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In a world in which the use of violence continues to be viewed as an acceptable method to pursue political goals, the use of terrorism as a political method will also continue. And within that world, in the coming years, hostage rescues and other direct actions to combat terrorism are likely to be the most frequent type of missions conducted by state special operations forces, including those of Romania. This thesis explores the importance of integrating three types of decisions-informational, structural, and operational-for the successful outcome of special operations. The thesis analyzes four operations, conducted by American, Belgian, and Israeli forces, and the circumstances of their positive or negative outcomes. The historical cases show that, if any one of the three types of decisions was not integrated with the other two, the operation was doomed. The analysis also reveals that the integration of decision-making can best be realized by using interagency coordination mechanisms and a collocation of decision-makers, especially for situations in which command arrangements are highly complicated or unclear. In light of the findings in the four case studies, an analysis of the Romanian Special Operations Forces reveals that its overall structure does not favor either immediate-response or high-complexity missions. The thesis concludes with a number of recommendations for short- and long-term mitigation of current command and control problems faced by Romanian Special Operations Forces., http://archive.org/details/decisionsintegra109451316, Captain, Romanian Army, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This thesis examines USSOCOM's proposal to educate IW strategists / campaign planners, and compares it to the existing model utilized by SAMS for educating conventional campaign planners. SAMS is a good comparative model because the SAMS program has a proven record in conventional campaign planning. Simply put, SAMS is a success and a model for other advanced ILE programs. This comparative analysis extracts educational "best practices" from both approaches and makes recommendations for consideration. Even with an optimal approach, implementation is an equally challenging problem. At the end, the thesis identifies future research opportunities for the utilization of USSOCOM's IW educated officers., http://archive.org/details/annalyticalpproa109454616, US Army (USA) author., Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

U.S. air bases in Iraq have been attacked over 1,000 times in just the first two years of the conflict. This prompted the U.S. Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations to declare in October 2004 that air base defense was one of the five critical problems without a solution currently facing the U.S. Air Force. Yet a solution exists, but not in current air base defense doctrine where the threat to air bases is presented as a conventional force or saboteur. Instead, the history of air base attacks reveals a different but consistent enemy over the last 50 years: the insurgent. Unlike conventional forces which seek decisive military victory and the destruction of the adversary's military resources, the insurgent seeks primarily and ultimately a political victory. To do this, among other efforts; the insurgent must wage an "information war" in order to expand the growth and power of the insurgent organization, often through acts of symbolic violence against targets of strategic value. As such, the air base is a leading target of choice for insurgents. Air bases are key operational and strategic terrain to the United States military - arguably the most critical terrain in the current American way of war. With each air base attack, no matter which specific tactic used, the insurgent attempts to strengthen their hold over their own center of gravity - the local population - while attacking the U.S. center of gravity - the political will of the American public. Only a base defense doctrine that targets the insurgents' center of gravity in the physical, informational, and moral spectrum will succeed at disrupting insurgent operations and protect the air base, the local population, and the U.S. center of gravity. Counterinsurgency provides a foundation for this proposed doctrine., http://archive.org/details/applyingcounteri109451981, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Since World War II, the Philippines has confronted threats from communist insurgents, Muslim secessionists, and a few other agitators. Recently, however, a new threat has emerged-- this time coming from a terrorist organization known as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Although the ASG is a relatively small group, it has wrought great injury to the Philippine image as of late. Common among the groups presenting a threat to internal security are that their strategies and tactics tend to be unconventional and asymmetric. This thesis seeks to determine how special operations can improve the AFP's capability to address internal security threats. The study begins by examining the security environments in which the AFP currently operates, and then proceeds to study emerging security environments in which it will likely operate. The current special operations capability of the AFP is explored and assessed, while inquiring whether it needs enhancing. Case studies of past AFP special operations against groups which posed major internal threats are analyzed to determine whether or not the doctrine and strategy of the AFP was correct, especially regarding its use of Special Operations Forces (SOF). Furthermore, this study considers the United States (U.S.) model for special operations, namely the U.S. Special Operations Forces, in proposing a special operations strategy for the AFP that is feasible, suitable, and sustainable. It is suggested that such an examination will produce a strategy that is relevant, adaptable, and responsive to dealing with the internal security environments likely to be encountered by the Philippine government., http://archive.org/details/thearmedforcesof109451227, Major, Philippine Army, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

