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La « responsabilite sociale » des investisseurs est au cœur de nombreux debats actuels. Cet article interroge le passe et le futur de ce concept. Tout d’abord, il montre que l’« investissement socialement responsable » est historiquement une contradiction dans les termes : la figure de l’investisseur– un apporteur de capitaux qui ne s’implique pas dans la gestion d’une entreprise – n’a pu apparaitre que le jour ou la responsabilite des actionnaires a ete limitee. Comprendre la revolution qu’a ete la generalisation de la responsabilite limitee permet ensuite d’eclairer nombre de debats contemporains sur l’investissement « socialement responsable » et de mettre en evidence ses limites. Enfin, cet article plaide en faveur de formes alternatives, plus fortes, de responsabilite des investisseurs qui, si elles etaient introduites, bouleverseraient en profondeur l’intermediation financiere. Classification JEL : G10, G32

We offer a sketch of an Austrian theory of corporate finance by studying the structure of firms’ liabilities both on an unhampered market and through a monetary policy-induced business cycle. Building on recent contributions on the time-structure of savings, we show that booms are characterized by increased leverage and higher levels of maturity mismatches for firms. Such fragilities are to be corrected during busts. Key words: Business Cycles, Corporate Finance, Austrian Economics. JEL Classification: B53, E32, G30. Resumen: En este trabajo ofrecemos un esbozo de una teoría austriaca de las finanzas corporativas mediante el estudio de la estructura del pasivo de las empresas, tanto en un contexto de mercado libre puro, como de ciclo económico inducido por la política monetaria. Basándonos en recientes con-tribuciones sobre la estructura temporal de los ahorros, mostramos que los periodos de auge están caracterizados por un aumento del apalancamiento y mayores niveles de descalce de plazos de las empresas. Tales fragilidades deben corregirse durante las recesiones. Palabras clave: Ciclo Económico, Finanzas Corporativas, Economía Austriaca. Clasificación JEL: B53, E32, G30.

I study a contracting innovation that suddenly insulated traders of hedging contracts against counterparty risk: central clearing counterparties (CCPs) for derivatives. The first CCP was created in Le Havre (France) in 1882, in the coffee futures market. Using triple difference‐in‐differences estimation, I show that central clearing changed the geography of trade flows Europe‐wide, to the benefit of Le Havre. Inspecting the mechanism using trader‐level data, I find that the CCP solved both a “missing market” problem and adverse selection issues. Central clearing also facilitated entry of new traders in the market. The successful contracting innovation quickly spread to other exchanges.

We study risk management in financial institutions using data on hedging of interest rate and foreign exchange risk. We find strong evidence that institutions with higher net worth hedge more, controlling for risk exposures, across institutions and within institutions over time. For identification, we exploit net worth shocks resulting from loan losses due to declines in house prices. Institutions that sustain such shocks reduce hedging significantly relative to otherwise‐similar institutions. The reduction in hedging is differentially larger among institutions with high real estate exposure. The evidence is consistent with the theory that financial constraints impede both financing and hedging.

Empirically, bank equity value is decreasing in the interest rate. Yet (i) many banks do not hedge interest rate risk, and (ii) more than 50% of hedging banks use derivatives to increase exposure. I model a bank’s capital structure and show that these facts are consistent with optimal hedging under financial frictions. Novel predictions on the characteristics of banks taking long or short interest rate derivative positions are tested and supported by the data. Therefore, banks’ derivatives exposures are not necessarily evidence of excessive risk taking. More broadly, the results challenge the view that “hedging” and “speculative” positions can be identified from a positive comovement between derivatives payoffs and equity value. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.

Central clearing counterparties (CCPs) have a variety of economic rationales. The Great Recession of 2007–2009 led regulators to mandate CCPs for most interest-rate and credit derivatives, markets in which large amounts of risks are transferred across agents. This change led to a large increase in CCP studies, which along with classical studies are surveyed in this article. For example, multilateral netting, the insurance against counterparty risk, the effect of CCPs on asset prices and fire sales, margins setting, the default waterfall, and CCP governance are discussed here. We review both CCP theory and empirical work and conclude by discussing regulatory issues.

