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The European Union’s (EU) policy in Southeast Europe is in crisis. On the one hand, citizens and governments of the region are frustrated because of the constant postponement of accession to the EU. On the other hand, the region is still viewed in EU capitals and by many of its citizens as a source of instability and problems for the continent. However, various researchers and observers working on politics in Southeast Europe agree that the EU is not innocent regarding the decline of democracy and rule of law in the region. They see the EU as complicit by legitimating and often financially supporting non-reforming governments, so-called “Stabilitocracies”. This article finds evidence for this argument in two less discussed country cases, namely North Macedonia and the Republic of Moldova. However, it also argues that the EU was eventually key in supporting oppositional actors to bring the Stabilocrat-governments down when their time had come. Still, another problem of the EU is addressed: Its inability to support credible reform actors and their agendas in the region by offering a meritocratic EU accession process. The EU is thus not only an involuntary supporter of authoritarianism in the region, but also able to act as an ally of strong opposition movements. However, in its current state and with its current policy the EU seems unable to “bring in the harvest” of its successful actions in Southeast Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Moldova’s parliamentary election on 11 July 2021 resulted in a landslide victory for the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) that was founded by now President Maia Sandu. The election was the final breakthrough for Moldova’s reform actors who now control the presidency, the executive branch, and parliament. The article presents the election results and then explains the political circumstance in order to understand what happened in Moldova. It then goes on to discuss whether or not the promises of fundamental reform are likely to be fulfilled. For this, it considers PAS’ and Sandu’s track-record, the hurdles they had to overcome so far, compares these to past “reformist” actors, and finally outlines obstacles which might impede even well-intentioned measures of reform. It seems that despite all uncertainties that persist, the new government might be the best chance the country has ever had to turn things for the better in its three decades of independence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]