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This study delves into the impact of the 2008 Global Crisis on the competition between the wholesalers and unregistered firms in Eastern European and Central Asian countries. The survey data from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance (BEEPSII and BEEPSIV) conducted by the World Bank in 2008 (crisis) and 2013 (post-crisis) were utilized. The survey covers 29 countries in the region. The results of the nonparametric tests show that significantly more wholesalers experienced competition against unregistered firms in 2008 when compared to 2013. While approximately half of the wholesalers experienced informal sector competition in 2008, in 2013, only around one-third of wholesalers experienced informal sector competition. This post-crisis decline is seen for both the five Central Asian economies (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) that are examined and the other transition economies. When wholesalers are classified into different categories based on size, independence from a larger firm, type of firm (partnership, sole proprietorship, etc.), gender of the owner, gender of the top manager, experience of the top manager, and having an internationally recognized quality certification, it is observed that competition against unregistered firms declined in 2013 for all types of wholesalers except for partnerships and larger firms. The results show that, on a scale of 0 to 4 (0 being no informal sector competition and 4 being very severe informal sector competition), the mean severity of competition against unregistered firms was 1.52 in 2008 and 1.18 in 2013. However, this decline in the severity of informal sector competition post-crisis is not seen for the five Central Asian economies that are examined. Also, when different firm types are examined, limited partnerships and firms that are part of a larger firm did not experience a decline in informal sector competition. To find the determinants of competition between the wholesalers and unregistered or informal firms, binary logistic regressions were used. The results show that smaller firms without an internationally recognized certification are more susceptible to informal sector competition in the Central Asian economies, whereas larger, shareholding firms are more prone to informal sector competition in the other transition economies.

In this study, we examine how entrepreneurs’ perception of the national and local economy affects the entrepreneurial activity in U.S. states. We also look into the impact on small business owners’ outlook for the future and on their firm’s performance. Does the status of the economy affect small business owners’ optimism, their activities, and their success? We find that although the perception of the economy does not have an impact on the entrepreneurial activity in a state (as measured by the number of new startups), it has a significant impact on both small firms’ performance and small business owners’ outlook for the future. In the states where the business owners have a more positive view on the national economy, small firms are more successful and their owners are more optimistic in terms of their plans for future hiring. In the states where the business owners have a more positive view on the local economy, small firms are more successful and their owners are more optimistic in terms of encouraging others to start a business in their state. We also find that the states with a higher percentage of owners showing their business as primary employment tend to have significantly more entrepreneurial activity when compared to the other states.

This paper investigates corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Using World Bank’s BEEPS IV and BEEPS V surveys, we investigate the degree of corruption in these countries for different industries. We focus on the manufacturing sector, the services sector, and the core sector, and focus on corruption related to customs/imports, courts, and taxes/tax collection. We find that the overall degree of corruption for all three sectors is somewhere between “seldom” and “never”. Our results show that, for all three sectors, the degree of corruption is the highest in taxes/tax collection and the lowest in courts. Again, for all three sectors, shareholding firms with shares traded in the stock market and limited partnerships suffer the most. While for the manufacturing and services sectors, larger firms suffer the most, for the core sector, medium-sized firms suffer the most. When we compare the manufacturing sector to the other sectors, we find that while the overall level of corruption is similar in the manufacturing sector and the other sectors, manufacturers face a higher degree of corruption in transactions related to customs/imports and taxes/tax collection when compared to the other sectors. We do not find any significant difference between the manufacturing sector and the other sectors with respect to the degree of corruption related to courts. Overall, our findings indicate that policymakers in the region need to protect manufacturers from requests/demands for additional payments or gifts by customs authorities and/or by tax collectors and auditors.