While some multiethnic states suffer from ethnicity-based conflicts, others enjoy the benefits of diversity, such as different skill sets, interests, and cultures. However, the cost of ethnic conflict is overwhelming. Ernest Regehr wrote in 1993 that almost two-thirds of political conflicts worldwide were ethnic conflicts. Although ethnic conflict is a worldwide phenomenon, it is not fate. Unlike the many unfortunate ones, some ethnically divided nations have successfully lived together without giving rise to widespread bloodshed or forceful repression. Potential fault lines between parties have been reengineered and tensions have been regulated. In this study, the central question is focused on governmental policies as a tool to prevent conflict. Contrary to the general perception, the vast majority of ethnic conflicts are political. As a political problem, it can be exacerbated or moderated by governmental policies or the lack of such policies. This thesis study has three main parts. In the first part, Daniel Byman's four causes of ethnic conflicts are discussed. In the second part, I recommend a solution in the form of a coherent four-fold framework consisting of "population control," "winning hearts and minds," "strengthening national identity" and "reengineering the political system". In the last part, this framework is applied to present-day Iraq., http://archive.org/details/ethnicconflictsn109452378, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This thesis presents a historical analysis of the evolution of US Army Special Forces operations from 1995 to 2004, focusing specifically on operations conducted in the Balkans (Bosnia and Kosovo), Afghanistan and Iraq, answering the research question: How have the operations conducted by US Army Special Forces evolved from the Balkans in 1995 through Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)? The thesis examines the progression of Special Forces operations during each of the aforementioned campaigns, analyzing their evolution in the areas of intelligence operations, unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, close air support, integration with conventional forces and the institutionalization of lessons learned. The thesis concludes by examining future roles of US Army Special Forces with respect to employment. Tracing the progression of Special Forces employment from the Balkans to OIF is critical to understanding the factors contributing to the success of Special Forces operations in both the decisive operations and stability and support (SASO) phases of OEF and OIF., http://archive.org/details/frombosnitobaghd109451356, Major, United States Army, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This thesis investigates, analyzes, and determines how the current levels of operations tempo (OPTEMPO) and the Army's efforts to mitigate OPTEMPO's negative impacts are affecting the recruitment of U.S. Army officers for service in Special Forces (SF). In light of the dynamic nature of the Army's operational environment today, this thesis does not attempt to provide a conclusive list of all the things that have a positive or negative impact on SF officer recruitment, but rather focuses on aspects that have been most often identified by previous research, highlighted in interviews with SF volunteers and recruiters, and demonstrated by statistical trend analysis. This thesis contends that SF officer recruiting appears promising for the next several years despite the challenges of today's dynamic operational environment. There are two main reasons behind this success: the aspects of mission satisfaction associated with SF, which appear to be consistent across time, and the benefits of SF OPTEMPO structure, which may be temporary in nature. Both of these elements are currently enhanced by SF's increased exposure to the conventional Army., http://archive.org/details/specialforcesoff109454023, US Army (USA) author.

Internal wars are by default the business of others, until someone says they are not. Artificially contained within the confines of the current international system, insurgent conflicts are considered domestic affairs only until they threaten external interests. In judging intrastate conflict by and large from a crisis-response perspective, conventional assessment methodologies, oriented largely toward interstate wars, tend to fall short in objectively analyzing the historical and dynamic aspects of internal wars. This thesis develops an Adaptive Security Construct (ASC) that aims to correct such shortcomings through the multi-disciplinary integration of three conceptual lenses: a qualitative situation estimate, a game-theoretic dynamic conflict model, and geospatially oriented nexus topography. Using Sudan's internal wars as a case study, where the existence of signed peace-agreements in both the south and Darfur exist in apparent contradiction of these conflicts' causes, the ASC iteratively correlates the analysis of each of the three lenses to provide an observer a more objective external view of conflicts that are inherently "internal." This thesis presents the ASC as an iterative process and perspective that enables the formulation of general imperatives and specific approaches in response to contemporary arenas of conflict, both in Sudan and within the international community at large., http://archive.org/details/andaptivesecurit109453057, Major, United States Army, Major, United States Air Force, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This thesis develops a theory to determine the best execution time to conduct a hostage rescue attempt. It does so by explaining the phenomenon of a hostage crisis biorhythm and proposing four principles essential for success. The principles of hostage rescue operations presented in this thesis and used in the biorhythm model-surprise, intelligence, operator's skill, and deception-are derived from looking at numerous planning models from special operations, from personal experience, and the thorough analysis of six historical cases. The historical cases show that in every instance any one of these four principles was overlooked, the operation was doomed. These principles have been determined to be the most critical factors that change as the crisis develops throughout the hostage ordeal. A thorough understanding of this biorhythm will provide planning guidelines to assess the best windows of opportunity for a proposed rescue attempt. One main focus of this work will be an in-depth case study of the hostage rescue operation "CHAVIN DE HUANTAR". This case study will present compelling evidence to reinforce my hypothesis, and serves as a template model for successful rescue operations. The analysis of this single case will provide a wealth of information on the success of this remarkable operation. Another main focus of this thesis will be strategic thinking of a hostage crisis using game theory analysis. The findings of this thesis will enable decision-makers to plan and organize hostage rescue forces to act at the appropriate time (window of opportunity), maximizing their chances of success. Additionally, it will provide a useful planning model that can be implemented effectively and accurately, presenting a clear picture of possible outcomes throughout a hostage crisis. Furthermore, this thesis will help the reader become a better strategist during the planning, preparation, and execution of a hostage rescue operation. It will provide a thorough understanding of how, http://archive.org/details/anatomyofhostage109451367, Major, United States Army, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited., Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Preparedness for operations in both the Irregular Warfare (IW) and Major Combat Operations (MCO) environments is essential given a tumultuous and unpredictable Contemporary Operational Environment (COE). This thesis is an effort to provide a solution to the U.S. Army's emerging trend toward uni-focused operations fixated on IW. In this thesis, we propose recommendations for change to the current Army force structure centered on the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model through which these units are cycled for refit, training, and deployment. These recommended modifications are intended to optimize the Army for its role as a deterrent force, and to assist the Army in its ability to proficiently conduct operations in the IW and MCO environments either consecutively or simultaneously., http://archive.org/details/transformingrmyg109453794, Outstanding Thesis, US Army (USA) author., Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

