inspection performance with regard to process diversity and effort in inspection teams. We encourage further studies on the topic of time usage with defect detection techniques and its effect on inspection effectiveness in a variety of inspection contexts to support inspection planning with limited resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]