Using new transaction-level data for non-financial commercial paper (CP) in the U.S., we show that companies systematically reduce their outstanding short-term debt on quarterly and annual disclosure dates. Constraints on CP lending supply cannot explain this pattern. Instead, firms prefer repaying short-term debt over disclosing high cash holdings to signal that their cash is readily available and not trapped in foreign subsidiaries. Consistent with this interpretation, we show that firms with higher cash holdings, more sales in regions with tight capital controls, or with higher debt-equity ratios compared to industry peers reduce their short-term debt more aggressively at disclosure dates.

I show that the maritime shipping industry - handling above 80\% of global trade flows - has evolved over the past decades to systematically evade "corporate responsibilities,'' i.e., compliance with regulatory standards and potential tort liabilities. Shipping firms increasingly dissociated legal and ultimate ownership, fragmented assets in one-ship subsidiaries, used flags of convenience, and evaded end-of-life responsibilities with "last-voyage flags.'' Microeconomic tests confirm that responsibility evasion, amidst global competition, is a dominant motive behind these patterns. These findings have implications for our understanding of corporate social responsibility, of extended forms of liability, and of the "dark side'' of globalization.

We study the allocation of interest rate risk within the European banking sector using novel data. Banks’ exposure to interest rate risk is small on aggregate, but heterogeneous in the cross-section. Contrary to conventional wisdom, net worth is increasing in interest rates for approximately half of the institutions in our sample. Cross-sectional variation in banks’ exposures is driven by cross-country differences in loan-rate fixation conventions for mortgages. Banks use derivatives to partially hedge on-balance-sheet exposures. Residual exposures imply that changes in interest rates have redistributive effects within the banking sector.Received October 31, 2017; editorial decision August 30, 2018 by Editor Philip Strahan. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

We empirically explore the fragility of wholesale funding of banks, using transaction‐level data on short‐term, unsecured certificates of deposit in the European market. We do not observe a market‐wide freeze during the 2008 to 2014 period. Yet, many banks suddenly experience funding dry‐ups. Dry‐ups predict, but do not cause, future deterioration in bank performance. Furthermore, during periods of market stress, banks with high future performance tend to increase reliance on wholesale funding. We therefore fail to find evidence consistent with adverse selection models of funding market freezes. Our evidence is in line with theories highlighting heterogeneity between informed and uninformed lenders.

We study risk management in financial institutions using data on hedging of interest rate and foreign exchange risk. We find strong evidence that institutions with higher net worth hedge more, controlling for risk exposures, both across institutions and within institutions over time. For identification, we exploit net worth shocks resulting from loan losses due to drops in house prices. Institutions that sustain such shocks reduce hedging significantly relative to otherwise similar institutions. The reduction in hedging is differentially larger among institutions with high real estate exposure. The evidence is consistent with the theory that financial constraints impede both financing and hedging.

We empirically show that adverse selection is a key determinant of banking market structure. Using newly-constructed panel data on all US bank branches over the 1981-2016 period, we study banks' decisions to expand or contract geographically. First, we show that banks are more likely to expand in counties that are similar, in terms of industry shares, to those in which they already have branches. Second, we show that banks are more likely to contract in more similar areas. These results are consistent with the theory that banks value diversification, but that informational barriers to entry prevent them from achieving optimal scale. These findings have implications for the assessment of banking competition and for the rise of fintech.

I argue that one rationale for central clearing counterparties (CCPs) is to mitigate inefficiencies associated with distressed asset sales. First, I build a simple model where asset sales give rise to multiple equilibria, and show that a contract resembling a CCP ensures coordination on the Pareto-dominating equilibrium. Second, I empirically study the first event in economic history during which a CCP successfully eliminated inefficient asset sales: the global wool crisis of 1900.

We show that the volatility puzzle in labor economics (Shimer, 2005) stems from the inability of technology shocks to generate sufficient volatility of firm value. We introduce non-fundamental shocks to firm value, akin to bubbles, into an otherwise standard search-and-matching model. When calibrated to stock market data, stochastic bubbles significantly improve the ability of the matching model to quantitatively explain the volatility of the US labor market. An extension with multiple sectors improves the persistence of simulated labor market variables.

