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This article reconstructs the earliest known movement for sex workers' rights in US history. It interprets collective assertions of due process as a strategy to overturn vagrancy laws, which permitted municipal officials to summarily commit 'common prostitutes' to the penitentiary for months. Mass arrests sparked an anticarceral movement of 'streetwalkers' who refused to be contained. Unlike the middle‐class Woman's Rights Movement, which sought equal rights for their own sake, streetwalkers acted to build a world in which they could control their own labour, have sex without punishment and move freely through their city. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S. Supreme Court has turned its attention back to the law of habeas corpus, with a string of new decisions that emphasize the limited scope of federal habeas relief. But focusing one's sights on only those decisions would overlook what has transpired at the Supreme Court in recent years in state habeas cases coming directly to the Supreme Court from the state postconviction courts. Montgomery v. Louisiana, in particular, shifted the division of power between the Supreme Court and state postconviction courts for questions conventionally considered to be questions of state law. Montgomery, on the surface, is a decision about retroactivity and the effect of new Supreme Court decisions on old state-court criminal sentences. Must those new Supreme Court decisions be a basis for retrospectively invalidating final sentences, even decades later? Montgomery says yes, at least for some new Supreme Court decisions. Below the surface, Montgomery rests on an unstated assumption that where there is a violation of a constitutional right, as revealed by a new Supreme Court decision, a state postconviction court must provide a collateral remedy, at least in some circumstances. This article examines that assumption, its seeming inconsistency with the Supreme Court's recent federal habeas decisions, and its broader implications for what the Constitution has to say about constitutionally required collateral remedies in state and federal habeas courts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The military detention facility at the Guantánamo Bay naval base is the most enduring manifestation of the US “war on terror.” It is also materially and symbolically central to US torture, war crimes, and other egregious violations of law in the post-9/11 era. Since the first detainees arrived in 2002, Guantánamo has been the subject of controversy and debate, as well as a key setting for legal challenges to government policies. This article traces the legacy of the prison and the military commissions across four administrations. It demonstrates that the lack of a common understanding or shared narrative about what Guantánamo means or has meant is a product of entrenched partisanship that characterizes contemporary US politics more broadly. Guantánamo's confounding legacy reflects the lack of a national consensus about the role of laws and courts as guarantors of even the most basic rights.

Copyright of Taiwan Law Review is the property of Angle Publishing Co., Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Foro Revista de Derecho is the property of Universidad Andina Simon Bolivar, Sede Ecuador and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Las demandas judiciales en torno a los grandes simios hacen foco en un tema abordado desde la ética y el derecho animal: la consideración de los animales como sujetos de derecho. A partir de los procesos judiciales que involucraron a la orangutana Sandra y la chimpancé Cecilia, que estuvieron confinadas en zoológicos de Argentina, analizaremos los dispositivos de inclusión que materializan su conversión de objetos a sujetos. ¿En qué medida la concepción antropocéntrica respecto de los animales pierde peso frente a nuevos juicios clasificatorios, al menos en ciertas tribunas públicas y con determinadas especies? Nuestro supuesto es que algunos elementos y tecnologías (enunciados jurídicos de acciones judiciales y de sentencias; audiencias públicas; mejoras del recinto, estudios médicos y traslado de los animales a un santuario) conforman un dispositivo de ampliación de derechos que permite una política de reparación de animales considerados semejantes a nosotros o bien injustamente maltratados, con riesgo de vida u otro padecimiento objetivable. Desde una perspectiva interdisciplinaria entre la antropología y el derecho presentamos, en primer lugar, los argumentos usados en las demandas judiciales. Luego, analizamos las sentencias que dieron lugar a la liberación de ambas primates. Y, en los últimos apartados, reflexionamos sobre el funcionamiento de estas técnicas de acercamiento animal/humano que buscan la inclusión de ciertos animales en una determinada comunidad moral.