R missions in support of a variety of customers. This thesis examines the changing environment in which Combat Rescue forces are employed; evaluates the ability of these forces to perform PR tasks within an Irregular Warfare campaign; and makes recommendations regarding where and under whose control rescue assets should be employed., http://archive.org/details/evolutionofrescu109453095, US Air Force (USAF) author., Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Alternate Military Strategy for the War on Terrorism calls for addressing the war as a global insurgency. Addressing the war on terrorism as a Global Insurgency provides an alternative strategic framework for prosecuting the campaign. This study is intended to determine the utility of analyzing the war on terrorism using an insurgency/counterinsurgency conceptual framework. Additionally, the recommendations can be applied to the strategic campaign, even if it is politically unfeasible to address the war as an insurgency. The study is broken down into five chapters: an introduction, explanation of Dr. McCormick’s Counterinsurgency model used for analysis, application of the model to a historical case, application to the war on terrorism, and conclusions. The first half of the study is intended to provide a thorough understanding of Dr. McCormick’s model. This is done by, first providing an overview of the model and, second, applying the model to a historical case: the insurgency in Lebanon following the Israeli invasion in 1982. The second half of the study addresses the current U.S. lead war on terrorism. The counterinsurgency model is applied to the war on terrorism based on the al Qaeda Network and the United States’ vision and mission for the conflict. Ten on terrorism are drawn from the analysis. The final chapter addresses the utility provided by the insurgency/counterinsurgency framework as applied to the war on terrorism., http://archive.org/details/anlternatemilita109451289, Major, United States Army, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

The purpose of this thesis is to explore an alternative strategic focus for the Department of Defense to implement in the conduct of the Global War on Terrorism. Our thesis is as follows: A non-conventional approach to strategic policy, led by an enhanced Foreign Internal Defense concept, and judicious execution of U.S. Sponsored Unconventional Warfare, applied as a primary tool of U.S. national policy through the Department of Defense, will serve as an effective solution to the global "terrorist" threat. This paper will justify such by analyzing the historical conduct of the United States through the framework of its own doctrine and the "Mystic Diamond" a State/Counter-state dynamic model as presented by Dr. Gordon McCormick. Elements of the Department of Defense and the Department of State know the operational strategy to take, but are hampered by the misapplication of counter-guerilla tactics as strategy, and are reluctant to use sponsored UW to preempt or curtail the exportation of terrorism. In essence, the Department of Defense has been and continues to be limited by its conventional tactical successes, when what is required is strategic application of FID, UW, and limited Direct Engagement to defeat an enemy employing a non-conventional method of engagement., http://archive.org/details/anonconventional109453485, US Army (USA) authors., Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This paper analyzes the current Philippine counterinsurgency strategy in relation to the Philippine government past experiences of fighting insurgency nationwide. The Philippine government recognizes insurgency as a national threat that hampers sustained peace and development in the country, but government efforts in counterinsurgency have been less than successful. The thesis examines four historical case studies: the "All Out Friendship or All Out Force" program of President Ramon Magsaysay against the Huk Rebellion in 1950s; "Oplan Katatagan" during the Martial Law Era under President Ferdinand E. Marcos; "Lambat-Bitag Campaign" during the administrations of Presidents Corazon Aquino and Fidel V. Ramos; and "Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines" in the current administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. The thesis demonstrates that successful counterinsurgency operations require a collaborative interagency approach based on a clear and logical national strategy. This strategy cannot succeed at the national level only. The strategy must be pushed down to the local level where effective change can occur. Despite current perceptions, counterinsurgency operations are not the exclusive domain of the military. In fact, the possibility of success is often diminished when the military takes a dominant role in counterinsurgency operations. Finally, the thesis recommends that the Philippine government should internalize and adopt the "correct attitude" that has been missing in most of the early counterinsurgency efforts. Although focused on the Philippines, lessons from this thesis can be applied elsewhere., http://archive.org/details/findingmissingli109453393, Philippine Army author., Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This thesis addresses the implications of the Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) concept on U.S. Army doctrine. EBAO has the potential to radically change the Joint concept of warfare if one considers it as a more holistic approach to planning and conducting operations. Despite the Army's resistance to apply EBAO below the Corps level, numerous case studies from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) exist to prove otherwise and demonstrate how EBAO can be integrated into Army doctrine. This thesis begins by reviewing the evolution of EBAO from its inception during Desert Storm through Millennium Challenge 2002 (MC02) to its present form. Next, it compares Army doctrine to the current EBAO concept and identifies potential shortfalls and conflicts between the two. By addressing the major shortfalls or conflicts, this thesis answers the question of whether or not EBAO has a role in future Army doctrine. Finally, recommendations are made in the form of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) as to how EBAO should be implemented into Army doctrine and what the implications of this application would be to the Army organization., http://archive.org/details/theeffectsbasedp109452458, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Under the leadership of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), the military is undergoing transformation to more effectively counter the asymmetric threat of non-state terrorists and extremists in the "long war." After five years, however, one component of national security strategy is visibly unfulfilled: military pursuit of terrorists and extremists outside of Afghanistan and Iraq. The lack of offensive military efforts outside of areas designated as combat zones creates the impression that the long war has stalled. Overt offensive military operations targeting non-state actors may advance the counterterrorism mission and serve as a deterrent. This thesis identifies and analyzes four major constraints on the conduct of such operations: legal concerns about the use of force, use of the CIA for covert paramilitary activities, limits on USSOCOM and Special Operations Forces, and civilian and military leaders' aversion to risk. It describes the historical, bureaucratic and cultural causes of the constraints, concluding with recommendations to allow the US government and the US military to pursue non-state terrorists and extremists with overt offensive military operations., http://archive.org/details/anexaminationofo109452395, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