This article, using Austrian Business Cycle Theory, shows how entrepreneurs and business managers are vulnerable to central bank monetary policies targeting interest rates. These policies distort market signals used as inputs in widely used capital budgeting metrics. Their reliance on nominal cash flows—together with their dependence on market-based discount rates, themselves directly or indirectly influenced by central bank policy—induces entrepreneurs to misestimate the real future profitability and feasibility of investment projects. Based on distorted market signals, entrepreneurs and business managers ignite an unsustainable economic boom. The divergence between ex ante and ex post profitable investment projects is widened because of business miscalculation leading to a cluster of errors that eventually results in the bursting of an economic boom. Therefore, although the exogenous distortion of market signals is a necessary condition of a business cycle, its ignition is purely endogenous.

We present a stress test model for the CDS market, with a focus on the interplay between banks' bond and CDS holdings. The model enables us to analyse credit risk transfer mechanisms, features of market and liquidity risk, and features contagious propagation of counterparty failures. As an illustration, we calibrate the model using sovereign bond and CDS holdings data for 65 major European banks. The model simulation shows that, in case of a sovereign credit event, banks' losses due to direct and correlated bond exposures are significantly larger than losses due to CDS exposures. The main risk for CDS sellers is found to be sudden increases in collateral requirements on multiple correlated CDS exposures. Close-out netting considerably reduces the extent to which contagion may occur.

Cet article analyse les effets redistributifs lies aux paiements de CDS en cas de defaut souverain en Europe. Un grand nombre de scenarios de defauts sont simules en utilisant des donnees sur les portefeuilles d’obligations et de CDS des banques europeennes, ainsi que le cadre theorique developpe par Vuillemey et Peltonen [2013]. Nous estimons un modele probit afin d’examiner, selon quatre criteres, les determinants des effets redistributifs des paiements de CDS entre banques. Les CDS n’ont pas d’effets redistributifs consequents. Cependant, certaines caracteristiques des groupes bancaires et des entites souveraines sont significativement correlees avec les paiements de CDS observes. Des resultats supplementaires ont trait a la magnitude relative des pertes subies par les banques sur leurs portefeuilles obligataires et de CDS.

Do claims on the private sector serve the role of safe assets? We answer this question using high-frequency panel data on prices and quantities of certificates of deposit (CD) and commercial paper (CP) issued in Europe. We show that only very short-term private securities benefit from a premium for safety. Using several identification strategies, we show that the issuance of short-term CDs, but not of CPs, strongly responds to measures of safety demand. The private production of safe assets is stronger for issuers with high credit worthiness, and breaks down during episodes of market stress. We conclude that even very short-term private assets are sensitive to changes in the information environment and should not be treated as equally safe at all times.

This paper provides evidence for the procyclicality of banks' credit risk by investigating the historical resilience of several European banking sectors before and after the 2008 banking crisis. It provides a decomposition of banks' probabilities of default between a solvency and a liquidity component. The results show a gradual build-up of fragilities before 2008 in most countries. Increased probabilities of default are shown to be mainly driven by a surge in liquidity risk, even when shocks of relatively low magnitude are imposed on the system.

This article presents the epistemological and conceptual foundations on which current attempts to model crises and assess financial risks are based. It draws a distinction between two research programs, in Lakatos' sense: on the one hand, crises understood as structural events within a cycle; on the other hand, crises seen as statistical tail events. The methodological, theoretical and practical consequences of such a dichotomy are exposed. A crucial difference lies in the assumptions about change in the causal processes generating economic outcomes, especially asset returns. Furthermore, this article insists on providing conceptual definitions of key terms that have distinct meanings within the two research programs.

Dans cet article, nous livrons une analyse du statut epistemologique de l’hypothese d’efficience des marches. Sans juger de sa veracite ou de sa faussete, nous montrons qu’elle ne peut, en aucun sens rigoureux, etre entendue comme une proposition empirique testable. Aucune experience n’existe permettant de la falsifier irrevocablement. A rebours, nous montrons qu’elle ne peut etre entendue que comme une proposition analytique, comme inaugurant un nouveau systeme de definitions coherent par lui-meme. En cela, la formulation de l’hypothese d’efficience des marches a ouvert un nouveau programme de recherche, dont nous mettons en evidence les grandes lignes directrices.