La prelibertad concedida al ex vicepresidente de la República del Ecuador Jorge David Glas Espinel a través de la acción de hábeas corpus y su computo de la pena ha sido controversial tanto para la ciudadanía, así como para el mundo del derecho. Con ello ha aumentado la crítica y opinión acerca de los hechos sucedidos a partir de la continuación de su pena domiciliaria. Fueron cuatro las ocasiones en las que se plantearon medidas de seguridad entre las que suscitaron destitución y revocación hasta que finalmente el 28 de noviembre del 2022 obtuvo la boleta para su liberación de la cárcel nº4. A partir de ahí se realiza un análisis jurídico y cronológico desde la primera circunstancia en que fue concedida la garantía hasta su salida del centro penitenciario tomando como referencia el estudio del hábeas corpus desde su concepción. Para ello se analiza esta garantía jurisdiccional y su manejo mediante entrevistas en profundidad con expertos del área con la finalidad de evidenciar el papel que ha jugado esta herramienta de protección establecida en la Constitución la cual puede conformar la contrafigura de lo que promulga. The pre-release granted to the former Vice President of the Republic of Ecuador Jorge David Glas Espinel through the action of habeas corpus and calculation of the sentence has been controversial both for the general public as well as for the world of law. With this, criticism and opinion have arisen about the events that occurred after the following of his house sentence. There were four occasions on which security measures were raised, including those that led to dismissal and revocation until finally on November 28, 2022, he obtained the ticket for his release from jail no. 4. From there, a legal and chronological analysis is carried out from the first circumstance in which the guarantee was granted until his departure from the penitentiary center, taking as a reference the study of habeas corpus since his conception. For this reason, this jurisdictional guarantee and its management are analyzed through in-depth interviews with experts in the area in order to demonstrate the role of this protection tool established in the Constitution, which can form the counterfigure of what it promulgates.

A federal statute restricts the habeas corpus remedy, but do federal judges also have equitable discretion to deny relief to unlawfully detained prisoners? Over the last several terms, the Supreme Court has begun to embrace this novel, ambitious view of habeas law. Although the Court has long cited what I call “negative” equity as a source of authority to devise its own limits on habeas relief, it had never — until recently — suggested that lower courts have free-floating discretion to deny relief to which prisoners are otherwise entitled. This Article, which consists of three parts, considers and refutes the “new negative equity.” In Part I, I set forth the older version of negative equity and then describe the recent departure therefrom. In Part II, I explain why the new negative equity doesn’t follow from any text-centered approach to statutory interpretation — relying substantially on context and drawing heavily from a statutory history that decisional law and academic discourse have thus far neglected. In Part III, I focus on the most troubling register of the new negative habeas equity, which involves a rule against habeas relief for those who are not “factually innocent.” Equitable power to refuse relief might be consistent with “comity, finality, and federalism,” as it were, but orphaned policy preferences are not law. Under the text-centered approach to law endorsed by most who favor habeas restrictions, such a practice is impossible to justify. Although no interpreter can be perfectly certain of statutory meaning, the new negative equity is both inconsistent with habeas history and a least-plausible reading of the modern statute. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines a Ninth Circuit ruling on the jurisdictional status of the Washington, D.C. Superior Court regarding habeas corpus appeals. It states that in Eldridge v. Howard, the court determined that the D.C. Superior Court does not qualify as a "State court" under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A), affecting the appeal process for habeas corpus petitions. It includes textual interpretation, showcasing the complexities of jurisdictional interpretation within the federal legal system.

Despite its obvious advantages, the disruptive development of neurotechnology can pose risks to fundamental freedoms. In the context of such concerns, proposals have emerged in recent years either to design human rights de novo or to update the existing ones. These new rights in the age of neurotechnology are now widely referred to as “neurorights.” In parallel, there is a considerable amount of ongoing academic work related to updating the right to freedom of thought in order to include the protection of “freedom of thinking” (i.e., freedom of thought itself) and not only its social manifestations. Neurorights such as cognitive liberty, free will, mental freedom, and mental self-determination come into play here. Importantly, freedom of thought has often been considered a prerequisite for all the other fundamental freedoms and rights. In any case, just as other rights require additional legal instruments to guarantee their compliance, substantial neurorights will probably require specific complementary developments in procedural law. In relation to this, there is a long tradition of habeas corpus as an emergency remedy to enforce the rights of a citizen against illegal or arbitrary detention. More recently, the habeas data writ has been proposed and admitted in certain countries to guarantee a person’s ownership of their personal data. In this article, we propose to expand this procedural apparatus by incorporating a third habeas, which we call habeas cogitationem: a writ aimed primarily at enforcing the right to freedom of thinking (and, subsidiarily, the rest of neurorights) against direct, harmful interferences in a person’s thought process by both public and private perpetrators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

