Search

Illiberal regimes have become central players in international organizations. In this working paper, we provide a unified framework for understanding their effects. We start by outlining the theoretical foundations of this work, focusing first on why regime type matters for international cooperation. We then show how differing memberships and decision-making processes within international organizations affect the influence illiberal regimes can wield, the activities they undertake, and the impact that they have on domestic political outcomes.

Abstract: The return of authoritarian great powers, the slowing of the democratic wave, and outright reversion to authoritarian rule pose important questions for international theory. What are the implications of an international system populated with more autocracies? This question was posed by a diverse array of social scientists, public intellectuals, and policy analysts in response to the autocratic wave in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. We show that a series of conversations emanating from quite diverse intellectual priors – from Christian realists to international lawyers and disaffected Marxists – converged on the risks these autocratic regimes posed to democratic regimes and the international order they sought to forge. These risks included unconstrained rulers, an inability to sustain international commitments and political processes that undermined rational deliberation at home and spread disinformation abroad. The reading of this work suggests an under-appreciated strand of liberal international relations theory, and these debates have direct implications for liberal arguments about the democratic peace. Rather than theorizing why democracies avoid war, they underscore the importance of understanding why authoritarian and democratic countries are particularly prone to conflict.

Research has demonstrated how membership in democratic regional organizations can strengthen prospects for democracy. However, a significant number of regional organizations are dominated by autocratic members who have very different preferences: to limit democratic contagion and consolidate authoritarian rule against democratic challengers. We outline a menu of mechanisms through which regional organizations with authoritarian members might have pernicious effects on the prospects for democratic rule. We use cross-national quantitative analyses to demonstrate that membership in deeply authoritarian international organizations is associated with autocratization. We supplement the quantitative results with an analysis of 29 of the most authoritarian regional organizations and illustrative case studies. The multi-method approach strengthens inference by showing that authoritarian international organizations do in fact engage in behaviors inimical to democratic rule.

Over the last few decades, the number and influence of regional international organizations (RIOs) with powerful authoritarian members have been on the rise, helping stall democratization and preserve autocratic regimes. This paper, the first in an IGCC series on authoritarian international organizations, charts the growth of authoritarian RIOs since the end of World War II to present day and analyzes their pathways for influence, including through election monitoring, peacekeeping, and development assistance. It concludes by exploring the implications for U.S. foreign policy, including how the United States can build coalitions of its own; whether (or not) the United States should engage with certain authoritarian RIOs; and why the United States should be cautious when partnering with certain regional organizations.

Japan and Korea—the United States’ two key allies in Northeast Asia—are both advanced industrial democracies facing similar constraints from a rising China and a nuclear North Korea. One would think that trilateral cooperation would be a cinch. Yet Japan and Korea have been at each other’s throats over simmering historical issues and differing approaches to China. Forging a trilateral alliance is highly unlikely. But strengthening cooperation is possible by focusing less on the military components of the alliance—i.e., providing extended deterrence—and more on new issues such as 5G, artificial intelligence (AI), and infrastructure, which can strengthen collective capabilities and make cooperation more appealing.

The international community has consistently underestimated North Korean nuclear and missile capabilities. How has an economically impoverished, technologically backward, and internationally isolated state been able to establish robust and increasingly competent nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs? Has the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) achieved this on its own, as it proudly claims? Or has it been predominantly reliant on foreign sources and if so, to whom and in what ways? This brief synthesizes what we know about the development of North Korean nuclear and missile capabilities, which together makes up the country’s strategic weapons complex. These industries have made rapid and concerted progress up the global innovation ladder over the past few decades. Indeed, this highly secretive apparatus is probably the most innovative, dynamic, technologically advanced, and privileged segment of the North Korean economy. The barriers to dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program are substantial, and ultimately depend on strategic choices in Pyongyang. Will the DPRK continue to focus on developing the next generation of strategic weapons as negotiations stall out, or will they shift resources to other economic activities? Nuclear negotiations must consider the deeper implications of the sprawling nuclear and missile industrial complex: how to bring greater transparency to this infrastructure and assure it is rolled back.

The international community has consistently underestimated North Korean nuclear and missile capabilities. How has an economically impoverished, technologically backward, and internationally isolated state been able to establish robust and increasingly competent nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, especially since the mid-2010s? Has North Korea predominantly relied on foreign sources of technology or are its nuclear and missile programs the result of domestic effort? Even when technologies have been borrowed, a detailed analysis of the evolution of the programs suggests sustained domestic investment has proven crucial. The result is a far-flung and large weapons of mass destruction (WMD) infrastructure. Any negotiations over the program must take the extent of this infrastructure into account and consider the challenges of how to inspect, verify, and limit them, including through repurposing these capabilities to civilian uses.

When Right Makes Might: Rising Powers and World Order. By Stacie Goddard. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018. Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and Retrenchment. By Paul MacDonald and [...]

This policy brief links debates about the economic development of the Asia-Pacific to possible security implications. The brief makes four points. Past periods of high growth in the region have inevitably slowed, and China’s will too. The main question is whether thishappens gradually or as a result of crisis. Second, the global imbalances associated with export-oriented strategies and reserve accumulation have created strong dependence on the U.S. market. Third, the growth of intra-regional trade does not necessarily indicate a “decoupling” of the region. Increased Chinese leverage within the region may be exaggerated because of the continued role of international production networks in which Japanese, American, and European firms continue to play an important role. Finally, regional institutions are evolving and contributing to ongoing liberalization at the margin. But the institutional architecture remains fragmented and hamstrung by the tremendous diversity of the region’s political systems and economies.