The United States is entering its seventh year of the Global War on Terror and continues to struggle with irregular war. As the Department of Defense's lead for Irregular Warfare (IW), U.S. Special Operations Command co-authored the Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) Version 1.0 with the U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command in order to "outline a holistic U.S. Government and partner nation approach to IW." The concept establishes the need to integrate all instruments of national power in order to enable a joint force commander to successfully conduct a protracted IW campaign against state and non-state actors. The end state is a joint force with enhanced capability for IW and a balanced approach to warfighting. To succeed in IW the commander and staff need a campaign planning system that answers two primary questions: "How do you effectively focus on controlling or influencing populations?" and, "How do you measure your efforts in IW?" The answer maybe a "marriage" of an effects-based thinking with the concepts outlined in the new IW JOC. This thesis will analyze the potential of such a concept utilizing a case study of Special Operations Command Pacific's own effects-based approach to the War on Terror., http://archive.org/details/howtowinndknowit109453048, US Army (USA) author.

Since the watershed events of September 11, 2001, the United States military has been engaged in fighting what has been recognized as a highly organized and networked global insurgency. These global insurgents have sought to take advantage of all the technological advances available in the current information age, combined with the innovative and adaptive advantages of networked organizations. This study asks two questions: 1.) How can global insurgent networks be countered; and 2.) Where might the most appropriate personnel to man a global U.S. counter-insurgent network be found? This thesis asserts that organizational considerations matter and that for the U.S. military to have the best chance to defeat these global insurgent networks it must further develop small, adaptive human networks of its own. Secondly, the authors will demonstrate that there exists within the Army Special Forces field grade officer population the capability and capacity to man and lead a small, yet globally dispersed counter-insurgent network. These arguments will be evidenced by an examination of the networked aspects of the global insurgency, hierarchical aspects of the U.S. military and finally the specific manpower data within the Army Special Forces officer population. What is still needed in the evolving global war on terror, and this study hopes to contribute, is a small turn of mind towards applying networked counter-terror organizations against a very serious irregular, networked threat. To this end, the authors will propose the establishment of a Special Forces Global Counter-Insurgent Network (SFGCIN)., http://archive.org/details/optimizingarmysp109453556, US Army (USA) authors., Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

raise it to the same governmental level as the Norwegian Police and Security Service., http://archive.org/details/thenorwegidecisi109453104, Norwegian Armed Forces author., Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This thesis examines USSOCOM's proposal to educate IW strategists / campaign planners, and compares it to the existing model utilized by SAMS for educating conventional campaign planners. SAMS is a good comparative model because the SAMS program has a proven record in conventional campaign planning. Simply put, SAMS is a success and a model for other advanced ILE programs. This comparative analysis extracts educational "best practices" from both approaches and makes recommendations for consideration. Even with an optimal approach, implementation is an equally challenging problem. At the end, the thesis identifies future research opportunities for the utilization of USSOCOM's IW educated officers.

