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Despite four major Supreme Court opinions involving lesbian, gay, and bisexual ('LGB') rights, how courts should treat sexual orientation under equal protection remains unknown. This ambiguity will persist until LGB advocates abandon the essentialist theoretical model of sexual orientation as a status derived from nature and instead promote a social constructionist framework that conceptualizes sexual orientation as a status derived from sex. Scholars assert that social constructionist arguments are 'risky arguments' because they challenge the perceived natural order and incite anxieties about nonincremental change. Surprisingly, federal courts have become increasingly willing to conceptualize sexual orientation as a dynamic concept derived from sex and subsequently, to find that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex discrimination. Courts and scholars have indeed talked about sexual orientation discrimination as sex discrimination, and some scholars have discussed individual cases. This article is the first to take a broad theoretical approach to this growing trend in federal courts. It argues that underpinning this striking development is a profound theoretical shift in how sexual orientation is conceptualized. It systematically reviews the three legal arguments that courts have used when adopting this approach: comparative, associational, and gender-stereotyping. It analyzes a comprehensive dataset of seventy-one cases to determine which of these arguments is gaining the most traction. Understanding sexual orientation through the lens of sex discrimination not only promises to clarify how courts should approach LGB equality, but also better reflects the diverse reality and fluidity of modern gender identities, and it makes sense, normatively, theoretically, and strategically. This theoretical argument is now the less 'risky argument.' In short, this article (I) provides groundbreaking theoretical insights to a remarkable shift in how courts are treating sexual orientation, (2) challenges scholarly notions of how LGB social justice litigation should be approached, and (3) offers a solution to the ambiguity in how sexual orientation should be treated under the Equal Protection Clause. I. INTRODUCTION 51 II. THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS FOR UNDERSTANDING SEXUAL ORIENTATION 54 A. ESSENTIALISM & SEXUAL ORIENTATION 55 B. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION & SEXUAL ORIENTATION 57 III. RISKY ARGUMENTS: ESSENTIALIST FRAMEWORK AS FUNDAMENTAL TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION 60 A. DISTINGUISHING LGB INDIVIDUALS FROM HETEROSEXUAL INDIVIDUALS 60 B. DISTINGUISHING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE FROM MARRIAGE 61 C. DISTINGUISHING STATUS FROM CONDUCT 63 IV. SHIFTING ARGUMENTS: SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION IN COURT 66 A. COMPARATIVE ARGUMENTS 67 1. Comparative Arguments in Court 67 2. Comparative Counterarguments 69 B. ASSOCIATIONAL ARGUMENTS 74 1. Associational Arguments in Court 75 2. Associational Counterarguments 76 C. GENDER-STEREOTYPING ARGUMENTS 78 1. Gender-Stereotyping Arguments in Court 80 2. Gender-Stereotyping Counterarguments 83 V. WINNING ARGUMENTS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 86 A. METHODOLOGY 86 B. WINNING ARGUMENTS 87 VI. CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS: HOW WE SHOULD APPROACH SEXUAL ORIENTATION UNDER EQUAL PROTECTION 88 A. WINNING STRATEGIES 88 B. REFRAMING SEXUAL ORIENTATION UNDER EQUAL PROTECTION. 91 VII. CONCLUSION 94 APPENDIX 95 DATA SET PART I. CASES ACCEPTING SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION MAY BE A FORM OF SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THEORIES ADOPTED 95 DATA SET PART II. CASES ACCEPTING SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATIONS A FORM OF SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THEORIES ADOPTED 98 A. Theory Success Subset 98 B. Excluded Cases 106, I. INTRODUCTION Although the United States Supreme Court had four major opportunities since 1996 to clarify the applicable level of review, lower courts have little guidance on how to treat [...]

The article examines whether a fair-cross-section claim is structural under Rule 37 to the U.S. and Arkansas Constitutions. Topics discussed include right to a jury trial; role of Arkansas Supreme Court in expanding fair-cross section right to the petit jury when other courts have noted that it is unworkable; and the take of U.S. Supreme Court on the same.

The article discusess various cases on digital technology and the future of privacy of the U.S. Topics discussed include U.S. Supreme Court case Carpenter v. United States concerning the privacy of historical cellphone location records under the Stored Communications Act; Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission court case on free exercise of religion of same-sex couple; and Janus v. AFSCME court case on agency fee pertaining to compelled speech.

The article focuses on Soviet policy in Austria from 1946 until 1955, the year when the Austrian State Treaty was signed. The Soviets reversed their policy in Austria, by granting them sovereignty, due to economic considerations. They have already profited from their occupation of the Central European country. Nikita Khrushchev, the leader of the Soviets during the time, executed the withdrawal based on peaceful coexistence. The Austrian State Treaty, which was agreed upon by France, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, removed Austria from the Cold War.