The 2008 Global Crisis had profound impacts on economies worldwide, prompting significant scrutiny of various institutional frameworks, including court systems. During this period, legal systems faced unprecedented challenges in addressing the ensuing turmoil. Courts were busy with cases related to foreclosures, bankruptcies, and financial misconduct. Due to the exposed weaknesses in regulatory oversight, reforms were made to improve accountability, transparency, and efficiency within judicial systems. Transition economies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia bore a significant brunt of the crisis and its subsequent reform endeavors. In this study, we evaluate the perspectives of Eastern European and Central Asian retailers on their court systems during and after the 2008 global crisis. We assess how many of them dealt with the legal system during and after the crisis, how quickly the cases moved through the court system, how fair and impartial the court was, and how successfully the court could enforce its rulings. To evaluate the impact of the global crisis on retailers’ views on the court system, we compare the crisis period to the post-crisis period. The World Bank’s BEEPSII and BEEPSIV surveys performed in Eastern Europe and Central Asia are used as our crisis and post-crisis samples. To compare the crisis period responses to the post-crisis ones, we use nonparametric tests (i.e. the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon and the Chi-square tests). Our results show that, after the crisis, fewer retailers went to court, when compared to the crisis period. This finding can be seen as positive. We also find that, after the crisis, retailers were more optimistic about judicial impartiality and case processing speed in their respective countries, compared to the crisis period. On the other hand, our results show that retailers’ assessments of the court’s ability to implement its rulings in these countries did not seem to change after the crisis. These findings have important policy implications. Policymakers can use these findings to take precautions before a global crisis hits. They will know that a global economic/financial crisis affects the volume of cases, courts’ fairness, and processing speed. Therefore, they can hire more employees to deal with the upcoming problems with the volume and the processing speed, and they can increase the scrutiny of the system to protect the system’s fairness.

This study investigates the transformation of competitive dynamics between formal sector retailers and their informal sector counterparts in Eastern European and Central Asian countries after the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. The absence of extensive government bailouts in these regions intensified the economic repercussions of the crisis. This study used data from the BEEPS II and BEEPS IV (i.e. Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey) surveys conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank with a focus on informal competition in Eastern Europe and Central Asia based on data from owners or top-managers of companies working in this region. To investigate the impact of the global crisis on informal competition for retailers, survey results in 2008 ("crisis period") were compared with the data in 2013 ("post-crisis period"). Non-parametric tests, specifically the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon tests, were used to compare the 2008 and 2013 results. Binary logistic regressions were used to identify factors influencing the perception of competition from the informal sector (Pearson correlation coefficients and assessed Variance Inflation Factors to detect multicollinearity issues). Findings reveal a significant shift post-crisis shift with a reduced proportion of formal sector retailers competing with informal firms. Notably, this effect is statistically insignificant for retailers with sole proprietorships and partnerships and those with internationally recognized quality certifications. Moreover, research highlights a diminished perception of informal competitors as substantial hindrances to retailers' business operations post-crisis. However, this observation is not statistically significant for retail businesses structured as partnerships. Logistic regression indicates that smaller firms, firms led by a more experienced top manager, and firms with a female top manager are more prone to perceive competition from the informal sector. Furthermore, this study delves into the factors shaping retailers' perceptions across post-Soviet and other transition countries, revealing differences in the impact of firm size and female ownership. This nuanced investigation contributes depth to the current literature concerning the interconnections between formal and informal retail sectors. It offers a comparative analysis focusing on post-Soviet states and other transitioning nations in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

One of the main problems in emerging countries is corruption in the administration and systems of courts. This research investigates whether the perspectives of manufacturing businesses in Eastern Europe and Central Asia that took part in the BEEPSII (2008) and BEEPSIV (2013) surveys during and after the global crisis of 2008 were different. We evaluate the number of times they interacted with the judicial system both during and after the crisis, the speed at which it proceeded, its fairness and impartiality, and the degree to which the court was able to successfully enforce its rulings. More than five thousand manufacturing enterprises from Asia and Central Europe took part in the surveys. We find that fewer manufacturers went to court following the crisis. After the crisis, there is no discernible change in the manufacturers' opinions regarding the fairness, impartiality, or corruption of the legal system. A few years after the crisis, manufacturers' assessments of the legal system's rate of advancement were seen as noticeably improved, while the court's capacity to carry out its decisions in these nations was thought to be less effective.

We investigate the impact of the 2008-2009 Global Crisis on banking and insurance around the world. Using World Bank’s classification, we examine the impact on high-income OECD, high-income non-OECD, middle-income, and low-income countries. We examine how the crisis affected seven banking-related variables and two insurancerelated variables. First, we test to see if there was any sign of an upcoming crisis in each group before the crisis started. Our results show that in none of the country-income groups, there was a sign of an upcoming crisis. In other words, there was no significant change in any of the banking or insurance variables during the year preceding the crisis. Then, we test to see the impact of the crisis on these variables for each group. We do not see a significant impact on any of these variables during the crisis year. Finally, we examine the long-run impact of the crisis on these variables for each group and we find that, liquid liabilities went up significantly just after the crisis. Therefore, we conclude that middle-income countries were affected more than the other groups in terms of banks’ liquid liabilities going up significantly.

