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This paper analyzes some of the general election consequences of the top-two primary system in California elections beginning in 2012.  In particular we focus on general election contests between candidates of the same party that were not possible under the previous primary system, but have occurred with some regularity with the top-two.  We find that same party elections are characterized by greater competitiveness, lower turnout, and less—but still substantial—polarized voting.

Objective: Receiving instruments from surgical technicians during endoscopic laryngeal and airway microsurgery (ELAM) has challenges including repeated, expeditious handling of delicate instruments and passing them to the surgeon's hand opposite of where the surgical assistant is standing. Optimizing this interaction may reduce surgical errors and improve operative efficiency. Methods: A proprietary ELAM instrument holder was attached to both sides of the operating room bed. The device consisted of an articulating arm with custom silicone inserts mounted on a tray (storing up to three endoscopic instruments). ELAM cases were randomized to be performed either with (device) or without the holder (control). Using custom software, instrument pass time (IPT), instrument drop rate (IDR), and communication errors (eg handing incorrect instruments) were manually recorded. Qualitative use metrics relating to overall device satisfaction were also obtained. Results: Data were collected from 25 device and 23 control cases among three different laryngologists. Average IPT was nearly three times quicker for the device (0.80 s, n = 1175 passes) compared with controls (2.09 s, n = 1208 passes) [p < 0.001]. IPT interquartile range was five times higher for control (1.65 s) versus device cases (0.42 s). IDR was not significantly different [p = 0.48]; however, device cases had significantly lower communication errors compared to control cases [p = 0.01]. Surgeons and surgical assistants were similarly satisfied with the device on a 5‐point Likert scale (mean: 4.2/5, standard deviation: 0.92). Conclusion: The proposed endoscopic instrument holder can improve ELAM operative workflow by reducing instrument passing time and variability without increasing IDR. Level of Evidence: 2 Laryngoscope, 133:3492–3498, 2023 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the effects of Chile's 2015 electoral reform, which increased the magnitude of districts in Chile's lower legislative chamber from two to between three and eight. This increase in district magnitude allows for a convenient 'natural experiment': post-reform voters should strategically vote at lower levels than pre-reform voters. I find strong evidence that voters have responded to Chile's electoral reform by engaging in less party-level strategic voting. However, I surprisingly find no evidence that the reform has decreased strategic voting for Chile's pre-electoral pacts. This study demonstrates that Chile's electoral reform is already affecting voter behaviour and is doing so in line with theoretical expectations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Strategic voting occurs when voters make vote choices using their ex ante expectations about the results of an election in addition to their sincere candidate preferences. While there is ample theoretical reason to believe strategic voting should occur under certain electoral conditions and institutional arrangements, the evidence for it in the literature has been mixed. I theorise that the polarisation of the two main British political parties and the highly publicised predictions of defeat for Britain's primary national third party, the Liberal Democrats, make the 2015 UK election an ideal case for studying strategic voting. I adapt established methods of identifying strategic voting to this election and find evidence that Liberal Democrat voters in the UK voted strategically for Labour and Conservative candidates to maximise their odds of affecting the electoral outcome in their constituency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the longstanding underrepresentation of blacks in Congress, political science research has not settled on the cause. While there is increasing evidence that racial attitudes affect vote choice in today's congressional elections, how this effect interacts with the race of the candidates is unknown. This study addresses this debate by analyzing novel survey, census, and candidate data from the Obama era of congressional elections (2010–2016) to test whether racially prejudiced attitudes held by whites decrease their likelihood of supporting black Democratic candidates and Democratic candidates as a whole. In line with theoretical predictions, this paper finds that Democratic House candidates are less likely to receive votes among white voters with strong racial resentment toward blacks, and black Democratic candidates fare even worse. These findings help to explain the persistence of black legislative underrepresentation and contribute to theories of partisan racial realignment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]