En el presente artículo se plantea exponer la difícil situación legal de la privación de libertad y los traslados a distintos centros de privación de libertad. Para ello, es necesario verifcar las teorías de la pena que nuestro ordenamiento jurídico pretende seguir, lo que permitirá saber las razones de la normativa expedida en materia de garantías penitenciarias. Así también, conocer el estado normativo de los traslados y su relación inmediata con el hábeas corpus. Camino que se pretende seguir entre la supuesta desnaturalización de garantías jurisdiccionales y la ausencia de un control judicial. De igual forma, plantear la relación que existe sobre los traslados y otros conflictos carcelarios como el hacinamiento, la violencia, la falta de personal penitenciario y que tiene incidencia en varios derechos constitucionales como la unidad familiar, derecho a la defensa, entre otros. Finalmente, se buscan posibles salidas a la problemática que acarrean los traslados de personas privadas de libertad, de manera especial sobre la contradicción entre el art. 668.2 del Código Orgánico Integral Penal que impide realizar traslados a través de una garantía jurisdiccional y la sentencia de la Corte Constitucional n.º 365-18-JH/21 y acumulados (Integridad personal de personas privadas de libertad) que habilita la posibilidad de realizarlo en casos de afectación al derecho a la integridad personal.

The article presents an empirical review of U.S. federal and state procedural default in capital habeas corpus cases from 2017 to 2021, including the benefits and limitations of alterative merits holdings and the relationship between exhaustion and procedural default.

This essay challenges solitary confinement in immigration prisons and examines how solitary confinement is an extrajudicial segregation designed by courts and congressional plenary power. Topics discussed include evolution of immigration prisons that led to solitary confinement, state claims against private officials, Section 1983 claims for violations of Fifth, Eighth and 14th amendment rights, federal tort claims, habeas and international law claims, and harm-reduction legislative options.

This Note highlights a troubling gap in access to federal habeas relief for persons detained in American Samoa, the only United States territory that does not confer birthright citizenship on persons born there. There is no law affirmatively establishing that persons detained in American Samoa are entitled to seek federal habeas relief, regardless of citizenship status. However, there is a theoretical pathway for U.S. citizens detained in American Samoa to petition for federal habeas relief using a common law exception to the "immediate custodian rule" that requires habeas petitioners to name their local warden as respondent. This rule usually creates an insurmountable barrier to federal habeas relief because there is no federal court in American Samoa and no federal court can assert personal jurisdiction over a prison warden in American Samoa. The exception is explicitly available only to U.S. citizens detained outside the territorial jurisdiction of any federal court. The Secretary of the Interior has plenary authority over American Samoa. Therefore, as indicated by the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii in Barlow v. Sunia, a U.S. citizen detained in American Samoa could name the Secretary as respondent and petition for federal habeas relief in the District of D.C. Because this exception does not extend to noncitizen U.S. nationals detained in American Samoa, and the "noncitizen national" designation exists only in American Samoa, this population is uniquely precluded from accessing federal habeas relief, a privilege the Supreme Court has extended to extraterritorial noncitizen detainees in notable cases like Rasul v. Bush and Boumediene v. Bush, among others. There are myriad solutions available to correct differentiated access based solely on citizenship status. The simplest option would be for the federal courts to expand the Padilla exception to include noncitizen nationals. Alternatively, Congress could establish a federal court in American Samoa or expand an existing federal court's jurisdiction to encompass claims arising out of the Territory. Unfortunately, there are also significant barriers to enacting those solutions. This is in large part because the federal government has unrestricted power over American Samoa, and the Territory's small population and remote location make amassing sufficient political power to compel change unlikely. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article illuminates the enduring legacy and contemporary potential of personal replevin - a common law writ which, for centuries, has entitled detainees to a jury trial to challenge their alleged unlawful detention. Dubbed the "companion remedy" of the "great writ" of habeas corpus, personal replevin descends from the early days of the English common law, predating even the Magna Carta. Throughout its history, the writ has fulfilled an essential. function as perhaps the only common law mechanism by which individuals could be recognized by the law as "persons" possessing the right to self-possession. Despite, or maybe because of this unique provenance, the writ has been subject to a recurring cycle of disuse and resurgence. Relying on newly uncovered 20th-century case law not previously discussed by legal scholars, this article refutes notions of the writ's presumed obsolescence or abolition from modern jurisprudence in nearly two dozen states, with a particular focus on Maine, the only state with a personal replevin statute still in force. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]