This study investigates the impact of social media events on the behavior of six mega-cap technology stocks. Analyzing both positive and negative events, we find that negative events correlate with higher VIX Betas and trading volumes, while positive events are linked to higher stock prices. These effects vary across individual stocks, and unexpected associations emerge, such as increased trading volume for certain positive events. Our findings offer insights into the intricate interplay between social media events and market dynamics, highlighting the nuanced influences on volatility, trading volume, and stock prices for specific stocks. This study contributes to our understanding of the complex relationship between social media and financial markets, emphasizing the importance of considering stock-specific dynamics in investment strategies.

This paper summarizes the arguments and counterarguments within the scientific discussion on the issue of corruption. The main purpose of the research is to examine the impact of global economic/financial crisis on corruption. We focus on manufacturing firms in the EECA region and examine their activities including bidding for government contracts, applying for an operating license, and applying for an import license. Systematization of the literary sources and approaches for solving the problem indicates that bribes got significantly smaller after the crisis ended. The relevance of this scientific problem decision is that governments’ efforts to improve the overall business environment when facing an economic/financial crisis help reduce corruption. Investigation of corruption in the paper is carried out in the following logical sequence: First, the size of bribes for securing government contracts is examined. Then, the prevalence of bribery during import license application process is examined. Finally, the prevalence of bribery during operating license application process is examined. Methodological tools of the research methods were non-parametric tests that compare the years of 2007 and 2010-2014. The research object is manufacturing firms in the EECA region because they were included in the BEEPS IV and BEEPS V manufacturing surveys. The research empirically confirms and theoretically proves that governments’ actions during an economic or financial crisis affect the size and prevalence of bribery. The research results can be useful for government officials that plan on reducing corruption in their region or country.

Abstract In this study, we examine whether retailers in Eastern Europe and Central Asia found corruption, courts, tax administration, tax rates, political instability, and business licensing/permits as an obstacle to their firm. We focus on a specific period when retailers all around the world suffered in terms of revenues and profits. This is the period surrounding the 2008-2009 global crisis. We first examine the degree to which retailers see each of these factors as an obstacle in the pre-crisis period. Were they seeing each of these factors as a minor, moderate, major, or very severe obstacle, or were they seeing them as no obstacle? Then, we compare our findings to our findings in the post-crisis period. Had their perceptions improved or worsened after the crisis ended? We expect to see improvements in each of these areas due to governments’ efforts to lessen the burden on retailers. Our results show that retailers’ perceptions of all six factors had improved post-crisis. These findings confirm that, overall, governments were successful in reducing the burdens on retailers.

In this paper, we focus on retailers in Eastern Europe and Central Asia and examine the possible change in the level of corruption after the 2008-2009 Global Crisis. We focus on three events: securing government contracts, applications for an operating license, and applications for an importing license by retailers in the region. We find that fewer retailers secured or attempted to secure a government contract after the crisis ended. This may be due to overall economic activities going down during this period. We also find bribes got smaller after the crisis ended, which was a positive change. Our results show that there was no significant change in the percentage of retailers applying for an import license or the percentage that paid bribes after the crisis ended. The number of days needed to get this license went down, which was a positive change. Our results show that applications by retailers to get an operating license went down, which might also be due to overall activities going down. The percentage that paid bribes to get an operating license got smaller, which was a positive change. On the other hand, the number of days needed to get an operating license went up, which was a negative change. Overall, we can conclude that there were some positive changes in terms of corruption facing retailers in the region.