Bubbles are recurrent events, which contribute to both macroeconomic and employment volatility. We introduce stochastic bubbles in the standard search-and-matching model of the labor market. The economy alternates between latent and bubbly states, each being associated with a distinct solution for the market value of firms (respectively, stable or explosive). Bubbles in firm value induce distortions in hiring decisions and wages, which we explicitly characterize. Faced with bubbles, the social planner optimally deviates from the standard Hosios efficiency condition. The optimal share of workers in total surplus must be above the elasticity of hiring rates, by a small but increasing amount as the bubble expands. Finally, our specification for bubbles significantly improves the quantitative ability of the model to match U.S. data, along both real and financial dimensions.

Using a one-dimensional model of multi-bloc two-part competition across the two rounds of the French presidential election, and drawing on polling results from several months in advance of the election, we examine the Socialist Party's chances of winning the French presidency in 2012. Although the polls show that the Socialist Party has a high probability of winning the presidency, using our model, we argue that their likely success can be strongly affected by which candidate wins the 9 and 16 October two-stage Socialist Party primaries. We also show that our one-dimensional model allows us to estimate how the removal of Dominique Strauss-Kahn from the set of candidates shifted votes among the other candidates in the primary based on which of them was seen as ideologically closer to him. We also provide insights into the strategic calculations of President Sarkozy in his 2007 campaign and in anticipation of the 2012 election.

Dans sa première partie, cette thèse étudie l’utilisation optimale des produits dérivés par les intermédiaires financiers dans leur gestion du risque, en prêtant spécifiquement attention au marché des dérivés de taux d’intérêt. En modélisant la structure de capital optimale d’une banque, le premier chapitre montre comment l’usage optimal des dérivés affecte certaines décisions souvent étudiées en finance d’entreprise : l’offre de crédit, la transformation de maturité, la politique de dividendes ou les probabilités de défaut. La seconde partie de la thèse étudie au contraire le marché des dérivés comme un système à part entière. Le second chapitre utilise une base de données nouvelle et unique d’expositions bilatérales sur des contrats CDS afin d’offrir une description détaillée de la structure du réseau des expositions. Le troisième chapitre a pour objet la régulation des marchés de produits dérivés. Il étudie la compensation centrale des produits dérivés standardisés, et la demande de collatéral induite par cette réforme à l’échelle mondiale, sous une variété d’hypothèses concernant la microstructure du marché.

This paper studies the scope for cross-border contagion in the European banking sector using true bilateral exposure data. Using a model of sequential solvency and liquidity cascades in networks, we analyze geographical patterns of loss propagation from 2008 to 2012. We study the distribution of contagion outcomes after a common shock and an exogenous bank default over simulated networks of actual long- and short-term claims. We exploit a novel and unique dataset of money market transactions estimated from TARGET2 payments data. Our results show the critical impact of the underlying network structure on the propagation of losses. An econometric analysis of the determinants of contagion shows that the position of a bank in the network and its exposure to the riskiest counterparties are significantly correlated with default outcomes, behind its own financial ratios.

We empirically explore the fragility of wholesale funding of banks, using transaction level data on short-term, unsecured certificates of deposits in the European market. We do not observe any market-wide freeze during the 2008-2014 period. Yet, many banks suddenly experience funding dry-ups. Dry-ups predict, but do not cause, future deterioration of bank performance. Furthermore, in periods of market stress, banks with high future performance tend to increase reliance on wholesale funding. Thus, we fail to find evidence consistent with adverse selection models of funding market freezes. Our results are in line with theories highlighting heterogeneity between informed and uninformed lenders.

We study risk management in financial institutions using data on hedging of interest rate risk by banks and bank holding companies. We find strong evidence that better capitalized institutions hedge more both in the cross-section and within institutions over time. For identification, we exploit net worth shocks resulting from loan losses due to drops in house prices. Institutions that sustain such losses reduce hedging substantially relative to otherwise similar institutions. The evidence is consistent with the theory that financial constraints impede both financing and hedging. We find no evidence that risk shifting, adjustments of interest rate risk exposures, or regulatory capital explain hedging behavior.