This thesis investigates, analyzes, and determines how the current levels of operations tempo (OPTEMPO) and the Army's efforts to mitigate OPTEMPO's negative impacts are affecting the recruitment of U.S. Army officers for service in Special Forces (SF). In light of the dynamic nature of the Army's operational environment today, this thesis does not attempt to provide a conclusive list of all the things that have a positive or negative impact on SF officer recruitment, but rather focuses on aspects that have been most often identified by previous research, highlighted in interviews with SF volunteers and recruiters, and demonstrated by statistical trend analysis. This thesis contends that SF officer recruiting appears promising for the next several years despite the challenges of today's dynamic operational environment. There are two main reasons behind this success: the aspects of mission satisfaction associated with SF, which appear to be consistent across time, and the benefits of SF OPTEMPO structure, which may be temporary in nature. Both of these elements are currently enhanced by SF's increased exposure to the conventional Army.

Preparedness for operations in both the Irregular Warfare (IW) and Major Combat Operations (MCO) environments is essential given a tumultuous and unpredictable Contemporary Operational Environment (COE). This thesis is an effort to provide a solution to the U.S. Army's emerging trend toward uni-focused operations fixated on IW. In this thesis, we propose recommendations for change to the current Army force structure centered on the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model through which these units are cycled for refit, training, and deployment. These recommended modifications are intended to optimize the Army for its role as a deterrent force, and to assist the Army in its ability to proficiently conduct operations in the IW and MCO environments either consecutively or simultaneously.

The United States is entering its seventh year of the Global War on Terror and continues to struggle with irregular war. As the Department of Defense's lead for Irregular Warfare (IW), U.S. Special Operations Command co-authored the Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) Version 1.0 with the U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command in order to "outline a holistic U.S. Government and partner nation approach to IW." The concept establishes the need to integrate all instruments of national power in order to enable a joint force commander to successfully conduct a protracted IW campaign against state and non-state actors. The end state is a joint force with enhanced capability for IW and a balanced approach to warfighting. To succeed in IW the commander and staff need a campaign planning system that answers two primary questions: "How do you effectively focus on controlling or influencing populations?" and, "How do you measure your efforts in IW?" The answer maybe a "marriage" of an effects-based thinking with the concepts outlined in the new IW JOC. This thesis will analyze the potential of such a concept utilizing a case study of Special Operations Command Pacific's own effects-based approach to the War on Terror.

Internal wars are by default the business of others, until someone says they are not. Artificially contained within the confines of the current international system, insurgent conflicts are considered domestic affairs only until they threaten external interests. In judging intrastate conflict by and large from a crisis-response perspective, conventional assessment methodologies, oriented largely toward interstate wars, tend to fall short in objectively analyzing the historical and dynamic aspects of internal wars. This thesis develops an Adaptive Security Construct (ASC) that aims to correct such shortcomings through the multi-disciplinary integration of three conceptual lenses: a qualitative situation estimate, a game-theoretic dynamic conflict model, and geospatially oriented nexus topography. Using Sudan's internal wars as a case study, where the existence of signed peace-agreements in both the south and Darfur exist in apparent contradiction of these conflicts' causes, the ASC iteratively correlates the analysis of each of the three lenses to provide an observer a more objective external view of conflicts that are inherently "internal." This thesis presents the ASC as an iterative process and perspective that enables the formulation of general imperatives and specific approaches in response to contemporary arenas of conflict, both in Sudan and within the international community at large.

R missions in support of a variety of customers. This thesis examines the changing environment in which Combat Rescue forces are employed; evaluates the ability of these forces to perform PR tasks within an Irregular Warfare campaign; and makes recommendations regarding where and under whose control rescue assets should be employed.

This paper analyzes the current Philippine counterinsurgency strategy in relation to the Philippine government past experiences of fighting insurgency nationwide. The Philippine government recognizes insurgency as a national threat that hampers sustained peace and development in the country, but government efforts in counterinsurgency have been less than successful. The thesis examines four historical case studies: the "All Out Friendship or All Out Force" program of President Ramon Magsaysay against the Huk Rebellion in 1950s; "Oplan Katatagan" during the Martial Law Era under President Ferdinand E. Marcos; "Lambat-Bitag Campaign" during the administrations of Presidents Corazon Aquino and Fidel V. Ramos; and "Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines" in the current administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. The thesis demonstrates that successful counterinsurgency operations require a collaborative interagency approach based on a clear and logical national strategy. This strategy cannot succeed at the national level only. The strategy must be pushed down to the local level where effective change can occur. Despite current perceptions, counterinsurgency operations are not the exclusive domain of the military. In fact, the possibility of success is often diminished when the military takes a dominant role in counterinsurgency operations. Finally, the thesis recommends that the Philippine government should internalize and adopt the "correct attitude" that has been missing in most of the early counterinsurgency efforts. Although focused on the Philippines, lessons from this thesis can be applied elsewhere.