In this study, we examine two groups of firms in Eastern Europe and Central Asia: retailers and core industry firms. We focus on these firms’ new loan applications before and after the 2008-2009 Global crisis. Our results show that there was a statistically significant decrease in the percentage of retailers and core industry firms that applied for a new loan post-crisis. We find that fewer retailers needed a loan post-crisis and that they thought that all aspects of financing significantly improved after the crisis. On the other hand, more core industry firms needed a loan post-crisis. According to the core industry firms, certain aspects of financing (i.e. the complexity of application procedures and the interest rates) worsened, while certain other aspects (i.e. collateral requirement and the required loan size and maturity) improved after the crisis. We also find that there was a statistically significant decrease in the percentage of retailers and core industry firms that had their financial statements checked/certified by an external auditor. Finally, we find that, post-crisis, “access to finance” was seen as a smaller obstacle by both groups of firms (although core firms stated that certain aspects of financing had deteriorated). We conclude that, post-crisis, fewer retailers applied for a new loan because fewer firms needed funding. On the other hand, post-crisis, fewer core firms applied for a new loan because of more complex application procedures, higher interest rates, and their belief that it would not be approved.

After the 2008-2009 Global crisis, governments around the world implemented changes in taxes and regulations. In this study, using two survey datasets, we examine how these changes had affected retailers in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. We look at several measures including the time spent by senior managers on regulations, the visits or inspections by tax officials, the number of inspections or meetings with tax officials, and whether a gift or informal payment was expected or requested by tax officials. The BEEPS IV survey serves as our pre-crisis sample and the beeps V survey serves as our post-crisis sample. We find that the results are mixed. Our results show that, postcrisis, time spent by senior management on regulations had significantly increased. This is a negative change that happened after the crisis. However, we also find that, post-crisis, there was a significant drop in the number of retailers that were visited or inspected by tax officials. The overall number of inspections or meetings with tax officials went down slightly, but this drop was not statistically significant. We also find that the percentage of retailers who felt that a gift or informal payment was expected or requested went down significantly. Overall, we conclude that the results are mixed. While certain aspects of regulations worsened (i.e. the time spent on regulations), other aspects (i.e. visits/inspections and expectation of informal payments) improved.

This paper summarizes the arguments and counterarguments within the scientific discussion on the issue of changes in financing conditions due to a global financial or economic crisis. The main purpose of the research is to examine how the loan collateral requirement for manufacturers in Eastern Europe and Central Asia had changed after the 2008-2009 Global Crisis. Systematization of the literary sources and approaches for solving the problem of changes in collateral requirement after the 2008-2009 Global Crisis indicates that there were some significant changes in terms of the collateral requirement and the type of collateral used post-crisis. The study is important because its findings will guide manufacturing firms, as well as lenders and government agencies in the region in case of an upcoming financial or economic crisis. Investigation of the topic of collateral requirement in the paper is carried out in the following logical sequence: First, the percentage of manufacturers that were required to show a collateral for obtaining a new loan is examined pre- and post-crisis. Then, the type of collateral that was used pre- and post-crisis is examined. The study uses six years of research data: the 2007 survey responses were used as the pre-crisis data and the 2010-2014 data were used as the post-crisis data. We focus on manufacturing firms in Eastern Europe and Central Asia because we have detailed data from the BEEPS IV and BEEPS V surveys of EBRD-World Bank. The paper presents the results of an empirical analysis of collateral requirement and type of collateral used, which shows that fewer manufacturers reported a collateral requirement for new loans post-crisis. When we examine the different types of assets that were used as collateral, we find that there were some significant changes from the pre-crisis period to the post-crisis period. We find that, post-crisis, fewer manufacturers used lands and buildings, machinery and equipment, or other items as collateral for new loans. There was no significant change in the percentage of manufacturers that used accounts receivable and inventories as collateral. On the other hand, our results show that, post-crisis, more manufacturers used personal assets of the owner as collateral. Overall, although fewer firms reported a collateral requirement for new loans post-crisis and fewer firms needed to show lands and buildings, machinery and equipment, or other items as collateral, more firms had to show their owner’s personal assets. The research empirically confirms and theoretically proves that governments and lenders reduced the collateral requirement in this region and that in these times of deteriorating financial conditions, as a last resort, manufacturers had to use the owner’s personal assets as collateral. The results of this research can be useful for manufacturing firms, as well as for lenders and government agencies in the region.

