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From an early emphasis on geographic exploration and exploitation of the resources in the polar offshore area (by hunting for walrus ivory teeth, seals, and whales), the focus is currently shifting toward the sustainable use of the Arctic’s resources. Developments in the Antarctic are mainly limited to fisheries, cruise traffic, and scientific expeditions. The focus in the Arctic is currently on using the Arctic offshore for fisheries, transport of oil and gas products, cargo traffic, and leisure (cruise traffic) in a safe and environmentally sustainable way. During this process, maritime operations have become relatively safe due to the introduction of international codes for the design and strengthening of polar vessels (ice class), the rules of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and in particular the requirements for training of polar crew members. The continuous work to align the classification societies’ rules for ships in polar regions is a step toward improved safety for sailing in these regions. Safety for crew members and passengers has also improved through the use of modern communications systems (particularly satellite navigation) and the availability of ships and helicopters to support search and rescue (SAR) operations.

Source at https://iopscience.iop.org/journal/1757-899X. In a risk analysis we identify the causes that could lead to unwanted events/ outcomes. We introduce barriers that will reduce the probabilities of such events and also barriers that will mitigate the consequences of such events. Regarding Arctic Marine Transportation Challenges, more attention should be placed on communicating all work that is undertaken to enhance the safety and limit the environmental footprint of sailing along the Northern Sea Route. Training of personnel is, furthermore, undertaken in accordance with the requirements set to obtain Polar Code Certificates, and evacuation, escape and rescue exercises are regularly undertaken by vessel owners having vessels entering the area. Support is available for rescue operations and legal regulations is administrated by the Northern Sea Route Administration. Improved information on ice and ice-flow conditions are made available by an increased number of satellite observations. A steady improvement of all safety related features is ongoing. It is necessary to identify why the problems and the challenges are highlighted by the commercial actors, while the opportunities and savings are not that clearly presented. This paper will discuss a series of challenges for Arctic Marine Transportation and how these are being mitigated. Recommendations will be given regarding prioritizing of additional mitigation measures. Of key concern is the climate impact where the Northern Sea Route could be presented as a Green intercontinental transportation route in case use of heavy fuel oil is not permitted and by highlighting the support of icebreakers to ensure that schedules for all traffic can be kept and that safety during the transit is of key importance. The total climate imprint of using the Northern Sea Route should be compared to the imprint of sailing alternative routes and be communicated as a key opportunity for sustainable intercontinental sea transportation.

Marine traffic is increasing in the Arctic Region. As ice in the Arctic Region retracts, opportunities for the marine industry increase. This relates to the fishing industry, which is moving further into the Arctic Seas, the shipping industry, which is using the Northern Sea Route, particularly for transporting liquefied natural gas, and the cruise industry, which is transporting passengers to the last frontier on the globe. The question has been raised: Are the marine industry’s activities in the Arctic Region safe for people, the environment and assets? The International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) Polar Code, which came into force in 2017 sets requirements for ships and procedures, as well as for the competence of those involved. In particular, there have been uncertainties regarding how people on board a ship in distress can be saved should it be necessary to abandon ship. The question is of considerable concern in Norway, which is a main stakeholder in the Arctic Region, with the involvement/passage of many fishing, cargo and cruise vessels. Over several years, considerable research has therefore been carried out to review the status of safe operations in the Arctic Region and to identify methods to improve the safety of all involved in the Arctic maritime traffic. This paper presents a summary of recent Norwegian research relevant to safe evacuation, search and rescue under Arctic conditions. The summary includes the outcome of the Norwegian research programme, Sarinor, the SARex exercises carried out by the University of Stavanger, the Norwegian Coast Guard and the industrial company GMC (Stavanger) in 2016, 2017 and 2018, as well as follow-up research carried out later. Its implementation in the IMO is also discussed. Finally, thoughts on continuing the work to further improve safety are presented.