The purpose of this thesis is to explore an alternative strategic focus for the Department of Defense to implement in the conduct of the Global War on Terrorism. Our thesis is as follows: A non-conventional approach to strategic policy, led by an enhanced Foreign Internal Defense concept, and judicious execution of U.S. Sponsored Unconventional Warfare, applied as a primary tool of U.S. national policy through the Department of Defense, will serve as an effective solution to the global "terrorist" threat. This paper will justify such by analyzing the historical conduct of the United States through the framework of its own doctrine and the "Mystic Diamond" a State/Counter-state dynamic model as presented by Dr. Gordon McCormick. Elements of the Department of Defense and the Department of State know the operational strategy to take, but are hampered by the misapplication of counter-guerilla tactics as strategy, and are reluctant to use sponsored UW to preempt or curtail the exportation of terrorism. In essence, the Department of Defense has been and continues to be limited by its conventional tactical successes, when what is required is strategic application of FID, UW, and limited Direct Engagement to defeat an enemy employing a non-conventional method of engagement.

raise it to the same governmental level as the Norwegian Police and Security Service.

Since the watershed events of September 11, 2001, the United States military has been engaged in fighting what has been recognized as a highly organized and networked global insurgency. These global insurgents have sought to take advantage of all the technological advances available in the current information age, combined with the innovative and adaptive advantages of networked organizations. This study asks two questions: 1.) How can global insurgent networks be countered; and 2.) Where might the most appropriate personnel to man a global U.S. counter-insurgent network be found? This thesis asserts that organizational considerations matter and that for the U.S. military to have the best chance to defeat these global insurgent networks it must further develop small, adaptive human networks of its own. Secondly, the authors will demonstrate that there exists within the Army Special Forces field grade officer population the capability and capacity to man and lead a small, yet globally dispersed counter-insurgent network. These arguments will be evidenced by an examination of the networked aspects of the global insurgency, hierarchical aspects of the U.S. military and finally the specific manpower data within the Army Special Forces officer population. What is still needed in the evolving global war on terror, and this study hopes to contribute, is a small turn of mind towards applying networked counter-terror organizations against a very serious irregular, networked threat. To this end, the authors will propose the establishment of a Special Forces Global Counter-Insurgent Network (SFGCIN).

While some multiethnic states suffer from ethnicity-based conflicts, others enjoy the benefits of diversity, such as different skill sets, interests, and cultures. However, the cost of ethnic conflict is overwhelming. Ernest Regehr wrote in 1993 that almost two-thirds of political conflicts worldwide were ethnic conflicts. Although ethnic conflict is a worldwide phenomenon, it is not fate. Unlike the many unfortunate ones, some ethnically divided nations have successfully lived together without giving rise to widespread bloodshed or forceful repression. Potential fault lines between parties have been reengineered and tensions have been regulated. In this study, the central question is focused on governmental policies as a tool to prevent conflict. Contrary to the general perception, the vast majority of ethnic conflicts are political. As a political problem, it can be exacerbated or moderated by governmental policies or the lack of such policies. This thesis study has three main parts. In the first part, Daniel Byman's four causes of ethnic conflicts are discussed. In the second part, I recommend a solution in the form of a coherent four-fold framework consisting of "population control," "winning hearts and minds," "strengthening national identity" and "reengineering the political system". In the last part, this framework is applied to present-day Iraq.

This thesis addresses the implications of the Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) concept on U.S. Army doctrine. EBAO has the potential to radically change the Joint concept of warfare if one considers it as a more holistic approach to planning and conducting operations. Despite the Army's resistance to apply EBAO below the Corps level, numerous case studies from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) exist to prove otherwise and demonstrate how EBAO can be integrated into Army doctrine. This thesis begins by reviewing the evolution of EBAO from its inception during Desert Storm through Millennium Challenge 2002 (MC02) to its present form. Next, it compares Army doctrine to the current EBAO concept and identifies potential shortfalls and conflicts between the two. By addressing the major shortfalls or conflicts, this thesis answers the question of whether or not EBAO has a role in future Army doctrine. Finally, recommendations are made in the form of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) as to how EBAO should be implemented into Army doctrine and what the implications of this application would be to the Army organization.

Under the leadership of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), the military is undergoing transformation to more effectively counter the asymmetric threat of non-state terrorists and extremists in the "long war." After five years, however, one component of national security strategy is visibly unfulfilled: military pursuit of terrorists and extremists outside of Afghanistan and Iraq. The lack of offensive military efforts outside of areas designated as combat zones creates the impression that the long war has stalled. Overt offensive military operations targeting non-state actors may advance the counterterrorism mission and serve as a deterrent. This thesis identifies and analyzes four major constraints on the conduct of such operations: legal concerns about the use of force, use of the CIA for covert paramilitary activities, limits on USSOCOM and Special Operations Forces, and civilian and military leaders' aversion to risk. It describes the historical, bureaucratic and cultural causes of the constraints, concluding with recommendations to allow the US government and the US military to pursue non-state terrorists and extremists with overt offensive military operations.