In this study, we focus on how regulations and taxes affect manufacturing firms in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. We examine whether overall regulations became a bigger obstacle to these firms after the 2008-2009 Global crisis. We also examine whether tax inspections became a bigger obstacle after the Global crisis. Besides regulations and tax inspections, we also look into the prevalence of corruption related to tax officials before and after the Global crisis. Using two large datasets (i.e. the BEEPS IV and BEEPS V surveys), we are able to compare the pre-crisis period to the post-crisis period. Our results show that, in this region, post-crisis, senior managers spent more time on dealing with overall regulations which includes tax-related regulations and other types of regulations. Therefore, we can conclude that, post-crisis, regulations became a bigger obstacle to manufacturing firms’ operations. We also find that, post-crisis, there was a significant drop in the percentage of firms that had inspections or meetings with tax officials. Also, post-crisis, each firm on average, had fewer inspections or meetings with tax officials. Therefore, while overall regulations became a bigger obstacle to these firms, tax inspections became a smaller problem. When we examine corruption, we find that there was no significant change in the prevalence of bribes related to tax officials. Before and after the Global crisis, a similar percentage (8-9%) of manufacturing firms had to deal with bribe requests by tax officials. Future studies may focus on other types of regulations which include employment regulations, health and safety regulations, licensing regulations, environmental regulations, and zoning regulations, and the corruption related to these regulations.

In this study, we examine how retailers and core industry firms changed their banking relationships after the global crisis in 2008-2009. We use the BEEPS IV and BEEPS V (i.e. Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey) surveys to compare the pre- and post-crisis periods. Our results show that while there was no significant change with respect to retailers’ use of checking or savings accounts, the core industry firms increased their use of these accounts. We also find that fewer firms in both groups had an overdraft facility or a line of credit or loan post-crisis, when compared to the pre-crisis period. Our results also show that, while there was no significant change in the type of the financial institution that a core firm deals with post-crisis, for retailers, it was a different story. Post-crisis, a higher percentage of retailers borrowed from a private commercial bank and a lower percentage borrowed from a state-owned bank/agency or from a non-bank financial institution. Overall, we conclude that, access to finance was harder for both groups in the region post-crisis (i.e. both overdraft facilities and lines of credit or loans went down). Also, post-crisis, more of the retailers were forced to borrow from a private commercial bank rather than a state-owned bank/agency or a non-bank institution.

In this study, we examine whether different types of regulations affect the composition of small business owners in U.S. states. We employ a national survey titled the “United States Small Business Friendliness Survey”. This survey asks small business owners their opinions on different types of regulations (i.e. “health and safety regulations”, “employment regulations”, “tax code”, “licensing regulations”, “environmental regulations”, and “zoning regulations”). The survey also asks business owners questions on their own characteristics like “position in the firm”, “previous entrepreneurial experience”, “gender”, “age”, “political view”, “education level”, and “race”. Our results show that each regulation category affects almost all categories of owner characteristics. The exceptions are the following: “Health and safety regulations” do not affect position in the firm, “employment regulations” do not affect gender and age, “tax code” does not affect position in the firm and age, “licensing regulations” and “environmental regulations” do not affect position in the firm and gender, and “zoning regulations” do not affect position in the firm, previous experience, and gender. “Health and safety regulations” affect gender, age, political view, education level, and race. “Employment regulations” affect previous entrepreneurial experience, political view, education level, and race. “Tax code” affects previous entrepreneurial experience, gender, political view, education level, and race. “Licensing regulations” affect previous entrepreneurial experience, age, political view, education level, and race. “Environmental regulations” affect previous entrepreneurial experience, age, political view, education level, and race. “Zoning regulations” affect age, political view, education level, and race. Overall, our findings indicate that regulations affect the geographical choice of entrepreneurs. The states with a more favorable score in a certain area of regulation attract a certain group of entrepreneurs. Policymakers should consider these findings when devising their strategies to attract certain types of entrepreneurs to their states.

This paper studies the impact of the 2008-2009 global crisis on banking and insurance industry, using relevant variables obtained from the Global Financial Development Database, including bank private credit, deposit money bank assets, deposit money bank assets to deposit money bank assets and central bank assets, liquid liabilities, central bank assets, financial system deposits, life and non-life insurance premium volumes, and private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions. Our study does not find any significant change in any of the variables of concerned before or during the crisis periods. However, we find that the ratio of liquid liabilities in the financial system to GDP increased significantly following the crisis period. Liquid liabilities comprise cash and demand deposits, and any easily convertible (into cash) liquid assets including fixed deposits, money market accounts, foreign exchange, marketable securities and government bills.