The physical conditions of the Barents Sea, a note to fshing vessels. The conditions for fshing in the Barents Sea are excellent. An abundance of fsh and well-regulated agreements between Norway and the European Union Countries. For fshing vessels, there are, however, aspects to be aware of in relation to the physical environment: • The extreme wave conditions in the area are characterized by large waves, Norsok Standard N003. The fetch giving rise to the largest waves is from the south western direction and it is noted that the waves are longer than in the North Sea. This may infuence on the response of vessels to the wave conditions. • In case of Polar Low pressures, the forecasts are very uncertain and in general vessels should not be in the area of a passing Polar Low Pressure. Meteorologist will issue warnings to fsheries to be prepared to leave the locations of potential tracks of Polar Lows. Very large waves may occur within an hour in case of the most extreme conditions (Orimolade et al., 2016). • In case of high winds, large waves and low temperatures, sea spray icing may grow very fast and vessels must initiate ice removal procedures to avoid loss of stability (Johansen et al., 2020). A warning occurs prior to dangerous situations as the roll period of the vessel increases when approaching unsafe stability conditions, low GM values. Note that in case of Polar Low pressures, there may be heavy snow following the Polar Low. The snow may easily freeze to ice, hampering the stability of the vessel. The Norwegian Meteorological Institute issues icing warnings to seafarers. • In case of sea spray icing, the ice will accumulate on the fore part of the vessel and on the bridge, less on the back of the vessel. It should be possible to trim the vessel to ensure an even keel voyage. • Due to the northern latitude, GPS signals may disappear and backup navigation tools shall be available. • In case of distress, the Norwegian Rescue Center; The Joint Rescue Coordination Center (JRCC) in Bodø, Norway, is in charge of search and rescue. The Norwegian Coast guard is normally on duty in the Barents Sea and will assist all vessels in the area.

For design of marine facilities, a design basis is needed. This design basis will include selection of safety level and codes to be used during the design process. The design basis will include all aspects necessary to design safe facilities, including methods for load calculations. In this paper the design basis for offshore structures and marine vessels is discussed. Particular emphasis is put on robust facilities which will not collapse under loads slightly higher than the design load. Furthermore, the new types of fuel introduced in the marine industry for vessels give rise to concern as these fuels are highly flammable with high explosion pressure. Mitigating measures to reduce the consequences of large loads represent important considerations.

HVL sin Skriftserie, HVL-Rapport This report is prepared to identify safe procedures for transfer of personnel from vessels to floating offshore wind turbines. The use of a gangway system mounted on the deck of a vessel is known to represent state of art for access to fixed offshore wind turbines. For floating offshore wind turbines, the transfer is involving two floating moving objects and the relative motion between these will limit the availability to use the system. Safe procedures at the vessel are critical and the vessel master will be in charge of the transfer. This report should, however, point to measures to be carried out to ensure safe transfer and be a support to all involved in the transfer of personnel. The operator of the wind turbine will have to select vessel and equipment in accordance with an evaluation of the required availability to access the wind turbine. The capabilities of vessels are quite different and the vessel should be selected to have minimum of motions in normal wave situations. The motion of vessel and wind turbine foundation in long swells could also be a limiting factor for safe access. It may also be necessary to evacuate personnel from offshore floating wind turbines, possibly caused by increasing weather situations where the limiting conditions are approaching. Other causes for evacuation or other emergency situations should also be identified.

The Arctic has great significance in relation to the exploration and exploitation of its huge petroleum resources. Seismic surveys are the key part of petroleum exploration. Reflected sound waves are used to produce a 3D subsurface geological model, which helps to take a decision on drilling location for potential hydrocarbon resources. Seismic surveys are very complex operations, and growing energy demand pushes exploration activities into highly challenging environments, for example areas covered with surface ice, which necessitate exceptionally sophisticated approaches. We have carried out state-of-the-art studies on the use of unmanned aerial systems and autonomous underwater vehicles during seismic data acquisition procedures in such environments. Our conclusion is that both of these techniques are highly relevant for all stages of seismic operations offshore. We have also studied the possible effects on marine life from the sound waves, which are introduced during these surveys. We have found that great caution must be exercised in whale’s habitat; and recommend further studies on the direct effects.