This study explores the nature of Bulgarian national security and how it is supported by Bulgarian Special Operations Forces (BSOF). It examines the changing global security environment and its implications on Bulgarian security challenges in the 21st century. In particular, the global war on terror and the newly acquired NATO membership have posed new challenges for the Bulgarian Armed Forces, including BSOF. This thesis explores Bulgarian security strategy and NATO requirements for special operations, and analyzes how each of these may be satisfied, in part, by BSOF. The shortfalls between Bulgarian and NATO needs and BSOF's current capabilities suggest that BSOF should be unified under a single joint Special Operations Command directly subordinate to the highest commanding headquarters of the Bulgarian Armed Forces. Moreover, BSOF should be provided with an independent funding program with dedicated air and maritime assets for strategic support, and with advanced SOF-specific equipment. This study suggests the necessity for reorganization and improvement of BSOF in response to the requirements of national security and NATO Special Operations requirements. It posits that a restructuring and enhancement of BSOF is likely to strengthen Bulgarian national security, as well as contributing to an improvement in the global security environment.

U.S. air bases in Iraq have been attacked over 1,000 times in just the first two years of the conflict. This prompted the U.S. Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations to declare in October 2004 that air base defense was one of the five critical problems without a solution currently facing the U.S. Air Force. Yet a solution exists, but not in current air base defense doctrine where the threat to air bases is presented as a conventional force or saboteur. Instead, the history of air base attacks reveals a different but consistent enemy over the last 50 years: the insurgent. Unlike conventional forces which seek decisive military victory and the destruction of the adversary's military resources, the insurgent seeks primarily and ultimately a political victory. To do this, among other efforts; the insurgent must wage an "information war" in order to expand the growth and power of the insurgent organization, often through acts of symbolic violence against targets of strategic value. As such, the air base is a leading target of choice for insurgents. Air bases are key operational and strategic terrain to the United States military - arguably the most critical terrain in the current American way of war. With each air base attack, no matter which specific tactic used, the insurgent attempts to strengthen their hold over their own center of gravity - the local population - while attacking the U.S. center of gravity - the political will of the American public. Only a base defense doctrine that targets the insurgents' center of gravity in the physical, informational, and moral spectrum will succeed at disrupting insurgent operations and protect the air base, the local population, and the U.S. center of gravity. Counterinsurgency provides a foundation for this proposed doctrine.

Since World War II, the Philippines has confronted threats from communist insurgents, Muslim secessionists, and a few other agitators. Recently, however, a new threat has emerged-- this time coming from a terrorist organization known as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Although the ASG is a relatively small group, it has wrought great injury to the Philippine image as of late. Common among the groups presenting a threat to internal security are that their strategies and tactics tend to be unconventional and asymmetric. This thesis seeks to determine how special operations can improve the AFP's capability to address internal security threats. The study begins by examining the security environments in which the AFP currently operates, and then proceeds to study emerging security environments in which it will likely operate. The current special operations capability of the AFP is explored and assessed, while inquiring whether it needs enhancing. Case studies of past AFP special operations against groups which posed major internal threats are analyzed to determine whether or not the doctrine and strategy of the AFP was correct, especially regarding its use of Special Operations Forces (SOF). Furthermore, this study considers the United States (U.S.) model for special operations, namely the U.S. Special Operations Forces, in proposing a special operations strategy for the AFP that is feasible, suitable, and sustainable. It is suggested that such an examination will produce a strategy that is relevant, adaptable, and responsive to dealing with the internal security environments likely to be encountered by the Philippine government.

This thesis presents a historical analysis of the evolution of US Army Special Forces operations from 1995 to 2004, focusing specifically on operations conducted in the Balkans (Bosnia and Kosovo), Afghanistan and Iraq, answering the research question: How have the operations conducted by US Army Special Forces evolved from the Balkans in 1995 through Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)? The thesis examines the progression of Special Forces operations during each of the aforementioned campaigns, analyzing their evolution in the areas of intelligence operations, unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, close air support, integration with conventional forces and the institutionalization of lessons learned. The thesis concludes by examining future roles of US Army Special Forces with respect to employment. Tracing the progression of Special Forces employment from the Balkans to OIF is critical to understanding the factors contributing to the success of Special Forces operations in both the decisive operations and stability and support (SASO) phases of OEF and OIF.