This paper investigates the impact of the 2008-2009 Crisis on retailers and core industry firms in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Utilizing the World Bank’s BEEPS IV (for pre-Crisis) and V (for post-Crisis) survey data, we look at the timing of payment of fixed assets purchased as well as how these firms paid for their purchases of fixed assets, i.e., financing by internal funds, financing by owner’s contribution, and financing by supplier credit. We find that the percentage of customers of retailers and core industry firms paying after delivery had declined post-Crisis. Such finding suggests that these firms had tightened up their credit policies which resulted in more customers paying before deliveries. We also find that the use of internal funds by both retailers and core industry firms significantly increased post-Crisis. As such, we also find that the use of owner’s distribution (new shares) and supplier credit significantly decreased post-Crisis, for both retailers and core industry firms. These findings are consistent with prior studies which suggest more stringent credit requirements following a crisis. This results in a change in firms’ capital structure.

ct This study examines the impact of the 2008 Global Crisis on the efficiency of the financial institutions around the world. We focus on 203 countries and examine nine efficiency measures which include net interest margin, lendingdeposit spread, non-interest income, overhead costs, return on assets, return on equity, cost to income ratio, credit to government and state-owned enterprises, and stock market turnover ratio. We document how each of these efficiency measures had changed during the run-up to the crisis, during the crisis, and after the crisis. Our results show that, during the run-up to the crisis, there was no sign of an upcoming crisis in terms of these efficiency measures. During the crisis period, both return on assets and return on equity went down significantly. There was no change in the other variables during this period. During the post-crisis period, we find that return on assets and return on equity continued to go down. Also, cost to income ratio went up significantly post-crisis. On the other hand, credit to government and state-owned enterprises went up significantly post-crisis. There was no significant change in the other variables. These findings should help policymakers to devise strategies that would protect their country’s financial system.

This study examines how the depth of the financial system around the world have changed before, during, and after the 2008 Global Crisis. In total, we examine nine variables related to the depth of the financial system. Two of these variables are related to the depth of the stock market, four of them are related to outstanding amounts of public and private debt, one variable is related to the amount of international debt offerings, and four variables are related to the amount of equity and debt instruments in portfolios. When we examine the year preceding the crisis, we find that two of the variables had changed significantly. These are the “stock market capitalization” and the “stock market total value traded” variables. Both of these variables had gone up significantly before the crisis. We do not see any significant change in the other nine variables. When we examine the crisis period, we find that the “stock market capitalization” started to go down and also the “gross portfolio equity liabilities” went down significantly. None of the other variables had changed during the crisis period. Finally, when we examine the year following the crisis, we find that “stock market capitalization” went down significantly. None of the other variables had changed significantly during the year following the crisis. Policymakers can use these findings to evaluate the chances of a new crisis happening and also to take precautions beforehand.

This paper examines how entrepreneurial activity and the factors associated with entrepreneurial activity have changed after the 2008-2009 Global Financial Crisis. For entrepreneurial activity, we look at new business density and new business registrations. For factors associated with entrepreneurial activity, we look at cost of business start-up procedures, cost to import and export, required number of tax payments, total tax rate, required number of procedures for start-ups, required time for different procedures, credit coverage, and legal rights. Our results show that most categories (i.e. taxes, number of procedures required, time required, credit coverage, and legal rights) improved over our sample period. This shows that countries were showing efforts to make improvements in these areas. The results for costs are mixed. The cost of business start-up procedures improved (i.e. declined), but both the cost to export and cost to import deteriorated (i.e. increased) over the sample period. The increases in cost to export and cost to import might have been due to governments’ actions to protect their own producers. We conclude that while most of the measures had improved during this period, these improvements do not seem to translate into an improvement in the number of new businesses. The results are mixed at best. New business density slightly declined, while new business registrations increased. Overall, our findings indicate that when facing a global economic/financial crisis, government action is essential in preventing the collapse of the small business sector. The timely changes in laws and regulations help protect the entrepreneurial environment