This paper surveys the theoretical and empirical literature on interest rate risk in banking. Theoretically, it considers the origins of interest rate risk and its allocation. Interest rate risk is non-diversifiable and does not originate from the banking sector, but from the potential time inconsistency between future aggregate demand and supply of consumption goods. Empirically, we discuss measurement and stylized facts. Banks bear part of total interest rate risk, but also engage in risk management and risk-sharing with non-financial agents. They transfer large amounts of risk to households and firms, by writing interest rate-contingent loan and deposit contracts. We consider the determinants of the aggregate exposure to interest rate risk and the pricing of marginal units of risk. Finally, interest rate policy, both conventional and non-conventional, is discussed.

We introduce interest rate derivatives in a model of bank capital structure. Distinct motives to engage in risk management imply that both increases and decreases in the short rate can be hedged. Moreover, derivatives are a partial substitute to financial flexibility for risk management. Substitutability implies that derivatives users are more leveraged and have a more procyclical lending policy. These predictions are consistent with the data and have novel testable content.

We use an extensive data set of bilateral exposures on credit default swap (CDS) to estimate the impact on collateral demand of new margin and clearing practices and regulations. We decompose collateral demand for both customers and dealers into several key components, including the "velocity drag" associated with variation margin movements. We demonstrate the impact on collateral demand of more widespread initial margin requirements, increased novation of CDS to central clearing parties (CCPs), an increase in the number of clearing members, the proliferation of CCPs of both specialized and non-specialized types, and client clearing. Among other results, we show that system-wide collateral demand is increased significantly by the application of initial margin requirements for dealers, whether or not the CDS are cleared. Given these dealer-to-dealer initial margin requirements, however, mandatory central clearing is shown to lower, not raise, system-wide collateral demand, provided there is no significant proliferation of CCPs. Central clearing does, however, have significant distributional consequences for collateral requirements across various types of market participants.

We use an extensive data set of bilateral exposures on credit default swap (CDS) to estimate the impact on collateral demand of new margin and clearing practices and regulations. We decompose collateral demand for both customers and dealers into several key components, including the “velocity drag” associated with variation margin movements. We demonstrate the impact on collateral demand of more widespread initial margin requirements, increased novation of CDS to central clearing parties (CCPs), an increase in the number of clearing members, the proliferation of CCPs of both specialized and non-specialized types, and client clearing. Among other results, we show that system-wide collateral demand is increased significantly by the application of initial margin requirements for dealers, whether or not the CDS are cleared. Given these dealer-to-dealer initial margin requirements, however, mandatory central clearing is shown to lower, not raise, system-wide collateral demand, provided there is no significant proliferation of CCPs. Central clearing does, however, have significant distributional consequences for collateral requirements across various types of market participants.

This paper analyses the network structure of the credit default swap (CDS) market, using a unique sample of counterparties’ bilateral notional exposures to CDS on 642 sovereign and financial reference entities. We study the network structure, similarly to the literature on interbank and payment systems, by computing a variety of network metrics at the aggregated level and for several subnetworks. At a reference entity level, we analyse the determinants of some key network properties for large reference entities. Our main results, obtained on a sub-sample of 191 reference entities, are the following. First, the CDS network shows topological similarities with the interbank network, as we document a “small world” structure and a scale-free degree distribution for the CDS market. Second, there is considerable heterogeneity in the network structures across reference entities. In particular, the outstanding debt volume and its structure (maturity, collateralization), the riskiness, the type (sovereign/financial) and the location (European/non-European) of reference entities significantly influence the size, the activity and the concentration of the CDS exposure network. For instance, the network on a high-volatility reference entity is typically more active, larger in size and less concentrated. JEL Classification: G15

This article provides evidence for the procyclicality of banks’ credit risk by investigating the historical resilience of several European banking sectors before and after the 2008 banking crisis. It provides a decomposition of banks’ probabilities of default between a solvency and a liquidity component. The results show a gradual build-up of fragilities before 2008 in most countries. Increased probabilities of default are shown to be mainly driven by a surge in liquidity risk, even when shocks of relatively low magnitude are imposed on the system.