Petroleum operations in remote locations offshore off northern Norway call for technical and operational solutions, sustainable and capable of withstanding extreme and harsh weather conditions. This paper discusses hazards, risks and winterization measures when working in cold climate and presents a wind chill study performed on a semi-submersible drilling rig, when operating southwest in the Barents Sea. The objective of that study was to evaluate the winterization measure of partly enclosing the drill floor, with regards to the risk of hypothermia and operational restrictions. Five independent measurements of wind chill temperatures were performed, during a period from May to February. Information were also gathered in conversations with personnel working on the floor. It was found from the temperature measurements that the working area became less exposed for wind turbulence and the effect of wind chill after the enclosure. Feedback from personnel working in the area confirmed the findings. The passive winterization measure of partly enclosing the drill floor showed to be an effective safeguard for personnel against heat loss and the risk of hypothermia. In addition, operational restrictions with respect to working hours at lower temperatures could be reduced.

The SARex3 exercise was conducted in May, 2018 in Fjortendejuli Bukta, North of Ny-Ålesund. Significant players within the industry was present, including flag state, vessel operators, vessel owners, equipment suppliers, emergency response providers and academia. It is important to acknowledge that the findings from SARex are to be representative of a best-case scenario associated with an incident in the polar waters. This implies that the participants were on average fitter than the average seamen or passenger, and the metocean conditions were not to be extreme. The first part of the exercise assessed the mechanisms associated with survival during an evacuation to shore. Compared with the findings from the SARex1 and SARex2 it was evident that there was a significant improvement of the survival rate when evacuating onto the shore, compared with a prolonged stay in a survival crafts. The participants were supplied with a water ration of 1 liter per person per day, which proved insufficient in a 5-day survival perspective. The project was also to assess the functionality provided by the different PSK (personal survival kits) and GSK (group survival kits) provided. This proved to be an impossible task due to great variations with regards to activity levels conducted by the individual participants to compensate for a heat loss caused by lack of insulating abilities in the equipment. It is of importance that IMO defines a level of heat loss that is regarded as acceptable for the human body to maintain for the expected time to rescue, a minimum of 5 days. Based on a predefined heat loss figure, equipment and combinations of equipment can be assessed in a transparent way. Utilizing this methodology also opens up for approval of alternative solutions. During SARex3 phase 2 of SARex3 about 50 casualties were to be evacuated from a remote beach onto the vessel Polarsyssel (owned by the Governor of Svalbard). The operation was led by representatives from the Governor of Svalbard and was executed by Røde Kors (Red Cross), Longyearbyen. The additional challenges represented by a large number of casualties should be addressed in the Operational Assessment (as defined in the IMO Polar Code) for vessel of relevance. The additional challenges should further be mitigated to maintain a reasonable risk profile, as time is a critical element in a survival situation in cold climate. Triage, transportation and treatment of a large number of casualties takes time, and requires a significant effort by the emergency response providers in addition to imposes additional strain on equipment, communication systems and the human element. During SARex3 phase 3 Maritime Broadband Radios were tested. A remote relay station was erected at Enjabalstranda. The signals were beamed from the exercise area, via the relay station, to Ny Ålesund, and further transmitted to Longyearbyen and Oslo. The system proved reliable and live video feeds that were watched in Oslo in real time and live news updates were sent on the national tv-channel TV2. Representatives from Sysselmannen tested a software for increasing common operational picture between the different emergency response providers. The MBR system proved reliable, but significant technical expertise was needed to initiate the system. As most “line of sight” systems it is necessary with base stations, connecting the data feed onto commonly utilized communication carriers like the internet. It is important to acknowledge the reduction in bandwidth (50%) for each relay station needed. This reduces the effective bandwidth provided by the system.