In this study, I examine the impact of business conditions on high-leverage and low-leverage U.S. retailers and wholesalers during the 2000-2005 period. I focus on firms’ profitability and liquidity values. My objective here is to see if business conditions affect high-leverage and low-leverage firms’ profitability and liquidity values in a similar fashion. In terms of profitability, I find that leverage is an important factor for both retailers and wholesalers. My results show that while business conditions significantly affect high-leverage retailers’ profitability, they do not affect low-leverage retailers’ profitability. The opposite is true for wholesalers: while business conditions do not significantly affect high-leverage wholesalers’ profitability, they do affect low-leverage wholesalers’ profitability. In other words, the profits of high-leverage retailers and low-leverage wholesalers are significantly affected by business conditions. In terms of liquidity, I find that leverage is an important factor for wholesalers, but not for retailers. While favorable business conditions affect high-leverage wholesalers’ liquidity values positively, the impact on low-leverage wholesalers’ liquidity value is negative.

In this study, we examine how the 2008-2009 Global Crisis has affected the informal payments/gifts paid by manufacturing firms. We compare the crisis period to the post-crisis period and found that the manufacturing firms believed that the incidence of bribes went down significantly after the crisis ended. When we differentiate the firms with respect to size, structure, legal form, gender of the owners, gender of the top manager, and whether or not they held an international quality certification, we find that the results hold for almost all classifications of firms. When we go into more detail and examine the incidence of bribes in customs/imports, courts, and taxes/tax collection, we found similar results. In almost all categories of firms, the respondents saw a significant drop in the incidence of bribes in all of these areas (i.e. customs/imports, courts, and taxes/tax collection) after the crisis ended.

In this study, using a widely available market liquidity measure, the “turnover ratio”, the authors test for market liquidity contagion during the four financial crises that occurred between 1997 and 1999: The Thai crisis, the Hong Kong crisis, the Russian crisis, and the Brazilian crisis. It is found that while the liquidity levels decreased in approximately half of the sample markets, in the remaining half, the liquidity levels actually improved. The Granger causality tests show that while there is almost no evidence of causality (in both directions) before each crisis, during each crisis, approximately half of the pairwise tests were significant. The results show that most of these causalities are reverse feedback effects from the non-crisis-origin markets to the crisis-origin market. Therefore, it is concluded that the more crucial phenomenon during these crises is the “reverse feedback effects” rather than the liquidity contagion itself.

This paper documents the empirical relationship between ownership concentration and monetary policy to fill out the picture for when ownership concentration is likely to change within U.S. publicly traded firms. Our sample is drawn from the Dlugosz et al. (2006) data set for firms between 1996 and 2001. The authors explore the patterns between the Federal Reserve’s policy position and ownership concentration rather than asserting causal direction between the two. This empirical paper tests alternative theories on blockholder activism by examining whether “voice” or “exit” is more dominant under contractionary monetary policy. Using the series of same direction changes in the Federal Funds Rate to establish time periods as a proxy for monetary policy in the U.S., nonparametric tests show that there are more blockholders per firm, the sum of their blockholdings in percentage terms is higher, and the total percentage held by the blockholder in U.S. firms is greater under contractionary policy periods. This supports an active theory of blockholder behavior in corporate governance.

In this study, we examine the impact of the 2008 Global Crisis on access to finance. We use three measures of access to finance: “Number of bank branches per 100,000 adults”, “Value traded of top 10 traded companies to total value traded (%)”, and “Market capitalization outside of top 10 largest companies to total market capitalization (%)”. We use non-parametric tests in our analyses. Our results show that in the run-up to the crisis and after the crisis, there was no significant change in any of these three measures. However, during the crisis period, we find that “Value traded of top 10 traded companies to total value traded (%)” has gone up and this change is marginally significant. We do not find any impact on the other two measures during the crisis. We conclude that the global crisis only had a marginally significant impact on access to finance.

In this study, we compare the determinants of GDP per capital for China and the other BRICS countries over the 1985-2011 period. Due to missing data, we do not include Russia in the analysis. The variables that we include in the analyses are patent applications by residents, scientific and technical journal articles, exports, household consumption, age dependency ratio, foreign direct investment, energy production, and domestic credit to private sector. Our regression analyses show that, for the sample period, the determinants of GDP per capita are different for China and the other BRICS countries. While scientific and technical journal articles, household final consumption expenditure, foreign direct investment net inflows, exports of goods and services, age dependency ratio, and domestic credit to private sector by banks explain China’s GDP per capita in one or both models, the results are mixed for the other BRICS countries.