This thesis develops a theory to determine the best execution time to conduct a hostage rescue attempt. It does so by explaining the phenomenon of a hostage crisis biorhythm and proposing four principles essential for success. The principles of hostage rescue operations presented in this thesis and used in the biorhythm model-surprise, intelligence, operator's skill, and deception-are derived from looking at numerous planning models from special operations, from personal experience, and the thorough analysis of six historical cases. The historical cases show that in every instance any one of these four principles was overlooked, the operation was doomed. These principles have been determined to be the most critical factors that change as the crisis develops throughout the hostage ordeal. A thorough understanding of this biorhythm will provide planning guidelines to assess the best windows of opportunity for a proposed rescue attempt. One main focus of this work will be an in-depth case study of the hostage rescue operation "CHAVIN DE HUANTAR". This case study will present compelling evidence to reinforce my hypothesis, and serves as a template model for successful rescue operations. The analysis of this single case will provide a wealth of information on the success of this remarkable operation. Another main focus of this thesis will be strategic thinking of a hostage crisis using game theory analysis. The findings of this thesis will enable decision-makers to plan and organize hostage rescue forces to act at the appropriate time (window of opportunity), maximizing their chances of success. Additionally, it will provide a useful planning model that can be implemented effectively and accurately, presenting a clear picture of possible outcomes throughout a hostage crisis. Furthermore, this thesis will help the reader become a better strategist during the planning, preparation, and execution of a hostage rescue operation. It will provide a thorough understanding of how

In a world in which the use of violence continues to be viewed as an acceptable method to pursue political goals, the use of terrorism as a political method will also continue. And within that world, in the coming years, hostage rescues and other direct actions to combat terrorism are likely to be the most frequent type of missions conducted by state special operations forces, including those of Romania. This thesis explores the importance of integrating three types of decisions-informational, structural, and operational-for the successful outcome of special operations. The thesis analyzes four operations, conducted by American, Belgian, and Israeli forces, and the circumstances of their positive or negative outcomes. The historical cases show that, if any one of the three types of decisions was not integrated with the other two, the operation was doomed. The analysis also reveals that the integration of decision-making can best be realized by using interagency coordination mechanisms and a collocation of decision-makers, especially for situations in which command arrangements are highly complicated or unclear. In light of the findings in the four case studies, an analysis of the Romanian Special Operations Forces reveals that its overall structure does not favor either immediate-response or high-complexity missions. The thesis concludes with a number of recommendations for short- and long-term mitigation of current command and control problems faced by Romanian Special Operations Forces.

Brief for Chilean visitor.

The Balkan Experience, Bosnia conflict, military history, special operation forces political implications and lessons learned are presented., Pres. 12th Annual NDIA SO/LISC Symposium & Exhibition, 12-14 Feb 2001, Arlington VA. Viewgraphs only. This article is from ADA391108 12th Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium & Exhibition, 12-14 Feb 2001, Arlington VA. NDIA Event #1880

This paper analyzes U.S. special operations at the operational-level. The role of the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) is the focus. As envisioned by the authors of the Cohen-Nunn Amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1987, U.S. SOF were placed under one command, the U.S. Special Operations Command. Ten years later, the intent of the Cohen-Nunn Amendment (to ensure the readiness of this nation's special operations capability) has been achieved. Yet, the institutional separation between conventional forces and SOF creates a void in the knowledge of special operations at the operational-level. Despite the efforts and successes of the theater Special Operations Commands (SOC), this lack of knowledge risks misuse or under use of SOF in an environment where SOF possess a comparative advantage: coalition operations. Using recent coalition operations as illustrative case studies, the author details SOF's history, their comparative advantage in coalition operations, and the unique characteristics of the JSOTF. It is the author's intent to improve the level of understanding of future conventional force commanders and staff involved in the planning and execution of coalition operations.

This study explores the nature of Bulgarian national security and how it is supported by Bulgarian Special Operations Forces (BSOF). It examines the changing global security environment and its implications on Bulgarian security challenges in the 21st century. In particular, the global war on terror and the newly acquired NATO membership have posed new challenges for the Bulgarian Armed Forces, including BSOF. This thesis explores Bulgarian security strategy and NATO requirements for special operations, and analyzes how each of these may be satisfied, in part, by BSOF. The shortfalls between Bulgarian and NATO needs and BSOF's current capabilities suggest that BSOF should be unified under a single joint Special Operations Command directly subordinate to the highest commanding headquarters of the Bulgarian Armed Forces. Moreover, BSOF should be provided with an independent funding program with dedicated air and maritime assets for strategic support, and with advanced SOF-specific equipment. This study suggests the necessity for reorganization and improvement of BSOF in response to the requirements of national security and NATO Special Operations requirements. It posits that a restructuring and enhancement of BSOF is likely to strengthen Bulgarian national security, as well as contributing to an improvement in the global security environment., http://archive.org/details/bulgarinationals1094510075, Bulgarian Army Special Operations Forces author., Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.